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Expanding NATO: What Challenges and Opportunities Wait Ahead?

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Foreword

In an ever-changing world marked by geopolitical shifts and evolving security threats, it is crucial to reassess and adapt the collective defense architecture that underpins international stability. Established more than 70 years ago, NATO has been a crucial element of global security and a demonstration of the effectiveness of collective defense. The expansion of NATO's reach has become a significant topic of debate as the world evolves.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has effectively ensured the security of its member states through a collective defense framework, making it a successful alliance. The evolving global landscape, which includes emerging threats, changing power dynamics, and evolving security challenges, has led to a reassessment of NATO's role and scope. There are those who advocate for the acceptance of NATO's expansion as a means of strengthening security and fostering collaboration among nations with similar values. The argument posits that enlarging NATO's membership can function as a deterrent against acts of aggression, strengthen democratic principles, and promote a more stable global system.

This special issue, which we had the great pleasure of working together with NATO's Public Diplomacy Divison, seeks to delve into the multifaceted dimensions of expanding NATO, exploring the challenges and opportunities that lie on the horizon. As we examine this critical issue, it is important to emphasize that the views expressed in these pages are diverse and reflect the complex and varied perspectives on NATO's expansion. Our authors, specialists from a wide-range of different fields, contributed their valuable opinions regarding this important discussion which has become further important since Russia's aggression against Ukraine has escalated with simultaneously intensifying debates concerning the start of a new Cold-War in our time.

Romania's former Prime Minister, Petre Roman, emphasizes the significance of NATO's eastward expansion as a crucial geopolitical process. He highlights how this expansion allowed countries to prepare for potential Russian aggression while pursuing the path of successful democracy. Romania, having emerged from the oppressive communist regime of Ceausescu, eagerly sought NATO membership, and officially joined in 2004. Geographically positioned at the heart of NATO's objectives, Romania plays a central role in the defensive complex within the "post-Soviet space." With Poland guarding the Baltic Sea, Romania stands as a pivotal defender of the Black Sea region, where historical Russian imperial ambitions persist. Moreover, Romania's commitment to NATO is demonstrated through its active participation

in Western missions and its role in safeguarding vital corridors, such as the precious grain corridor. This article sheds light on Romania's strong pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment, positioning the country as a model ally within the alliance.

Professor Richard Higgot and Professor Simon Reich critically examine the prevailing narratives surrounding the structure of the world order, ranging from bi-polarity and multi-polarity to predictions of the end of globalization or a "Cold War v. 2.0." They caution against the tendency of pundits to assert rather than reason these explanations, often seeking fleeting moments of fame. Instead, their paper takes a more modest approach, eschewing grand statements about world order and emphasizing the inherent uncertainty of the future. Their paper offers valuable insights into the nuanced dynamics of a fuzzy bifurcation, emphasizing that the behavior of different actors is influenced by a more fluid and less predictable global landscape. By exploring the implications for NATO, Higgot and Reich contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities that arise in an increasingly complex international environment.

Professor Roger E. Kanet undertakes a comprehensive examination of Vladimir Putin's commitment to rebuilding "Greater Russia" and its implications, particularly in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. Putin's vision revolves around re-establishing the former Soviet Union and extending Russian dominance beyond its borders, driven by a belief in the historical and cultural ties between Russians and Ukrainians. Professor Kanet argues that despite other influencing factors, the re-establishment of Moscow's influence and control over as much post-Soviet territory as possible, essentially recreating "Greater Russia," is of utmost importance. While NATO expansion may have been a contributing issue, the author contends that the dominance of Ukraine is a primary objective. Moreover, the successful domination of Ukraine could pave the way for future expansion into other former Soviet areas, such as the Baltics.

Professor Ryszard Zieba adopts an offensive realist perspective to examine the implications of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. The article highlights that these implications unfold on multiple levels, encompassing various aspects of the international landscape. Through this lens, Professor Ryszard Zieba's article offers a comprehensive analysis of the implications of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. By examining these implications on multiple levels, the article sheds light on the intricate dynamics and challenges that arise in the evolving international landscape. The insights presented contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex interactions between NATO, Russia, and other global actors, urging careful consideration of the consequences of NATO's expansion and its ongoing policy choices.

We encourage you to learn more about "Expanding NATO: What Challenges and Opportunities Wait Ahead?". On behalf of Transatlantic Policy Quarterly, I would like to express my gratitude to all the contributors who committed a significant amount of effort and work. The TPQ team has had a great time putting together this special issue. An important acknowledgment goes to our partner for this special issue, NATO's Public Diplomacy Division. Moreover, we are grateful for our Premium Cooparete Sponsor for this issue, Tüpraş. In addition, we would like to thank our online sponsor, and the sponsor of this issue, Monaco Economic Board. We also like to thank our other sponsors Gordon-Blair, Halifax, Kalekim, TEB, The Ritz-Carlton, and Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi for their ongoing support.

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WHY ROMANIA IS A NATO "MODEL ALLY"?

NATO's eastward expansion was a fundamental geopolitical process that allowed countries to be prepared for the worst, the Russian revanche, by pursuing the best, the most successful path for democracy. Romania, which emerged from the tremendous communist Ceausescu regime, strongly wanted NATO membership and, after the first encouraging meetings in 1990, officially entered in 2004. However, Romania has been already back then contributed to many Western missions. Due to its geographical position, Romania is central to all NATO objectives. Now, Romania and Poland are the pivots of NATO's defensive complex in the "post-soviet space": Poland protects the Baltic Sea, Romania the Black Sea, where the Russian old-imperial appetites remain; Romania still defends the precious grain corridor. Furthermore, Romania is a "model ally". There is a solid pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment in the country.

Petre Roman*

Keywords: Black Sea, Collective Security, Model Ally, NATO, Romania.

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Spring 2023

* Mr. Petre Roman is the Former Prime Minister of Romania.

The fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a new and positive phase for all the countries of the so-called "New Europe," which had been subjected to the heavy yoke of the Warsaw Pact and which wanted to return to the Western camp to which they felt they wanted to belong. The promise of freedom, rights, and security justified the collective efforts. At the time, Romania, a country that has always been linked to Western culture, was in precarious conditions: it was the only country where a Stalinist regime had remained standing while the other nations had launched timid reforms; the economic and productive Romanian system was in shambles. Romania had to free itself through a bloody revolution. So, constructing a democratic system was even more complicated: in any case, those who led that process knew what they were leaving behind.

The months and years that followed were very turbulent. After the communist regime's collapse, the country also had to manage the internal ethnic conflict, as in the case of Transylvania, where the Hungarian minority claimed the rights that the communist regime had always denied them. Only the army's intervention managed to keep the factions separate, avoiding the worst. In parallel with the opening of the economy, Romania approached the Atlantic Alliance. NATO membership was not a move against Russia, it was a way of belonging to the Western world. Although it took a long time, about 14 years after the end of the regime, Romania achieved the two objectives that all post-Ceausescu governments had set themselves: achieving a membership from both NATO and the European Union.

Unfortunately, the revanchist specter has re-emerged in Russia and found vent in Putin's authoritarian leadership. For this reason, the accession of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact to NATO remains a guarantee of security and stability for the whole world. All these countries have had to "cross the desert": to reform and restructure the economy, they have paid a high price, but none has turned back or intends to relive the climate of the Iron Curtain. In short, there has been tangible progress in history for many people, who are now free, but history is neither linear nor always has the same time for everyone, so Russia has been going backward.

The Relevance of Romania: a Bulwark in the East and in the Black Sea

Romania is an essential component of NATO's defensive system: it ensures a presence in the critical scenario of the Black Sea, and guarantees projection in many strategic areas, like the Balkans or the Middle East; so, together with Poland2, became a primary defensive bulwark. NATO has identified Romania and Poland, nations similar in terms of territory and population, as the two main defensive bastions on the East flank: the air defence shield has been deployed in Poland, the

anti-missile shield in Romania, which guarantees a broad range of coverage against external threats; in addition, both countries have airbases that can accommodate F35s.

> *"The importance of Romania for NATO – also for the rest of the world – in the Black Sea scenario has plastically emerged with the corridor for grain (the deal will expire in May) protected by the port of Constance where the Samp/T systems are located and where are NATO warships."*

The importance of Romania for NATO – also for the rest of the world – in the Black Sea3 scenario has plastically emerged with the corridor for grain (the deal will expire in May) protected by the port of Constance where the Samp/T systems are located and where are NATO warships. Romania has already helped Ukraine in the export of grain with the system of ports of the lower Danube4 bypassing the Russian blockade in front of Odesa. As the great historic Fernand Braudel5 wrote, the Mediterranean is a "sea made of seas" and a "sea between seas": so, the security of the Atlantic depends also on the Black Sea – the Kara Deniz for the Ottomans – protection. Meanwhile, the Romanian navy, together with the Turkish and Bulgarian ones, keeps the sea safe with regular demining operations.

Not only that, but Romania is also a very reliable ally. In Romania, there is a strong pro-American and Atlanticist sentiment also due to the country's cultural roots that link it to Roman civilization and the French Republic. There is no sympathy for Russia, there are no political forces openly close to Russia, and nobody would ever want to go back. Indeed, Romania was also the least Russophile country during the USSR.

NATO After Ukraine

No room for a Manichaean view of war here; there is a victim that NATO is right to protect, and there is an aggressor that has made poor military and economic calculations. There is no justification for the aggression. The fact that millions of Russians now live in countries other than Russia because of the collapse of the Soviet Union is not an excuse. After all, there is also a Russian minority in Estonia, which remained there after the end of the USSR, but has preferred the path of freedom.

"China is in a quandary with Russia, but China also has a great potential. China can continue to play a global peace-making role, as demonstrated by brokering the deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia."

By coming to Ukraine's aid, NATO has disproved skeptics and showed that it is, in fact, alive and growing. After being halted by the brave Ukrainian resistance and falling deeper into trouble, Russia now faces a more unified and powerful great wall than ever before, stretching from Finland to Türkiye. After failing to interfere in 2014, NATO finally did so in 2022, at which point it also strengthened itself.

While NATO has made great strides in recent years, it is still primarily a defensive alliance led by the United States. Given the potential for divergent interests between the United States and Europe and the complexity of potential threats, a military-only approach may not be adequate. Europe must become aware of the fact that it cannot continue to depend on the United States for its defence and must launch a programme for European security.

The time has come for NATO to choose a new secretary general, and while the odds favor a candidate from the "New Europe" rather than the Scandinavian countries, the weight of Boris Johnson's nomination as the man who wrote "the dream of Rome" hangs over the entire process.

China: A Global Competitor But Also An Actor With Whom to Dialogue

One point that NATO must analyse is its relationship with China. Romania has had political and cultural ties with China since the Cultural Revolution of 1968; the rapprochement with China allowed Romania to move away from Russia by attempting an autonomous route. Unlike Russia, China is much more solid and more organized. China has accomplished something incredible in a short time: an economic and social miracle that lifted millions of people out of poverty in a very short time. It is a more unique than rare case in the history of the world. China is more of an economic and technological competitor than an adversary. China is in a quandary with Russia, but China also has great potential. China can continue to play a global peace-making role, as demonstrated by brokering the deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

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

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TOWARDS A FUZZY WORLD ORDER: WHAT ROLE FOR NATO?

Bi-polarity, multi-polarity, the end of globalization, or Cold War v. 2.0. New explanations of world order abound. Often, they are asserted rather than reasoned by pundits looking for their 15 minutes of fame. This paper is much more modest. It eschews grand statements about world order. Rather we demonstrate that the future is far less clear cut and predetermined. Yes, a global binary is emerging around U.S.-China competition, but it is what we describe as fuzzy bifurcation. If our analysis is accurate, then it affects the behavior of other actors differently than a tight bi-polar system. In this paper we look at the implications of a fuzzy bifurcation of world order for that most important of alliances – NATO.

Richard Higgot* & Simon Reich**

Keywords:Fuzzy Bifurcation, International System, NATO, State Behavior, World Order.

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Spring 2023

* Prof. Richard Higgot is the Emeritus Professor at University of Warwick and the Distinguished Professor in the Vesalius College, VUB.

** Prof. Simon Reich is a Professor at Rutgers University Newark and Chercheur Associé at Le Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po (Paris).

Thinking about world order in international relations occurs at both the conceptual and the empirical level. At the conceptual level, la question du jour is what shape the world order will take if we assume that we are in a post-Liberal International Order. At an empirical level, the key concern is the role of the principal players in the organization of that world order. We usually focus on states—the USA, China, Russia and Europe and the other key international regional players. Less attention is paid to alliances as actors beyond their immediate strategic environment. They are usually analyzed as actors specifically in the security domain—NATO in Europe, U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific, and now AUKUS and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific. This is an increasing lacuna in conventional analysis. It is time to think of alliances in the broader context of the changing global order and their role as stabilizers or destabilizers of that order. Our purpose in this short paper is to examine the contemporary role of NATO (especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine) as an actor in the ongoing discussion of what we call a fuzzy, bifurcated world order.

"We are ready to stand guard over the world order (Xi Jinping to Vladimir Putin, Moscow - 21 March 2023)"

Some assert that we are shifting into a bipolar or multipolar era, both interpretations according to the Cold War narrative that a rejuvenated NATO plays a familiar foundational role as a buttress for the 'West against the rest'.[1] According to these analyses, the Covid pandemic and the Ukraine war have prompted a "turning point"[2] and globalization is widely touted as ending.[3] At the very least, hyperglobalization is ending and even Davos has swapped its usual one-world thesis for the theme of "History at a Turning Point."[4] It is a symptom of a world "splitting in two," China

1) Angela Stent, "The West vs. the Rest," Foreign Policy, 2 May 2022.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/02/ukraine-russia-war-un-vote-condemn-global-response/

2) Christoph Heusgen, "The War in Ukraine Will Be a Historic Turning Point," Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2022.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2022-05-12/war-ukraine-will-be-historic-turning-point

3) Adam S. Posen, "The End of Globalization?" Foreign Policy, 17 March 2022.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-03-17/end-globalization

4) Mark Leonard, "The Decline and Fall of Davos Man," Project Syndicate, 30 May 2022.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fall-of-davos-man-geopolitics-replacing-globalization-by-mark-leonard-2022-05

and Russia forming the basis for a bloc in opposition to the West.[5] As a result, historian Niall Ferguson[6] has proclaimed Cold War 2.0 and, as M.E. Sarotte has written, the 'Cold War Conundrum is Back.'[7] For some, containment is the only option.[8] The future is the past.[9] Historians will refer to the post-Cold War world as but an 'era' of American unipolarity that has now ended.[10]

There are worse things than an American-run world, suggests Robert Kagan.[11] Having complained about American cajoling (Bush and Obama) and then bullying (Trump), Europeans now reluctantly concur, at least in the security domain. Their illusion of Europe as a war-free haven has been punctured. And lest Americans indulge in schadenfreude, it isn't just Europeans facing an existential crisis. With the ongoing 6 January investigations in the U.S., the last vestiges of a belief in the moral superiority of trans-Atlanticism have evaporated, and the rest of the world knows it.[12] Strong leaders, who bend the rules, are back in vogue[13] in the Global South, and even in parts of Europe, stretching from Sweden in the north to Italy in the south, where right wing parties flourish electorally.

The parallels between the past and present are problematic. The Cold War era was relatively stable. This new era is proving distinctly disorderly.[14] With some notable exceptions, formal allies, albeit often reluctantly, were fairly consistent in their support for the U.S. or Soviet position across the realms of diplomacy, economy and security. Now they are not, even among formal American allies such as NATO members Hungary and Türkiye, and security partners like India and Saudi Arabia. Beyond the clamor that everything has irreparably altered, we must therefore ask what is changing and what is remaining the same?

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5) Michael Schuman, "The World is Splitting in Two," The Atlantic, 28 March 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/ukraine-war-china-covid-lockdowns/629401/

6) Niall Ferguson: "Now We are in Cold War II," Belfer Center, 28 April 2020. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/niall-ferguson-now-we-are-cold-war-ii

7) M. E. Sarotte, "The Classic Cold War Conundrum is Back," Foreign Policy, 1 July 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/iron-curtain-russia-ukraine-cold-war/

8) Ivo H. Daalder, "The Return of Containment: How the West Can Prevail Against the Kremlin," Foreign Affairs, 1 March 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-01/return-containment

9) Tanisha M. Fazal, "The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine," Foreign Affairs, 6 April 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/ukraine-russia-war-return-conquest

10) Francis P. Sempa, "Our Elites Need to Recognize that America's 'Unipolar Moment' is Over," Real Clear Defense, 24 March 2022. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/24/our_elites_need_to_recognize_that_americas_unipolar_moment_is_over_823466.html

11) Robert Kagan, "The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?" Foreign Affairs, 6 April 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/russia-ukraine-war-price-hegemony

12) Angela Stent, 2 May 2022.

13) "Arabs Believe Economy is Weak under Democracy," BBC News, 6 July 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62001426

14) Daniel Treisman, "Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad," Foreign Affairs, 6 April 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/putin-russia-ukraine-war-unbound

The popular view is that it's a lot of the former and little of the latter. Beyond that, the dominant view in Washington is that the global system will devolve into twentieth century-style bipolarity dominated by the U.S. and a rising China, with Europe and Russia respectively aligned. Most of the Global South, albeit reluctantly will pick sides, and one current fight between China and the USA is for their 'hearts and minds', as many avoid a commitment to either in the midst of the Ukraine conflict.[15]

> *"The parallels between the past and present are problematic. The Cold War era was relatively stable. This new era is proving distinctly disorderly."*

But one undoubted effect of the Russian invasion has been to give a major boost to the role of NATO. An organization whose mission was mocked by Donald Trump as "obsolete", one that Emmanuel Macron described as "brain-dead" has now been invigorated, finding two renewed objectives—to defend democracy and European sovereignty. It has reemerged as a key international actor, now extending to the wider context of exacerbating debate between China and the USA. Indeed, it has now launched an initiative named "Futures in the Indo-Pacific", seeking to develop and deepen its security cooperation to regional partners in Asia.[16] Nonetheless, the portents of NATO's future are not as clear as Washington's consensus might optimistically assume.

Continuity and Change: The Countervailing Logics of Fuzzy Bifurcation

In a classic periodization of history, a consensus has developed that the pandemic and war have proven pivotal to a broad, emphatic change.[17] But, rhetorical flourishes aside, the harder task is to identify what has and will continue, what has and will change, and what the consequence of that mix will be – in the intersection where change and continuity meet. While the logic of geopolitics pushes awkwardly towards two insulated blocs, the logic of geoeconomic globalization endures.

15) Shivshankar Menon, "A New Cold War May Call for a Return to Non-Alignment," Foreign Policy, 1 July 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nonalignment-international-system-alliance-bloc/

16) "NATO Launches New Cooperation Initiative with Experts from Partners in the Indo-Pacific Region," NATO/OTAN, 25 January 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211244.htm

17) David A. Bell, "Does Putin's War Mark a New Period in History?" Foreign Policy, 1 July 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/world-history-new-era-russia-ukraine-war-covid-19/

Beyond the legislation that promises the onshoring of American and Chinese manufacturing production with long-term time horizons,[18] it is a world of continuity, where globalization's tentacles are currently adapting and rerouting, but are not retreating. America and China will continue to create two competitive geopolitical poles—to bifurcate. There is a clash. It predates Donald Trump, the pandemic, and the Ukraine war, having been underway since the U.S. reoriented towards the Indo-Pacific over a decade ago.

> *"The result of this unfolding process will not, however, resemble the Cold War, where geopolitics and geoeconomics aligned to create two insulated blocs. It is now far messier and more complicated. It is a world where allies — facing competing logics — are unreliable."*

The result of this unfolding process will not, however, resemble the Cold War, where geopolitics and geoeconomics aligned to create two insulated blocs. It is now far messier and more complicated. It is a world where allies—facing competing logics—are unreliable. They may side with the U.S. on one issue, hedge on another, and oppose it on a third. It is a world, where "ally," "partner," "competitor," "rival" and "adversary" are expedient and contextual terms. Joe Biden already finds this a frustrating world. Xi Jinping perhaps finds it easier to manage, although his diplomatic services' all-to-frequent descent into the language of 'wolf warrior diplomacy' suggests that we should not overstate China's ability to deal with its challenges.[19] We call this the world of fuzzy bifurcation.

Fuzzy bifurcation describes a global system where the logics of geoeconomics and geopolitics clash rather than align. Distinct from the bipolarity of the Cold War, it is 'fuzzy' because the firm bonds that tied allies together across different policy domains then have now been replaced by frayed, porous relationships that shift from one policy issue to another. In this context, relationships are neither reliable nor transparent. National security is inevitably key, but not always paramount. It's a world, where states, their strategies and their behavior lack the consistent alignment of the Cold War world. It is a world where the 'weak' can exercise a surprising

18) "Congress Passes Investments in Domestic Semiconductor Manufacturing, Research and Design," SIA. https://www.semiconductors.org/chips/

19) Clea Caulcutt and Stuart Lau, "China Sends Top Wolf Warrior Lu Shaye to the Dog House," Politico, 26 April 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/china-lu-shaye-ambassador-france-diplomacy/

degree of independence, even among America's closer allies.

The Implications for NATO - and Beyond

The implications of this dynamic for NATO are significant. Hungary is embedded in NATO and the EU, yet Viktor Orban calls the latter's leaders "opponents"[20] as he continued to buy Russian oil and gas, refuses to provide armaments for Ukraine, and rejects any discussion of Ukraine's NATO membership.[21] Like Hungary, Türkiye haggles over Sweden's admission to NATO, after spending the last few years oscillating in its relations with NATO and Russia.[22] France supports Ukraine with arms, but Macron talks to Putin and wants to avoid "humiliating" him. Further, he rejects any measures in Taiwan that would make European states American "vassals".[23] All, in distinct ways, undermine NATO solidarity. Only the UK—increasingly reliant on the U.S. since it left the EU—has consistently stood with the U.S., both within and beyond NATO.[24]

The intricate web that weaves NATO together is more fragile than its proponents generally acknowledge. It is hard to reconcile a NATO (or, more broadly, a European) commitment to play an active maritime role in the Indo-Pacific when concurrence over such fundamental issues such as who can join the organization, and even who can partner it, seem unattainable.[25] Domestic politics, and the divergent wedge between economic and security interests, undermine institutional coherence. That problem is likely to become exacerbated in European countries if the mild European winter of 2023 is followed by a colder one in 2024 and they confront greater oil and gas shortages.

This trend is unlikely to abate. Globalization has and will continue despite American efforts to introduce export controls,[26] decouple global supply chains and undermine Russia through a powerful sanctions regime. Continued projections that the Russian

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20) "Hungary Election: Viktor Urban's Victory Hailed by Putin," BBC News, 4 April 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60981648

21) Lili Bayer, "'What?!' Orban Throws Cold Water on Ukraine's NATO Hopes," Politico, 21 April 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-ukraine-nato-membership-aspirations-twitter/

22) "Why are Turkey and Hungary Against Sweden Joining NATO?" Reuters, 5 April 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-finland-joins-nato-why-is-turkey-making-sweden-wait-2023-04-04/

23) Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt, "Europe Must Resist Pressure to Become 'America's Followers,' says Macron," Politico, 9 April 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-china-america-pressure-interview/

24) "China: MI5 and FBI Heads Warn of 'Immense' Threat," BBC News, 7 July 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-62064506

25) "EU's Borrell Asks European Navies to Patrol Taiwan Strait," The Defense Post, 23 April 2023. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/04/23/borrell-european-navies-taiwan-strait/

26) "U.S. Aims to Expand Export Bans on China Over Security and Human Rights," New York Times, 5 July 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/05/us/politics/us-china-export-controls.html

economy would collapse under the weight of western sanctions have, to NATO's dismay, not materialized,[27] suggesting that the war will be more protracted and the prospects of a Ukrainian victory less likely. European strategic autonomy in the form of an independent military force – which would potentially undermine NATO's solidarity – looks as fanciful as ever. There have even been credible claims that Germany has spent none[28] of its new defense budget and the EU's 'strategic compass' initiative on joint defense innovation and production has been characteristically slow to get started.[29]

We should parenthetically add that these dynamics of fuzzy bifurcation are not confined to NATO or its members. Alliances, formal and informal, are more fluid than ever. Asian states may cleave towards the USA on security but sustain their economic links with China. Indonesia, for example, is one of the USA's larger defense partners in the Indo-Pacific, cooperation including military exercises and events.[30] Yet it invited Russia to a meeting of the G-20 in November 2022 despite Western objections, resulting in the U.S. and many European states boycotting a subsequent finance ministers meeting.[31]

Likewise, when asked about his country's rejection of the American-sponsored sanctions regime, India's Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, commented "Europe's problems are not India's problems, as India lines up to buy record amounts of Russian oil,[32] even as they attend Quad meetings. And Saudi Arabia refuses to pump more oil to assist European countries, while Brazil and Mexico reject the sanctions regime, and Brazil (and Argentina) agree to trade with China in Yuan instead of dollars.[33] Like their European counterparts, their interests are often too nuanced to throw their lot in with the U.S. simply. It's a fuzzy world.

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27) David McHugh, "Russia's Economy Hold Up, But Growing Challenges test Putin," AP News, 13 March 2023. https://apnews.com/article/russian-economy-ukraine-war-putin-sanctions-0231252b7a145040530245b58590f7f0

28) "German Military Boost Fails to Spend Single Euro," BBC News, 14 March 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64955247

29) Johannes Nordin, "The EU's Strategic Compass: Building Consensus Ahead of Strategy," Institute for Security & Development Policy, 1 April 2022. https://www.isdp.eu/the-eus-strategic-compass-building-consensus-ahead-of-strategy/

30) Bich Tran, "A Renewed Focus on Indonesia-U.S. Relations," CSIS, 17 February 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewed-focus-indonesia-us-relations

31) "Putin and Zelensky Both Invited to Indonesia G20 November Summit," Le Monde, 29 April 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/04/29/putin-and-zelensky-both-invited-to-indonesia-g20-november-summit_5981996_4.html

32) "India Finds Russian Oil an Irresistible Deal, No Matter the Diplomatic Pressure," New York Times, 4 May 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/world/asia/india-russia-oil.html

33) "Brazil Takes Steps to Transact in Yuan as China Ties Grow," Bloomberg News, 30 March 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-30/brazil-takes-steps-to-transact-in-yuan-as-ties-with-china-grow

The Future of a Fuzzy World and NATO's Role in It

Geopolitics is spinning into a world divided between the U.S. and China. Of the major powers, including India, Japan, Russia, and the EU, only the U.S. and China have major populations, military might and global economic clout. The others only have two of the three at best. This is most evident in U.S. leadership of NATO, as it aids Ukraine, secures Finland's membership, and attempts to shepherd Sweden through the organization's admissions process despite Türkiye's objections. But NATO's new focus on China[34] may be more symbolically representative of this accelerating bifurcation. It is a process spurred by Biden's repeated clarion call for a division between democracies and autocracies. But we conclude, this is unlikely to work.

Some of America's closer allies (such as Hungary and Poland) are not authentically democratic and plenty of democracies (such as Israel, Mexico and Brazil) hedge, and are reluctant to join the fray. In a fuzzy world, values are not the basis for coalitions and allies are unreliable, even on the biggest of issues. Meanwhile, some economic unraveling may take place. But a meaningful and sharp detachment will be too complex and costly. Biden is unlikely to secure agreements with formal allies like Israel or partners like Saudi Arabia that diminish their diplomatic or economic relations with China and Russia or bolster the immediate delivery of oil and gas to the West. Such is the collision between geopolitics and geoeconomics.

A fuzzy, bifurcating world may be less dramatic than "Cold War 2.0." But it is a more accurate state of affairs. The United States will have to adapt to the idea that the support of even their closest NATO allies will be more contingent than consistent. Bandwagoning with the U.S., even by NATO members, is not assured unless it evidently suits their interests. Instead, it will have a greater reliance on balancing incentives and coercion. It is a world for which the Trump administration was ill-equipped, and with which the Biden administration now wrestles.

Tangibly, we can anticipate that the EU will strive for what it labels greater "strategic autonomy"– in truth little more than a capacity to assemble the necessary resources to act independently to protect its security and prosperity–if only to provide some insurance should Trump, or a comparably inclined nationalist, return to the White House. But unless Americans are willing give up their cellphones or most of the clothes they wear in a patriotic act, globalization-- wounded but with staying power—will continue apace.

34) "A More Muscular NATO Emerges as West Confronts Russia and China," New York Times, 29 July 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/world/europe/nato-expansion-ukraine-war.html

Clean lines of Cold War bipolarity misstate the new order. This messy world has been evolving for some time. The pandemic and war have simply made the contrasting logics of economic globalization and political polarization between China and the U.S. more transparent. There is a bifurcation, but it is fuzzy. In that context, NATO membership will – for many members – occasionally be more of a convenience than a tie that binds.

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REBUILDING "GREATER RUSSIA" AND THE INVASION OF UKRAINE

This article examines Vladimir Putin's commitment to rebuilding "Greater Russia" and its implications in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. Putin's vision involves re-establishing the former Soviet Union and extending Russian dominance beyond its borders, fueled by a belief in the historical and cultural ties between Russians and Ukrainians. The article explores Russia's assertive and unilateralist approach to international politics, its military interventions in neighboring countries, and the justifications used to expand Moscow's control over former Soviet territories. Highlighting the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and its devastating consequences, the author raises questions about Putin's long-term goals and whether they involve recreating "Greater Russia" or countering perceived threats from the West and neighboring states. The author contends that despite other factors that might play a role in influencing Russian policy, the re-establishment of Moscow's influence/ control over as much post-Soviet territory as possible – the recreation of "Greater Russia" -- is the most important role – not NATO expansion, although it no doubt was an issue. If the Russians are successful in dominating Ukraine, other former Soviet areas – for example, the Baltics – are likely to become targets of future expansion.

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Keywords: Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Greater Russia, Russian Aggression, Eastern Europe, NATO.

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Vladimir Putin made clear more than a decade and a half ago, that, in his view, "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century," and that he is committed to re-establishing Russia's greatness and dominant role in world politics. Russian policy toward its near neighbors under Putin is committed to de facto re-establishing the former Soviet Union – or "Greater Russia"[1] – a Russia, including areas outside the state of Russia populated by ethnic Russians, as well even as regions of the state of Russia largely populated by non-Russians who have been part of the Russian state in the near or distant past. Russia has a centuries-old tradition of expanding and dominating other national groups. After the dissolution of the USSR into fifteen independent states substantial numbers of ethnic Russians found themselves living outside Russia. As Putin notes, he finds this situation "a major humanitarian disaster."[2]

Associated with this view of Greater Russia has been the idea of Moscow as the center of an alternative international civilization which has justified an assertive and often unilateralist approach to the rest of the world. While other European states have modified their views of sovereignty and pursued policies that de facto have resulted in pooled sovereignty over the past half century, the Russians have continued to view the international system in stark Westphalian terms. The Soviet Union and its major successor state, the Russian Federation, have been seen as more than simply the current nation state of the Russian Federation. In all these cases, Moscow and Russia are the centers of a potentially single expanding political system, regardless of the ethnicity of the population.

