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NATO's Changing Priorities



Carmen Romero

Protecting The Future:
NATO's Madrid Summit
and Strategic Concept

E. Fuat Keyman

A Revitalized NATO and
Its "New Strategic
Concept" Amid Global
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Kemal Köprülü

E-mail for Subscription: subscriptions@transatlanticpolicy.com

E-mail to the Editor: editor@transatlanticpolicy.com

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TRANSATLANTIC POLICY QUARTERLY

Asmalı Mescit Mah. Oteller Sok. No.8 Kat.2 Beyoğlu- İSTANBUL

T: (0 212) 621 4442 - 621 9258 F: (0 212) 531 8718

Web: www.transatlanticpolicy.com Email: info@transatlanticpolicy.com

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Foreword

In response to the shifting landscape of international politics, the most current TPQ issue focuses on “NATO’s Changing Priorities.” We present thirteen insightful essays for our Summer 2022 edition from prominent figures in academia, journalism, and nongovernmental organizations. Ten of these articles address the changing priorities of NATO in more general terms, while three others take this phenomenon in light of the effects of the most recent Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Several significant new difficulties for the global order emerged in the wake of the Russian invasion. NATO has proposed a new Strategic Concept, which was emphasized at its most recent Summit in Madrid, in response to these fresh concerns. TPQ explores not just the potential of this recent, significant document but also examines the more considerable consequences of it on the global stage. *Transatlantic Policy Quarterly’s* publication interests have always been significantly inspired by the Alliance’s agenda. We hope that by concentrating on NATO’s Changing Priorities in our Summer 2022 issue, we will be able to better inform our readers about the shifting framework of international relations.

Carmen Romero provides an exciting overview of the recent Strategic Concept outlined by NATO in its Madrid Summit. She correctly draws attention to the novelty of this novel idea in light of the circumstances surrounding its revelation. Additionally, she thinks that the important choices made at the Summit will guarantee that NATO keeps adapting and protecting its members in an increasingly dangerous and competitive world. An overview of these choices is given in this article within the framework of the Alliance’s increasingly erratic security environment.

E. Fuat Keyman highlights that the NATO summit in Madrid was significant and essential, but it wasn’t enough. To support his claim, he thoroughly examines NATO’s new strategic concept, its crucial significance, its transformational impact, and the six obstacles it confronts. As NATO today finds itself in a period of strategic rivalry, in his opinion, the organization’s most recent Strategic Concept reflects a very different threat environment. It acknowledges for the first time that the Euro-Atlantic region is “not at peace,” but instead that strategic rivalry and general instability threaten regional security.

Ahmet O. Evin offers a careful method that considers contextual circumstances. According to him, NATO now looks to be taking on the role of a champion for both the liberal order and the shared principles of the transatlantic Alliance. Moreover, he also focuses on the longer-term effects of the shifting dynamics in international

events on ordinary individuals by saying that unhappiness brought on by the stagnant economy, the growing cost of living, and perhaps energy shortages may be expected to expand the ranks of those opposed to the war and its effects on the quality of life in Europe.

We encourage you to find out more about the elements that make up NATO's Changing Priorities. I want to express my gratitude to all authors who contributed and put a lot of time and effort into it. Bringing you the newest edition has been a wonderful experience for TPQ crew. An important acknowledgment goes to our premium corporate sponsor Halifax. In addition, we would like to thank our online sponsor, and the sponsor of this issue, Monaco Economic Board. We also like to thank our other sponsors, Beko, Ford, Gordon Blair, Kalekim, TEB, The Ritz-Carlton, and Yapı Kredi for their ongoing support.

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PROTECTING THE FUTURE: NATO'S MADRID SUMMIT AND STRATEGIC CONCEPT

In June 2022, Spain hosted one of the most consequential summits in NATO's history. The doors of the Alliance were opened to Finland and Sweden, leaders made clear that they would continue to support Ukraine, outlined the largest reinforcement of Alliance deterrence and defense in decades, and agreed NATO's new Strategic Concept. For the first time, Indo-Pacific partners were invited to join a NATO Summit. These and other key decisions taken at the Summit will ensure NATO continues to adapt and protect its citizens in a more competitive and dangerous world. This article provides an overview of these decisions in the context of the more unpredictable security environment facing the Alliance.