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1) Roger E. Kanet, "The Rebuilding of 'Greater Russia': From Kievan Rus' to the Eurasian Union," *Advances in Politics and Economics*, Vol. 4, No 2 (2021): 22-43. http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape/article/view/3869S

2) Cited in Andrew Osborn and Andrey Ostroukh, "Putin rues Soviet collapse as demise of 'Historical Russia'," Reuters, 12 December 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/. For a brief, but excellent, review of Putin's policy concerning "Greater Russia," see Anna Akage, "Greater Russia? Four Scenarios for Putin's Expansionist Ambitions," Worldcrunch, 21 January 2022. https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/putin-greater-russia. Also see Vladimir Putin, "President's Speech to the Federal Assembly," BBC Monitoring. 25 April 2005. www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/. For discussions of the commitment of Russia's political elites to regaining great power status see Ingmar Oldberg, "Foreign Policy Priorities Under Putin: A Tour d'Horizon," in Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander , Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg, and eds, *Russia as a Great Power* (New York-London: Routledge, 2005): 29-56 and Ingmar Oldberg, "Russia's Great Power Ambitions and Policy under Putin," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 13-30. Public opinion surveys in Russia indicated that a majority of Russians supported the return of Russia to great power status. Fifty-one percent expected Putin's successor to return Russia to a preeminent global role, while only nine percent expected the president to establish good relations with the West, see Angus Reid Global Monitor (2008) "Half of Russians Yearn for Super-Power Status," Angus Reid Global Monitor, 4 February 2008. In August 2008, at the time of the Russian invasion of Georgia, opinion in Moscow strongly supported the reassertion of Russian influence see Anne Barnard, "Russians Confident That Nation is Back," The New York Times, 15 August 2008. https//www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/world/europe/15russia.html

The Rebuilding of the USSR/Greater Russia

One of the indicators of Putin's view of Russia's place in its political environment is his refusal to recognize the independent existence of Ukraine, the second largest of Soviet successor states, as a state, or of Ukrainians as a nation, rather than but a subset of Russians.[3] "Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole …. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe."[4] The fact that all three peoples were Orthodox Christians and spoke a similar language, "Old Russian," and that Moscow gradually exercised increasing political authority over the entire region after the sixteenth century are directly relevant to Putin's assessment. This, plus his argument that Ukraine has been collapsing economically since its separation from Russia in 1991, are part of his justification for invading Ukraine supposedly to reintegrate the larger community of "Russians" in a single state. Putin summarizes his argument with the words:

> *I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories.*[5]

Although the Russian leadership that took power immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union officially accepted the independence of the fourteen other Soviet successor states, relations among them have not been equal. Russia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who were initially committed to joining the West -- to integration into the "community of civilized states,"[6] to use Yeltsin's phrase – moved toward a policy that emphasized rebuilding Russia's links with (and influence in) the other successor states of the USSR. Already in February 1993 Yeltsin, who had asserted that Russia, had no intention of resurrecting its imperial past, responded to domestic complaints about the plight of the 25 million ethnic Russians "stranded" outside Russian borders and to the growing disorder in a number of post-Soviet states. He noted that "the time has come for authoritative international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in this region."[7] In other words, Yeltsin was requesting a specific Russian zone of influence on the territory

3) Vladimir Putin, "The Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," Modern Diplomacy, 15 August 2021. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/08/15/the-historical-unity-of-russians-and-ukrainians/

4) Vladimir Putin (2021).

5) Vladimir Putin (2021).

6) Boris Yeltsin, "Speech of Boris Yeltsin on Russian television," 14 February 1992; cited in S. Crow, "Russian Federation Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:10 (1992).

7) Boris Yeltsin, "Speech of Boris Yeltsin to Members of Civic Union'," ITAR-TASS, 1 March 1993.

of the former USSR.

> *"Although the Russian leadership that took power immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union officially accepted the independence of the fourteen other Soviet successor states, relations among them have not been equal. Russia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who were initially committed to joining the West -- to integration into the "community of civilized states," to use Yeltsin's phrase – moved toward a policy that emphasized rebuilding Russia's links with (and influence in) the other successor states of the USSR."*

By then, Russia was already fully involved in a series of regional conflicts – from Moldova in the West to Tajikistan in Central Asia – in which Russian forces were playing an important role.[8] Russian wars or virtual wars with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine since 2014, but especially now since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have all had at least one objective – that of extending Moscow's political and economic control over former Soviet territory. In the following pages we shall examine this process.

Russian involvement exhibited a number of objectives. There was the desire to fill the power vacuum that had resulted from the demise of the USSR and to ensure Russia's regional dominance. Second, since the Russian military was in decline, it was important to find a way to impose unity on what remained of the collapsed union. Third, Russia needed the CIS as a way to preserve existing links of interrepublic cooperation, mainly in the economic sphere. Finally, Russian military involvement in those conflicts was justified by the desire to protect the interests of the ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population in the entire region.[9] By the middle of the 1990s, this final objective had become an important rhetorical, as well as a concrete issue in Russian politics.

8) Alexei Arbatov et al. (eds.) (1996) *Managing conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1997); Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, eds, *Peacekeeping and the role of Russia in Eurasia* (New York: Westview Press, 1997).

9) Aleksandr V. Kozhemiakin and Roger E. Kanet, "Russia as a Regional Peacekeeper," in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Resolving Regional Conflicts* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998): 225–39.

As noted, Russia's willingness to follow the Western lead on major international political issues was short-lived. Even before 1995 Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev had been led by internal pressures to redefine Russian foreign and security policy in a much more realistic (and nationalistic) direction than they had done initially. With Kozyrev's replacement as foreign minister by Yevgeni Primakov in 1996, Russia proclaimed a formal Eurasian thrust in its policy, one that included active Russian involvement in, and primacy over, the so-called "near abroad" of former Soviet territory. Closely associated with this approach was direct and indirect Russian military involvement in regional, mainly ethnically based, conflicts – such as those in Chechnya, a southern breakaway province of the Russian Federation, and elsewhere in Russia. Moreover, in Chechnya, when Putin took over the Russian presidency while the conflict was still in process, Russian policy led to the virtual annihilation of society, much as in Ukraine at the present time. Support for secessionist activities in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan, which had already begun while Kozyrev was foreign minister, provided Moscow with other opportunities for regional influence.

This was especially true of Georgia, where in return for Russia's role as a "peacekeeper" in the secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (conflicts that could not have developed as they did without Russian support for the insurgents), the Georgian government finally agreed to join the Russian-sponsored CIS and to grant Russia basing rights on its territory.[10] By the end of the 1990s, with Russia playing the role of "peacekeeper," most of these conflicts no longer involved active military operations, although they were still far from being resolved. Mostimportantly, Moscow had successfully reasserted its influence over several other post-Soviet states.[11]

The gap between U.S. and Russian policy goals grew significantly during the latter half of the 1990s and into the 2000s. For example, Russia opposed the use of largely U.S.-initiated UN sanctions against a number of countries that were viewed in Moscow as potential partners. The issue that raised the most serious response in Moscow in this period was the eastward expansion of NATO and the incorporation of former Warsaw Pact allies into the Western security system.[12] Prior to NATO's Madrid meetings of July 1997, at which the decision was to be made about possible expansion, Moscow orchestrated a multifaceted campaign that included pressure on applicant countries, many of which represented the "near abroad," and threats that

10) Catherine Dale, "The case of Abkhazia (Georgia)," in Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, eds, *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia* (New York: Westview Press, 1997): 121–38.

11) Roger E. Kanet, "The Failed Western Challenge to Russia's Revival in Eurasia?" *International Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 5 (2015): 503-22.

12) For a discussion of NATO expansion see Kanet (2015) and Kanet and Ibryamova (2002).

the expansion would initiate a new Cold War.

In fact, when NATO decided to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance, Russia accepted the decision without retaliating. Yet it was clear in the approach that Washington and its allies took to Moscow's objections that Russia was not viewed as a major player in the restructured European security environment. Once it became obvious that it had failed to forestall NATO expansion, Russia seemingly accepted reality and attempted to gain whatever benefit it could out of that acceptance. On 27 May 1997, Moscow signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act that was supposed to provide clear parameters for the relationship between Russia and the Western alliance. In return, Russia was granted membership in an expanded Group of 8 (G8). During the rest of the year Russia participated in a U.S.-led military exercise in the Baltic Sea and continued to cooperate with Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities.

"In fact, when NATO decided to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance, Russia accepted the decision without retaliating. Yet, it was clear in the approach that Washington and its allies took to Moscow's objections that Russia was not viewed as a major player in the restructured European security environment. Once it became obvious that it had failed to forestall NATO expansion, Russia seemingly accepted reality and attempted to gain whatever benefit it could out of that acceptance."

Russia's relations with the "near abroad," therefore, evolved in an environment in which relations with the West, especially the United States, were increasingly conflictual. From Russia's perspective it was seemingly no longer taken seriously in world affairs, and its views and concerns were ignored.[13] Even in its immediate

13) Senator Jesse Helms, (1999), then the powerful chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was especially outspoken on this question. In introductory remarks before the committee, he dismissed Russian objections to U.S. changes in the ABM Treaty. See Jesse Helms, "Amend the ABM Treaty? No, scrap it," The Wall Street Journal, 22 January 1999. For a comprehensive analysis of Russian expectation of Western policy changes in the post-Cold War world, see Richard Sakwa, "Greater Russia: Is Moscow out to subvert the West?" *International Politics*, Vol. 58

geopolitical environment Moscow could not control developments that it viewed to be of central importance to Russian security. This was the situation inherited by Putin at the turn of the millennium.

Putin, the Return of Imperial Russia and 'Greater Russia'

Soon after his replacement of Yeltsin as president, Vladimir Putin made clear his commitment to what were seen as preconditions for the fulfillment of these objectives, as the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept indicated.[14] According to the document, Russia had to overcome separatism, national and religious extremism, and terrorism. As already noted, Putin moved coercively to re-establish Russian control over all parts of the Federation and Moscow's influence in the broader post-Soviet area.[15] In the following pages I wish to treat brief, Russian efforts to intervene in and gain control or at least greater influence in neighboring areas.

Russia and the Wars in Transnistria and Chechnya

Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the newly established Republic of Moldova suffered a territorial change of its own with Transnistria, a pro-Russian separatist region in the east of the country, trying to break out and seek independence.[16] This move was followed by the Transnistria war that lasted until 1992. Initially, when the war started in 1990, – long before the rise of Vladimir Putin to a leadership position -- Russia adopted a policy of neutrality. Two years later, however, the fighting escalated, and the Russian involvement turned to active participation in combat. Eventually, the war ended with a Russian-backed ceasefire agreement and Russia began a peacekeeping operation in the region, which essentially meant it decided to keep its troops there – for three decades, until today. Russia's interest in Moldova was and remains three decades later part of its larger bid for influence over post-Soviet states, as well as its posture against the eastward expansion of Western institutions like NATO and the European Union.

Since the end of the war, Transnistria has developed strong political and economic ties with Russia, and Putin has been offering financial and military support to the

(2021): 334–362. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00258-0

14) "The Foreign Policy Concept" of the Russian Federation," approved by the president of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, 28 June, reprinted in *Johnson's Russia List*, No. 4403, 14 July 2000; Paul Kolstoe, "Kontseptsii natsional'noi bezopasnosti," Rossiiiskaya gazeta, 26 December 1997, 4–5.

15) For a brief assessment of the expansion of Russian imperial policy until Russia's incursion into Ukraine and the absorption of Crimea in 2014, see Vladimir Putin, "Vladimir Putin: The rebuilding of 'Soviet' Russia," BBC News, 28 March 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481

16) Ryan Cimmino, "The Transnistrian Gambit: Russia in Moldova," *Harvard International Review*, 1 May 2021. https://hir.harvard.edu/the-transnistrian-gambit-russia-in-moldova/

breakaway state. Over the years, Moldova and international groups such as NATO, have repeatedly urged Russia to withdraw its troops from Transnistria, but it has refused to do so. Having troops in Transnistria allows Putin to influence policies in Moldova indirectly and to prevent its integration with the European Union. For Moldova to be able to boost its economic and political development, getting closer to being accepted into the EU, Russian troops must leave Transnistria.[17]

In addition to the Russian involvement in the military conflict in Transnistria during the Yeltsin years, after the disintegration of the USSR, Chechnya, a province in the far south of the Russian Federation, declared its independence and war broke out between Moscow and the Chechens in 1994-96. A second war occurred in 1999-2000, when Putin, now president, carried out the literal obliteration of the city of Grozny – a foretaste of what would today occur in Ukraine -- and Moscow regained control. Sporadic conflict continued until 2009.[18]

Russia in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Wars with Georgia[19]

From the 1990s until the present Russian relations with Georgia have been strained – to the point of military conflict at times. Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Georgia, the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which comprise about twenty percent of Georgia's territory, declared themselves independent. Russia recognized them and generally supported them in the ensuing military operations. It then oversaw peacekeeping forces in the regions. After Vladimir Putin came to power in Moscow in 2000 and a pro-Western government-controlled Tbilisi three years later, relations between Russia and Georgia began to deteriorate and the ceasefire broke down. They were destroyed in 2008 when Russian-backed separatist forces from Ossetia and Abkhazia, joined by the Russian military, moved against Georgia. Russian bombardment of Georgian cities proved to be a further harbinger of Russia's destruction of cities in Ukraine and the accompanying mass murder in 2022. Moreover, fifteen years later relations of Russia with Georgia were still seriously strained. Yet, Russia continues to exercise significant influence over its southern neighbor, including recognizing the independence of the two secessionist provinces and its de facto veto of the latter's

17) Russian involvement in Transnistria, which borders Ukraine, is directly relevant to Russia's invasion of and destruction of the latter country, see Katarzyna Rybarczyk, "Russian Troops Must Leave Transnistria for Moldova's EU Ambitions to Come True," Data Driven Investor, 24 March 2022. https://www.datadriveninvestor.com/2022/03/24/russian-troops-must-leave-transnistria-for-moldovas-eu-ambitions-to-come-true/

18) Hillary McQuilkin and Meghna Chakrabarti, "What Putin's destruction of Grozny in 1999 means for Ukraine now," WBUR. 2 March 2022. https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/03/02/putin-grozny-chechen-ukraine-russia-military-past

19) See Natia Seskuria, "Russia's 'Hybrid Aggression' against Georgia: The Use of Local and External Tools," CSIS Center for International Studies, 21 September 2021, and Georgi Shaiselashvili, "Russia's Permanent War against Georgia," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2 March 2021. https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/03/russia-permanent-war-georgia/

entrance into NATO – as it attempts in most of the post-Soviet area.

The Invasion of Ukraine and the Incorporation of Crimea in 2014[20]

Although President Putin had met resistance to his proposal for the creation of a Eurasian Union, the decision by the Armenian president in fall 2013 to break off negotiations with the EU and not join the organization, followed little more than a month later by President Yanukovych's similar announcement for Ukraine, seemed to put the matter at rest. Moscow's plan for a mostly economically and politically reintegrated Eurasia under Russian leadership seemed well on the path to the establishment. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and also Ukraine, along with Russia, had all apparently "signed on" to the plan for a multinational economic organization. Yet, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan – not to speak of the Baltic republics -- continued to resist Moscow's overtures and threats, and the route that Uzbekistan might take creation was not clear. But, with Ukraine in the fold, the likely success of creating the Eurasian project seemed enhanced – although its long-term impact in modernizing the economies of the member countries was by no means guaranteed.

In early 2014, ongoing and expanding challenges emerged in Ukraine to the president's announced decision to opt for closer ties with Russia and the Eurasian Union. Then came the unexpected events that toppled President Yanukovych, followed by de facto Russian military intervention in Crimea – complete with propaganda about a fascist takeover in Kyiv that supposedly threatened the security of ethnic Russians in Ukraine – and the referendum in Crimea about union with the Russian Federation followed by incorporation of the region into the Russian Federation and the parallel secession of regions in eastern Ukraine, the Donbas, and their being recognized as independent states and given military aid by Russia.[21] In other words. Putin and Moscow moved dramatically in the ongoing process of expanding influence, even control, over an ever-broader post-Soviet area – it moved closer to the expansion of "Greater Russia," and this especially in Ukraine.

The Russian Invasion and Annihilation of Ukraine -- virtual Genocide?[22]

20) By the second decade of the twentieth century Ukraine became a major target of Russian expansion. See Oliver Bullough, "Vladimir Putin: The rebuilding of 'Soviet' Russia," BBC News, 28 March 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481, and Dina Moulioukova with Roger E. Kanet, "The Battle of Ontological Narratives: The Annexation of Crimea," in Roger E. Kanet and Dina Moulioukova, eds, *Russia and the World in the Putin Era from Theory to Reality in Russian Global Strategy* (London: Routledge, 2022): 239-259.

21) Max Fisher, (2014) "Everything You Need to Know About the 2014 Ukraine Crisis," Vox, 3 September 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know

22) See Alberto Nardelli, "EU Says Russia Is Aiming to 'De Facto Integrate' E. Ukraine," Bloomberg, 12 May 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-12/eu-says-russia-is-aiming-to-de-facto-integrate-eastern-ukraine

Russian pressures on its neighbor came to a head on 22 February 2022 when, after the eight years of Crimea's incorporation into Russia, of support for secessionists in eastern Ukraine and after months of the buildup of an estimated 125,000 troops along the mutual border, the Russian army invaded Ukraine. The justifications – across the board – were based on blatant lying in virtually every public statement concerning the war coming out of Moscow, starting with Putin's assertion that fascists controlled the Ukrainian government and threatened Russian security, that Ukraine was engaged in the genocide of ethnic Russians, and the denial that Moscow has invaded and is engaged in a murderous war in Ukraine —represent a current and extreme example of information warfare or disinformation.[23] Propaganda and disinformation policy are central elements in Russia's current military policy in Ukraine and build on developments of the recent past and, in fact, of many centuries.[24]

By mid-2022 Russia had literally decimated most of eastern and southern Ukraine and, has been driven out of areas around Kyiv and further east, there has been widespread evidence of war crimes -- even genocide – as bodies of hundreds of civilians shot in the head are being found, many with their hands tied behind their backs. Moreover, hospitals and schools have been bombed and civilian housing blocks destroyed in the rocket attacks that became a highlight of Russian military policy – and numerous women have been assaulted by Russian soldiers.[25]

As we have already seen, other post-Soviet states that have disagreed with Moscow on various issues, the "near abroad," has suffered Russia's ire, including military operations. If one looks at relations since independence with the other fourteen post-Soviet countries or with some districts of Russia itself, one sees the destruction of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, as well as the effort to coerce Georgia and Ukraine militarily – even to the point of virtual annihilation – as Russian means of gaining control over portions of post-Soviet space. Other countries, such as Armenia and especially Belarus, are so strongly under Russian control that they are almost smaller versions of Russia.

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23) On Russian disinformation about the war in Ukraine see, among other works, see U.S. Department of State, (2022a) "Fact vs. Fiction: Russian Disinformation on Ukraine Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs." 20 January 2022. https://useu.usmission.gov/fact-vs-fiction-russian-disinformation-on-ukraine/; U.S. Department of State, (2022b) Disarming Disinformation Our Shared Responsibility, 11 May 2022. https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/

24) Peter Pomegranates, "Russia and the Menace of Unreality" How Vladimir Putin is Revolutionizing Information Warfare," The Atlantic, 9 September 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-revolutionizing-information-warfare/379880/

25) Lexi Lomas, "Here are Russia's alleged war crimes in the Ukraine invasion," The Hill, 8 April 2022. https://thehill.com/policy/international/3262626-here-are-russias-alleged-was-crimes-in-the-ukraine-invasion/

"As we have already seen, other post-Soviet states that have disagreed with Moscow on various issues, the "near abroad," has suffered Russia's ire, including military operations. If one looks at relations since independence with the other fourteen post-Soviet countries or with some districts of Russia itself, one sees the destruction of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, as well as the effort to coerce Georgia and Ukraine militarily – even to the point of virtual annihilation – as Russian means of gaining control over portions of post-Soviet space."

"Greater Russia" as Putin's Goal

As one examines the factors that have gone into Russian relations with its neighbors, as well as with the West, it is important to recognize the complexity of the answer. Are Putin and his supporters really committed to recreating the former Soviet Union or a "Greater Russia?" Or is the expansion of U.S. involvement and influence in Central and Eastern Europe, including NATO expansion, the driving factor for a Russian defensive policy and a new "cold war?" Finally, do other post-Soviet states represent threats, alone or in conjunction with the West, to Russian security and is Russian policy, therefore, defensive?

By now in this examination of Russian policy, it appears fully evident that Russia has responded to every challenge to its existence and control over territory, such as Chechnya, by suppression; to take advantage of comparable challenges to other states, as in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; or the use other means, such as dependence on Russian energy, to expand Russian influence, even control, over the post-Soviet region. Overall, despite other factors that might play a role in influencing Russian policy, the re-establishment of Moscow's influence/control over as much post-Soviet territory as possible – the recreation of "Greater Russia" -- is the most important role – not NATO expansion, although it no doubt was an issue. If the Russians are successful in dominating Ukraine, other former Soviet areas – for example, the Baltics – are likely to become targets of future expansion.

BUILDING DEMOCRACY

CREATING OPPORTUNITY

PROMOTING PEACE

HALIFAX

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORUM

Canada

CLUB HFX
PRO-DEMOCRACY
BUSINESS GROUP

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MEDIA PARTNER

POLITICO
MEDIA PARTNER

WHERE DOES NATO'S ENLARGEMENT LEAD TO?

The aim of this article is to show from the perspective of offensive realism the implications of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. These implications should be seen on multiple levels: (a) the security of the new members of the North Atlantic Alliance, (b) the USA and the cohesiveness of NATO, (c) Russia, (d) the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine, (e) the militarization of relations in Europe, and (c) the global international system. The war in Ukraine is forcing the U.S. to make compromises with Russia and China, and this calls into question NATO's continued 'open door' policy.

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Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, China, NATO Enlargement, Russia, the USA, Ukraine

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According to the realist paradigm, political-military alliances are instruments of states' security policies and influence the redistribution of power in the international system. The United States, as the main victor of the Cold War that ended in the late 1980s and the leader of the Western world, undertook a policy of actively supporting democratic and market reforms in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This meant, in practice, pursuing the export of democracy, 'non-violent struggle' and 'subversion strategy,' as indicated by Prof. Gene Sharp.[1] At the same time, some of the post-communist countries, most advanced in democratic reforms and fearful of Russia's return to imperial policies, pushed hard to join NATO. After several years of hesitation, Washington decided on a policy of expanding NATO eastward. The first post-Cold War NATO enlargement in 1999 included Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the second in 2004 included as many as seven countries in the Central European region, namely Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. With both enlargements, Russia protested strongly, but was too weak to prevent the process. Of particular concern to Moscow was the inclusion of the three post-Soviet Baltic republics in the North Atlantic Alliance. Later still, Albania and Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2016), North Macedonia (2020) and Finland (2023) were admitted to NATO.

The United States and its allies (from NATO and the European Union) are guided by an ideology of the primacy of liberal values and a belief in the imperative of their eastward expansion, disregarding Russia's vital security interests. They justify NATO's expansion policy with the need to expand the zone of peace and security, and support the sovereign right of each state to choose its international affiliation. The latter argument is even enshrined in OSCE documents. On the other hand, they do not respect another norm developed at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul about the indivisibility of security, which means not strengthening one's own security at the expense of other states.

Russia, on the other hand, has expressed concern about its own security from the beginning of the NATO enlargement process, pointing out that NATO is ‘walking up’ to its borders, and that the U.S. surrounds Russia on all sides with a system of military bases in other countries. A superpower that pursues a policy of liberal hegemonism and expansionism ‘forces’ other countries to counter, as it were. Russia is therefore no exception, and by acting rationally it reacts negatively, as it is driven by concern for its core security interests. Jack Matlock or John Mearsheimer have often invoked a hypothetical situation asking how the United States would behave if, for

1) Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation* (Bangkok: Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, 1994).

example, Russia expanded its influence and entered Mexico or China entered Canada with its own military bases. Thus, the U.S. argument about expanding the zone of peace through NATO expansion cannot be convincing to the leaders of countries concerned about their security, especially Russia, which the West heavily criticizes. For expanding NATO, according to the assumption of the theory of offensive realism, means expanding its power, and this makes it likely to be used against Russia, since the intentions of states, as Mearsheimer writes, cannot be guessed with 100 percent certainty. Every superpower, aims at its own survival, and its behavior is determined by three factors: fear, self-help, and power maximization.[2] Therefore, it is not enough for Russia for NATO to declare that it is defensive, especially since there are well-known examples of NATO intervening illegally or in excess of the UN Security Council's mandate against Yugoslavia in 1999 (the so-called Kosovo war) or in Libya in 2011.

"It is also worth mentioning that the U.S. is now spending significantly more on armaments than it did during the Cold War, when there was a real threat of a nuclear war with the USSR."

Finally, it cannot be ignored that U.S. military spending rose sharply after the Cold War, despite declaring until 2015 that the U.S. had no adversary in the form of any state. It is also worth mentioning that the U.S. is now spending significantly more on armaments than it did during the Cold War, when there was a real threat of a nuclear war with the USSR. According to reliable SIPRI data, the U.S. spent $877 billion on armaments in 2022, or 39.15 percent of the entire world's spending ($2.24 trillion), while Russia spent only $86.4 billion (or 3.86 percent of the world's spending), and China spent $292 billion (13.03 percent). U.S. military spending is greater than the next 11 countries (China, Russia, India, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, Italy and Australia). These expenditures are more than 10 times greater than Russia's, and if we add to them the expenditures of the then remaining 29 NATO members, an even greater disparity emerges – more than 14 times ($1.22 trillion to $86.4 billion). On top of this, since 2014 the U.S. has been forcing its allies to increase their arms spending and militarily strengthen the Alliance's eastern flank. It should be recalled that contrary to the 1990s agreements with Russia, the U.S. is expanding its bases and sending its troops to new NATO member countries.[3]

2) John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): 32.

3) Josua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, "Deal or No Deal? The End of Cold War and the U.S. offer to limit NATO Expansion," *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 4, (April 2016): 7–44.

If all this is taken into account, including NATO's systematic move closer to Russia's borders and strong declarations about admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, Russia's concerns seem rational and justified. There is also no willingness on the part of the West to discuss Russia's emerging concerns and reorganize the European security architecture. In December 2021, the U.S. and NATO rejected Russia's proposals on this issue without hesitation. This means that the West as a whole intends to continue the policy of expanding its influence and structures, 'snatching' more Eastern European countries from Russia's influence, marginalizing this nuclear power on the international stage. U.S. President Joe Biden spoke about it many times at the beginning of Ukrainian war. American politics lacks an idea of what the world will be like after the end of this war. It would be naive to assume that Russia could be eliminated as a great power. Prominent American neorealists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt warn against such attempts.[4] Besides, it is worth considering why President Biden's administration is striving so fiercely to defeat and marginalize Russia, when its main rival and adversary is the ever-strengthening China.

Consequences of NATO Expansion: For Europe

a) NATO enlargement is supposed to strengthen the security of the countries newly admitted to the Alliance. This is the perception of the granting of guarantees to them to provide assistance in case they become the object of aggression (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), the stationing of soldiers and military equipment of Western allies on NATO's eastern flank, new military bases and increased spending on armaments. Whether this creates sufficient guarantees for their security in the event of expected aggression from Russia is a matter of debate. It is possible to think that Russia, unprovoked, will not attack NATO countries, but it is possible that if war were to occur it could use nuclear weapons, and this already changes the situation, since a nuclear conflict would spell disaster for everyone, including the new Central European allies.

(b) The U.S. is trying to win new allies for itself and expand its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area. Recently, they have been most anxious to draw Ukraine into NATO. This drive by Washington is bolstered by fears of an ongoing reconfiguration of the international order that weakens the U.S. international position. It does this because in this area it is possible, does not entail great costs, and even brings benefits (political and economic). Central and Eastern European societies, wanting to secure themselves from Russian domination, willingly submit to American domination, and are encouraged by the Western vision of prosperity and democracy. Not everyone understands that the way forward is through market reforms and integration with the

4) The Munk Debate: Russia Ukraine War, (Stephen Walt, John Measheimer, Michael McFaull, Radoslaw Sikorski). Toronto, 12 May 2022. @sikorskiradek. https://mobile.twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1jMJgeOlPzkKL

European Union, not NATO membership. This is especially true for Ukraine, which has squandered 30 years of its independence, has failed to implement market and democratic reforms, and its leaders who came to power in a coup in February 2014 suddenly set course to gain NATO membership and have led to the vassalization of their country against the U.S.

"The United States fears losing its hegemonic position. That's why it is strengthening asymmetrical ties with European allies, forcing them to increase spending on armaments, transferring weapons to militant Ukraine, and using pressure to apply economic sanctions against Russia, forcing them to give up imports of fossil fuels (oil and gas) from Russia."

(c) Strengthening the cohesiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance around the U.S. Disciplining allies with the Russian threat and expanding NATO, including the Balkan and Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden), is being done. The United States fears losing its hegemonic position. That's why it is strengthening asymmetrical ties with European allies, forcing them to increase spending on armaments, transferring weapons to militant Ukraine, and using pressure to apply economic sanctions against Russia, forcing them to give up imports of fossil fuels (oil and gas) from Russia. In this way, the U.S. has managed to increase the economic benefits for its own arms and energy sectors. That is, tradition has come to pass, on yet another war the U.S. is making a lucrative business. This is laced with the rhetoric of assisting a country defending itself against Russian aggression, supporting Ukraine's sovereign right to join NATO, and the EU.

(d) Incredible justification for NATO expansion. NATO's eastward expansion is justified by the need to expand the democratic zone of peace, security and even prosperity.[5] These arguments, enshrined in the 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy, were intended to convince Congress and the U.S. public of NATO expansion. It seems that in the course of its practical implementation, successive Democratic and Republican administrations have come to believe these illusory platitudes and put them above the requirements of maintaining stability and international security. While the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999 may have been justified by this, since the three countries most advanced in democratic reforms (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) were admitted to the Alliance, and in addition had settled relations with Russia opposing NATO expansion. In contrast, in the second round

5) Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," New York Review of Books, 10 August 1995, 27-28.

implemented in 2004, three post-Soviet republics with serious dispute problems with Russia, including over the Russian minority in the territories of Estonia and Latvia, were admitted to the Alliance. That is, they disregarded not only Moscow's serious objection, but also the dispositions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the possibility of inviting, by unanimous consent, to the Treaty of another European state that is able (1) to implement the principles of this Treaty and (2) to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Ukraine did not fulfill both conditions in 2008 (when it was invited to NATO by the Bucharest Summit), nor does it meet now during the war with Russia. It is not a country with a stable democracy, as shown in the latest U.S. Department of State report on the state of human rights in 198 countries around the world. In the report, the worst situation in terms of respect for human rights is currently in Ukraine, as well as in China, Iran, Myanma (Burma), South Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan.[6] It cannot be explained by the fact that Ukraine is actually at war with Russia. The paradox of NATO's enlargement policy in the name of promoting democratic values is that it has led to war with Russia. However, it is impossible to justify that war serves to build democracy. An additional aspect that undermines the credibility of the arguments in favor of NATO's eastward expansion is the fact that Poland is one of its most ardent supporters, which has ceased to be a democratic state since 2015. In Poland, under the rule of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party, there is an ostentatious violation of the rule of law, for which disciplinary proceedings are underway in the EU, also strongly protested against oppressive power by the Polish public.[7] It is incomprehensible that the United States is not bothered by this. What matters above all is that Poland continues to support Ukraine and represent an anti-Russian orientation.

(e) Sense of threat by Russia and Russophobia. The aspirations of post-communist Central European countries to join NATO have mostly been justified by a sense of threat to their security by Russia. While these arguments can be considered legitimate in the case of Poland or the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), they can hardly be applied to Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro or North Macedonia. In these cases, the U.S. drive to gain a military and political presence in the Balkans was decisive. Fears of Russia are reinforced by successive U.S. administrations committed to expanding their sphere of influence in Europe and Asia. The Russophobia present in certain circles of public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe is exploited for this purpose. Russophobia, as contempt for Russia and Russians, was intensified when Vladimir Putin, a capable politician with a vision to strengthen Russia and its development, headed the Russian Federation from the beginning of the 21st

6) 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC, 2023. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ukraine/

7) For more see Ryszard Zieba, "Illiberalism and Nationalism in Poland's Politics." In: Ryszard Zieba (ed.), *Politics and Security of Central and Eastern Europe: Contemporary Challenges* (Cham: Springer, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16419-4_5

century. Remarkably, when Putin became Russian president in 2000, he declared his country's openness to cooperation with the West. He succeeded in establishing several years of partnership with the EU and NATO, which was not so easy after NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, and Russia also joined the grand anti-terror coalition after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S. The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush quickly undermined this promising cooperation by denouncing the ABM disarmament treaty and supporting the 'color revolutions' in the countries of the former USSR (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, the Belarus trial). Then, too, the U.S led the second round of NATO enlargement, with the inclusion of the post-Soviet Baltic republics. A factor that made relations between Western countries and Russia more difficult was also Russia's pacification of the rebel republic in Chechnya (the Second Chechen War). The West openly sided with the Chechen fighters. Russophobia gained new breezes, after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and especially after Russia's aggression against Ukraine starting in February 2022. In this war, Russophobia was combined with propaganda aimed at demeaning the opponent as a very dangerous enemy and criminal and to destroy him. Groupthink syndrome began to prevail, making it impossible to objectively analyze and diagnose the ongoing war.[8] Again, Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic republics, the United Kingdom and the United States became its main fighters.

(f) Militarization of relations in Europe. NATO's policy of eastward expansion has prompted countries newly admitted to the alliance to adapt their armed forces to NATO standards in order to ensure their compatibility and interoperability with allied forces. It was necessary to rearm their own armies and equip them with modern armament, most of which was purchased from the U.S. It turned out that the new allies were under great pressure from Washington. The sharp increase in arms spending came as a reaction by the allies to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its beginning to support Donbass separatism. This was recommended by the decisions of the NATO summits in Newport (September 2014) and Warsaw (June 2016). Then the allies began to implement a policy of increasing defense spending by 2 percent of GDP over the previous year. The frontrunner was Poland, which tried to implement similar arrangements on the basis of its own earlier decisions in 2001. In general, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the military spending of European countries steadily increased and in 2022 it was 13 percent higher than the previous year and more than 30 percent higher than in 2013.

At the same time, new NATO members have been vying for the redeployment of infrastructure (logistics) and troops – mainly U.S. – to the Alliance's eastern flank since their entry into the Alliance. Until 2021, the U.S. was cautious about these tasks,

8) Stephen M. Walt, "The Perpetually Irrational Ukraine Debate," Foreign Policy, 29 November 2022.

and the stay of its troops of the new Alliance member countries was a successive 'rotation,' as it sought to overtly not violate the May 1997 political commitments to Russia contained in the Founding Act on Relations and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. After Russia's open aggression against Ukraine began in 2022, there was a shift away from this cautious rearmament of NATO's eastern flank. Significant redeployments of U.S. troops, as well as those of the UK, Canada, Germany and France to countries bordering Russia and Ukraine were made. It was decided to change the nomenclature defining the presence of these forces in the host countries as 'permanent,' and logistics and some command structures were shifted to Poland and Romania. Once again, the primus in this militarization of its own country turned out to be Poland, which – to the delight of U.S. military commanders – declares to create the strongest army (300,000 soldiers) in Europe.

"At the same time, which turned out to be a surprise not only to Russia, but also to NATO countries, Ukraine learned the lessons of losing the war with Russia in 2014, made a significant strengthening of its own army, receiving armaments and training assistance, mainly from the U.S., the UK and Poland."

This is served by successive large arms purchases (without a tender) in the U.S. and South Korea. At the same time, which turned out to be a surprise not only to Russia, but also to NATO countries, Ukraine learned the lessons of losing the war with Russia in 2014, made a significant strengthening of its own army, receiving armaments and training assistance, mainly from the U.S., the UK and Poland. In parallel, Russia, preparing to strike Ukraine, steadily increased military spending and deployed some 100,000 of its troops to the Ukrainian border in late 2021 and sent some of its armed forces to allied Belarus. In the spring of 2023, Russia suspended implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) of 2010 and terminated the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The militarization of relations in the eastern part of Europe has become a reality, accompanied by a setting of war propaganda the likes of which has not been seen in Europe since the apogee of the Cold War several decades ago.

(g) Russia's major invasion of Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an aggression against Ukraine, attacking the country from every border with it. From the outset, Russia has described its aggression as a 'special operation' aimed at eradicating Ukrainian nationalism and demilitarizing Ukraine; it has also made no secret of the fact that it was concerned with changing power in Ukraine. To the surprise not only of Russia, but also of observers in the West, the operation failed. More than a dozen months later, Ukraine continues to defend itself with unprecedented political, military, economic and humanitarian support from NATO and EU countries. In practice, the war has become a proxy war between Russia and NATO. This is a risk of this conflict turning into a third world war involving nuclear weapons.[9]

Consequences of NATO Expansion: For The Global International System

Contemporary scholars, mainly neorealists, emphasize the importance of the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order, in which two opposing tendencies clash. The first is to defend the hegemony of the United States formed after the end of the Cold War, supported by the West, mainly the United Kingdom, the European Union and a few U.S. allies from the East Asian (Japan, South Korea) and Pacific (Australia, New Zealand) regions. The second, on the other hand, is represented by the pretenders for co-determination of the fate of the world, namely Russia, China, India, Brazil and a few other countries of the non-Western South (Global South), who are taking steps to polycentrize the world. These actions are evident in outspoken criticism of U.S. and Western hegemony, the most notorious example of which was Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Policy Conference in February 2007. At the same time, the institutionalization of cooperation among the new emerging powers in the BRIC formula (Brazil, Russia, India, China) began, to which South Africa was admitted in 2011, forming BRICS. This anti-Western power already produced a larger GDP than the G7 in 2022 (31.6 versus 30.4 percent of global GDP, respectively). More countries are now interested in joining this grouping, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Argentina, Mexico, Türkiye, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, Thailand. This process signifies the building of a new formula for cooperation among countries challenging the liberal international order, led by the U.S.

Expanding NATO is an effort to maintain U.S. hegemony. The spring of 2023 saw the expansion of this alliance to 31 participants, and Sweden can be expected to join soon. Such a large and powerful alliance is first and foremost a tool of U.S. security policy, as it ensures that the superpower controls an area from the western coasts of North

9) John J. Mearsheimer, "Playing with Fire in Ukraine: The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation," Foreign Affairs, 17 August 2022.

America and most of Europe to the border with Russia. This means a vast sphere of influence and the ability to affect adjacent regions. Suffice it to mention NATO's participation in the war in Afghanistan since 2001 and the military intervention in Libya (2011).

Back in the 1990s, when preparations were being made for the first expansion to Central Europe, the idea of making NATO a global alliance was discussed. However, it was decided only to expand NATO's functions to include non-treaty crisis response operations, which until then could be carried out by the UN and regional organizations such as the OAU/African Union and the CSCE/OSCE. These so-called crisis management operations mainly initiated by the U.S. drew criticism from other countries (Russia, China) and even doubts from some European allies (France, Germany), and made new NATO members such as Poland fear that this undermined NATO's core treaty function of providing defense for member states. That's why President Barack Obama's administration sought to move away from President G.W. Bush's policy of treating NATO as a 'toolbox'. Therefore, the Lisbon Summit in 2010 reaffirmed the viability of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and agreed that crisis management operations would be limited to what was necessary and would be carried out jointly with NATO partners. Reality contradicted this agreement, as evidenced by NATO's intervention in Libya the following year.

During the war in Ukraine in 2022, NATO decided to take another step to broaden its spectrum of interest. At the Madrid summit on 29-30 June 2022, the leaders of NATO countries adopted a new strategic concept for the Alliance. They for the first time in the history of NATO referred to China in its strategic document, pointing to its "ambitions and coercive policies" which "challenge NATO's interests, security and values." Also NATO confirmed the continuation of the alliance's 'open-door" policy, strengthening its deterrence and defense potential, conflict prevention and management, and even actions to protect the climate. All these statements indicate the adoption of the American point of view by the allies, which confirms the thesis of neorealist researchers about the instrumental treatment of NATO by the USA and about NATO's transition to a new Cold War.

The protracted war in Ukraine is increasingly taking on the appearance of an armed confrontation between the West and Russia, which is politically and economically supported by China. This could lead either to its "Koreanization," i.e. a freeze and a new division in Europe, along the lines of the outcome of the unresolved Korean War (1950-53), or to an escalation with the risk of a major war between Russia and NATO. It is also possible that China will side with Russia, which poses a growing challenge to U.S. hegemony, and this pushes both superpowers, the U.S. and China, into the

so-called Thucydides trap.[10] U.S. realists have no doubt that such a war will occur, and only the date when the U.S. will attack China is unknown. That is, the current situation in Ukraine may be just a prelude to a great hegemonic war, which will see a clash between the incumbent hegemon (the U.S.) and the pretender (China), with Russia on its side. There seems to be an awareness of such a prospect in the Chinese leadership. This may be confirmed by President Xi Jinping's words to Russian President Putin during his visit to Moscow (March 2023) about how the world does not know that changes are now being prepared that no one can imagine. That is, it can be assumed that the Russian-Ukrainian war may signal profound changes in the international order, which will see a clash between a weakening West and the pretenders to the management of world affairs. This is indicated by the behavior of most non-Western countries, which, while condemning the invasion of Russia, do not blame this superpower for causing the war, but the excessive enlargement of NATO, which threatened its security, which caused such an extreme reaction in the conditions of geopolitical competition.[11] This is a view close to that of leading neorealists.

The war in Ukraine, from the perspective of Russia and China, is expected to block, to halt further U.S. and NATO expansion. Western support for a belligerent Ukraine means upsetting the dynamic balance between the liberal West and the authoritarian East. The ongoing enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance to include Finland and perhaps Sweden not only further pushes Russia to an inferior position, but represents an imbalance of power, and this, as the neorealists reason, causes a rival to counter and increases the possibility of a major war in Europe. Expanding NATO when Russia is struggling to contain it in Ukraine is not only an anti-Russian step. It cannot be ruled out that the U.S. is also acting in this way with a view to preventing China from exploring the Arctic. Hence this pulling of Finland and Sweden away from neutrality. Today, the U.S. is also playing the Ukraine card to preserve its own hegemonic interests in the context of containing China.

The U.S. is facing an accelerating reconfiguration of the international order. It has become involved in the war in Ukraine, strongly supports the country, has reaped some economic benefits from the war, but sees no prospect of ending it without concessions from its protégé. There are signs that the United States would like to end the war already. In April 2023, even Democratic-linked U.S. experts suggested territorial concessions to Ukraine.[12] But carrying a reputation as an ‘indomitable’

10) Graham Allisson, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Hardcourt, 2017).

11) Ziya Öniş, „The West Versus The Rest: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Crisis of the ‘Post-Western’ Order,” *Transatlantic Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1 March 2023): 33-52. DOI: 10.58867/LWFJ8049

12) Richard Haass & Charles Kupchan, “The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine: A Plan for Getting From the

defender, neither President Volodymyr Zelenski, nor President Putin, who has not achieved the goals of the unleashed war, are thinking of concessions. Where to look for a neutral mediator in this situation? Probably it is in U.S.-unfriendly China and the countries of the South.

Meanwhile, U.S. influence in the world is shrinking. Many factors have contributed to this, the loss of the U.S. intervention war in Iraq, Afghanistan, the decline of U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia, and finally the emergence of candidates from Asia, Africa and Latin America to join the BRICS. The liberal international order and U.S. hegemony are being openly contested. At the same time, the influence of its main competitor China is growing. There is growing interest in the Global Security Initiative announced in April 2022 by Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum. China promotes the idea of indivisible (inclusive) security, which criticizes the augmentation of its own security by states and military blocs, at the expense of the security of others, and rejects U.S. unilateralism. China's idea is that all states should respect the policy of balance. The U.S. was quick to criticize this concept. Thus, it can be seen that the U.S. is failing to maintain its dominance. They are unable to prevent the rise of China, defeat Russia at the hands of the Ukrainians, prevent the strengthening of the BRICS group and even other smaller emerging powers (Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Nigeria). A new international order is being born before our eyes, and opponents of the liberal international order are coming to the fore. The Ukrainian crisis is becoming a turning point where the future of the world may be decided.[13] In this situation, the U.S. will have to make compromises with China and Russia.

Conclusions

An analysis of NATO's implemented eastward expansion policy leads to the following conclusions: (1) The post-Cold War West selfishly rejected the idea of the indivisibility of peace; (2) The enlargement of the liberal West by admitting former communist Central European countries to NATO gave them a delusional sense of security, and instead of strengthening European security, the stability of the global international system was undermined, and in the third decade of the 21st century, a war over Ukraine occurred and the threat of a global conflict (hegemonic war) arose; (3) The war in Ukraine, has caused clear divisions between the West and the rest of the world. Russia and China claim that the West is responsible for it, while the rest of the world believes that it was caused by the over-enlargement of NATO; (4) Since the first decade of the 21st century, the liberal international order has been challenged, and there has been a rejection of the hegemony of the United States and the West

Battlefield to the Negotiating Table," Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2023.

13) Andrey Sushentsov (Interview with), "Dolgaya ukrainskaya igra Putina: pochemu Kremlin uveren chto budyet smeyatsa poslednim," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 12 April 2023.

by Russia and its partners, i.e., China and the countries of the South; (5) There is an acceleration of the reconfiguration of the international order towards a polycentric order, which forces the U.S. to make compromises with Russia and China, including on Ukraine. This calls into question the continuation of NATO's 'open door' policy.

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THE RENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE AND THE LIMITS OF HISTORY

As NATO calibrates its response to increased Russian reliance on nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, references to the 1979 Dual Track decision as a blueprint for policies today have become in vogue. However, calls to compete to negotiate do not fully appreciate the risks of such a strategy for alliance cohesion. They also fail to acknowledge crucial factors that helped bring about the INF Treaty and that are absent today. A closer look at the origins of the INF Treaty reveals the important role of then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who seized an opportunity to push through their ambitious arms control agendas even against considerable resistance in Moscow as well as Washington and NATO capitals. Expectations that U.S. President Biden would have the political capital and Russian President Putin the willingness to conclude a similar agreement today are misplaced. Moreover, in the history of the Cold War, weapons deployments meant to counter adversary capabilities have more often remained unchecked than they were negotiated away. Rather than trying to match Russia's non-strategic capabilities or limited nuclear options, NATO should seek to focus on its conventional deterrence and defense in ways that minimize firststrike incentives and hedge against uncertainties about America's commitment to Europe after the 2024 elections.

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Keywords: Arms Control, European Defense, NATO,
Non-Strategic Capabilities, Nuclear Deterrence, Renuclearization.

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Against the backdrop of Russia's war against Ukraine, the military balance in Europe is shifting in NATO's favor. Russia is dedicating much of its conventional forces to the fighting in Ukraine. Analysts have observed that Moscow faces significant obstacles to rapidly rebuilding its military.[1] Meanwhile, NATO is reinforcing its conventional posture along its eastern flank. Finland has joined the alliance, and Sweden is poised to follow suit. As a result, the NATO-Russia border has more than doubled, and operations in the Baltic Sea will become much more complicated for Russia.

Russia's relative weakness should be good news for NATO. However, Moscow will likely seek to compensate for its conventional inferiority by putting even more emphasis on its nuclear forces. Even though estimates suggest that Russia has almost 2,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons—compared to roughly 100 such U.S. arms deployed on European soil—the Russian military has already put greater emphasis on these kinds of weapons in recent years.[2] Even before the war, Russia had deployed nuclear-capable short-range missiles to Kaliningrad and had upgraded a nuclear weapons storage facility there.[3] To shield its Ukraine invasion from possible NATO interference, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his confidants issued thinly veiled nuclear threats on a regular basis.[4] Putin's recent announcement that he is preparing to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is another step toward raising the profile of Russia's nuclear forces in Europe.

Confronted with Moscow's renewed emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, the United States may soon face pressure to reassure European allies who are unnerved by Putin's nuclear saber-rattling. As anxieties heighten, we can expect increasing calls by NATO members for additional nuclear options. Some

1) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Office of the Director of National Intelligence (6 February 2023): p. 14, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2023/item/2363-2023-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community

2) Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "United States Nuclear Weapons, 2023," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January 2023): p. 43, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686; Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, "Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May 2023): p. 174-99, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2202542. Back in 2000, with Russia's military in dire shape, Russian military doctrine lowered the threshold for the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons; see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine," Nuclear Threat Initiative (30 September 1999), https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-2000-military-doctrine/. Subsequent policy documents raised the threshold again following military reform (among other factors).

3) Reuters Staff, "Russia Deploys Iskander Nuclear-Capable Missiles to Kaliningrad: RIA," Reuters (5 February 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y; Hans Kristensen, "Russia Upgrades Nuclear Weapons Storage Site in Kaliningrad," Federation of American Scientists (18 June 2018). https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/06/kaliningrad/

4) Liviu Horovitz and Anna Clara Arndt, "One Year of Nuclear Rhetoric and Escalation Management in Russia's War against Ukraine: An Updated Chronology," SWP Working Paper (February 2023). https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/Arndt_and_Horovitz_-_Nuclear_Chronologie_21022023.pdf

analysts and scholars have already drawn parallels to the Cold War "Euromissiles" crisis, suggesting that NATO build up nuclear arsenals in order to negotiate them away in an arms control arrangement eventually. This historical reference is deeply misleading, though. Today's world is not the world of the 1980s, and there is no silver bullet to achieve arms control. Instead, more creative thinking is needed to strengthen NATO's conventional deterrence and defense posture.

> *"Confronted with Moscow's renewed emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, the United States may soon face pressure to reassure European allies who are unnerved by Putin's nuclear saber-rattling. As anxieties heighten, we can expect increasing calls by NATO members for additional nuclear options."*

The Dual Track Revisited?

To understand the historical reference to "Euromissiles," it is necessary to recall the military balance in Europe in the mid-1970s, when the Soviet Union began deploying new SS-20 missiles, which threatened targets across Western Europe. Then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt feared that as a consequence of a purported imbalance in terms of theater-range nuclear forces and Soviet conventional superiority, European NATO allies could become hostage to Soviet nuclear blackmail. In response, NATO foreign and defense ministers adopted the Dual Track Decision in 1979, which consisted of a defense and an arms control track. Under the defense track, the alliance would deploy intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe. Under the arms control track, the United States would offer to limit the new missiles if Moscow were to reciprocate.

Today, analysts see certain parallels unfolding.[5] Accordingly, some argue that a possible deployment of new U.S. theater-range missiles would give NATO the leverage it needs to bring Russia to the negotiating table.[6] Another option that has

5) Susan Colbourn, "Arms Control and Deterrence: The Euromissiles, Then and Now," The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (6 March 2023). https://hcss.nl/report/arms-control-and-deterrence-the-euromissiles-then-and-now/

6) John D. Maurer, "Future European Contributions to Arms Control: Compete to Negotiate," The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (27 February 2023), https://hcss.nl/report/future-european-contributions-to-arms-control-compete-to-negotiate/. Luís Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, "The Post-INF European Missile Balance," *Texas National Security*

been put forward is the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in NATO's eastern frontline states. In fact, Polish President Andrzej Duda has already suggested that Poland could host U.S. nuclear arms under NATO nuclear sharing, i.e., the alliance's arrangement of integrating U.S. nuclear bombs into the air forces of a select number of European allies.[7]

The overarching rationale seems logical at first: build up to build down. This strategy seems to have borne fruit in the past: As a result of the Dual Track Decision, Moscow agreed to eliminate all of its ground-launched short-range and medium-range missiles under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, thereby easing East-West relations and ultimately contributing to the end of the Cold War. What worked once should work again.

However, such a simplistic historical comparison fails to do justice to the fortunate conditions that had to align for arms control to kick in at the end of the Cold War. It obscures the extent to which the success of INF negotiations was the product of a series of unlikely circumstances. It also ignores how close NATO came to being split over the contested missile deployment issue. Historical references to Cold War experiences are only helpful as long as their complex genesis and unique circumstances are well understood.

Personalities Matter

Chief among these Cold War circumstances was U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who, in an unlikely combination, was as much a fervent anticommunist as he was a nuclear abolitionist.[8] This combination enabled Reagan to strike a bargain with the Soviets and to secure ratification in the U.S. Senate. His rejection of détente as a presidential candidate and the massive increase in defense spending during his first term lent him credibility among hawkish Republican senators. At the same time, Reagan eschewed much of the traditional arms control thinking and even came close to agreeing on complete nuclear abolition at the 1986 Reykjavik summit.[9]

Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autmumn 2020), p. 18, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10224; William Courtney, "NATO Could Consider a Nuclear Deployment of Its Own to Counter Russia," The Hill (19 April 2023), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3958536-nato-should-consider-a-nuclear-deployment-of-its-own-to-counter-russia/

7) Daniel Tilles, "Poland Has Discussed Hosting Nuclear Weapons with US, Says President," Notes from Poland (5 October 2022), https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/10/05/poland-has-discussed-hosting-nuclear-weapons-with-us-says-president/

8) Ronald J. Granieri, "It's Only Easy in Retrospect," in Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021): p. 57–63.

9) Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, "The Nuclear Abolition Package of 1986 and the Soviet Road to INF," in Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (2021): p. 71–87; Susan Colburn (2022), p. 226; Michael Krepon, *Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Nuclear Arms Control* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021): p. 246–7.

Even though Reagan's views on nuclear arms control were inconsistent, he was able to follow through on INF talks, supported by a few close advisors and a strong public demand for arms control in a number of allied nations.[10] Finally, in his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan found a partner who likewise had a highly ambitious arms control agenda and who was just as open to doing away with the nuclear orthodoxy. For economic reasons, the Soviet leader was intent on halting the arms race and did not shy away from sidelining the old nomenclature in order to secure an agreement.[11]

Even if we were to witness the (unlikely) return of a conservative "Reagan 2.0" figure in U.S. politics today, Washington would still lack an ambitious partner in Moscow. Vladimir Putin has established a reputation as a destroyer of arms control. Failing to address Western concerns about Russian treaty violations adequately, he allowed the demise of the INF Treaty. In addition, Putin suspended Russia's participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 2007 and triggered the procedure to withdraw from the agreement in May 2023 formally.

"All this suggests that Moscow has abandoned the Cold War practice of arms control as a form of limited cooperation among adversaries in pursuit of shared interests. With a partner in arms control nowhere in sight, it is unlikely that the strategy of building up arms in order to negotiate them away eventually will have any chance of success in today's competition with Russia."

Following the same playbook, Russia suspended the implementation of the New START agreement in February 2023. All this suggests that Moscow has abandoned the Cold War practice of arms control as a form of limited cooperation among adversaries in pursuit of shared interests. With a partner in arms control nowhere in sight, it is unlikely that the strategy of building up arms in order to negotiate them away eventually will have any chance of success in today's competition with Russia.

10) Susan Colburn (2022): p. 231–35.

11) Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (2021): p. 83–6.

Bargaining Chips Matter

Even with the right personalities in place, building up to build down is never a foregone conclusion. In retrospect, American "Euromissiles" served as precisely the right incentive for the Soviet Union's elimination of its SS-20s. As bargaining chips, they were cashed in when Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. In other historical instances, however, negotiators failed to design arms control packages that addressed asymmetric arsenals and were mutually perceived as equitable and fair.

In the early 1970s, for example, the United States began to equip its missiles with multiple warheads in an attempt to neutralize the Soviet numerical advantage in missile launchers. The Soviets soon adopted the very same technology, however, leading to an overall expansion of nuclear warheads by an order of magnitude.[12] Similarly, the Carter administration developed the air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles in order to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles and bombers.[13] Whereas the INF Treaty later banned the ground-launched variant, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles were never subject to any limitations. Once acquired, the technology remained a fixture for military planners and continues to plague arms control consultations to this very day.[14]

INF talks also succeeded because NATO had reached a consensus on the Soviet systems of concern. No such consensus is apparent today. Advocates of new INF-type missiles or of strengthening NATO capabilities to conduct "limited nuclear options" have cited, inter alia, possible Russian nuclear weapons deployments to Belarus, Russian Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, Russian intermediate-range SSC-8 cruise missiles, and Moscow's general superiority in terms of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.[15] Similarly, there is no consensus on whether Russia would have to fulfill specific preconditions, such as withdrawing from Ukraine, before arms control talks could start.

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12) Robert Jervis, "The Many Faces of SALT," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Fall 2022): p. 198–214, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01105

13) Richard K. Betts, "Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1981): p. 76.

14) Andrey A. Baklitskiy, "Solving the Strategic Equation: Integrating Missile Defense and Conventional Weapons in U.S.-Russian Arms Control," *Journal of International Analytics*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2020): p. 39–55.

15) William Courtney (2023); Luís Simón and Alexander Lanoszka (2020); Lydia Wachs, "Limited Nuclear Options and Extended Deterrence: Adapting to the Changing Strategic Context," in Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy (eds.), *Nuclear Strategy in the 21st Century: Continuity or Change?* (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2022), p. 25–32. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47020.10

Cohesion Matters

Beyond these enabling factors, strategists should also consider how close the alliance came to a breaking point in the early 1980s. Among NATO members, the deployment of American missiles was highly contested. Back then, several allies flatly rejected the deployment of nuclear-armed missiles on their territories, and those leaders who ultimately offered to host the missiles faced fierce opposition in their cabinets, parliaments, and on the streets. While allies stood together and weathered the storm for the deployment of new U.S. missiles in 1983, among other issues they failed to reach a common position on new short-range nuclear missiles.

Whether an alliance with thirty-two members would show unity regarding similar proposals today remains a matter of speculation. The negative experiences of alliance disunity prior to the Ukraine War do not bode well in this regard. NATO cohesion may well be brought into question should America once again elect a President with little regard for alliances and a strictly transactional approach to international security in 2024. Rather than respecting the principle of allied consensus, a potential "America First" incumbent could simply bypass NATO decision-making and deploy nuclear arms under a strictly bilateral arrangement, conditional on, for instance, an ally's defense spending or its government's political orientation. Such a transactional approach would clearly undermine alliance cohesion and invite Russia to exploit NATO disunity further.

In addition, NATO allies have quite diverse preferences when it comes to nuclear arms. While some allies, particularly along the central frontline with Russia, would like to see a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, other allies continue to seek a world with fewer nuclear arms. In 2022, NATO allies Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway sent observing delegations to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—raising eyebrows in Washington and other NATO capitals. Likewise, Sweden—slated to join NATO after Finland—attended the disarmament gathering. Dialing up the alliance's nuclear posture against these diverging interests could become a serious gamble in terms of NATO cohesion.

An Alternative Path Forward

From today's perspective, the conclusion of the INF Treaty looks more like a historical anomaly and less like a promising blueprint for increasing European security. Instead, managing today's nuclear risks requires a more consequential rethinking of the tools necessary to enhance deterrence and enable arms control. To begin with, member states along the eastern flank are right to demand support and reassurance from the alliance in light of Russia's threats. However, new missiles or more warheads would not necessarily enable a stable cold peace. Indeed, they could create first-strike incentives for Moscow and usher in a dangerous tit-for-tat cycle with no immediate end in sight. Trying to replay the "Euromissiles" playbook could risk making a dire situation worse.

NATO must not be paralyzed by Moscow's nuclear intimidation attempts. As a matter of fact, both NATO and Russia have been uneasily constrained through mutual deterrence in the war in Ukraine.[16] Concerns that Russia may be tempted to exploit a gap in NATO's escalatory options fail to appreciate that Russia's purported escalation dominance has not enabled it to prevent Western weapons supplies to Ukraine. The fact that Russia was indeed able to influence the scale and scope of weapons supplies is simply a result of nuclear deterrence that works both ways. It should be accepted as an uncomfortable reality of the nuclear age.

To reassure Central and Eastern European allies, NATO should instead strengthen conventional deterrence and defense in ways that minimize first-strike incentives and hedge against uncertainties about America's commitment to Europe after the 2024 elections.[17] To that end, the alliance should rely on a confidence-building defense (C-BD) approach, the goal of which is to increase confidence in allies' ability to defend themselves. Accordingly, European allies should deploy a network of dispersed infantry units along the eastern flank, equipped with light modern weaponry such as anti-tank rockets, portable drones, and towed artillery platforms, which have already proved valuable in thwarting Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Within this network, mobile combined-arms armored units could move to strike and halt advancing enemy forces. Crucially, these units would be large enough to halt a Russian offensive without conducting offensive operations on Russian territory. Furthermore, the network and the mobile units would be structured according to the "no target principle," i.e., avoiding, as far as possible, troop concentrations that

16) Jeffrey Lewis and Aaron Stein, "Who Is Deterring Whom? The Place of Nuclear Weapons in Modern War," War on the Rocks (16 June 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/who-is-deterring-whom-the-place-of-nuclear-weapons-in-modern-war/

17) Lukas Mengelkamp, Alexander Graef, and Ulrich Kühn, "A Confidence-Building Defense for NATO," War on the Rocks (27 June 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/a-confidence-building-defense-for-nato/

could present lucrative targets for early nuclear strikes.

This so-called "spider in the web" posture would aim to deny Russian forces the ability to quickly succeed in a hypothetical invasion of NATO territory and would buy allies enough time for the arrival of reinforcements. At the same time, it would allow European NATO members to take on a greater role in defending the alliance's eastern front. Compared to enhanced nuclear options, it could also be more acceptable to allied populations, thus mitigating the risk of displaying open disunity within the alliance. Given its inherently defensive approach, C-BD might even open up avenues for arms control with Russia down the road.

Rather than risking NATO cohesion, betting on a new Reagan-Gorbachev moment, and hoping for an equitable arms cuts deal, allies should abstain from aiding Russia's game of renuclearizing Europe. An alternative approach was recently advocated by former Head of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang Ischinger, who suggested that NATO could offer to reaffirm its long-standing policy of refraining from deploying nuclear weapons in eastern member states in return for Russian reciprocity vis-à-vis Belarus.[18] As Europe is entering a new age of insecurity, NATO leaders must act prudently and recognize the limits of history.

18) Wolfgang Ischinger, "Noch ist es möglich, mit Putin über nukleare Abrüstung zu verhandeln [It is still possible to negotiate nuclear disarmament with Putin]," Handelsblatt (21 April 2023), https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kolumnen/geoeconomics-noch-ist-es-moeglich-mit-putin-ueber-nukleare-abruestung-zu-verhandeln/29100078.html

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THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT IN 2023: FROM THE ARCTIC TO THE BLACK SEA AND BEYOND

This paper will examine the geopolitical implications of the most recent round of NATO enlargement, which was spurred by Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, through a three-dimensional assessment. First, we will broadly examine how NATO enlargement and the war in Ukraine have shaped the international system of alliances. Second, we will look at the strategic implications of NATO expansion in Sweden and Finland's geographical backyard, the Arctic and the Baltic regions, and their effects on regional politics and security. Finally, we will examine how NATO expansion has impacted Türkiye, one of two members that has delayed NATO's recent enlargement, and its strategic balancing act in the post-Ukraine world.

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Keywords: NATO Enlargement, Finland, Sweden, Turkish Foreign Policy, Common Defense.

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Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was a watershed moment not only for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but also for the international political system as a whole. While NATO has been undergoing an extended process of soul searching since, first, the Cold War and, second, the war on terror, the international system has been undergoing equally challenging changes to its modus operandi. First, the rise of right-wing populism and, second, the rise of Great Power competition have rocked the proverbial "end of history" for democracy. As the West has been forced to reconcile its place within these changes and restore its position amid the landscape of so-called "Westlessness," both the United States and Europe had ventured from their traditional decades-long outlook on cooperation, pushing Europe to seek greater strategic autonomy—or, put simply, European states' decision to seek autonomy and independence from the American security architecture.

Despite the popularity of this Trump-era trend toward securing an independent Europe, which has been strongly championed first and foremost by French President Emmanuel Macron,[1] attempts at strategic autonomy have proven far from successful amid today's shifting security environment. NATO and its members' firm support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion has trumped states' calls to pursue more divergent foreign and security policies as both the United States under President Joe Biden and the rest of Europe—particularly those in the Eastern bloc who have been most affected by the threats stemming from Ukraine—have called for stronger transatlantic ties and a more united NATO alliance. An increasingly broad understanding of security over a wider geography, as swiftly adapted by NATO and set out in its 2022 Strategic Concept,[2] requires increased multinational cooperation on not only hard security issues but also democratic values in face of Russian, and potential Chinese, aggression. Such a transatlantic zeitgeist necessitates greater cooperation and a stronger sense of multilateralism on both sides of the Atlantic, especially within countries who have pursed their own policies of strategic balancing in recent years.

There is no stronger example of this geopolitical shift in Europe than the example of NATO's latest round of enlargement, with Finland becoming the 31st Alliance member on 4 April 2023 and Sweden's ongoing accession aspirations. Foregoing both parties' historical preferences to be neutral actors, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the need for both states to seek additional security guarantees that are only offered from such a high level of multinational cooperation that is found in NATO.

1) Luke McGee, "Analysis: 'Tone deaf' Macron faces backlash over Taiwan comments," CNN, 14 April 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/13/europe/macron-taiwan-comments-transatlantic-relationship-intl-cmd/index.html

2) NATO, "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept," Adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

This paper will examine the geopolitical implications of the most recent round of NATO enlargement, which was spurred by Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, through a three-dimensional assessment. First, we will broadly examine how NATO enlargement and the war in Ukraine have shaped the international system of alliances. Second, we will look at the strategic implications of NATO expansion in Sweden and Finland's geographical backyard, the Arctic and the Baltic regions, and their effects on regional politics and security. Finally, we will examine how NATO expansion has impacted Türkiye, one of two members that has delayed NATO's recent enlargement, and its strategic balancing act in the post-Ukraine world.

The Impact of NATO Expansion on Global Alliances

As highlighted in a new report from the German Marshall Fund (GMF), "Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a clarifying moment for alliances."[3] Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent NATO expansion, most countries appear to have fallen into one of three categories: first, countries in support of (or at least aiding) the Kremlin and its war of aggression; second, countries in support of Ukraine, many of which have sought closer ties with NATO and the West; and, third, non-aligned countries. The coalescence of these blocs has precipitated significant changes for global security. NATO's recent enlargement to include two historically neutral countries into a distinctly Western political and military alliance is representative of a massive shift in political alliances on the European continent. Meanwhile, the rise of non-aligned nations in the post-Ukraine setting offers both challenges and opportunities should these states move past unilateral actions. As Western nations have been able to unite under their shared opposition to the Russian invasion, other nations have been unable to unite under a similarly shared global outlook.

While the trend toward the rise of smaller regional powers as prominent actors on the world stage has been ongoing over the last decade, the war in Ukraine has placed these actors in a more precarious position, creating a global third bloc of non-aligned countries. Although the large majority of these 'non-aligned' countries voted to condemn Russia's war of aggression within the United Nations, many of these countries have failed to make greater commitments to supporting Ukraine against it. As many of these states have prioritized their significant trade, energy, or security ties with Russia over their moral stance on the conflict, only 46 of these 141 nations have fully committed to the U.S.-led sanctions regime on Moscow.[4] Such moves are indicative of the position that these non-aligned nations have striven to adapt since

3) Heather A. Conley et al., "Alliances in a Shifting Global Order: Rethinking Transatlantic Engagement with Global Swing States," German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2 May 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/alliances-shifting-global-order-rethinking-transatlantic-engagement-global-swing-states

4) Heather A. Conley et al. (2 May 2023), 12.

the outbreak of the war. While many observers have lumped this group of actors into a third grouping of states, the possibilities for these states to act in coordination have so far been few as the preference of these states to "escape bipolar logic"[5] and act according to their own interests has so far trumped cooperation.

"While the trend toward the rise of smaller regional powers as prominent actors on the world stage has been ongoing over the last decade, the war in Ukraine has placed these actors in a more precarious position, creating a global third bloc of non-aligned countries. Although the large majority of these 'non-aligned' countries voted to condemn Russia's war of aggression within the United Nations, many of these countries have failed to make greater commitments to supporting Ukraine against it."

The bloc has yet to realize collective action beyond the musings of Brazilian President Luiz Inâcio Lula da Silva, who has called for a "peace club" of non-aligned actors to help broker an end to the war. Despite the potential challenges arising from such a negotiation club—namely its close economic relations with not only China but also Russia,[6] with whom Lula has closely cooperated since the advent of the BRICS economic bloc—the serious consideration of such an alliance would be a significant test for the weight of a potential bloc of non-aligned actors within the international order. However, with such a club yet to materialize, the power behind a non-aligned bloc has yet to extend beyond the weight thrown in by individual actors and the pursuit of their own interests. Meanwhile, China's co-opting of Central Asian states, who together held the first China–Central Asia Summit opposite the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May 2023, has sparked talk of a Beijing-led "axis of autocracy" that excludes Russia. Again, though, such a bloc has yet to solidify.[7]

In contrast to the trajectory of other neutral actors, the abandonment of a third bloc of actors in Europe and their anchor within NATO has held great geopolitical significance for the war and the shape of the international order moving forward. The shift from the historically neutral, third-bloc mentality of Sweden and Finland to the declaration of

5) Heather A. Conley et al. (2 May 2023), 2.

6) Katarína Javorceková, "The delusion of Lula's 'peace club,'" GLOBSEC, 27 April 2023, https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/commentaries/delusion-lulas-peace-club

7) Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "A Tale of Two Summits: G7 Displays Unity as China Courts Central Asia," China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 23 May 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/a-tale-of-two-summits-g7-displays-unity-as-china-courts-central-asia/?mc_cid=3ca079fdb1&mc_eid=1cd4490e9b

its membership aspirations in 2022 represents a sea change for international politics. In contrast to the non-aligned bloc's divergence, the Western bloc has drawn closer and grown stronger. Though critics of the West see Finland and Sweden's membership as an "inevitable choice" amid an environment in which "neutrality is dying",[8] the 180-degree shift in the perception of Finns' and Swedes' attitude toward NATO membership is evidence of just how monumental this shift is.[9]

While it is true that Sweden and Finland have been integrating themselves deeper within the NATO architecture since they were declared Enhanced Opportunity Partners at the 2014 Wales Summit following Russia's invasion of Crimea, and their military capabilities are already deeply intertwined with NATO, there is a fundamental difference and strong geopolitical signal between being a close partner and a member of NATO—namely, the willingness to accept members' Article 5 responsibilities. The move toward membership has solidified the Western bloc in Europe in the new post-Ukraine era and wiped away the Cold War remains of neutrality along Russia's northwest border. Researchers have proclaimed that "the dust of Finlandization has been brushed off."[10] While the global trend toward a non-aligned bloc may one day play a greater role in the war in Ukraine or the post-Ukraine world, no doubt stronger ties between Western nations will continue to outweigh those of a third bloc due to NATO's role as both a political and military alliance with a shared worldview. Furthermore, NATO's enlargement has improved the geostrategic position of the Alliance not only globally but also regionally, which will be discussed in the following section.

The Strategic Expansion of NATO in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea

Finland and Sweden's membership aspirations have reshaped the entire security landscape of the European continent. The addition of Finland into the NATO alliance and the likely prospect of Swedish membership have shifted the balance of power within both Europe and NATO toward the northeast of the transatlantic sphere.[11] While the three Baltic States (Estonia Latvia, and Lithuania) have been sounding the alarm on the Kremlin for over a decade and have been the subject of several hybrid attacks

8) "Finland's NATO membership Deepens Concerns Over the Bloc's Expansion into Asia," Global Times, 9 April 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1288763.shtml

9) E.g., in Finland, popular support for Finland's NATO membership skyrocketed after the onset of the war, from 28 percent to 76 percent in favor of NATO membership between January and May 2022. See, Tuomas Forsberg, "Finland and Sweden's Move Toward NATO," PRIO blogs, 9 May 2022, https://blogs.prio.org/2022/05/finland-and-swedens-move-to-nato/

10) The term "Finlandization" refers to Finland's role as a Third Power between the West and the Soviets during the Cold War. See Bradley Reynolds, "Finland's Long Road West," Wilson Center, 6 April 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/finlands-long-road-west

11) Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat," CNAS Transatlantic Forum on Russia, January 2023.

in recent years,[12] the addition of new Baltic littoral states into the Alliance provides additional security guarantees and new avenues for the defense of the increasingly vulnerable region. Once Sweden's membership is put into place, the sea will effectively turn into a 'NATO lake' over which it is will expand its land, air, and sea power. Though Russia's access to its Baltic bastion in Kaliningrad and its territory along the Gulf of Finland will continue to be a security concern for Allies,[13] the addition of Sweden and Finland will put NATO in a better position to defend its member states.

> *"The addition of Finland into the NATO alliance and the likely prospect of Swedish membership have shifted the balance of power within both Europe and NATO toward the northeast of the transatlantic sphere."*

On land, Finland's accession to the Alliance has more than doubled NATO's land borders with Russia, including a significant increase in its land border with Russia's strategic Koala Peninsula. In the air, by 2026, Lapland will host the world's second largest fleet of F-35 fighter jets,[14] providing ample opportunities to expand NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission. On sea, access to the Swedish and Finnish islands of Gotland and the Åland Islands will offer strategic assets for the defense of Baltic littoral nations.[15] NATO's access to these territories will also help bolster the defense of the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which prior to Finnish membership were geographically cut off from other NATO members with the exception of the narrow Suwalki Gap.

Sweden and Finland's move toward NATO membership has not only reshaped the strategic landscape of the Baltic Sea but also the Arctic. Politically, with Finland and Sweden's membership, Russia will be the only member on the Arctic Council that is not a member of NATO. Militarily, Finland's sizeable icebreaker fleet and Sweden's submarine fleet will help secure the high seas. Both militaries have significant experience in preparing for the extreme temperatures in this region and can offer other member states knowledge in this area through joint exercises.[16] An increased

12) Gabrielius Landsbergis, "7 Myths Standing in the Way of Ukraine's Victory," Politico, 19 March 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-victory-russia-7-myths/

13) Julian Pawlak, "No, Don't call the Baltic a 'NATO Lake'," RUSI, 5 September 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/no-dont-call-baltic-nato-lake

14) Lokker, Townsend, Hautala, and Kendall-Taylor, January 2023.

15) Luke Coffey, "NATO Needs a New Strategy for the Baltic Sea," Hudson Institute Policy Memo, October 2022.

16) Both militaries have been exercising with NATO member states for many years. Sweden recently hosted its largest military exercise in 30 years with the participation of several member states. See Charles Szumski, "Sweden to conduct

NATO presence inside the Arctic Circle not only has the potential to counter Russia's militarization of the region but also China's efforts to further destabilize the region as it builds up its Polar Silk Road. As NATO's High North has become increasingly important to Allied security as the ice in the Arctic continues to melt, Sweden and Finland are essential to help NATO defend this new strategic center. While much more is needed to counter Russia's military superiority in the region,[17] Finland and Sweden are essential to this.

Away from its geographic backyard, Finland and Sweden's membership offers protection of much more than the Baltic and the Arctic. Both nations offer large, highly capable militaries with significant experience internationally within NATO structures. Both nations have participated in several NATO operations over the last three decades, participating in NATO's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM), in Kosovo with KFOR, in NATO Mission Iraq (NIM), and with NATO's Response Force (NRF) in a supplementary role.[18] Finland and Sweden have become increasingly integrated within the NATO military structure since becoming Enhanced Opportunity Partners during the Wales Summit in 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, both nations have experience in combatting hybrid threats. For Finland, NATO can benefit from both the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki as well as draw lessons from the Finnish concept of "societal security" and resilience.[19] Both states are vibrant democracies and have been members of the European Union since 1995, offering greater opportunities for NATO-EU cooperation.

Despite their long history of neutrality, there is no doubt that Sweden and Finland will easily be incorporated into NATO's multilateral framework and continue to act as strong, effective proof of the multilateral shift within the global framework. Indeed, following Finland's accession into the Alliance on 4 April, its first act as a member was to submit its approval for Swedish membership. However, while Finland and Sweden's shift toward multilateralism has been a demonstration of cohesion amid the threats posed to the Western order *vis-à-vis* the war in Ukraine, Türkiye's continuing unilateral challenge to Sweden's membership has highlighted the need to continue to

largest military exercise in 30 years," Euractiv, last updated 24 April 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/sweden-to-conduct-largest-military-exercise-in-30-years/

17) Jacob Gronholt-pedersen and Gwladys Fouche, "NATO Allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the Arctic," 16 November 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-allies-wake-up-russian-supremacy-arctic-2022-11-16/

18) See, NATO, "Relations with Finland," last updated 5 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm#footnote; NATO, "Relations with Sweden," last updated 12 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm

19) Dr Katri Pynnöniemi and Dr Sinikukka Saari, "Hybrid Influence – Lessons from Finland," NATO Review, 28 June 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/06/28/hybrid-influence-lessons-from-finland/index.html

strengthen multilateralism within NATO. Looking at what's next for Türkiye's strategic balancing act following its recent elections on 14 May and 28 May will help us to see the tests and challenges that NATO expansion has posed for certain member states.

NATO Expansion and the Challenges to Türkiye's Strategic Balancing Act

Following Finland and Sweden's announcement to pursue NATO membership, Türkiye's persistent opposition to this round of enlargement has continued to shock the Alliance. As Türkiye eventually cleared the way for Finland's accession, Ankara's continued opposition to Sweden's membership rests in a bilateral dispute over individuals and organizations that Türkiye identifies as terrorists, namely the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). With some of the most liberal free speech laws in the world, Sweden's reluctance to arrest or deport such individuals has aroused anger and spite from Türkiye, which claims it cannot accept a NATO member who does not recognize Ankara's security concerns. Against the trend toward multilateralism within the Alliance, Türkiye has exercised strong resistance to NATO's enlargement to Sweden, instead clinging to its unilateral views.

Since the re-election of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 28 May 2023, hopes that an opposition victory would immediately lead to Türkiye's approval of Sweden's membership prior to this summer's Vilnius Summit in July have been dashed. Erdogan's renewed mandate to rule promises little to no change in Türkiye's top-down foreign policy, especially as his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), simultaneously scored a parliamentary majority. In the lead-up to the second round of the elections—following Erdogan and his main opponent's, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, failure to receive more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round of elections—Erdogan stated during an interview that he does not intend to green-light Sweden's membership following the elections.[20]

Furthermore, nationalist parties' sweeping success in the parliamentary elections have further reassured Türkiye's nationalist turn, presenting additional challenges to Türkiye's cooperation in multinational fora and reminding political scientists, again, that nationalism is "one of the most powerful… single movement[s] in the world today."[21] These nationalist parties—namely the AKP's main coalition partner, the MHP—will continue to push Ankara's gaze increasingly inward. Ankara's continued

20) Tamara Qiblawi and Isil Sariyuce, "Erdogan hails 'special relationship' with Putin ahead of crucial Turkey runoff vote," CNN, 19 May 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-interview-mime-intl/index.html

21) Isaiah Berlin, quoted in E. Fuat Keyman, "Nationalism in Turkey: Modernity, State and Identity," in *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*, ed. Ayse Kadioglu and E. Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011).

refusal to approve Sweden's accession will be just one symbol of this strategy as will Ankara's continuing efforts to seek tangible gains—e.g., the sale of F-16s—in return for engaging in multilateral cooperation.

Türkiye's nationalist turn has positioned Ankara further in line with other states practicing similar transactional governance strategies such as Russia, which following the elections congratulated Erdogan for continuing to champion an "independent foreign policy."[22] While Ankara has long sought to maintain its strategic balancing act between Russia and its membership in NATO, this position has indeed had some positive repercussions, most recently Türkiye's mediator role in negotiating the UN-led Black Sea Grain Initiative. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, Türkiye will likely continue to act as a go-between for the two sides, which in some ways will benefit the Western bloc. However, while this involves keeping one ear open to Moscow, this more importantly necessitates that Ankara maintain and strengthen its anchor within NATO and shift its strategic balance West to be firmly identified as a rooted NATO member rather than as a "global swing state."[23]

Now that Türkiye's elections have been decided, Ankara will face a litmus test to Türkiye-NATO relations in the lead up to the Vilnius Summit. Although Erdogan has thus far resisted Sweden's membership, several NATO member states as well as NATO itself have shown a strong will to keep Sweden's accession alive and negotiate between Stockholm and Ankara. As reflected in Western leaders' post-election congratulations to Erdogan, particularly that of President Biden, the West is "look[ing] forward to continuing to work together as NATO Allies on bilateral issues and shared global challenges."[24]

As the summit approaches, Erdogan must prepare to face the first test to NATO-Türkiye relations since securing his electoral victory. The new government must recognize that Türkiye's foreign policy cannot prioritize unilateral over multilateral action, and it should not continue to hamper NATO expansion. Türkiye has been strategically anchored within NATO as a member since 1952, and Ankara must recognize that NATO's expansion to include Sweden is beneficial to its own global and regional strategic position, as well.

22) "From Biden to Putin, world leaders congratulate Erdogan on election win," France 24, last updated 29 May 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230529-from-biden-to-putin-world-leaders-congratulate-erdogan-on-election-win

23) Conley et al., "Alliances in a Shifting Global Order."

24) "From Biden to Putin," France 24.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF NATO AND THE ALLIANCE'S PREHISTORY

This article delves into the prehistory and unique evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), questioning its categorization within the realm of military alliances. While NATO can be seen as a conventional military alliance, its prehistory spanning 450 years of European balancing history sets it apart. In contrast to other regions, Western Europe resisted the emergence of regional hegemony despite numerous attempts. Major power warfare in Europe revolved around balancing coalitions organized to resist French, Spanish/Habsburg, and German advances. These coalitions exhibited commitment reluctance and slow organization tendencies, highlighting the exceptional nature of European balancing. The article emphasizes Ludwig Dehio's theory, which attributes Europe's balancing success to the flanking powers on its eastern and western flanks. The creation of NATO institutionalized the anti-regional hegemony coalition, broadening its scope to include North America. NATO's historical trajectory and its contemporary challenges are discussed, highlighting the organization's adaptability and continued relevance in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

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Historians search document archives for insights into why people did what they did. Anthropologists observe people interacting and interpret their behavior. Political scientists tend to generalize after first identifying of what a political phenomenon is an instance. To what category does the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) belong? The obvious answer is that it is one of many military alliances that have taken place in world politics. But that answer glosses over the unusual prehistory of NATO. That prehistory underscores the exceptional nature of NATO. It does not defy categorization, but it suggests that we be cautious in jumping to conclusions about NATO. Given its prehistory, it is something of a particular case.

NATO's prehistory extends across some 450 years of European balancing history. Western Europe was peculiar in this period (1494-1945), at least by world standards. The typical pattern in most regions during this time and earlier was the emergence of some powerful group that could take over and control a region for a finite period of time. Europe had been less peculiar when the Romans established their Mediterranean-centric empire. But since the end of the western manifestation of Rome in the fifth century CE, and with the partial exception of the Carolingians, western Europe managed to defy the tendency toward regional hegemony. But it was not for a lack of trying. The French moved into Italy in 1494 which expanded the scope of the western European system at the expense of the Italian city state subsystem and initiated what became the Habsburg-Valois rivalry for control of the more extensive system. France and Spain contested control of western Europe until the Thirty Years War and the Franco-Spanish War that continued the contest into the 1650s established the French ascendancy over Spain. The focus of European warfare then turned to a fixation on the further wars of Louis XIV which were renewed by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Later in the nineteenth century, European attention fixed on the newly unified Germany and its potential aspirations. It would be hard to say that World War I started as a war to halt German hegemony in Europe, but it became one as the war slogged on. World War II, in many respects a continuation of the first world war, was more clearly oriented toward defeating German hegemony in Europe (and Japanese hegemony in East Asia).

Over almost half a millennium, major power warfare in western Europe revolved around balancing coalitions organized primarily to resist French, Spanish/Habsburg, and German advances. Ultimately, they triumphed in blocking regional hegemony even though Napoleon and Hitler were able to establish regional control for a few years. Yet these balancing coalitions were characterized by commitment reluctance and slow to late organization tendencies. If we ask what proportion of European

great powers were prepared to join a balancing coalition against a dire state that possessed more than one third of the region's military resources in the 1494-1945 period, the answer is about 50 percent. The answer would invariably be much lower if we asked what proportion of small states were prepared to join a balancing coalition.[1] In other words, balancing in these circumstances was never automatic and not all that common. At the same time, though, great power balancing coalitions were most likely when one great power possessed more than one third of the region's military resources and major power warfare aimed at thwarting the expansion of that powerful state was ongoing or imminent. So, one can say that great power balancing was common in certain circumstances.

"If we ask what proportion of European great powers were prepared to join a balancing coalition against a dire state that possessed more than one third of the region's military resources in the 1494-1945 period, the answer is about 50 percent. The answer would invariably be much lower if we asked what proportion of small states were prepared to join a balancing coalition."

The slowness of balancing coalitions to organize is underscored by the fact that roughly half of these efforts to resist European regional hegemony only came into being after the war to block perceived hegemonic advances had begun. Whether balancing coalitions in the 1494-1945 period ever deterred French, Spanish, or German expansion is unclear. But it is clear that in several cases there simply was no prewar balancing coalition in existence to deter a subsequent war. Coalitions that took form only after a war had begun could coordinate and amalgamate the resources of the resistance bloc which had something to do with which side won. Still, their initial absence could hardly be expected to stop wars fought over regional hegemony from taking place.

1) The great power calculations have been made (see Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson. "Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," *Security Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2005): 1-33, with Jack S. Levy "Balancing at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2010): 7-43. As far as I know no one has actually computed small power propensities to join European balancing coalitions. But as Paul W. Schroeder noted, small states were legendary in the efforts they took to evade commitments of this type. SeePaul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." *International Security*, Vol. 19 (1994): 108-148 and "Why Realism Does Not Work Well for International History (Whether or Not It Represents a Degenerate IR Research Strategy)," in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., *Realism and the Balancing of Power* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003).

Nonetheless, the balancing coalitions did manage to prevent regional hegemony and the natural question is why that took place repetitively. Ludwig Dehio puts forward the best single answer. Shortly after the end of World War II,Ludwig Dehio put forward a rich and brief history of modern European international relations.[2] The book itself is written in an old-fashioned, almost poetic style. Yet, it develops a short theory of European balancing that is unrivalled for its insight and apparent degree of fit. It has been empirically tested elsewhere and found to be quite accurate once Dehio's assertions are translated into statements of social science.[3] Despite its usefulness, though, it remains relatively unintegrated with much contemporary theorizing about the balance of power.

Dehio's argument was that Europe should have had a very high probability of being taken over by some regional hegemon in the last 500 years. That it never was conquered (for long) after the 1490s was attributed to the distinctive geopolitics of the region. Aspiring regional hegemons would rise somewhere on the European continent and ultimately fail because they encountered substantial resistance from states that flanked the region in the east and west. The eastern flank could mobilize large numbers of troops. The western flank, which also served as the principal intermediary for European- American/Asian trade, could rely on its sea power resources to contain the aspiring hegemon and cut it off from access to extra-regional resources. The simultaneous operation of the two flanking powers was not guaranteed but aspiring regional hegemons' behavior tended to make it more likely. Either they would attack to the east and the west simultaneously or sequentially after being rebuffed in one direction. The would-be hegemon then found itself fighting a two-front war that was difficult to win.

Thus, a coalition of flanking states, with help from others, intermittently restored the balance of power to Europe until the European system lost its autonomy in 1945, much as its predecessor prototype, the Italian city-state system had in 1494. Dehio went even further and described the balancing process as part of a complex dynamic that pitted two types of states against one another. The would-be regional hegemons were absolute monarchies, armed with large armies and bureaucracies, bent on territorial expansion within the region. The western sea powers, blessed with variable amounts of defensive insularity, possessed more restrained governmental leadership, sea power, and a primary interest in long distance trade. Both types of states waxed and waned in relative power vis-à-vis one another. When the sea

2) Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle* (New York: Vintage, 1962).

3) William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transitions," *World Politics*, Vol. 43 (1992): 127-152 and Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994).

powers were in decline, the continental powers were in ascent. The ascent of the continental powers alarmed the sea powers and encouraged their own rebuilding because they were susceptible to the threat of potential regional hegemons. The success of the hegemons would mean the absorption of the sea powers or, at the very least, the development of a competitive foundation for challenging the sea powers to control long-distance trade. But the sea powers could not hope to defeat an emerging regional hegemon on their own. Sea power could contain and block access to extra-regional resources. It could not defeat ascending land powers on land. For that, other large land powers were needed – preferably on the other flank, the better to divide the strategic focus of the rising continental power.

"The success of the hegemons would mean the absorption of the sea powers or, at the very least, the development of a competitive foundation for challenging the sea powers to control long-distance trade."

Dehio's interpretation is not without problems. But they seem fairly minor. One problem has to do with the emergence of the dynamic that he describes. He has the balancing system emerging in 1494 with the Spanish response to the French intervention into Italy. In the next century, a Franco-Ottoman coalition confronted the expansion of the United Hapsburgs. Later in the same century, an Anglo-Dutch alliance thwarted Spanish efforts in the Low Countries. The same group blocked France in the late seventeenth-early eighteenth century. A different coalition centered on Britain and Russia stopped France in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Britain, Russia/the Soviet Union, and the United States were critical in thwarting German plans in the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, it really was not a full-fledged system in 1494. Unless one insists on Venice as an eastern sea power flanker and Spain as the western flank state in 1494, the east-west flanking process was slow to emerge. There also was no Franco-Ottoman coalition in the sixteenth century. Both France and the Ottoman Empire fought the Hapsburgs and, occasionally, the two "balancing" states cooperated but they were neither allied nor did they coordinate their efforts very often. Moreover, France was definitely not a western sea power in the sixteenth century. The process described by Dehio only begins to take solid shape around the time of the Dutch Revolt later in the sixteenth century. The western sea powers are present and active. The eastern flank, however, is not really evident in Spain's involvement in France

at a time when it was still coping with the Dutch revolt. A Franco-Swedish alliance reinforced Dutch opposition to Spain in the early seventeenth century. Only after 1688 does something resembling the full east-west press emerge in the alliance among Austria, England, and the Netherlands. Briefly in the mid-eighteenth century, Prussia played the eastern flank with Russia taking over the role after 1792.

It is not really a criticism of Dehio to say that the balancing system did not spring full-blown in 1494. He does not argue that it came fully into being with the failed French movement into Italy. The fact that it emerged slowly with the key actors fumbling their way into assuming their roles underlines that there is certainly no geographical determinism at work. Europe was not a region with natural flanks or flanking powers. Different states gradually came to assume these roles. States perceived as would-be regional conquerors cooperated by encouraging excessive opposition to their territorial moves. Yet none of this detracts from describing the structured process as evolving towards an east-west vice on states rising in relative power between the Atlantic and the Urals.

A second weak criticism of Dehio is that it is debatable whether the Italian city-states system really served as a prototype for the European balancing mechanism – one of his arguments about the emergence of European balancing. Balancing rhetoric and behavior were present in the fifteenth century Italian subsystem. It may have been natural to borrow the rhetoric in 1494 Italy. The point here is that the 1494 coalition was not a western sea power-eastern cannon fodder combination. Nor was there a similar west-east flanking motion in most of the Italian balancing behavior. Venice was in the east and was initially reluctant to balance because it preferred to focus on commercial affairs outside the Italian subsystem. When it got around to balancing, it was usually a southern coalition opposing expansion from the north. In both cases, it took a while for the structures to emerge, but the European structure did not resemble the Italian structure closely. Presumably, the balancing behavior on which Dehio’s interpretation is based might well have emerged with or without the Italian precedent.

A possible criticism to which we do not subscribe is that European decision-makers began abandoning balancing rhetoric in the nineteenth century. Thus, some have argued that the heart of the balance of power system ended with the Napoleonic Wars. What matters more, however, is less the rhetoric used by statesmen and more whether the flanking mechanism continued to operate. Since the mechanism is clearly evident in World War I and II, extending the system's operation through 1945 seems fair, even if the last western sea power flanker was considerably far away from the European region.

These caveats aside, Dehio's model works very nicely in summarizing the structural dynamics underlying the European balance of power system. Given the attractiveness of the argument, one has to wonder if the success of the balancing is due not so much to the balance of power per se but more to the geopolitical structure that lay behind it. But the available variance is limited. On the one hand, balancing operated in Europe prior to the full emergence of the east-west structural pattern. One, therefore, cannot dismiss the balancing process as important to explaining the failure of any state to become the European regional hegemon. Yet the regional expansion efforts grew stronger over time. The French intervention in 1494 or the Franco-Spanish dueling in the first half of the sixteenth century cannot be compared to the energies and ambitions driving Louis XIV, Napoleon, or Hitler. Balancing alone might not have sufficed. The east-west flanking pattern must be given increasing explanatory credit as it solidified and contributed to thwarting the increasingly powerful attempts to take over the European region.

Of course, there is no need to distinguish between balancing and the east-west flanking structure. The balancing increasingly took place within the context of an east-west flanking structure. The failure of European regional hegemony after 1494 can then be attributed to an interaction effect between the two. Still, suppose we are contrasting the outcome in Europe with ones that occurred in other regions. In that case, one is still left with the puzzle of whether the geopolitical structure contributed most to the balancing working in Europe when balancing seems to have ultimately failed in other parts of the world.[4] But that is a question for another venue and need not concern us here.

The creation of NATO in 1949 effectively addressed the problem of states that ducked joining anti-regional hegemony coalitions by institutionalizing it and making it a permanent feature of contemporary European international relations. Beginning with two members, the military alliance has grown to encompass twenty-nine European and two North American states. This approach also gives deterrence a chance because the organization has preceded any outbreak of war in the region involving NATO members.

It does not replicate Dehio's formula for balancing success exactly. Dehio underlined the utility of possessing two flanks, one based on land power and another on sea power. The western sea power flank is maintained by the United States even if it is a transatlantic flank. Sea powers have been critical for organizing and coordinating counter-hegemony coalitions. Moreover, hegemonic aspirants were cut off from non-regional resources by sea power blockades, they also had to divide their

4) See Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, eds. *The Balance of Power in World History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

forces to fight on multiple fronts. Consequently, Philip II was defeated by England, the Netherlands, and France. Louis XIV was defeated by England/Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria. Britain, Austria, and Russia defeated Napoleon. World War I was won by Britain, France, and the United States, with earlier participation by Russia. Hitler was defeated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain.

Survival for sea powers in Europe meant creating and maintaining balance of power coalitions time and again if they were to avoid the traditional fate of older sea power - that is, being absorbed by adjacent land empires (as in the case of the Phoenician ports by Assyria). Eventually, most of the western European sea powers of the last 500 years were conquered but only after well past their eras of sea power eminence. The Portuguese were absorbed temporarily by Spain towards the end of the sixteenth century due to an unexpected succession struggle emerging in the aftermath of a major Portuguese defeat in Morocco that left the throne vacant and the Portuguese aristocracy greatly weakened. Philip II of Spain had a legitimate claim to the royal succession and more military power than the other candidates. The Dutch resisted the French until 1795 long after their "power and prosperity" peak in the seventeenth century. The English/British managed to escape successive Spanish, French, and German plans to cross the English Channel. Only the Dutch succeeded in capturing the English throne in 1688 thanks in part to their stadholder's claim to the throne backed up by Dutch military power.

No European sea power could play the Dehio western flanking role in the late 1940s. So, according to its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, NATO emerged "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Keeping the Americans in Europe preserved Dehio's western flank. Offshore balancing would not serve the same purpose. Keeping the Russians out reflected appropriately the anti-regional hegemony underpinning of the NATO alliance, but it also eliminated the possibility of an eastern flank. The compensating difference, however, is that the current western sea power is so much more potent than earlier European sea powers, in terms of wealth and military technology, that the traditional second flank may prove to be less critical should it become necessary to resist a renewed effort to assert regional hegemony in Europe. Perhaps nuclear weapons could be said to have trumped geography.

To date, changing the formula seems to have worked although one has to be careful in assuming that NATO has deterred a Soviet/Russian attack on NATO members. We lack a "smoking gun" in the form of knowing that NATO's existence led to calling off a planned attack from the east. At the same time, the expansion of NATO since the end of the Cold War appears to reflect a number of decision-makers who feel that betting that NATO membership will deter an attack is better than staying outside

of NATO's protective embrace. This approach is a contemporary form of Pascal's wager that has been operative for seventy-five years and, no doubt, a gamble that will need to be bolstered in the coming decade.

"To date, changing the formula seems to have worked although one has to be careful in assuming that NATO has deterred a Soviet/Russian attack on NATO members. We lack a "smoking gun" in the form of knowing that NATO's existence led to calling off a planned attack from the east. At the same time, the expansion of NATO since the end of the Cold War appears to reflect a number of decision-makers who feel that betting that NATO membership will deter an attack is better than staying outside of NATO's protective embrace."

As noted, balancing is not universal, certainly not automatic, and perhaps not even all those common outside European international relations. In the history of the European region, balancing occurred regularly and intermittently and certainly figured prominently in the international relations of the region. In western Europe, the success of balancing was reinforced historically by a distinctive geopolitical configuration. But balancing in the past, successful, or not, often had to be played out in great power warfare. It was rarely a diplomatic device that precluded the need to demonstrate the relative capabilities of the opposing sides violently. NATO altered this historical trajectory. It institutionalized the idea of a counter-hegemonic coalition and, in a sense, broadened the geographical scope of the original region to include a second region (North America) for security purposes and to keep at least one Dehioan flank operative. Obtaining commitments and organizing quickly enough was supplanted by needing to consult with a standing membership body. What had been a single region's approach to thwarting regional hegemony was now a two-region approach. European members had to hope that the western sea power would be willing to go to war to preserve a non-hegemonic Europe despite demonstrating some hesitation twice before in the twentieth century to do so. But now the western sea power was formally committed to do just that. With any luck, the innovations will help to avoid the fate of previous European anti-hegemony coalitions – having to fight intermittently to suppress hegemonic aspirations on an ad hoc basis.

Thus, the prehistory of NATO is long and checkered by problems of coalition formation and maintenance even if it did ultimately succeed in thwarting aspiring European hegemons on multiple occasions. Institutionalization, commitments from an expanding set of small and large powers, and half of the Dehioan explanation (western sea power on one flank) has supplanted the more ad hoc nature of anti-hegemonic coalition processes of the previous 450 years. The new approach appears to have worked for 75 years but then it is also fair to say that an aspiring hegemon has not characterized NATO's threat environment for that entire period. In its absence, NATO has experimented with out-of-area campaigns (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya) with various outcomes and now confronts the expansion of one large state into the territory of a small non-member that is adjacent to the borders of some NATO members. That is the sort of thing organizations do when their initial raison d'etre seems outdated. New activities are taken on to preserve the organization's continued functioning. But in the NATO case, the problem is complicated by intermittent, continuing external threats resembling the old days' hegemonic expansion. So, unexpectedly, some of the most recent novel NATO behavior may prove to be a continuation of its traditional function. William Faulkner's observation about the American South: the past is never dead. It's not even past may also prove to be accurate for ongoing and future NATO activity.

NATO, THE EU, AND GLOBAL SECURITY: A NEW ROLE FOR EUROPE

The world desperately requires mediators and peace-makers that can help prevent the New Cold Wars and the war in Ukraine from becoming all-out global wars that imperil the planet. Unfortunately, NATO, as Europe's main global military force allied with the U.S., has long allowed itself to become an instrument of U.S. hegemonic policy, at a time when we need Europe to help reduce hegemonic aspirations of all the Great Powers, including the U.S., China and Russia. I argue here that Europe must crystallize and pursue its own foreign policy, both inside and outside NATO, to defend its own economies and security and to advance global collective security in alliance with the Global South and progressive popular forces in Europe and around the world. Success would change and limit NATO, seeking to restrain it from pursuing New Cold Wars and making it a new partner in pursuing global peace and collective security.

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NATO operates today within the context of the New Cold Wars between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China.[1] The New Cold Wars - and the expansion of NATO – are propelled by bi-partisan U.S. foreign policy to sustain its global hegemony as well as by NATO policy and by intense European fear of Russian aggression after the invasion of Ukraine.

The world desperately requires mediators and peace-makers that can help prevent the New Cold Wars and the war in Ukraine from becoming all-out global wars that imperil the planet. Unfortunately, NATO, as Europe's main global military force allied with the U.S., has long allowed itself to become an instrument of U.S. hegemonic policy, at a time when we need Europe to help reduce hegemonic aspirations of all the Great Powers, including the U.S., China and Russia.[2] Fortunately, Europe's interests and policy are not exclusively tied to NATO, and Europe has long been struggling to define its independent foreign policy from the U.S., even as the EU and NATO continuously negotiate to build a strong partnership as in its 2022 Strategic Concept and its January, 2023, Third Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation.[3]

I argue here that Europe must crystallize and pursue its foreign policy, both inside and outside NATO, to defend its economies and security and to advance global collective security in alliance with the Global South and progressive popular forces in Europe and around the world. This does not necessarily imply leaving NATO but making significant change. It requires fully recognizing Europe and the EU as entities with their own values and interests, as well as rejecting U.S. hegemonic policy and the current expansionist NATO agenda. It also requires recognizing the historic Western and Great Power biases of European mediation efforts, as perceived by other nations.[4] Overcoming such biases requires working closely with non-aligned nations in the Global South. Success would change and limit NATO, seeking to restrain it from pursuing New Cold Wars and making it a new partner in pursuing global peace and collective security.[5]

1) Michael Hirsh, "We Are Now in a Global Cold War," Foreign Policy, 27 June 2022.

2) Ding Gang, "NATO Expansionist Agenda a Threat to Global Security, a US Tool to Control EU and Enhance Hegemonic Manipulation Capacity," Global Times, 29 June 2022.

3) "Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation," NATO/OTAN, 10 January 2023.

4) Ole Elgstrom, Natali, Michele Knodt, Pactrick Muller and Sharon Pardo, "Perceptions of the EU's Role in the Ukraine-Russia and the Israel-Palestine Conflicts: A Biased Mediator," International Negotiation, April 2018.

5) Michael McGwire, "NATO Expansion 'A Policy Error of Historic Importance," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24 (1998): p. 23-42.

Collective security is not a new or novel agenda for Europe. As late as the 1990s, Europe built a Common Security architecture. It included the Paris Charter, the NATO-Russian Founding Framework, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which issued the noteworthy 1999 Istanbul Summit OSCE memorandum.[6] The European concept was that no nation would seek greater security at the expense of any other. This principle has been eroding with the expansion of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[7]

NATO members such as France and Türkiye have recently shown some initiative in moving beyond the New Cold War framework; as such, they are potentially trying to renew Common Security and turn Europe itself into an independent negotiating coalition that would help end the Ukrainian war and bring the international community - including much of the Global South - into an independent force limiting the Great Powers. It may be hard to imagine NATO – and a Europe within NATO – aligning itself with the Global South in this way. Still, there are the Collective Security historical traditions, strong economic interests and peace and collective security movements in Europe and the EU that could support such new policy, both for Europe and a transformed NATO.[8] There are also U.S. labor interests and peace movements that support such change. Leading U.S. public intellectuals argue that NATO expansion and militarism must be urgently curtailed and ultimately prevented in the context of the Ukraine conflict, U.S. Hegemony and the New Cold Wars.[9] In addition, many nations in the Global South reject current U.S. and NATO policies in the New Cold War and would support a Europe seeking to help build an international mediating role to bridge Great Power rivals in the New Cold Wars and move the world from hegemony toward peaceful diplomacy and collective security.[10]

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6) OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Istanbul Summit, 1999. For a discussion of the Common Security architecture and vision, see Joseph Gerson, "Ukraine, the Deepening Euro-Atlantic Crisis and Common Security Possibilities, Common Dreams," 3 May 2023.

7) Joseph Gerson, 3 May 2023.

8) Joseph Gerson, 3 May 2023. For a discussion of how European public opinion about the New Cold Wars – and the European popular view that their own nations and themselves are not part of these Cold Wars, especially with China, in contrast to the US, the EU and NATO, see Ivan Krasteve, "What Europeans think about the US-China Cold War," European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021.

9) Noam Chomsky, "Chomsky: A Stronger NATO is the Last Thing We need as the Russsa-Ukraine War Turns 1," Truthout, 23 January 2023. See also Andrew Bacevich, "The Ukraine Conflict is not About American Freedom," The Nation, 28 April 2022.

10) For commentary on African and Latin American dissent from US and NATO maximalism, especially in the light of the Ukrainian war, see the voices of African and Latin American analysts represented in a broader discussion of Ukraine; they clearly dissent from the US and European analysts who support a more maximalist position. "The Invasion That Shook the World," Global Memo, Council of Councils, 22 February 2023.

Russia's brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine has dramatically intensified the New Cold War between the U.S. and Russia. Both sides are escalating the conflict into a protracted and deadly conflict in which nobody benefits. The position on both sides has been maximalist, fearing that any concessions to start negotiations will lead to weakness and defeat in the larger New Cold War.

> *"The European concept was that no nation would seek greater security at the expense of any other. This principle has been eroding with the expansion of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union."*

All interests require concessions on both sides as all-out victory by either side will be disastrous for peace and risks of nuclear conflict. This will destroy Ukraine and risk global nuclear war. But maximalist strategy reflects the U.S. and Russia's foreign policy, while destructive to Ukraine, Europe and the global South.

Like the Old Cold War, the New Cold War is functional for both the U.S. and Russia. Each needs the other – a credible evil enemy - to justify foreign expansion and pacify their domestic populations restive because of internal economic and social/ political crises. While long serving vital aims of the U.S. and Russia, these interests do not serve Europe and are destructive to the rest of the world.[11]

Since maximalist agendas of both the U.S. and Russia are not in the interest of Europe or NATO, both have strong incentives to break from current American policy as well as to oppose both Russian and U.S. expansion. I analyze what this implies for the NATO policy regarding Ukraine, Russian aggression and American hegemonic policy, and the alliance between the U.S. and Europe. I conclude by looking briefly at domestic socio-economic and political forces and movements in Europe and the U.S. that can help move Europe and NATO away from U.S. maximalism and hegemony.

From Maximalism and U.S. Hegemony to Mediation and International Global Collective Security

The shift of NATO and Europe from maximalism and U.S. hegemony to a new global mediating role requires 1) changing current European and NATO policy in Ukraine, including rejecting Zelensky's maximalism 2) rejecting current NATO embrace of U.S. maximalism in the larger global New Cold War, 3) changing current European

11) Charles Derber and Suren Moodliar, *Dying for Capitalism: How Big Money Fuels Extinction and What We Can Do About It* (Routledge 2023), Chapters 4 and 8.

and NATO policy toward European defense and security and 4) changing current European and NATO policy toward China, the Global South and global collective security.

Ukraine

Following the lead of the U.S., NATO has been helping sponsor Zelensky 's maximalist policy for defending Ukraine. Zelensky has increasingly taken a clear maximalist position – no concessions of any territory. Zelensky proclaims Ukraine must regain all territory taken over or annexed by Russia before or during the 2022 Russian invasion, including Crimea, the Donbass, and other Eastern autonomous regions of Ukraine. But such maximalism will prolong the war and further destroy Ukraine while also peeling off support in the U.S. and Europe as the war grinds on, something already happening as Ukrainian support weakens in parts of the U.S. and Europe. Ukraine must enter negotiations prepared, as in all peace negotiations, to compromise. Failure to do so will risk total destruction of Ukraine and further loss of global support.[12]

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Acting both within and outside NATO, Europe needs to play a significant role in helping jump-start negotiations by making clear to Zelensky that it will not continue indefinitely to provide massive arms and political support to Ukraine without a shift in Ukraine's maximalism. Europe should proclaim that while it and NATO oppose Russian aggression and support Ukrainian sovereignty, Ukraine must offer concessions to survive and get a durable peace from which they can recover and gain aid from all other nations. This will require explicitly limiting current NATO

12) Jonathan Steele, "Ukraine's Grim Choice: Why Surrender May Be the Honorable Option," Counterpunch, 7 March 2022.

and European aid and conditioning future assistance to a Ukraine open to immediate negotiations, a demand of many current European peace movements, discussed later.[13]

The war in Ukraine is not just a military catastrophe for Ukraine but an economic disaster for Europe. Re-arming Europe and pouring unlimited money into NATO in an endless war is creating a European financial crisis, threatening the financing of the social welfare, generous wages, and climate policies that have defined European identity for decades.[14] The greatest threat to European security is the economic costs of endless war in Ukraine and the New Cold War; that threat must be stopped initially by an immediate cease-fire in Ukraine which growing numbers of European leaders and peace movements are beginning to support.

NATO, Europe, and the U.S. Hegemony

European critique or distancing of itself from U.S. policy appears complex, as it fears Russian expansion more than ever. But the only way to reduce Russian aggression is to build bridges with Russia. Russia believes with justification that U.S. and NATO movements toward the Russian border after the unification of Germany are a violation of the 1989 verbal agreement between the American Secretary of State, James Baker, and Soviet Premier Gorbachev to move NATO not "one inch further" toward Russia.[15] Russia perceives this violation as just the latest form of Western aggression toward and invasion of Russia that follows invasions by Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler and U.S. expansion during the Cold War. Europe can be safe only if Russia feels safe, which ultimately means Europe, and NATO itself, must move away from the New Cold War militarism in the U.S. and shift Europe, acting inside and outside of NATO, away from hegemonic U.S. global aspirations. This will help reduce Russian fear and aggression, thus beginning to increase European and American security and as shown later, awaken peace movements throughout Europe.

NATO, European Defense, and Relative Autonomy of Europe from the U.S.

Since the end of World War II, European security has been primarily outsourced to the U.S., through NATO and European acceptance of U.S. hegemony as its own security guarantee.[16] Ukraine appears to make this dependency on the U.S. even more intense, but peace in Ukraine, as well as in the larger world community, requires a more independent European voice. Europe has long had independent

13) Jonathan Steele, March 2022. See also Noam Chomsky, 28 April 2022.

14) Patricia Cohen and Liz Alderman, "The 'Peace Dividend' is Over in Europe. Now Comes the Hard Tradeoffs," NY Times, 3 May 2023.

15) Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrin, "Deal or No Deal: The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion," International Security, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Spring 2016).

16) Max Bermann, James Amond, Siena Cicarellit, "The Case for EU Defense," CAP, 1 June 2021.

economic interests and political ideologies from the U.S., expressed after the end of World War II in support for social democratic European economic and social policy and a collective security foreign policy focus that rejected the possibility of new European empires and more World Wars that would destroy Europe again. Today, some leaders, political parties, civil society and peace movements in France, Germany, Spain and the rest of Europe are looking for ways to build independent European defense and trade as well as create a more independent foreign policy that is non-hegemonic and the foundation of a more autonomous Europe. Acting within and outside of NATO, Europe must resist U.S. policy and its own fears of a more autonomous foreign policy to promote European and collective security. This position will allow Europe to mediate between Europe and Russia in the New Cold War and begin the long process of moving NATO and the world toward a post-hegemonic world order. Some European governments and peace movements are beginning to promote this vision, reflecting public feelings and movements in parts of Europe and in much of the Global South.[17]

NATO and Europe, China, and the Global South

Much like Europe, China and the Global South have an interest in ending the war in Ukraine and the New Cold War between the U.S. and Russia. The Ukraine war could go nuclear and imperil survival of the entire world; escalation of conventional wars has always been the most probable way that a nuclear war would begin.[18] War in Ukraine is also creating global food supply issues, economic global downturns, and deeper conflicts among Russian and U.S. and NATO allies. More broadly, the rest of the world has a massive stake in avoiding a New Cold war, where the ultimate victims are the Global South subject to big power New Cold war post-colonialism. That is why much of the world is moving toward negotiation rather than maximalist support of either side.[19] Europe, inside and outside of NATO, needs to help sponsor and join these effects in Ukraine and the larger New Cold Wars between the U.S. and U.S. and China itself. In the long run, this would transform NATO itself from an instrument of U.S. hegemonic policy to a global partner with the Global South for a global collective security system.

17) See the argument for an autonomous European voice by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Olaf Scholz, "The Global Zeitenwende, "How to Avoid. New Cold War in a Multipolar Era," Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2022.

18) Willaim A. Schwartz and Charles Derber et.al, *The Nuclear Seduction* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993).

19) Jonathan Guyer, "Why Some Countries Don't Want to Pick a Side in Russia's War in Ukraine: Superpower Wars are Back, Can the Global South Find Inspiration From the Non-Aligned Movement?" Vox, 9 June 2022. https://www.vox.com/23156512/russia-ukraine-war-global-south-nonaligned-movement

As the war has intensified and become more dangerous, the rest of the world has increasingly shown interest in helping broker a peace in Ukraine and, ultimately, to avoid war between the U.S. and Russia. This is partially reflected in the declarations of many nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, including some that initially voted with the U.S., NATO, and Ukraine in the General Assembly, that they do not support current U.S. and NATO increases of military aid to Ukraine, and seek immediate negotiations and a cease-fire. An example is President Lula da Silva of Brazil, who has expressed horror about the war and the urgent need to start negotiations now before it is too late. Another example is India, which was one of 32 Global South nations which abstained to support the 23 February 2023 General Assembly resolution in support of the U.S. and Ukraine; India has consistently refused to condemn Russia's invasion, has purchased Russian oil, and rejected other U.S. trade sanctions on Russia.[20] Other Global South nations are expressing similar views, and many support efforts by the leaders of France, China, Türkiye, Brazil and India to take a neutral role and not support U.S. or NATO positions.[21]

This posture reflects the Global South's long experience with Big Power hegemony, that historically led to Western colonialism and military subjugation of less developed countries. Indeed, as noted above, the Old and New Cold Wars essentially served as a legitimating discourse for the Great Powers to expand into the Global South and subjugate them, in the name of "protecting" them from rival predatory or imperial powers. While this unwillingness of the Global South to support what the U.S. calls its "rules-based global order" is not well understood by many in the U.S., it reflects the reality that U.S. hegemony and the Old and New Cold Wars have always hurt the Global South most intensely; in fact, subjugating the Global South has long been a major purpose of Great Power Cold Wars.[22] After centuries of their own colonial Empires, the Europeans do not experience the views of the Global South in the same way. Still, their own destruction in two World Wars allows them to understand it more than Americans, who felt that the World Wars propelled them to global dominance. European memory of its devastation in World Wars may be fading in current younger European generations. Still, it remains a foundation for many Europeans to promote anti-hegemonic concepts of collective security that can help propel Europe as an essential mediator of the New Cold Wars, along with the Global South.

20) Stanly John, "Positing India's stand on the war in Ukraine," The Hindu, 2 March 2003.

21) Jonathan Guyer, 9 June 2022. Matias Spektor, "In Defense of the Fence Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong About Hedging," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023.

22) Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (NY: Holt, 2004).

China is a particular case of the rest of the world. It has been a victim for centuries of Western colonialism but is now also a rising Great Power itself embroiled in its own New Cold War with the U.S.. Taiwan could become the Ukraine of the increasingly dangerous rivalry between the U.S. and China, leading to war in what Graham Allison has famously called "Thucydides' Trap" in which a reigning hegemon feels threatened by a rising hegemon, leading inexorably to war.[23]

But war is not inevitable, and Europe is a major player who could help prevent it. Europe needs urgently to help mediate and limit the escalating conflict between the U.S. and China. Europe has strong economic and political interests in building its own peaceful relations with China. It can ally with the Global South to help lead a collective security movement to de-escalate and ultimately stop both New Cold Wars that could blow up the planet. This would enhance European stature in the world, increase European independence from the U.S. and reduce potential aggression both from Russia and China. It would help build European economies by opening up more friendly investment and trade opportunities in Russia, China, and much of the world.

European policy is still in flux. In April 2023, the EU's top foreign policy minister, Josep Borrel, called for European military exercises in the straits of Taiwan to signal support the EU's support for Taiwan's traditional autonomy.[24] While the EU and some European nations have increasingly expressed opposition to China's growing aggressive posture toward Taiwan, Europe has also expressed concern about the American maximalist policy against China as an enemy or rival, and have traditionally tried to maintain its own economic and strategic relations with China, that do not fully align with the American aggressive hostility to China and its rising power. French President Macron's April 2023 trip to China was an open rebuff to U.S. definition of China as an enemy or "adversary," with the French leader calling for an independent and more cooperative European relation to China, and expansion of trade and investment projects with China.[25] While some EU officials quickly rejected Macron's trip as showcasing for domestic purposes, some European governments and parts of the European public, quietly supported the underlying purpose. Many European nations are interested in expanding trade and investment in China. Decoupling from the Chinese economy as advocated by maximalist U.S. New Cold War policy would be against the interests of Europe and the Global South.[26] Moreover, Europe and the EU have broader interests in

23) Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?* (NY: Mariner, 2018).

24) Stuart Lau, "Send War Ships to Taiwan Strait, Borrell Urges EU Governments," Politico, 23 April 2023.

25) Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt, "Europe must resist pressure to become 'America's followers,' says Macron," Politico, 9 April 2023.

26) For a discussion of European decoupling from China, see Dashline, "2023: EU Decoupling from China?" 18 January 2023.

assuming a new leadership in limiting the New Cold Wars and building a world based on international law, cooperation and collective security, including a NATO supporting these aspirations.[27]

Europe is a site of foreign policy contestation, with great consequences for global peace. The U.S. government will continue to use NATO to seek American maximalism, and subordinate European interests to U.S. hegemony. But Europe has always had interests and values promoting an independent Europe and EU. In the context of the New Cold Wars, it is both possible and essential that

Europe pursues an autonomous foreign policy, both inside and outside NATO. Such a policy must advance global collective security and mediate Big Power conflict in concert with the Global South, while opposing hegemony of any Great Power. Forces within both Europe and the U.S., as well as the rest of the world, are rising to support this agenda.

Conclusion: Promoting Collective Security in Europe and NATO

The new role for Europe advanced here – both inside and outside NATO - is an urgent necessity for peace and global survival. Where powerful forces are working against it, there are also essential interests and movements to promote such changes in both Europe and NATO.

The forces opposing such urgent changes are mainly Big Power governments, especially the U.S.. NATO itself largely acts, as already discussed, as an instrument of U.S. hegemony. The global forces supporting the Big Power status quo are thus potent. But they can and are being opposed by domestic social and political movements of ordinary people and activists within the U.S. and Europe itself, acting in solidarity with nations and peoples in the Global South who share an interest in moving toward global collective security. After all, their survival is at stake, as is the public's economic well-being in Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the world. We conclude by looking briefly at interests, forces and movements in Europe and the U.S. that can change their own nations and global security arrangements, including significantly changing NATO itself.

The historical legacy of complete European destruction through two World Wars has left a deep popular sentiment against hegemony and war in Europe. Two generations after two World Wars questioned centuries-old policies of European policies of Empire, colonialism, and hegemony. After World II, Europeans rejected traditional

27) Charles Derber and Suren Moodliar, *Dying for Capitalism* (NY and London: Routledge, 2023).

European militarism and supported the United Nations and global collective security. True, they relied on the U.S. and NATO for European defense. They also sustained their commitments to a world of social democracy and peace, that helped Europe rebuild and create prosperity for new generations.[28]

Russian invasion of Ukraine has threatened to erase the European memory of the horrific costs of Western hegemony to Europe and the world. European nations such as Finland joined NATO in 2023 and Sweden has also applied, in what many, especially Russia, interpret as a major European shift toward its own new model of Western hegemony through a more expansive and aggressive NATO.[29] A long Ukrainian war -with ever more threatening Russian aggression - could institutionalize this shift and prevent the changes proposed here.

"But there are possibilities of a different European future, leading toward another NATO. Many European governments and people fear Russia and war, but they also have long feared maximalist U.S. hegemony."

But there are possibilities of a different European future, leading toward another NATO. Many European governments and people fear Russia and war, but they also have long feared maximalist U.S. hegemony. European nations and publics deeply opposed the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq, which sparked massive European peace movements and opposition in the French and German governments.[30] While Iraq was the most dramatic instance, since the end of World War II, large sectors of the European publics have tended to oppose U.S. wars in the Global South, whether 20th century Cold War interventions in Latin and Central American nations such as Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador or other imperial wars In Vietnam, Indonesia, East Timor, Angola and Palestine. More broadly, European governments and publics have been far more engaged in UN and regional peace-making forces throughout the world, as well as more supportive of the International Court, international law, and economic development strategies supportive of their own publics and the Global South, including global development and climate strategies developed at the UN.[31]

28) Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream* (NY: Tarcher, 2004). See also Derber and Moodliar, *Dying for Capitalism* (NY and London: Routledge, 2023).

29) Nicholas Lokker and Hel Hautala, "Russia Won't Sit Idly by After Finland and Sweden Join NATO," War On the Rocks: National Security for Insiders, 30 March 2023.

30) Philip H. Gordon, "The Crisis in the Alliance," Brookings, 24 February 2003.

31) EEAS "the European Union and the United Nations" 8 May 2021.

Economic interests coincide with collective security and peace interests. War and hegemony are costly, draining funds from domestic investment in jobs and social welfare. Europe has committed itself to a labor-driven social democracy and welfare state that became possible only by shifting public spending from war and imperialism to domestic public goods and development of a more sustainable and equitable society than likely in a militarized U.S., where trillions of dollars are diverted from jobs and domestic public welfare to war and empire.[32] The European public has a major stake in preserving its social welfare state, investment in public goods, and a green economy.[33]

Because these interests are so strong, both European governments and publics, including European social movements, have quietly been rising to express them, even in the heated militarist fever of the Ukrainian war. While French president Emmanuel Macron has been most visible in promoting an autonomous and mediating role for Europe, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has also pursued a more independent role for Germany and the EU, especially in the U.S. New Cold War with China. The German government has been more cautious than the U.S. would like in approving new weapons to Ukraine, while German companies and political leaders are seeking new trade and investment opportunities in China, which break with maximalist U.S. sanctions.[34] Türkiye has also rejected U.S. maximalism in Ukraine and has sought to mediate and limit the broader New Cold War conflicts.[35] Many European governments are also in a new phase of seeking a European defense and security role outside of NATO, partially stimulated by the Trumpist chaos that makes the U.S. a more unpredictable and potentially unreliable partner. This was especially clear when Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Iranian nuclear agreements that Europe saw as critical for peace and survival while restoring U.S. sanctions opposed by Europe.[36] The apparent danger to U.S. democracy at home, rooted in Republican election denialism, signals to Europeans that they have to assert a more autonomous role in their own security matters and be a more independent voice in NATO and in modeling democratic values globally.

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32) Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream* (NY: Tarcher, 2004).

33) Patricia Cohen and Liz Alderman, "The 'Peace Dividend' Is Over in Europe. Now Comes the Hard Tradeoffs," NY Times, 3 May 2023.

34) Melissa Eddy, "As US Tries to Isolate China, German Companies Move Closer," NY Times, 12 April 2023; Hans Von Der Burchard, "Germany and China Aim for June Summit Amid Taiwan Tensions," Politico, 25 April 2023.

35) Umar Farooq "Why is Turkey Trying to Mediate the Ukraine-Russia Crisis?" Al Jazeera, 28 Jan 2002; Samuel Damiano and Sergio Cantone, "Why Turkey's Erdogan is Trying to Cast Himself as the Main Mediator Between Russia and Ukraine," Euronews, 5 May 2022; Matthew Lee, "NATO allies US, Turkey Try to Mend Faces but Rifts Persist," AP, 18 January 2023.

36) Gardiner Harris and Jack Ewing, "US to Restore Sanctions on Iran, Deepening Divide with Europe," New York Times, 6 August 2018.

European and U.S. publics and social movements are rising to nourish such changes, often as part of global movements opposing U.S. neoliberalism and militarism. The Peace in Ukraine coalition, Democracy in Europe (DIEM25), and 92 U.S. organizations have called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, a centerpiece of a June 2023 Peace Summit in Vienna.[37] In 2022 and 2023 large peace protests have erupted in most of the major capitals of Europe, including Paris, Madrid and Berlin.

Democracy in Europe is allied with Progressive International (PI), co-founded by former Greek Minister of Finance Yanis Varoufakis, a global movement based on the vision of global democracy, sustainability and peace. DIEM25 promotes a European and global clean break with both U.S. and NATO hegemonic policy, in solidarity with the Global South.[38] DIEM25 seeks to democratize the EU, opposes European servitude to U.S. hegemony and end all forms of European New Cold War initiatives; it now advocates for a Green New Deal for Europe.[39]
DIEM25 joins many other European climate activists who have also advanced a European and global climate agenda that opposes U.S. militarism, a significant source of carbon emission. The ties between climate change and war are now too strong to ignore,[40] and European commitment to a leading role in combating climate change, a central issue for European political and social movements inevitably leading toward a critique of U.S. and NATO militarism. Peace movements that erupted in Europe against the U.S. war in Iraq are regrouping to oppose the new U.S. Cold Wars and U.S. and NATO maximalism. On 2 March 2023 major peace protests swept through Germany Belgium, the UK, and Italy to call for peace in Ukraine and an end to EU and NATO militarism.[41]

Interestingly, U.S. peace movements, while relatively weak today, are growing in the face of U.S. militarism and maximalism in Ukraine. The New Cold Wars are catching the attention of the U.S. public, at a time when the public interest in jobs and social programs at home are not being met.[42] This reflects extreme inequality in the U.S., spurring fears among U.S. workers who feel abandoned by U.S. neoliberalism and outsourcing of manufacturing jobs; they are identifying as part of a "precariat" that experiences severe economic insecurity and needs the U.S. government to shift

37) For a discussion of the Vienna Peace Summit and the European and US peace initiatives, see Joseph Gerson, "Ukraine, the. Deepening Euro-Atlantic Crisis and Common Security possibilities". For a discussion of Progressive International, see Progressive International "What We Do, Who We Are," Progressive international.

38) Yanis Varoufakis, "Progressive International: Today we begin organizing the world's Progressives," 5 November 2020.

39) DiEM25, "A Progressive Movement for Europe,".

40) Charles Derber and Suren Moodliar, *Dying for Capitalism* (NY and London: Routledge, 2023), especially ch. 6.

41) Breakthrough News, "Europe Rises for Peace, Protests in Europe Call for Peace in Ukraine," BT (Breakthrough News, 3 March 2023.

42) Charles Derber and Yale Magrass, *Moving Beyond Fear* (NY: Routledge, 2019), Chapter 2. Charles Derber and Suren Moodliar, *Dying for Capitalism* (NY and London: Routledge, 2023), Chapters 4, 5, and 8.

from spending on wars abroad to jobs at home.[43] It leads to U.S. public opinion shifting toward domestic concerns; a plurality of U.S. voters in early 2023 favor "isolationism."[44]

Pouring massive funds into Ukraine and more significant U.S. military spending is thus becoming a growing political issue in the U.S.. While support for U.S. hegemony and NATO has always been bi-partisan, we are seeing movements on both the Right and the Left that are challenging this consensus. On the Right, significant voices of the Trumpist Republican party are opposing the war in Ukraine, and some are looking toward withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe; Trump himself discussed pulling U.S. from NATO.[45]

The issue of U.S. hegemony and militarism has always been a focus of the U.S. Left and peace movement, particularly since the Vietnam era. U.S. progressives and the Left have long sought to withdraw U.S. troops in NATO from Europe, as part of opposition to U.S. Cold War politics. U.S. peace leaders and writers, such as Noam Chomsky, who helped found the Progressive International, increasingly try to focus the U.S. public on the dangers of NATO expansion and the risk of nuclear escalation both in Ukraine and the New Cold Wars.[46] They now support major shifts in the U.S. budget from war to desperately needed public goods at home and peace abroad. The unequivocal support for NATO is eroding both in the Republican Party, the Left of the Democratic Party, and the U.S. peace movements. These forces in the U.S. will increasingly build ties to European powers for peace and collective security, and advance support both in the US and Europe for a more autonomous Europe and a transformed NATO that advance collective security rather than hegemonic interests and wars.

43) Charles Derber and Yale Magrass, *Moving Beyond Fear* (NY: Routledge, 2019), Chapter 2.

44) Elaine Kamarck and Jordan Muchnick, "One Year into the Ukraine War – What Does the Public Think About American Involvement in the World?" Fixboc, 23 February 2023.

45) Julian Barnes and Helene Cooper, "Trump discussed Pulling US Troops from NATO, Aids say Amid New Concerns Over Russia," NY Times, 14 January 2019; Mariana Afaro, "Bolton says Trump Might have Pulled the US out of NATO if he had been Re-elected," Washington Post, 2 March 2022.

46) Noam Chomsky, 23 January 2023; The Breach, "Noam Chomsky says NATO "Most Violent Aggressive Alliance in the World," 13 April 2023.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND NATO'S EXPANSION

How can NATO's expansion maximize the benefits of emerging technologies to allied states and to further strengthen transatlantic security? This article reviews the need for deep strategic understanding. It examines theoretical and practical factors affecting emerging technologies and their diffusion inside NATO and in the context of current and future adversaries. Moreover, it highlights specific environments and areas in which new NATO states' experience and domain expertise are likely to contribute to the alliance and explores the role of emerging technologies in defense strategy. Specific recommendations regarding Arctic operations, emerging technologies, and Track II diplomatic efforts are proposed.

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When NATO conducted its first major strategic review, over a decade ago, it was observed that:

Less predictable is the possibility that research breakthroughs will transform the technological battlefield. Allies and partners should be alert for potentially disruptive developments in such dynamic areas as information and communications technology, cognitive and biological sciences, robotics, and nanotechnology [emphasis added] …. The most destructive periods of history tend to be those when the means of aggression have gained the upper hand in the art of waging war.[1]

While the suggestion that such emerging technologies will enable a new class of weapons that will alter the geopolitical landscape remains to be realized, several unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for international security, defense policy, foreign policy, and cooperation among allies. The extent to which these and other newer emerging technologies may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that NATO currently faces and is likely to encounter in the future needs to be further examined.

That short passage from the first strategic concept review conceptually highlights the uncertainty, complexity, and interdependence issues in trying to understand the interactions between emerging technologies and international security. To put it diplomatically, predicting how these innovations and breakthroughs in scientific understanding may be used is a challenge. Looking to history is one valuable past insight. However, one must be careful not to be purely technologically deterministic. That is not to assume that because something is possible, or something potentially may come about, that it is inevitable. History shows us that human ingenuity and use are more often a function of political decisions, regional security threats, and other factors of social, political, historical, economic, and cultural origin.

Previously I co-authored "Emerging Technologies and National Security: Russia, NATO, & the European Theater"[2] with former NATO SACEUR General (ret) Phillip Breedlove for the Hoover Institute's Governance in an Emerging New World project. This paper leverages that work and extends it considering the needs

1) NATO, "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010. http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html

2) Phillip Breedlove and Margaret E. Kosal, "Emerging Technologies and National Security: Russia, NATO, & the European Theater," Governance in an Emerging New World, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, 25 February 2019. https://www.hoover.org/research/emerging-technologies-and-national-security-russia-nato-european-theater

of NATO expansion.

Finland and Sweden have both been close partner states of NATO as participants in the "Partnership for Peace" program since 1994. Both have trained and exercised with NATO. And both Finland and Sweden contributed military forces to NATO operations and missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. The military technology of these two states is largely compatible with NATO militaries. They possess advanced capabilities that have already benefited NATO allies. For example, Sweden is recognized as "one of the [U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Comparative Testing] FCT program's best sources of innovative technologies"[3] Both states are viewed as being substantial contributors to helping "NATO maintain military technology advantage,"[4] especially but not only in the context of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.

"The impact of NATO expansion for technology generally and emerging technologies more specifically, is likely to be significant in two ways. First, in terms of expertise in environments of increasing importance in the context of climate change and great power competition... Second, the expansion of NATO is significant in the context of commitment to NATO's shared values and willingness to act to maintain those shared values, which should contribute to stability in the Baltic region, across Europe, and beyond."

The impact of NATO expansion for technology generally and emerging technologies more specifically, is likely to be significant in two ways. First, in terms of expertise in environments of increasing importance in the context of climate change and great power competition. Finland and Sweden bring expertise in the Arctic and sub-Arctic climates as well as the undersea environments. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2022, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Celeste Wallander noted that "Sweden's 'military expertise in the Arctic and undersea environments would substantially advance alliance capabilities'."[5] Finland's expertise in operations in cold weather

3) Brandi Vincent, "Pentagon exploring new Swedish military technology amid talks of NATO expansion," FedScoop, 9 May 2022, https://fedscoop.com/pentagon-exploring-new-swedish-military-technology-amid-talks-of-nato-expansion/

4) Meredith Roaten, "Pentagon Seeks Out Swedish Tech Partnerships," Defense News, 26 May 2022. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/5/26/pentagon-seeks-out-swedish-tech-partnerships

5) Jim Garamone, "DOD Official Touts Sweden, Finland Joining NATO," DOD News, 22 June 2022.

environments is well-recognized, if not legendary.[6]

Second, the expansion of NATO is significant in the context of commitment to NATO's shared values and willingness to act to maintain those shared values, which should contribute to stability in the Baltic region, across Europe, and beyond. How that may affect emerging technologies may be less direct but is no less critical.

Technology and War – the Scholarly Context

Consideration of challenges to international security and policy-making as a result of scientific and technological advancements is not novel. Anticipating and responding to potential emerging threats to security and understanding disruptive technologies are intrinsic to the security dilemma. Consideration of the relationship between technology and conflict has a substantial and deep history across the social sciences as a determinant of global power.[7] Within security studies, there is rich literature theorizing and empirically exploring the intersection of science, and technology, and understanding the outcomes of armed conflict.[8] In the later 20th century, one predominant political science and international relations model for understanding the conditions under which conflict and cooperation are likely and how technology can contribute to increasing instability in the international system or decrease it was the Offense-Defense model.[9] An advantage of defensive technology over offensive technology lowers the cost/benefit equation of the attacker and, in the words of Clausewitz, "tame(s) the elementary impetuosity of War."[10] Offensive ascendency, conversely, creates a sense of urgency for states to develop more outstanding offensive capabilities and seek out alliances, further increasing tensions. Emerging technologies, like nanotechnologically-enabled meta-materials, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and neurotechnology, may

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3071022/dod-official-touts-sweden-finland-joining-nato/

6) Bair Irincheev, *War of the White Death: Finland Against the Soviet Union, 1939-40* (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2012).

7) Turner, Ralph. "Technology and Geopolitics," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1943): p. 5-15.

8) Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Trevor Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980); Steven P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); EB Skolinikoff, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Etel Solingen, *Scientists and the State: Domestic Structures and the International Context* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); John Arquilla, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy,* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002); Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Science of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Warren Chin, "Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future," *International Affairs*, Vol. 95, No 4 (July 2019): p. 765-783; Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds, *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

9) Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978): p. 167-214.

10) Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by J.J. Graham, 1874, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm

problematize Offense-Defense theory via challenges to distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons.[11] This work doesn't seek to resolve that issue but notes that emerging technologies may entangle it further. Another major area of scholarly work has considered how emerging technologies may challenge existing laws, including the law of armed conflict, international environmental law, and arms control treaties, and need to govern the introduction, implementation, and use of emerging technologies as a means or method of warfare.[12]

Since WWII, the NATO alliance has seen the nexus between technology and military affairs as not just speculation but a reality that bears directly on the propensity for conflict and outcomes of war, as well as the efficacy of security cooperation and coercive statecraft. It is a critical variable in international security: military outcomes and technological advances are intricately tied.

Technology and NATO Security Environment

In order to understand the changing paradigms for national security in the 21st century and begin to probe its implications for NATO expansion, it is crucial to have an awareness of the factors driving new and emerging capabilities, possesses the ability to analyze the changing nature of technological progress and assess potential impacts on the nature of conflict, and understand the relationships among cutting-edge science, advanced technology, other trends, and international security.

For the U.S. and its allies, dominance in conventional and sophisticated military operations has been enabled by a technological advantage in precision, speed, stealth, tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance compared to adversaries.[13] Equally innovative and more revolutionary capabilities will be required in order to ensure dominance and security in the 21st century—when adversaries span from rising and revisionist peer competitor nation-states to disperse insurgencies and lone-wolf non-state actors. Globalization of technology has leveled the playing field internationally to some extent, and NATO faces more complex security challenges than at any time in its past. Additionally, adversaries are increasing their ability to adopt and adapt technology more rapidly than defense

11) Margaret E. Kosal and J. Wes Stayton, "Meta-materials: Threat to the Global Status Quo?" in *Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare: Development, Use, and Proliferation*, ed. M.E. Kosal (New York: Springer Academic Publishers, 2019): p. 135-154.

12) Kobi Leins, *New War Technologies and International Law: The Legal Limits to Weaponising Nanomaterials* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021); Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLaughlin (eds), *New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict* (Holland TMC Asser, 2014).

13) Defense Science Board, 2006 Summer Study on 21St Century Technology Vectors, February 2007. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-02-Summer_Study_Strategic_Tech_Vectors_Vol_I_Web.pdf & http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-02-Summer_Study_Strategic_Tech_Vectors_Vol_II_Web.pdf

establishments can respond. The changing global environment requires NATO and its member states to carefully evaluate new developments in politics and technology, to shape programs in response, and to be willing to take risks.

> *"For the U.S. and its allies, dominance in conventional and sophisticated military operations has been enabled by a technological advantage in precision, speed, stealth, tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance compared to adversaries."*

What are the roles and significance of emerging technologies, and how should the NATO community respond to the promise and perils of emerging technologies? How will these nascent scientific and technological developments impact local, regional, and international security, stability, and cooperation? What are the most likely sources of technological surprise with the most significant threat capacity and how can the national security community better identify them sooner? Emerging technologies present regional security challenges and may exacerbate (or mitigate) the future geopolitical, military, energy, and economic challenges to a state or region and the potential impacts on state interests and international security. A deep strategic and practical understanding of the significance of emerging technology and its diffusion, as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, and inter- and intra-national social relations interact to shape and facilitate the management of the changing global security landscape, is a pressing need for the 21st century.

The author readily acknowledges that there are additional factors beyond technology that will dominate and drive a changing, new strategic environment. These include, but are not limited to, demographics – smaller populations in some states, youth bulges, and increasingly aging populations in other states. Outside of Russia, much of the discussion revolves around megacities and dense urban conflict, which is about people and environments not just structures.

The balance across the acquisitions "iron triangle" of survivability, mobility, and lethality (or firepower) will very soon reach the end of 'era' of physical mass providing protection, even for ground troops. With a near-peer competitor and other operating scenarios, it is likely to be those capabilities that shift the approach to

survivability from protection via mass (which is limiting) to capabilities for active defense and capabilities such as metamaterials that can make objects invisible or ideas like the use of "swarms" by adversaries.[14] Regarding lethality, directed energy weapons are needed; we have to get away from relying solely on traditional explosives and heavy projectiles. New ways to generate, store, and convert power are needed, including at the individual level, such as through harvesting otherwise wasted energy of footsteps striking the ground or other movements.[15] Information and communications technologies (aka cyber-everything) are emerged – not emerging technologies. When the individual is directly connected to the internet or other enhancements are possible, what does that mean for the laws of war? People are likely to learn more quickly by computers hooked into the mind. Do we want to go to that? We may be forced to go to that. The use of augmented reality and man-machine interface portends questions of how such cutting-edge capabilities will affect the balance of power and conflict.[16] The author doesn't claim to project how an adversary will fight – no one's crystal ball has that level of fidelity. However, looking to such emerging technologies offers scenarios to capabilities in which mass is relied upon to protect so it doesn't limit mobility.

Disruptive Technologies & Defense Strategy

Disruptive technology is distinctive because it upsets the established way of doing things. It causes shifts that change the world. Novel technologies are one of the principal means of surprising adversaries or competitors and disrupting established ways of doing things. It is, however, essential to recognize that not all innovative, novel, new or emerging technologies or innovative use of technology are disruptive. Some new technologies and capabilities stay in the laboratory, many start-ups fail when taking the technology to market, and plenty of new and innovative technologies or use of technology never disseminate.

14) Margaret E. Kosal and J. Wes Stayton, "Meta-materials: Threat to the Global Status Quo?" in *Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare: Development, Use, and Proliferation*, ed. M.E. Kosal (New York: Springer Academic Publishers, 2019), 135-154.

15) Yong Qin, Xudong Wang & Zhong Lin Wang, "Microfibre–nanowire hybrid structure for energy scavenging," *Nature*, Vol. 451 (2008): p. 809-813, https://www.nature.com/articles/nature06601; Carlos García Núñez, Libu Manjakkal & Ravinder Dahiya, "Energy autonomous electronic skin," npj *Flexible Electronics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2019): p. 1-24, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41528-018-0045-x; Minbaek Lee, Chih-Yen Chen, Sihong Wang, Seung Nam Cha, Yong Jun Park, Jong Min Kim, Li-Jen Chou, Zhong Lin Wang, "A Hybrid Piezoelectric Structure for Wearable Nanogenerators," *Advanced Materials*, Vol. 24 (2012).

16) Margaret E. Kosal and Joy Putney, "Neurotechnology and International Security: Predicting Commercial and Military Adoption of Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) in the US and China," *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2023): p. 81-103, https://doi:10.1017/pls.2022.2

To be disruptive, technologies do need not be radical or novel from an engineering or technical perspective.[17] In fact, another class of disruptive technology is important to acknowledge: innovative use or misuse of existing technology. Using a combination of existing technologies in novel ways can also result in a disruptive capability.

In defense policy, an offset strategy is a central concept applied to national security involving technological capabilities, specifically targeting disruptive technologies. Offset strategies have used technological innovation to counter the strength of adversaries and deter them. Three offset strategies since WWII are commonly cited. The first offset strategy used a nuclear based deterrence strategy to offset Soviet land forces, proximity to Europe, and conventional superiority in Europe. In order to counter and deter the Soviet adversary, the U.S. and NATO relied on massive retaliation and use of nuclear weapons. The first offset strategy was a success. The second offset began in the 1970s. As the Soviets developed their nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, a new strategy was needed to counter and deter the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior conventional forces and address Soviet advances in strategic nuclear capabilities in the late stages of the Cold War. The second offset strategy invested in developing stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and space-based reconnaissance and navigation capabilities. Second offset capabilities and conventional military superiority were demonstrated during the First Gulf War. The disruptive technology of the second offset has proliferated widely and adversaries (specifically, near-peers) have narrowed the technology gap.

In the case of some states, such as Russia, not only does one need to consider advances in high technology for traditional military applications but also consider innovations and uses below the level of declared war, i.e., what is referred to as hybrid warfare, the grey zone, non-linear war, or war below the line (of the Gerasimov "doctrine"). These terms have been taken to mean the use of subversion, information warfare, and covert activities literally to prepare the battlefield before intervention, or what George Kennan called political war: "the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives,"[18] seeking to undermine influence abroad and in Europe specifically and to weaken the post-WWII rules-based international order. Leveraging all aspects of national power, political warfare spans military, diplomatic, information, and economic arenas and includes both covert and overt activities.

17) National Research Council. *Persistent Forecasting of Disruptive Technology*, Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2010).

18) A. Ross Johnson, "George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare," History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 30 April 1948. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320

Additionally, while the calculus for use in a traditional state-on-state military conflict may not have changed substantially,[19] Russia and its allies are using unconventional weapons, namely chemical agents, in non-traditional ways. Chemical weapons, which once seemed to be nearing status as an artifact of history in the first decade of the 21st century have re-emerged as weapons for targeted assassinations by states like Russia and the DPRK, and these prohibited weapons have been used against insurgents and civilians as part of Syria's civil wars. The long-standing chemical weapons taboo has been shattered, repeatedly.

Concluding Remarks

Emerging technologies present regional security challenges and may exacerbate (or mitigate) the future geopolitical, military, energy, and economic challenges to a state or region and the potential impacts on NATO's interests and security. A deep strategic and practical understanding of the significance of emerging technology and its diffusion as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, and inter- and intra-national social relations interact to shape and facilitate management of the changing global security landscape is a pressing need for the 21st century.

In order to transform the current paradigm of incremental and evolutionary improvements of defense acquisition programs and systems, recognition of the need to leap ahead and embrace truly far-sighted concepts as well as foster integrated, multi-disciplinary, and cross-cutting basic research approaches is warranted – such as recent dramatic advances within and at the nexus of nanoscience, materials science, catalysis, supramolecular science, bioinformatics, cellular materials, genomics, proteomics, metabolomics, information sciences, and the cognitive sciences. It's much more important that just funding. It is program management, oversight, and implementation that is risk tolerant. And at a foundational level, it's all about people.

One approach that would benefit NATO is further reinvigorating science diplomacy. The instruments of broader science diplomacy include means like MOUs and other official government-to-government interactions: the classic tools of traditional Track I diplomacy. Science diplomacy has perhaps made the most significant impact in foreign policy as a part of Track II diplomatic efforts: informal diplomacy between individuals who are not officially empowered to act on behalf of the state but are working in accordance with a state's foreign policy goals interact through dialogue, exchanges, cooperative programs, or other means as part of increasing cooperation and transparency or decreasing conflict among states. Track II efforts with nuclear

19) Geoffrey Chapman, Hassan Elbahtimy & Susan B. Martin "The Future of Chemical Weapons: Implications from the Syrian Civil War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 27, No 4 (2018): p. 704-733.

physicists and other scientists during the Cold War are legendary, in the best ways.[20]

In many ways, nuclear diplomacy of the Cold War may be argued as the pinnacle of Track II science diplomacy. Overall, Track II science diplomacy has been an under-utilized tool since then, which may be ironic considering that since the early 1990s, the world has become increasingly technologically dependent and technology has enabled the spread, at an unprecedented rate, of scientific knowledge, capabilities, and materials globally.

In the context of NATO's expansion and emerging threats creating Track II efforts that coordinate with the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) military-to-military efforts, often at the flag-and-general-officer level, is one potential route. Programs like the University of Alaska Fairbanks' Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CSAR) and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) collaborative community of interest represent models that might be emulated with a technological focus or Arctic focus. Such programs might also partner with universities or other organizations from NATO states to focus on bringing together emerging technology to address security needs in the Arctic and Arctic/sub-Arctic undersea environments.

As NATO expands and looks to the future – whether dominated by extremist groups co-opting advanced weapons in the world of globalized non-state actors or states engaged in persistent regional conflicts in areas of strategic interest – new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. Choices made today that affect science and technology will impact how ably the NATO alliance can and will respond. The changing strategic environment in which security operations are planned and conducted impacts science and technology policy choices made today and affects how science and technology may play a beneficial or harmful role in the future. Some game-changing technologies have received global attention, while others may be less well known; these new technologies and discoveries may significantly alter military capabilities and may generate new threats against military and civilian sectors.

20) Ola Dahlman, Frode Ringdal, Jenifer Mackby, and Svein Mykkeltveit, "The inside story of the Group of Scientific Experts and its key role in developing the CTBT verification regime," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 27, No 1-3 (2020): p. 181-200; John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (Oxford University Press, 1999); Siegfried S. Hecker, ed., *Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers* (Los Alamos: Bathtub Row Press, 2016).

INDIGENIZING NATO

The expansion of NATO in the Arctic has been greeted with enthusiasm by its Arctic member-states. However, states are not the only actors in the Arctic, and there is the real risk of opposition to NATO's ambitions in the Arctic from Indigenous peoples living there. The success of NATO's strategy in the Arctic will depend on its abilities to strike collaborations with Indigenous peoples. The way to do that is to indigenize NATO. Indigenous knowledge ought to be identified as a significant resource which NATO needs in order to be able to operate in the Arctic, and especially Indigenous capacities for resilience can contribute much to NATO's strategy in the region.

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Keywords: Arctic, Indigenous, Knowledge, NATO, Resilience

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NATO's military presence in the Arctic is expanding fast in response to the growing importance of the region to Euro-Atlantic security.[1] The establishment of a new NATO Arctic Command is now mooted, designed to 'concentrate the particular expertise, technology, and strategy necessary to operate in this singular threat environment'.[2]

Arctic states (Russia excluded) are generally enthusiastic about this expansion and keen to contribute. Finland has sacrificed its tradition of non-alignment to join the Alliance, and Sweden is expected to follow. Seven out of the eight Arctic states will then be members of NATO. All of which would seem to strengthen NATO's stance in the Arctic and provide a well of regional knowledge from which NATO can draw in its struggle against Chinese and Russian influence in the region. However, states are not the only actors in the Arctic. One potential "wild card" that NATO may face in the Arctic is Indigenous opposition to militarizing Arctic Indigenous lands. How will NATO face down such likely opposition? Does NATO have a strategy for quelling Indigenous opposition, or is it unaware of this potential risk?

The Risks of Militarization

It would seem evident that NATO will need to forge cooperation with indigenous groups whose territories it wants to increase its presence on. However, there is very little evidence that NATO perceives such a necessity. When NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addresses NATO's Arctic expansion, he invariably makes no mention of the Indigenous peoples who inhabit it.[3] It might, of course, be that NATO feels it already has the support of Indigenous peoples, because those peoples are primarily subjects of Arctic states. However, many Arctic Indigenous peoples would balk at the idea that they are simply part of "our people" who NATO strives to "keep safe".[4]

As such, ignoring Indigenous perspectives could quickly turn out to be a strategic mistake for NATO. The militarization of Indigenous lands is a significant issue for Indigenous peoples worldwide. A report of the United Nations' Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on the impact of militarization on the rights of Indigenous peoples will be discussed in Geneva in July of 2023, when the Expert Mechanism holds its annual session.[5] Scholars have been drawing attention to the

1) J. Stoltenberg, "NATO is Stepping Up in the High North to Keep Our People Safe," (2022). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206894.htm

2) L. Mottola, "NATO's Arctic Command: A Case for the Expansion of NATO's Mission in the High North," The Arctic Institute (17 January 2023). https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-command-case-expansion-nato-mission-high-north/

3) J. Stoltenberg, (2022).

4) J. Stoltenberg, (2022).

5) United Nations, "Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous People," (2023). https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrc-subsidiaries/expert-mechanism-on-indigenous-peoples

threats of militarization to Indigenous peoples for some time.[6] The question arises, therefore of how NATO plans to negotiate Indigenous resistance to its presence in the Arctic.

Representing Indigenous Peoples in NATO

NATO could see its engagement with Indigenous peoples in the Arctic as an opportunity. With the suspension in operations of the Arctic Council,[7] NATO has the chance to rebrand itself as a space for the representation of the interests of Indigenous peoples. After all, the Arctic Council has been the one major international organization in the Arctic where Indigenous peoples had at least the possibility to make their voices heard. With the damage done to the Arctic Council by severing relations between its Western members and Russia, Indigenous peoples in the Arctic have had no dedicated forum to communicate their needs and interests with Arctic states. NATO could very well use this crisis in the functioning of the Arctic Council as an opportunity to build relations of cooperation with Arctic Indigenous peoples.

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been met, at best, by responses from Indigenous peoples in the Arctic which are conflicting and ambiguous. The Gwich'in people welcomed the suspension of the Arctic Council and called for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine.[8] The Inuit too, accepted the pause, while not offering the same degree of condemnation as the Gwich'in.[9] The Saami are clearly divided, with the Saami Council suspending relations with Saami groups living in Russia on

6) T. R. Na'Puti, "Archipelagic Rhetoric: Remapping the Marianas and Challenging Militarization from 'a Stirring Place'," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2019): p. 4-25.

7) O. Young, "Can the Arctic Council Survive the Impact of the Ukraine Crisis?", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (30 December 2022). https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/12/30/can-the-arctic-council-survive-the-impact-of-the-ukraine-crisis/

8) Gwich'in Council, "Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," (3 March 2022). https://gwichincouncil.com/sites/default/files/2022%20March%203%20GCI%20Statement.pdf

9) Inuit Circumpolar Council, "Statement from the Inuit Circumpolar Council Concerning the Arctic Council,"

account of their support for Putin's war.[10] The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) has outright supported Russia's war.[11] The Aleut International Association has been quiet on the issue but compliant with the Arctic Council's pause. The Arctic Athabaskan Council too, has been quiet, while expressing concern about the impact of geopolitical division on the future of the Arctic Council and the security of Indigenous Peoples, including within Ukraine.[12]

It is already transparent that some Indigenous peoples of the Arctic are circumspect about the impact NATO's increased presence on their lands will have on Indigenous futures.[13] As the co-chairman of the Gwich'in Council International, Edward Alexander, put it recently:

"When we think about hard security issues whether it is in NATO or the States or Canada – or in Russia – if it does not include Indigenous people at those tables, it is going to have negative impacts and implications for Indigenous people. So, NATO should include us in their discussions…NATO should ensure that they have the consent of the Indigenous people of the Arctic, so things are done ethically. And also, in a way that promotes a better relationship for long-term security".[14]

The Benefits of Collaboration

What are NATO's strategies going to be, then, for inclusion of Indigenous peoples in their plans and operability in the Arctic? In the United States, a clear argument has emerged about the importance of collaborating directly with Indigenous peoples in the Arctic. The talk is about " aligning with and learning from the Indigenous people of the High North and sharing the responsibility for defending the homeland".[15] The rationale for such collaboration is not simply ethics but strategy and tactics. As the argument goes, Indigenous peoples understand the Arctic environment better than anybody, having lived and thrived there for so long, and hence partnering with them is

(7 March 2022). https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-from-the-inuit-circumpolar-council-concerning-the-arctic-council/

10) J. Last, "The Ukraine War is Dividing Europe's Indigenous People," Foreign Policy, 27 June 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/27/russia-ukraine-war-saami-indigenous-arctic-people-norway-sweden-finland/

11) T. Koivurova, "Is It Possible to Continue Cooperating with Russia in the Arctic Council?" *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, (29 June 2022). https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/06/29/is-it-possible-to-continue-cooperating-with-russia-in-the-arctic-council/

12) Arctic Athabaskan Council, (2022), "Conflict Continues in the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine," (14 February 2022). https://arcticathabaskancouncil.com/news/2019/3/11/ahi-point-wa-2xhzd-g9x8p

13) T. Jonassen, "Arctic Indigenous Leaders: We Did Not Shut Down," High North News (31 March 2023). https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-indigenous-leaders-we-did-not-shut-down

14) T. Jonassen (31 March 2023).

15) J. R. Morton and R. Burke, "Special Operations Forces and Arctic Indigenous People: Partnering to Defend the North Arctic American Homeland," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* (3 October 2022). https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3171534/special-operations-forces-and-arctic-indigenous-people-partnering-to-defend-the/

said to be essential to the potential for operational success.[16] The extreme cold climate of the Arctic poses particular problems to United States military forces, and the U.S. is keen to learn from the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic how to adapt to it.[17]

But will the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic be willing to collaborate? The dominant view of indigeneity today is one of peoples whose ways of life are at odds with western modernity and in conflict with the national interests of powerful western states. For example, we read a lot about the conflicts over land and sovereignty that arise over extractivism.[18] It is easy to imagine that the further expansion of NATO into Indigenous lands in the Arctic will be interpreted as an extension of settler colonialism. In the last decade, for example, NATO has often been criticized for being a colonial entity, in the wake of its invasion of Libya in 2011.[19] It ought to be keen to avoid such accusations in the Arctic, especially if they come from the representatives of the colonized themselves.

"It is easy to imagine that the further expansion of NATO into Indigenous lands in the Arctic will be interpreted as an extension of settler colonialism."

However, there are reasons to believe that collaboration between NATO and Indigenous peoples in the Arctic could well be successful. It is a fact that, already, of all the different minorities which make up the United States armed forces, Indigenous minorities are among the highest contributors. Alaskan Indigenous are said to contribute to U.S. voluntary forces five times more than any other demographic group.[20] There are good reasons for this. Indigenous cultures are defined not only by knowledge of environments, and capacities to survive and thrive in extreme climates, but by immense abilities to wage war and organize violence.[21] The advance of settler colonialism itself met with fierce military-strategic resistance from Indigenous peoples historically, especially in North America.[22] Indigenous peoples such as the Iroquois and the Sioux outfought and outmaneuvered colonial armies from Spain, Britain,

16) J. R. Morton and R. Burke (3 October 2022).

17) J. R. Morton and R. Burke (3 October 2022).

18) A. Willow, "Indigenous ExtrACTIVISM in Boreal Canada: Colonial Legacies, Contemporary Struggles and Sovereign Futures," *Humanities*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2016).

19) C. Nyere, "NATO's 2011 Invasion of Libya: Colonial Repackaged?", in Everisto Benyera (ed.), *Reimagining Justice, Human Rights and Leadership in Africa* (Springer, 2020).

20) J. R. Morton and R. Burke (3 October 2022).

21) R. Chacon and R. G. Mendoza (eds.), *North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence* (Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 2007).

22) P. Hämälainen, *Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America* (New York: Liveright, 2022).

France and the Netherlands.[23] Indigenous peoples were adept at using geopolitics to serve their interests.[24] Among Arctic peoples too, there is a rich and yet under-researched history of Indigenous warfare, for example between the Inuit and rival Indigenous peoples.[25] So, there is every reason to believe that Indigenous knowledge can contribute to the geopolitical and strategic needs of NATO in the Arctic, should it be also in the interests of Indigenous peoples.

Indigenous Warfare

Should a direct clash of forces occur between NATO and Russia in the Arctic we could anticipate the high likelihood of conflict between Indigenous peoples of the Arctic once more. The Russian mobilization in Ukraine has involved the participation of a disproportionate number of Indigenous peoples. More than 20 percent of males eligible for military service in some Russian Indigenous communities have been mobilized, compared with just one percent of the total Russian population.[26] Of course, it may be that this mobilization of Indigenous peoples to fight for Russian interests in Ukraine is because their vulnerability forces them to comply with Russian state demands. Indigenous peoples in the West are concerned that Indigenous peoples in Russia are being manipulated and forced into silence.[27] However, when interviewed directly by independent media, Indigenous recruits to the Russian mobilization from the Nenets people of the Russian Arctic have expressed enthusiasm for their participation.[28]

In a way it is odd that it should have taken this long for "indigenization" to have become a possible debate for NATO. The trend towards indigenization has been around for a while in international relations and has affected the character of policies of states and international organizations in a wide variety of issue areas, including foreign policy.[29] States are keen to maintain international legitimacy for their policies and profiles, and indigenization is identified as a way for them to do so.[30] Following suit and doing so ought to be perceived as an open goal for NATO.

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23) P. Hämälainen (2022): p. 86-88.

24) P. Hämälainen (2022): p. 113.

25) C. A. Bishop and V. P. Lytwyn, "'Barbarism and Ardour of War from the Tenderest of Years': Cree-Inuit Warfare in the Hudson Bay Region," in Chacon and Mendoza (eds.), *North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence* (2007): p. 30-57.

26) Indigenous Russia, "Forced Mobilization in Russia among Indigenous Peoples for the War in Ukraine: Open Letter for UN," (14 December 2022). https://indigenous-russia.com/archives/28697

27) T. Jonassen (31 March 2023).

28) Cherta Media, 1 September 2022. https://cherta.media/story/nenec-podpisal-kontrakt-na-vojnu

29) N. Cochran and B. Harding, "What is Indigenous Foreign Policy? Lessons from Australia and New Zealand," United States Institute of Peace (2022). https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/what-indigenous-foreign-policy-lessons-australia-and-new-zealand

30) D. Chandler and J. Reid, *Becoming Indigenous: Governing Imaginaries in the Anthropocene* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).

Building Resilience

However, it is a thorny question whether indigenous peoples should tolerate the further expansion of NATO in the Arctic and on their lands. At the very least they will need incentives. Of course, it is a fact that Indigenous sovereignty remains limited worldwide on account of the exceptionalism which nation-state governments nearly always apply to their lands in the name of "national security." But Indigenous peoples are progressively less tolerant of the validity of that argument.

One strategy which would make sense from the perspective of NATO would be to emphasize the importance to its Arctic presence of "Indigenous resilience." NATO has been gradually developing its interest in the conceptual framework of resilience. It has grown exponentially in importance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine to prepare the peoples and states of NATO for the possibility of various crises, including military invasion.[31] The Indigenous peoples of the Arctic are commonly said to be exceptionally capable when it comes to being resilient.[32] NATO can forge collaborations with the Indigenous by seeking to mobilize their know-how in the Arctic while developing NATO's Arctic presence. Such collaborations would be entirely compatible with its practice of drawing on the "diverse composition of its member-states".[33] New member-state, Finland, is already emphasizing its abilities to contribute to the advance of the resilience agenda within NATO.[34] Highlighting the particular contributions which Indigenous peoples living in Finland can make to NATO would be an effective way of including them.

Conclusion

NATO is behind the curve when it comes to the indigenization of policies and strategies internationally. Now is the time, as it expands deep into Indigenous territories in the Arctic, for it to catch up with the rest of the world, and forge real and meaningful collaborations with the Indigenous peoples on whose lands it seeks to operate. Not doing so would be to risk policy and strategic failure in the Arctic.

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31) J. Reid, "Resilient Ukraine and the Future of War in Europe," E-IR (17 March 2022). https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/17/opinion-resilient-ukraine-and-the-future-of-war-in-europe/

32) M. Carson and G. Peterson (eds.), *Arctic Resilience Report* (Stockholm: Arctic Council, Stockholm Environment Institue and Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2016).

33) L. Mottola, "NATO's Arctic Command: A Case for the Expansion of NATO's Mission in the High North," The Arctic Institute (17 January 2023). https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/nato-arctic-command-case-expansion-nato-mission-high-north/

34) Ministry of the Interior Finland, "NATO Membership and Finland's Resilience," (2023). https://intermin.fi/en/current-issues/finland-and-nato

EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN DEFENSE POLICY

The aim of the article is to analyze the attitude of Europeans to defense as well as to progress in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Is an EU-specific security and common defense identity being created? According to Karl Deutsch's concept, this identity was to lead to the creation of a security community similar to those that function in nation states. It was also intended to pave the way for further progress in European integration. Difficulties in constructing identity in defense policy may hinder further European integration, including federalization and democratization of the European Union. These problems with European identity may also serve to strengthen transatlantic relations and cooperation within NATO.

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The aim of the article is to analyze the attitude of Europeans to defense as well as to progress in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Is an EU-specific security and common defense identity being created? According to Karl Deutsch's concept, this was to lead to the creation of a security community, similar to those that function in nation states.[1] Admittedly, there were many institutional dysfunctions in the EU's defense policy, including competence and budgetary dysfunctions.[2] Nevertheless, the starting point for political mobilization for deepening integration in the field of defense seemed to be the emergence of EU identification in the area of security and a similar perception of strategic threats by European nations.

Common identity was therefore the basis for the progress of integration in the field of foreign policy and defense policy. However, the ambitions were greater and went beyond EU defense policy. It was believed that without European identification there is no demos, and therefore no political community in the EU. Thus, transferring competences to the EU level in terms of key competences of nation states - including those related to defense policy - was undemocratic[3] or burdened with a growing democratic deficit in Europe.[4] Democratic control at the level of nation states was weakened, and at the same time it was not possible to build appropriate institutions of democratic supervision over officials and political decision makers at the EU level. This approach refers to the constructivist assumptions, according to which, for the success of integration, it is necessary to disseminate European identifications.[5]

Thus, the creation of identity in the area of security had a proto-federal dimension, if we assume that the existence of a political community (demos) and a sufficiently strong political identification of Europeans are the prerequisites for the emergence of a federation in Europe.[6] At the same time, difficulties in constructing identity in defense policy have serious consequences for further European integration, as they may hinder the federalization and democratization of the European Union.

1) K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (MIT Press, John Wiley & Sons, Cambridge - London, 1953).

2) A. Cottey, "Astrategic Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 2, p. 276-291; T.G. Grosse, "Systemowe uwarunkowania slabosci polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej," [Systemic determinants of the weakness of the European Union's foreign policy], *Studia Europejskie*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2010): p. 33-66.

3) F. Nicoli, "Democratic Legitimacy in the Era of Fiscal Integration," *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2017): p. 389– 404; J.H.H. Weiler, "Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision," *European Law Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1995): p. 219– 258 [particularly 226].

4) W. Wagner, The Democratic Control of Military Power Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006): p. 200-216.

5) T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," [in:] *European Integration Theory*, eds. A. Wiener, T. Diez (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): p. 159-176.

6) B. Rosamond, "Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2005): p. 463-478; L.E. Cederman, *Constructing Europe's Identities: The External Dimension* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 2001).

European Defense Identity

Identity in defense policy has two references in the scientific literature. The first is referred to as the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). It was aimed at strengthening European cooperation in the field of defense, and thus paving the way for the development of this policy within the EU, and, on the other hand, connecting it with the North Atlantic Alliance. In the institutional dimension, the ESDI concept was, according to the declaration of the NATO summit in Rome (1991), to create the European pillar of this alliance, and thus to combine the activities of the EU with NATO.[7] At the same time, according to the declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty, it was primarily to strengthen the role of the Western European Union,[8] a military organization in Western Europe which was the precursor of the CSDP. The same declaration ensured close organizational ties between the Western European Union and the EU, as well as recognizing that the ESDI should serve to "increase solidarity within the North Atlantic Alliance".[9]

The concept of the European Security and Defence Identity was therefore intended to constitute a certain compromise between the U.S. expectations regarding the superior role of NATO for European security and the French desire to develop defense potential in the EU. This compromise turned out to be unsatisfactory for both sides. On the one hand, Washington was skeptical of the two-pillar structure within NATO and tried to control and limit the development of ESDI as strictly as possible. On the other hand, France perceived the development of ESDI as the first step towards transferring NATO functions to the EU, and thus promoting strategic autonomy within the EU, which was supposed to mean building an EU defense capability independent of the North Atlantic Alliance.[10] Therefore, under the slogan ESDI, a number of organizational activities were undertaken to ensure the possibility of conducting operational activities independent of NATO.[11]

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7) Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991. https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a

8) An international military organization, established under the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1954, which entered into force, after the ratification process, on 5 May 1955. It was dissolved on 31 March 2010, by decision of the Member States, due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

9) Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 29 July 1992: p. 105.

10) M. Dembinski, D. Gaus, "NATO and the European Security and Defence Identity: Complementary or Mutually Exclusive?," in M. Dembinski, K. Gerke (Hg.), *Cooperation or Conflict? Transatlantic Relations in Transition*, Studien der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Bd. 31, (Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag, 1998): p. 91-123 [in particular 116-120].

11) G. Messervy-Whiting, "Europe's Security and Defence Identity: The Western European Union's Operational Development," *The RUSI Journal*, (April 1997): p. 48-51.

The French ambitions were continued by actions aimed at establishing the CSDP.[12] Its precursor was the agreement between France and the United Kingdom of Saint Malo (1998), which established the progress of European policy, but on the condition of its complementarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Soon after, it was agreed to establish the European Union Rapid Reaction Force, which was supposed to have a strength of 50-60 thousand troops and be ready for deployment within sixty days. The idea was not implemented in practice, and it was not resumed until 2022, although on a smaller scale (the forces were supposed to consist of 5,000 soldiers).[13]

"Among the objectives guiding the construction of identity in defense policy, the pursuit of strategic autonomy in the EU should be mentioned above all, which has been the ambition of the French elites for decades."

The second approach to identity in defense policy has a sociological dimension and is related to changes in the awareness of EU elites and societies in relation to security and common defense. It concerned shared values and principles, goals, and instruments of action in the CSDP, including basic geopolitical assumptions or visions of future strategic relations inside and outside the EU.[14] Identity in defense policy was also linked to this more generalized EU identification. It was difficult to abstract the progress under the CSDP from the broader perspective of EU development, especially since one of the assumptions of the proponents of the defense policy was to deepen integration and bind European societies more closely to it.

Among the objectives guiding the construction of identity in defense policy, the pursuit of strategic autonomy in the EU should be mentioned above all, which has been the ambition of the French elites for decades. It can even be considered that increasing independence from the USA and NATO was to be the most important geopolitical motive for shaping the identity of Europeans in defense policy.[15] As the

12) P. Zurawski vel Grajewski, "Bezpieczenstwo miedzynarodowe. Wymiar military" [International security. Military dimension], *PWN* (Warszawa, 2012): p. 257-295.

13) J. Howorth, "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?" *Chaillot Paper*, No. 43, WEU-ISS, (Paris 2000); D. Mathew, "Europe's Quest for a Security Identity," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2000): p. 429-432.

14) T.G. Grosse, "Consequences of the War in Ukraine – the EU Perspective," Strategy & Future, 5 April 2022. https://strategyandfuture.org/en/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-eu-perspective/

15) E. Kirchner, J. Sperling, "Will form lead to function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a European

French ambassador to NATO put it, if the North Atlantic Alliance gets too close to the EU, Washington could control the processes of European integration from the back seat.[16] The point was therefore to make Europe independent of the political influence of the U.S., and more precisely to guarantee the largest countries of Western Europe the possibility of freely shaping integration. Moreover, the development of social identification with the defense policy was to support integration processes, especially in the face of numerous disintegration tendencies and increasing divisions in the EU. Supporters of the EU federation believed that building a strong CSDP would facilitate this type of political transformation in Europe.[17] The promoters of such an approach were especially German politicians and experts.[18] Finally, the purpose behind the creation of this identity was to support the development of the European defense industry, primarily corporations from the largest Western European countries.

"It should be noted that the missions undertaken by the EU and the so-called Civilian CSDP Compact was in line with EU values and a peaceful strategic culture."

The problem was that matters relating to European foreign, or defense policies were generally regarded as unimportant by EU residents. In subsequent studies of the European Commission, the problem of immigration or climate change gained first place, while the issue of the EU's impact on the international scale was only in eighth place.[19] Also, youth surveys showed little interest in defense policy.[20] In other studies, young people's support for building a defense potential and a common EU army was much higher but treated in a rather abstract way. This was an expression of general support for the progress of integration, rather than for a particular policy entailing specific obligations or costs.[21] In these analyses, support for defense policy

Security and Defence Identity," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2000): p. 23-45 [in particular 25-26, 33].

16) K. -H. Kamp, "Europe's Defence Project – Time for Transatlantic Rearrangement," *Global Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2015): p. 186.

17) E. Kirchner, J. Sperling, "Will form lead to function?" op. cit., p. 33; K.-H. Kamp, Europe's defence project… op. cit., p. 183.

18) K.-H. Kamp, Europe's defence project… op. cit., p. 190.

19) Standard Eurobarometer 92. Autumn 2019, European Commission, Brussels 2019, p. 15; Europeans' views on the priorities of the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 2019) European Commission (Brussels, 2019): p. 35.

20) Flash Eurobarometer 478, How do we build a stronger, more united Europe? The views of young people, European Commission, Brussels 2019, p. 8.

21) Similar conclusions emerge from the research: B. Bremer, P. Genschel, M. Jachtenfuchs, "Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 58,

was clearly lower in societies that are net contributors to the EU budget and among people with a stronger attachment to national identity.[22] In the Commission's surveys, many respondents supported the idea of developing the CSDP. Nevertheless, when it was necessary to determine which policy should be developed first and which is less important for Europeans, defense and foreign affairs were invariably in the background.

CSDP had some potential for the future, including building international identification of European residents. The advantage of this policy was that it raised some hopes, probably quite different in varied parts of the EU. For example, it was supported by the societies of the Baltic states, mainly due to the sense of the Russian threat, as well as by the Germans and French, who had dissimilar expectations towards this policy. Neutral states, such as Austria and Sweden, were the most reluctant towards this sphere of integration.[23] What is significant, however, from the point of view of identification in this area - it was not important for Europeans to consider CSDP the highest EU priority. Defense policy aroused much greater ambitions and interest among political elites, especially in Western Europe, which, at least in the second decade of the 21st century, was not reflected in the views of ordinary citizens.

It is worth noting that support for the CSDP was significantly higher than for the project to establish a European army. Here, the societies of neutral countries had a decidedly critical position. They probably feared that this might push them to the margins of the integration processes, i.e., make them second-class Europeans. They could also expect political pressure to abandon their earlier strategic culture. All other nations declared less enthusiasm for the EU army compared to the CSDP, but it was especially visible among the Germans.[24] Perhaps this was due to the very strong culture of pacifism in this society. Unlike the Americans, for example, most Germans did not consider the use of the army to be an important instrument for foreign policy or international order.[25]

In a 2022 poll conducted by the news portal Politico, the highest support for the creation of an EU army was expressed by the Greeks. Roughly half of respondents in France and Spain approved of it, but people in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were much more skeptical.[26] In the latter case, it could have resulted from the

No. 1 (2020): p. 56-75.

22) B. Bremer, P. Genschel, M. Jachtenfuchs, Juncker's Curse? op. cit.

23) Europeans' views on the priorities of the European Union, op .cit., p. 5.

24) Special Eurobarometer 461, Designing Europe's future Security and Defence, European Commission, (Brussels, 2017): p. 18.

25) "American and Germans Differ In Their Views of Each Other and the World," Pew Research Center, (Washington, March 2020): p. 6.

26) C. Hirsch, "Europeans Support Ukraine Joining the EU — but not yet," Politico, 16 March 2022.

potential costs, which made Dutch voters reluctant to deepen integration projects, especially in the fiscal sphere.

As in the previously cited studies on defense policy, a European army was not a major priority for EU societies. It was listed at the end of the list of matters considered important for the future of the Union.[27] In other studies,[28] the majority of respondents (nearly 60 percent) were in favor of decisions on EU armed forces being taken unanimously or by those countries that are ready to send their soldiers to European missions. Only 7 percent of respondents were in favor of the possibility of a majority vote in order to force all countries to send troops on missions undertaken under the EU banner. In the same study, less than 20 percent of respondents agreed that a European army should replace the armed forces in the Member States.[29] All this proves that the Europeans were thinking of a loose cooperation of national armed forces, and one in which each state would have the final say on the use of its own forces. In the matter of security, which is very important for national sovereignty, the citizens of the Union opted for the voluntary cooperation of national armies, rather than the establishment of a single European army, following the example of solutions practiced in states with a federal system. In this way, the strong attachment of societies to national identification became evident.

Europeans were pacifist in opinion polls. They were also attached to the idea of "peaceful power", "civilian power",[30] and "normative power",[31] which meant that in international relations they put the promotion of peace, human rights, democracy, and other EU values first.[32] This posed a challenge for shaping the identity in defense policy, which naturally used arguments of force and the threat of war.[33]

The consequence of the pacifism of Europeans was the adoption of a strategic culture in the Union, which was based on means of exerting peaceful influence, mainly through international law and economic exchange. Europeans were reluctant to point to their own geopolitical goals, including their biggest rivals posing a security

https://www.politico.eu/article/poll-show-european-back-ukraine-path-to-eu-membership/

27) Special Eurobarometer 467, Future of Europe, European Commission (Brussels, 2017): p. 127.

28) P. Manigart, Public opinion and European defense, European Commission (Brussels, 2001): p. 13.

29) P. Manigart, Public opinion and European defense, op. cit., p. 16.

30) F. Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace," [in:] R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972): p. 1–21; H. Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1982): p. 149–64; C. Hill, European foreign policy: power-bloc, civilian model – or flop?, [in:] R. Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990): p. 31–55.

31) I. Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002): p. 235-258.

32) "Europeans Credit EU with Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens," Pew Research Center (March, 2019): p. 2; Special Eurobarometer 467, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

33) E. Kirchner, J. Sperling, Will form lead to function? op. cit., p. 34.

risk. They also did not allow the use of coercive measures against potential enemies, especially in the military dimension. That is why some researchers evaluating EU strategic documents defined the Union as an a-strategic organization, i.e., not using grand strategy - as other powers do.[34] Others saw the EU as a "small power" in geopolitical terms.[35] Even if more than 30 foreign operations were undertaken under the CSDP, they were small in scale, focused on peacekeeping or on civilian rather than military objectives. The effectiveness of these missions was assessed as "marginal at best".[36] It is difficult not to recognize that the effectiveness of the EU defense policy resulted from the pacifist attitude of Europeans and the strategic culture adopted in Western Europe. Some considered that foreign and defense policies were too dependent on a liberal and left-wing narrative that actually limited the ability to effectively pursue security goals.[37] An example of this tendency was the dissemination of "feminist foreign policy" in Germany, already during the war in Ukraine, which was mainly aimed at supporting minorities and handicapped groups, as well as promoting a healthy lifestyle abroad.[38]

It should be noted that the missions undertaken by the EU and the so-called Civilian CSDP Compact was in line with EU values and a peaceful strategic culture. This dimension focused on peacekeeping, police, training, hybrid threats, including in cyberspace, terrorist, and organized crime.[39] It could potentially become an effective instrument for counteracting illegal immigration, especially that related to terrorist threats. This could introduce a kind of "division of labor" between NATO and the CSDP, leaving the defense of the territory of the member states to the Alliance, and leaving other threats and conducting peacekeeping missions to the Union. However, this was not satisfactory for France, for which much more important than the civilian dimension of the CSDP was the EU's autonomy in the geopolitical sphere, as well as the support provided by EU instruments for the production and export of arms. At the same time, the EU's defense policy had little focus on ensuring common security,[40] at least that was the case until the 2022 war in Ukraine.

Concluding Remarks

34) A. Cottey, Astrategic Europe, op. cit., p. 276-291.

35) A. Toje, "The European Union as a Small Power," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2011): p. 43-60.

36) A. Cottey, Astrategic Europe, op. cit., p. 286.

37) E.A. Juncos, "Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatist Turn?" *European Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2017): p. 1-18.

38) C. Adebahr, "What Germany's Turning Point Means for its Feminist Foreign Policy," Politico, 21 March 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-turning-point-feminist-foreign-policy/

39) J. Bergmann, P. Müller, "Failing Forward in the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy: the Integration of EU Crisis Management," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (2021): p. 1669-1687.

40) T.G. Grosse, "Development of Defense Policy and Armaments Industry in the European Union," [in:] *Fuel for Dominance. On the Economic Bases of Geopolitical Supremacy*, ed. T.G. Grosse (Berlin: Peter Lang): p. 189-236.

Summing up the considerations so far, it can be concluded that there were a number of obstacles to building a strong identification in the security sphere. First of all, EU societies were attached to their own national traditions and culture, and national identities played a much stronger role than that of the EU. In addition, European nations were divided. They had different strategic cultures, attitudes to armed forces and readiness to use them, and finally a different perception of threats and geopolitical interests. As Reimund Seidelmann rightly pointed out, the enlargement of NATO and the EU to include Central European countries has fundamentally changed the preferences regarding European security, including the influence of the United States on both organizations, as well as reducing the chances of implementing an autonomous defense policy in the EU.[41] The prospect of expanding the North Atlantic Alliance to include Sweden and Finland in 2023 has further strengthened this geopolitical trend. Intergovernmental governance within the CSDP was a natural thing, i.e., oriented towards national interests.[42] However, in such a situation, building a common identity in defense policy was much more difficult.

Moreover, many Europeans were pacifist, not only those from countries with a long tradition of neutrality. For example, the memory of World War II and German militarism from that period meant that support for the progress of the CSDP was decreasing in many countries.[43] Union citizens associated the ideas of European integration with the international promotion of peace and democracy. The problem was that the ideas of Europe as a "civilian" or "peaceful" power conflicted with the growing militarism of the European project. It was difficult to justify the need to invest from EU funds in the development of the arms industry, and thus increase the export of arms by the largest European corporations. Only to a certain extent could the development of the CSDP be justified by the desire to stimulate integration processes in Europe. What is more, the sphere of defense was in the public opinion a distant place among the tasks that should be dealt with by the Union.

In Western European countries, i.e., leading in integration processes, at the beginning of the 21st century there was no sense of geopolitical threat that could justify the need to develop a defense policy in the EU or to create a European army. Russia has not been perceived as a threat here, at least since the end of the Cold War, and thus has not mobilized any identification in defense policy. The leading motive for the progress of the CSDP was the idea of strategic autonomy from the

41) R. Seidelmann, "Nato's Enlargement as a Policy of Lost Opportunities," *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 20, No. 2-3 (1997): p. 233-245.

42) A. Menon, "Defence Policy and the Logic of 'High Politics'," [in:] P. Genschel, M. Jachtenfuchs (eds.), *Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): p. 66–84.

43) C. De Vries, "Don't Mention The War: Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2020): p. 138– 154.

U.S. and NATO, which was sometimes proclaimed under the slogan of "European sovereignty". It was mainly related to the strengthening of the arms industry in the EU, which was largely export-oriented.[44] In the countries of Central Europe, these ideas raised serious doubts, because the transatlantic alliance was the foundation of security for these societies. On the other hand, the criticism of the USA visible in Western Europe was based on pacifism and dislike of U.S. militarism. Thus, there was strong resistance in the Union to the advances of the CSDP from the pacifist left, as well as from conservatives and national groups averse to the concept of European sovereignty or strategic autonomy.[45] All this seriously limited the construction of a common identification in defense policy.

The institutional development of the CSDP was quite moderate, far from the expectations of some politicians in Western Europe, especially in Paris or Berlin. They were unable to mobilize European societies to give stronger support to this project. It seems that poor identification of Europeans with defense policy limited the institutionalization of this policy. As a result, Europe's problem was that it did not have sufficient potential to guarantee its own security and had to rely on U.S. support and NATO structures to do so.[46] The best example of this was the helplessness of the European Union in the face of the war in the Balkans in 1992–1995. Later, the same kind of vulnerability of the EU was exposed by Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, too strong development of the CSDP became a challenge for Europe's security, as it could lead to the weakening of NATO.[47] For this reason, the countries of the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance, in the face of Russian imperialism, tried to concentrate around NATO, while at the same time they were less willing to look at German and French proposals aimed at building strategic autonomy within the CSDP.

In conclusion, the weakness of the European identity in defense policy may have serious implications for the further development of European integration. Firstly, it may hinder the development of the CSDP and the creation of a European army. Secondly, it may weaken federalist aspirations in the EU. Thirdly, it constitutes a barrier to the geopolitical ambitions of the EU's strategic autonomy and independence from NATO. Fourthly, it enforces the maintenance of transatlantic ties in the field of security.

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44) T.G. Grosse, Development of Defense Policy and Armaments Industry in the European Union, op. cit.

45) A. Herranz-Surrallés, "Paradoxes of Parliamentarization in European Security and Defence: When Politicization and Integration Undercut Parliamentary Capital," *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2019): p. 29-45.

46) K.-H. Kamp, Europe's defence project… op. cit., p. 185.

47) E. Kirchner, J. Sperling, Will form lead to function? op. cit., p. 32; T.G. Grosse, "The Challenge for the EU's Defence Policy," 18 October 2022, The Sobieski Institute, https://sobieski.org.pl/en/the-challenge-for-the-eus-defence-policy/

DETERRENCE BY RESILIENCE: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

Applying the theory of deterrence to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, this paper addresses where deterrence failed and identifies applicable lessons. NATO's success building and reinforce resilience between 2014 and 2022 demonstrates the capability of national resilience to deny an aggressor achieving objectives without escalation. Russia's use of Strategic Deterrence presents the capability, credibility, and communicated nuclear threat necessary to deter NATO involvement, but Russia's reliance on other nations within a multi-polar world increasingly diminishes the credibility of their deterrent threat. Finally, the Russo-Ukraine war demonstrates that as a defensive organization, NATO lacks credibility in extended deterrence and must act to safeguard aspiring nations.

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"Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy…. the fear to attack (Dr. Strangelove, 1964)."

The 1964 noir-classic Dr. Strangelove describes the cornerstone of alliances – bound together, an adversary must carefully consider attacking. NATO as an international organization boasts a military force over one-million strong. The Alliance has demonstrated the ability to deploy coordinated, lethal force anywhere in the world. NATO warned Russia that there will be consequences for attacking their partner, Ukraine. In January 2022, Russia still attacked. Why? Did NATO and the U.S. fail to properly implement a strategy of deterrence? Did Russia in fact deter NATO as it used brute force to impose their will on their neighbor? Does this mean extended deterrence is dead? With Russia's expected three-day action entering its second year, what can the world observe of deterrence?

Examining the Russo-Ukraine war through the lens of deterrence theory provides a framework to assess a cornerstone of U.S. and NATO strategy for the past 75 years in practice. As the international community exits a unipolar environment and resumes great power competition, the war validates requirements to effectively implement a deterrence strategy, demonstrate its effectiveness, and increase its future effectiveness. Close examination demonstrates deterrence is effective and extended deterrence, while ineffective in Ukraine, can be effective through increasing partner resilience.

What is Deterrence?

In practice, deterrence takes two forms: punishment and denial.[1] In deterrence by punishment, the protagonist threatens military force to punish an antagonist if it takes a specific action; if the antagonist does not act, the protagonist does not punish. In deterrence by denial, a protagonist threatens to use military force to keep an antagonist from achieving their desired outcomes or to make it so expensive it isn't worth trying. Again, if there is no action by the antagonist, the protagonist does not use force.

1) Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (S.L.: Yale University Press, 1966): 69-73

NATO policy provides two examples of this. NATO maintains nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of defense – an attack on the core interest of Allies' sovereignty could result in a nuclear response.[2] This threat of overwhelming response to punish aggression and ambiguity on thresholds for crossing from the conventional to nuclear layer deters aggression against the Alliance. NATO also maintains over 40,000 troops in a high-readiness level, prepared to respond within 15 days of activation. This force could block aggression against the Alliance and keep an aggressor from ever meeting the goals of their military offensive. In both these examples, NATO seeks to change the cost-benefit calculation of aggressors.

According to Deterrence Theory, threats of punishment and denial alone are insufficient to impact an aggressor's cost-benefit calculation. To be effective, the protagonist's threat must be capable, credible, and effectively communicated.[3] The antagonist must believe the protagonist has the capability to impose the threat – does the state have the power to carry out the threat? The antagonist must believe the protagonist will use the threat – does the state have the will to commit the blood and treasure to carry out the threat? Finally, the antagonist must understand the threat – does the state effectively communicate the cost to an aggressor for taking an action and the cost avoidance if it doesn't? Without these three components, a threat will not adjust the aggressor's calculations or deter an action.

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Implementing the three components have separate challenges. Capability is the most straight forward – an assessment of NATO's capacity to take military action across the air, cyber, land, sea, and space domains compared to Russia's ability to defend in these domains indicates capability. Credibility is less mathematical as it assesses if the 30 members of NATO can agree to unified military action. Can one member carry the Alliance forward or does the Alliance have to pull a member(s)

2) NATO, "STRATEGIC CONCEPT Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid." 22 June 2022, 7-8. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

3) T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Paul, 2009): 3.

along? What does history and the current political environment suggest? Finally, communication can offer the biggest challenge – communicating across cultures the consequences of action, the assurance of no threat for inaction, opportunities to avert conflict, and the capability and credibility to use force if Russia acts must take different forms. Public statements, diplomacy, and military mobilization are forms of communication that must be clearly understood to be effective. If the protagonist and antagonist do not have similar understandings of the capability, credibility, and communication, deterrence will not be effective.[4]

The modern environment continues to make deterrence more complex to successfully implement as a strategy. For instance, an actor (or group of actors) can offer extended deterrence, where the protagonist offers a threat to an antagonist to deter actions against a protégé. Generally associated with a nuclear threat, extended deterrence usually has an elevated challenge with credibility as the protagonist must convince the antagonist it would go to war for the protégé.[5] The intervening protagonist has many levers to deter action, including reassuring the protégé of its protection against the antagonist, accommodating the antagonist to promote a level of peace, restraining the protégé's threats, or using deterrent threats to stop to antagonist.[6] Ukraine's innovative use of technology and potential targeting inside Russia demonstrate that in extended deterrence, the protégé's actions can be as impactful as the protagonist's or antagonist's actions. Even prior to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has tried to bolster the effectiveness of extended deterrence, through deterrence by resilience.

Similar to Schelling's "deterrent defense", NATO's deterrence by resilience relies on states (both Allies and partners) hardening their ability to resist offensive action to ultimately deny the aggressor's objectives or allow NATO time to mobilize a response to deny or punish the aggressor.[7,8,9] By 2022, NATO established the new Resilience Committee observing "[r]esilience is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment".[10] While the Committee sets priorities and the requirements change, maintains baseline requirements, including continuity of government services, energy supply resiliency, displaced personnel management, food and water security, and communications network resiliency.[11]

4) Tami D. Biddle, "Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners," *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 3 (Spring 2020): 97.

5) Paul, *Complex Deterrence*, 279-282.

6) Paul, *Complex Deterrence*, 289-292.

7) Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 78.

8) NATO, Strategic Concept, 9-11.

9) Jamie Shea, "NATO Review - Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence." NATO Review. 30 March 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html

10) NATO, "Resilience Committee." 7 October 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50093.htm

11) Shea, "NATO Review."

NATO, Russia, and Ukraine

Before examining Russia's decision to invade Ukraine it is important to understand fundamentals of NATO. Founded in 1949, the Alliance's founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty, outlines NATO's enduring purpose, which is to achieve collective defense for preserving peace and security.[12] NATO's core interest is safeguarding members' sovereignty through deterrence and collective response. NATO maintains a strong interest in the security and stability of its neighbors. The founding Treaty is specific that the defensive agreement protects Treaty Allies and that to enjoy those protections, a state must join the Alliance.

NATO, Russia, and Ukraine have been tied together since 1994 when Ukraine – heirs of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal – signed the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine pledged to end its nuclear weapons program and transfer all Highly Enriched Uranium to Russia through this document, also signed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In exchange, signatories affirmed – not guaranteed – to "respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine" and to "refrain from the threat or use of force" against that country.[13,14,15] A decade later in 2008, Ukraine demonstrated intention for even greater partnership with NATO as they became a contributing nation to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.[16] The same year, NATO re-affirmed its commitment to states' right to self-determination of alliances and started the Annual National Programme (ANP) for Ukraine, publicly recognizing that Ukraine would become a NATO member.[17]

Ukraine's goals of joining NATO directly clashed with Russia's sense of security. As early as 1990, when NATO sought to bring a unified Germany into the Alliance, Russia sought concessions that NATO would not expand further west.[18] In February 2014, following the Revolution of Dignity, Russia disregarded its commitment to

12) NATO. 1949. "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. 4 April 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

13) Steven Pifer, "The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations." Brookings, 4 December 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/04/the-budapest-memorandum-and-u-s-obligations/

14) "EIR Ukraine: The Budapest Memorandum of 1994." 2014. https://policymemos.hks.harvard.edu/files/policymemos/files/2-23-22_ukraine-the_budapest_memo.pdf?m=1645824948

15) Aaron Blake, "Analysis | What the Budapest Memorandum Means for the U.S. on Ukraine," Washington Post, 1 February 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/01/what-budapest-memorandum-means-us-ukraine/

16) "ISAF Regional Commands & PRT Locations Herat Qala-e-Naw." 2008. NATO. https://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_archive/2008-04-01-ISAF-Placemat.pdf

17) NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008." NATO. 3 April 2008, 23. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

18) Andrew Wolff, "The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 91, No. 5 (2015): 1105-1106. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24539021

respect Ukrainian sovereignty and seized the Crimean Peninsula, which increased Ukrainian resolve to join NATO.[19] After 2014, NATO and individual NATO members sought to build Ukrainian capacity in key areas across 13 support measures including Capacity and Institution Building, Logistics and Standardization, Cyber Defense, and Medical Rehabilitation.[20]

Continuing to progress membership, President Zelenskyy approved Ukraine's new National Security Strategy in 2019, outlining an enhanced partnership with NATO to work toward membership.[21] NATO publicly supported Ukraine's goal of membership and lauded Ukraine's progress in annual ANP reporting. By December 2021, Russia's concern with NATO expansion into Ukraine came to a head as troops massed on the Ukraine border. President Putin demanded formal agreements from NATO that Ukraine would not be able to join NATO, stating "the ball is in their court… they must answer us something."[22]

Analyzing the Deterrent Threats

In deterrence, initiative belongs to the antagonist, who chooses whether and when to attack. With Ukraine still a partner, not a NATO member, there were still several deterrent threats that Russia likely considered when deciding to act. Tools to evaluate Russian assessments are limited but comparing conditions in 2014 to 2022 is useful.

Capability

In 2022 as in 2014, NATO's conventional and nuclear capacity were unrivaled in the world. Drawing on the resources of 30 countries, NATO possessed the military capability to both punish and deny objectives. NATO does have limitations. In 2013, the U.S. redeployed its last forward stationed armored unit from Europe. The deployment of an armored battalion set in 2014 allowed for combined arms training but signaled that the U.S. military, a significant contributor of combat forces, would not immediately contribute significant combat force to a NATO response.[23] NATO also substantially relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Doubts about the U.S.

19) Daniel Treisman "Why Putin Took Crimea," Foreign Affairs. 18 April 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine

20) NATO, "Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine." NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_09/20160920_160920-compreh-ass-package-ukra.pdf

21) NATO, "Relations with Ukraine." NATO. 28 October 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm

22) Patrick Reevell, "Amid Ukraine Invasion Fears, Putin Says West Must Give NATO Guarantees," ABC News, 23 December 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/International/tensions-rise-russia-ukraine-putin-places-blame-west/story?id=81913009

23) Michael S. Darnell, "American Tanks Return to Europe after Brief Leave," Stars and Stripes. 31 January 2014. https://www.stripes.com/news/american-tanks-return-to-europe-after-brief-leave-1.264910#

willingness to engage in nuclear war over Europe and the lack of tactical nuclear weapons on the continent could drive NATO to a conventional response to a nuclear event. These two shortfalls in capability could be opportunities for Russia.

When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine had significant challenges responding. Without any formal defensive agreements with other nations, Ukraine's armed forces were the only available response. Outnumbering the Ukrainian army by more than four to one, Russia had a significant overmatch in equipment and personnel. At the same time, a combination of laws prohibiting use of the army, political corruption, and lack of trust between the people and the government significantly hindered the Ukrainian response to Russian aggression.[24]

In the seven years after Russia commenced its attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces progressed with NATO assistance. Leader training, combat training and support missions with ISAF developed resilience in the armed forces. NATO's 2019 assessment found Ukraine's armed forces had progressed from a 150,000-strong force that could only muster one brigade capable of combat operations to a capable 250,000-strong force, many of whom had benefitted from NATO training missions and with limited numbers of advanced NATO weapons. Under President Zelenskyy, Ukraine also reduced corruption, with NATO estimating that corruption reforms in between 2016 and 2018 saved the country $2 billion.[25]

Russia likely considered its own military strengths when weighing advances in Ukrainian capability. Beginning in 2008, the "New Look" reforms transitioned the Russian Army from a 5-million-man force based on conscription, to a leaner force balancing conscription and professional soldiers in a brigade structure.[26] The 2014 occupation of Ukraine, subsequent engagements, and operational deployments to Syria confirmed the efficacy of these modernizations to Russian officials. Operations in Syria also enabled Russia to trial integrating private armies such as the Wagner Group.

24) David Takacs, "Ukraine's Deterrence Failure: Lessons for the Baltic States." *Journal on Baltic Security*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2017): 4. https://doi.org/10.1515/jobs-2017-0001

25) Jane Cordy, "Committee on The Civil Dimension Of Security (CDS) Ukraine: Five Years After The Revolution Of Dignity Report." 9-11. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS).

26) Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, *The Russian Way of War: Force Structure Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces* (Fort Leavenworth Press, 2019): 10, 27-32.

Credibility

Ahead of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in May 2014, NATO had many competing claims for its attention, from the Arab Spring movement, the Eurozone crisis, and the disruption to intelligence sharing in the wake of the Snowden leaks. Against this backdrop of domestic and international turmoil, NATO did not respond militarily to the fait accompli of a partner nation's territory being annexed, merely using sanctions to attempt to coerce Russia to withdraw.

Ahead of the 2022 attack on Ukraine, NATO countries were even more internally focused, due to COVID and containment measures, market disruptions, and Brexit. The U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan in August of 2021 caught international and local headlines as the U.S. ended a 17-year occupation, causing a mass refugee migration out of Afghanistan. The U.S. also expended trillions of dollars to mitigate the impacts of COVID and started to see significant inflation from a demand-driven market.

Considering the two time periods, Russia could estimate an attack on a NATO partner in early 2022 would not bring a military response from NATO. Despite closer ties with Ukraine for training, NATO was still not committed to a military response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Russia likely understood that an attack on a NATO ally would result in punishment and denial, but an assault on a non-ally would not result in a military retaliation.

Communication

The most observable communication of threat is the movement of forces. Following the Russian annexation in 2014, NATO communicated two messages. At the Wales Summit of 2014 NATO agreed to deploy a rotational multinational force to Baltic allies and Poland.[27,28] In the same summit, NATO further committed to work with their Partner of Distinction, Ukraine, with a mission "designed to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security" through "substantial new programmes with a focus on command, control and communications, logistics and standardisation, cyber defence, military career transition, and strategic communications."[29,30] Agreements

27) NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales." NATO. 5 September 2014. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease

28) NATO, "NATO's Readiness Action Plan Fact Sheet." Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) – Press & Media Section – Media Operations Centre (MOC). https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_10/20151007_1510-factsheet_rap_en.pdf

29) NATO, "Wales Summit".

30) NATO, "Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission," NATO. 4 July 2014.

resulted in rotational battalions in Baltic states and Poland and NATO members (primarily the U.S) investing over $4 billion in Ukrainian resilience.[31] The clear message was that NATO reserves military presence for allies but will assist partners to develop resilience to deny Russian victory.

In the buildup to Russia's 2022 invasion, NATO reinforced these messages. The Brussels Summit in June 2021 highlighted the Alliance's preparedness for mutual defense if Russia attacked a NATO state. The conference also highlighted that "resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defence" and that NATO would help partners enhance their resilience.[32] Consistent with messaging of other NATO Allies, the U.S. made it clear the U.S. would not deploy troops to defend Ukraine.[33] At the same time, President Zelensky met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg seeking security commitments to help deter a renewed Russian invasion predicted weeks away. Consistent with earlier engagements, the Secretary General committed to Ukraine's future path to join the Alliance and severe economic punishment for Russia if it attacked, but not military support.[34]

When to Act?

For Russia to decide to attack, the perceived benefit for the action would need to exceed the risk from the deterrent threats. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has viewed NATO expansion and "Westernization" of border states as a significant security threat. An attack on a NATO ally would almost certainly result in significant military, political, and economic punishment and likely denial of any military objectives – NATO clearly communicated this, had the capacity to enforce, and credibility would act. Further military action in Ukraine could finally halt eastward expansion of NATO and European Union membership and reestablish overwhelming influence in Ukraine. The benefits of this action must overcome two threats – a NATO threat of extended deterrence through punishment and a Ukrainian threat to deny military and political objectives.

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm?mode=pressrelease

31) Rick Larsen "Special Report: Ukraine's Fight for Freedom & Allied and Global Response to Russia's War," 3-4. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee.

32) NATO, "Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021." NATO. 14 June 2021, 30. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

33) Jarrett Renshaw, "Biden Says He Warned Putin of 'Heavy Price' over Ukraine," Reuters, 31 December 2021, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biden-speak-with-ukraine-president-sunday-white-house-2021-12-31/

34) Michael Schwirtz, "NATO Signals Support for Ukraine in Face of Threat from Russia," The New York Times, 16 December 2021, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-nato-russia.html

NATO clearly stated that there would be no threat of military response with the statements came both from President Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. They clearly stated that there would be no such responses for Russian action.[35,36,37] Ukraine's threat of denial was equally ineffective. In 2014 Ukraine could only muster 6,000 troops to conduct operations at that rate of readiness. NATO training and member equipment would improve the performance of Ukraine, but Russia could overcome the limited weapon systems through their superiority in mass numbers. It also perceived that if the Ukrainian military stood to fight, the government would likely flee. These shortfalls in both deterrent threats would not outweigh potential benefits for Russia.

Observations and Implications

1) Denial by Resilience can work. Since 2014 and the rise of Russian aggression in Europe, NATO has focused on national resilience for both allies and partners. Ukraine's ability to survive the initial invasion with adequate government, military, and civil systems in place provided an opportunity for the international community to support the country. This is particularly critical as NATO's Strategic Concept maintains minimal forces in a "very high ready" state, with the bulk of forces planned to reinforce within 14-30 days. This observation also adds credibility to the threat of deterrence by resilience (denial), requiring a state to analyze the fragility of an opposing state before taking military action.

2) The International Community can reinforce resilience without nuclear escalation. Experience in Ukraine demonstrates NATO can help build and reinforce a partner nation's capability to fight without decisive engagement. This is demonstrated through the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) in building capacity and the ability to reinforce Ukraine's materiel requirements. NATO can provide conventional support to Ukraine without a nuclear response from Russia. This increases the capacity and credibility of the partner's threat of denial. Looked at in another way, this capability provides NATO a means to extend the deterrent umbrella and not rely on coercive threats to support partners.

35) Justin Gomez, "Biden Warns of 'Severe Consequences' If Putin Moves on Ukraine," ABC News. 8 December 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-warns-severe-consequences-putin-moves-ukraine/story?id=81627505

36) Andrew Rettman, "No Obligation to Defend Ukraine from Russia, NATO Chief Says," EUobserver. 1 December 2021. https://euobserver.com/world/153689

37) "NATO Secretary General with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 16 December 2021." NATO News. 16 December 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kH8eM-jI3Fs

3) Signaling nuclear escalation remains an effective deterrent against NATO. Since the beginning of the 2022 offensive, Russia has leveraged their Strategic Deterrence concept to threaten nuclear retaliation to deter support for Ukraine. In addition to using energy as a weapon for blackmail, Russia has suggested that NATO intervention could escalate the conflict from the conventional to nuclear layer. To add credibility and further communicate this, Russia announced in October 2022 that the "annexed" states were integrated parts of Russia and that efforts to retake them were attacks on Russia core interests.[38] Faced with a capable, communicated threat with some credibility, Russia's threat is a likely cause of NATO's choice to has limit the range and effectiveness of systems provided to Ukraine.

"Despite threats, NATO has trained and supplied Ukraine troops since the beginning of the conflict without a response."

Russia has also demonstrated that credibility is perishable. Despite threats, NATO has trained and supplied Ukraine troops since the beginning of the conflict without a response. China and India have both publicly stated that the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. As trading partners and economic lifelines around NATO-led sanctions, Russia is very unlikely to defy these powers. As inaction and international disapproval erode credibility, deterrence plays less in NATO's decision as demonstrated through supplying more advanced, longer-range systems to Ukraine.

This situation increases the risk of escalation. As the situation develops, NATO must continue to assess Russian communication and evaluate the credibility of the Russian threat to avoid overlooking a redline that might lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.

4) NATO's Credibility in extended deterrence remains a vulnerability that jeopardizes aspiring nations. Structured as a defensive treaty, NATO remains challenged to extend the deterrence umbrella. The 2022 Strategic Concept demonstrates NATO's commitment to defense, highlighting that all the three core missions are to "ensure collective defence and security of all Allies".[39] NATO

38) Paul Kirby, "What Russian Annexation Means for Ukraine's Regions," BBC News. 30 September 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63086767

39) NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept, 3.

has recently demonstrated at least three options to help assure partners and deter aggressors in this vulnerable period. The most promising is expedited membership, demonstrated by efforts to fast-track membership for Sweden and Finland. Unfortunately, NATO has demonstrated that the fast track for concurrence from 30 sovereign states isn't fast. Another option would be tripwire forces, such as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) troops deployed to the Baltic states. This option assures the allies and partners of NATO's intentions, while causing a deterrent dilemma for an aggressor state of attacking member forces. The third option is increasing resilience of the aspiring member as demonstrated in Ukraine. As Ukraine met conditions for the CAP, it increased the resilience of the entire government, including military and civilian response forces. NATO members also contributed billions of dollars to improve military capability. The investment in an aspiring partner did not prove effective in deterring Russian aggression, but it did prove effective in realizing denial of Russian victory. Of the three options to mitigate the risk to aspiring partners, only NATO members' investment in resiliency proves effective in bolstering capability of a deterrent threat.

Concluding Remarks

The Russo-Ukraine War demonstrates the limits of extended deterrence and the vulnerability of aspiring states seeking admission into NATO. NATO's core interest as a defensive alliance remains protected. Escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons remains deterred as of May 2023. From the Russian perspective, NATO has not directly intervened on Ukraine's behalf and has not supplied weapons that would alter the strategic environment against Russia. In these three instances, threat's capability, capacity, and communication exceed the potential benefit of action. Where deterrence did fail to alter Russia's aggression, the war has demonstrated that NATO can effectively reinforce a state's resilience to enable deterrence by denial. The war also verifies Shelling's theory that deterrence can effectively stop escalation between levels of weapons from conventional to nuclear. A major implication for NATO policy is that extended deterrence for non-member states requires costlier signaling than can be provided by money and training alone, and that when extended deterrence fails, the money and training required to impose high costs on an aggressor are significantly higher.

NATO'S 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT: PREPARING FOR A MORE COMPLEX AND INTERCONNECTED WORLD

In 2022, at the Madrid Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted a new Strategic Concept to guide the Alliance's adaptation in a world of strategic competition, pervasive instability, and recurrent shocks. The new Concept recognizes that many of the challenges and threats facing NATO, from growing pressure against the rules-based international order, to terrorism and climate change, are very much global in nature. Therefore, the Concept stresses the importance of adopting a global approach to security. This requires understanding the connections and interlinkages between different challenges and regions, but also actively investing in working with partners, near and far, in contributing to preventing crises and boosting resilience.

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At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. The Strategic Concept is NATO's most important guiding document, second only to the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's founding document, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949.[1] It expresses the Allies' collective political will, and outlines NATO's enduring purpose, core values, and fundamental tasks. The Strategic Concept agreed in Madrid is the eighth in NATO's history, and the fourth one in the so-called "post-Cold War era", following those adopted in 1991, 1999, and 2010. The 2022 Concept replaces the one agreed upon in Lisbon in 2010. It identifies the central features of the security environment, articulates how the Alliance intends to tackle its main threats and challenges, and provides guidelines for its future political and military adaptation.[2]

The 2022 Strategic Concept reflects the extensive changes in the Alliance's security environment that have occurred since 2010. Overall, it acknowledges that both the global and Euro-Atlantic strategic landscapes have significantly deteriorated and that the world in 2022 is more complex, contested and unpredictable. The Alliance now faces the most challenging security environment since the end of the Cold War. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine gravely altered the Euro-Atlantic security environment, exacerbating a climate of "strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks."[3]

The new Concept offers a blueprint to navigate this challenging strategic environment. To do so, it reaffirms the key purpose and greatest responsibility of NATO, as a defensive Alliance: to ensure the collective defense of Allies, against all threats, from all directions, by military and non-military means.[4] The Concept also stresses that NATO's principles and values, individual liberty, democracy and the rule of law, remain consistent and that all NATO Allies are committed to upholding them.

NATO's Strategic Concept also outlines how the Alliance seeks to engage with the rest of the world. In line with its commitments to the United Nations Charter, NATO intends to continue to work towards just, inclusive and lasting peace, and remain a bulwark of the rules-based international order. While NATO's primary focus is on the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance will retain a global perspective to address common challenges. To that end, NATO will work closely with partners in its neighborhood and across the globe, while continuing to

1) NATO, "Strategic Concepts", 18 July 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm
2) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
3) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 6.
4) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 1.

reach out to other countries with whom Allies share values and interests, and with international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations, to contribute to international peace and security. The Alliance will continue to promote good governance and to integrate climate change, human security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda across all its core tasks and activities, advancing gender equality ad a reflection of NATO's values.

> *"The world that NATO Allies face today is contested and unpredictable. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Its brutal and unlawful aggression, repeated violations of international humanitarian law and heinous atrocities have caused unspeakable suffering and destruction, and exacerbated instability across Europe and beyond."*

NATO's Challenges are Global Challenges: Security is Indivisible

The world that NATO Allies face today is contested and unpredictable. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Its brutal and unlawful aggression, repeated violations of international humanitarian law and heinous atrocities have caused unspeakable suffering and destruction, and exacerbated instability across Europe and beyond. The 2022 war against Ukraine is the culmination of a long-standing pattern of Russian destabilizing and coercive behavior, carried out through hybrid tactics, malicious activities in cyberspace, disinformation campaigns, the manipulation of energy and food supply chains, economic coercion, and military action. Russia has also engaged in irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and unraveled the international arms control and non-proliferation architecture. The effects of Russia's actions reverberate worldwide, resulting in global energy and food crises, and putting pressure on the rules-based international order.

NATO has taken significant steps to respond to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including by strengthening its deterrence and defense posture, boosting its resilience to hybrid tactics and working with partners to support their efforts to counter malign interference and aggression. Recognizing that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO has also reacted to Russia's unlawful and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by supporting Ukraine's inherent

right to self-defense, as rooted in the Charter of the United Nations.

More broadly, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are both leading an authoritarian pushback against the rules-based international order and promoting alternative authoritarian models of global governance. These trends have direct implications for NATO Allies and Euro-Atlantic security, but their impact is truly global. In this context, the NATO Strategic Concept also addresses, for the first time, the PRC and asserts that its coercive policies and stated ambitions represent a challenge to NATO's interests, security, and values as well as to the international rules-based order. In particular, the PRC "seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains."[5] The PRC engages in coercive behavior against neighboring countries but also against nations in different parts of the world. The deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and the Russian Federation and their attempts to undercut the rules-based international order are deeply troubling. NATO does not identify the PRC as an adversary and remains open to constructive engagement with the PRC, as there are many challenges that require cooperation, such as climate change. At the same time, the Allies need to address the systemic challenges Beijing poses to Euro-Atlantic security.

The Strategic Concept also highlights a range of non-traditional threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security that are shared by the rest of the world, highlighting once again the point that security is global. Terrorism remains the Alliance's main asymmetric threat. Terrorist groups are "enhancing their capabilities and investing in new technologies to improve their reach and lethality."[6] Conflict, fragility and instability endure in various regions of the world, such as in the Sahel, North Africa, and Middle East regions, directly affecting the security of NATO Allies and of partners. The impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies, and food insecurity exacerbate these crises. Emerging and disruptive technologies bring both "opportunities and risks,"[7] and represent a crucial arena of global strategic competition, just like cyberspace and outer space. The erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Last, but not least, climate change is "a defining challenge of our time,"[8] disrupting societies, undermining security, and threatening the lives and livelihoods of citizens in NATO and beyond.

5) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 13.
6) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 10.
7) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 17.
8) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 19.

In the same vein, the Strategic Concept explicitly recognizes that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area are affected by security developments in other key regions, such as the Indo-Pacific. In other words, just like Russia's war against Ukraine is impacting security and stability well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, conversely, a security crisis in the Indo-Pacific region would also have repercussions for European and transatlantic security.

How NATO Ensures the Security of Allies and Contributes to Upholding the Rules-Based International Order

The 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirms that NATO remains indispensable to guarantee the security and defense of Allies. As a political and military alliance, NATO is the "unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters relative to individual and collective security."[9]

NATO's key purpose and greatest responsibility is "to ensure our collective defense, against all threats, from all directions."[10] This key purpose is fulfilled through three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

Deterrence and Defense

The new Strategic Concept highlights the importance of deterrence and defense as core tasks. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace, and NATO cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Deterrence and defense represent the backbone of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the commitment that Allies undertake to defend each other against all threats. In an environment of growing strategic competitions, it is vital that NATO preserves a 360-degre approach and a global awareness and reach so that it can deter and defend, but also contest and deny effectively across all domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—and against all threats, no matter where they stem from.

The Concept acknowledges the progress made since 2014 to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture, while also urging the continued bolstering of Allied presence, forces and capabilities, to credibly and sustainably deter and defend, now and in the future.

9) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 3.

10) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 1.

At the Madrid Summit, Allies took concrete decision to strengthen deterrence and defense, building on the adaptation undertaken since 2014 and on the further measures implemented since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine to safeguard the security of the Alliance. Allies also reaffirmed their commitment to invest in defense and agreed to build on the 2014 Defense Investment Pledge to maintain a continued upward trajectory in defense spending and NATO common funding, to ensure that the Alliance is well-equipped and resourced to face present and future challenges.

"The new Strategic Concept highlights the importance of deterrence and defense as core tasks. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace, and NATO cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity."

Countering terrorism is also essential to NATO's deterrence and defense. This is why the Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's role in fighting terrorism, in line with the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. Allies will continue to deter and defend against terrorist groups based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures. Moreover, NATO will continue to enhance its cooperation with the international community, including the United Nations and the European Union, to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

Finally, the new Strategic Concept emphasizes Allies' commitment to build national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges. Making efforts to safeguard Allied societies is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, and it is essential to counter threats that go beyond the military realm, targeting Allied economies, societies, and services. The Concept stresses the importance of boosting resilience and working towards mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, with special efforts to ensure critically important reliable energy supply and sources.

Working With Partners to Prevent Crises and Tackle Common Challenges

The Strategic Concept recognizes that many of the challenges NATO faces—from climate change to terrorism, and from cyber threats to disinformation— are often global and require the Alliance to maintain a global outlook and to work with partners.

The Concept highlights how cooperation with NATO's partners strengthens the Alliance and contributes to "stability beyond our borders."[11] Central to protecting the global commons, partnerships enhance NATO's resilience and support the rules-based international order. NATO will continue strengthening ties with partners that "share the Alliance's values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order."[12]

Political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners are also key to NATO's crisis prevention and management agenda. Investing in conflict and crisis prevention is "a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security."[13] NATO is committed to preventing and responding to crises that can potentially affect Euro-Atlantic security.

> *"Training and capacity building are key tools in NATO's crisis prevention toolbox. These programs contribute to making partners more capable, more secure, and better prepared to respond to crises at home and abroad."*

Training and capacity building are key tools in NATO's crisis prevention toolbox. These programs contribute to making partners more capable, more secure, and better prepared to respond to crises at home and abroad. Allies are also committed to strengthening partners' resilience against malign interference, destabilization, and aggression. The Alliance has decades' worth of accomplishments in building defense institutions and capacity with partners in NATO's neighborhood and beyond.

The Alliance will continue to invest in bolstering the capabilities of partners in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea regions. NATO will also work with partners to tackle shared security threats and challenges in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel regions. NATO will continue to engage with new and existing partners

11) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 42.
12) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 44.
13) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 38.

in the Indo-Pacific region to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests.

In addition to investing in working with partners, NATO is also committed to cooperating with other international actors to contribute to tackle the root causes of pervasive instability, which often represent a "fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups" and the conditions fueling forced displacement, human trafficking, and irregular migration. In this context, NATO seeks to deepen cooperation and coordination with the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with other regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the African Union. Beyond existing partnerships, NATO remains willing to engage with any country or organization, "when doing so could bolster our mutual security."[14]

Climate change is an area in which international cooperation and engagement are particularly important, and NATO aims to become the leading international organization to understand and adapt to the impact of climate change on security. The Alliance will also contribute to combatting climate change by reducing emissions, improving efficiency, investing in the transition, while ensuring military effectiveness and a credible deterrence and defense posture.

Conclusion

In light of a worsened strategic environment, characterized by strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks, the unity of NATO Allies has never been as strong as now. The Alliance has responded to Russia's war of aggression by uniting in support of Ukraine's struggle for self-defense. The Strategic Concept is a product of this unity, providing a collective assessment of the Alliance's strategic environment and an overview of the tools and resources necessary for NATO to navigate this environment.

The Strategic Concept also reflects the dual purpose of NATO's actions: the Alliance aims to ensure security and respond to aggression, but in doing so it upholds the rules-based international order. In a contested and unpredictable world, the values and institutions created to ensure global peace and security are under severe pressure, and all like-minded actors must work in concert to protect them. NATO is doing its part, by supporting Ukraine as it exercises its right to self-defense, deterring further aggression in the Euro-Atlantic area, contributing to crisis prevention and management, and working with partners on tackling shared threats and challenges.

14) NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, paragraph 44.

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

NATO OTAN

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This special issue, which we had the great pleasure of working together with NATO's Public Diplomacy Divison, seeks to delve into the multifaceted dimensions of expanding NATO, exploring the challenges and opportunities that lie on the horizon. As we examine this critical issue, it is important to emphasize that the views expressed in these pages are diverse and reflect the complex and varied perspectives on NATO's expansion. Our authors, specialists from a wide-range of different fields, contributed their valuable opinions regarding this important discussion which has become further important since Russia's aggression against Ukraine has escalated with simultaneously intensifying debates concerning the start of a new Cold-War in our time.

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