Carmen Romero*



* Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In June 2022, Spain hosted one of the most consequential summits in NATO's history. The gathering of Allied leaders took place at a crucial moment for our security, and the Allies proved up to the task. They demonstrated unity and resolve to confront current and future security challenges and threats, and opened the doors of the Alliance to two new invitees – Finland and Sweden – which will help enhance their security and strengthen the Alliance.

The summit was particularly impactful for a range of reasons, not least because it took place against the backdrop of the Russian Federation's brutal invasion of Ukraine. Russian aggression, in addition to creating unspeakable human suffering and destruction in Ukraine, has increased global insecurity and instability, openly challenging the mutually agreed principles that underpin European security and seriously undermining the rules-based international order. Leaders made clear that NATO's support to Ukraine will last for as long as it takes. By agreeing to a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, Allies reaffirmed that their commitment to Ukraine is unshakeable.

During the Summit, Allies also adopted a new Strategic Concept, NATO's roadmap for the next decade. The Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's values, its purpose and its core tasks. It provides a collective assessment of the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks NATO will carry out to address them.

While NATO's three core tasks– collective defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security– remain, this new Concept is significantly different in scope and tone compared to its 2010 predecessor. Several aspects of the security environment a decade ago informed the 2010 Concept. The ambition of that time was to develop a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. There was also a belief that the international security order was, overall, more predictable and that most security challenges would come from beyond NATO's area of responsibility. The People's Republic of China (PRC) had not yet reached the transatlantic security agenda. These facts led to a consequent strong focus on crisis management. As we enter the 2020s, the Madrid Concept describes today's more unstable and challenging security environment, and makes clear the need for Allies to be prepared for this volatility.

In light of this changed security environment, the recently adopted Madrid Concept focuses on the future trajectory of NATO-Russia relations, the strengthening of NATO's collective deterrence and defense posture, and on the framing of NATO's

relationship with the PRC. It also makes pronounced reference to space, resilience and cyber as integral elements of our collective deterrence and defense posture and covers NATO's evolving approach to a number of other threats and challenges, including terrorism and hybrid activities.

In the Madrid concept, we also observe a stronger emphasis on collective defense over crisis management and cooperative security. However, all three core tasks persist, recognizing that NATO is the only international organization that can mount and sustain complex, multinational operations; and because working with partners remains key for NATO's security and theirs, including through efforts aimed at enhancing their resilience.

“NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of its deterrence and defense since the end of the Cold War. In the wake of the Russian Federation's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Alliance has brought 40,000 multi-national troops under direct NATO command, in addition to the 100,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe.”

Together with the Strategic Concept, the decisions taken at the summit have set NATO's strategic direction for the future, ensuring that the Alliance will continue to adapt to a changing world and keep its one billion people safe. Let us review these decisions in greater depth.

NATO-Russia Relations

Perhaps the most notable difference between the Lisbon and the Madrid Strategic Concepts concerns the change in NATO's relations with the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its aggressive pattern of behavior against its neighbors and NATO Allies, and the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have broken the trust that was once at the core of the NATO-Russia relationship, changing it fundamentally for the long-term. In this context, meaningful dialogue with the Russian Federation is no longer possible, precisely because of its blatant violation of international law and use of military force against an independent, sovereign nation.

The new Strategic Concept reflects this reality and considers the Russian Federation the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security.¹ NATO seeks stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in NATO-Russia relations, but Allies have made it clear that any change in the relationship will depend on the Russian Federation putting an end to its aggressive behavior and complying with international law. Nevertheless, the Alliance will remain open to keeping channels of communication with Moscow, in order to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency.

This important shift is accompanied by concrete actions. NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of its deterrence and defense since the end of the Cold War. In the wake of the Russian Federation's war of aggression in Ukraine, the Alliance has brought 40,000 multi-national troops under direct NATO command, in addition to the 100,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe. NATO has doubled the number of battle groups along its eastern front, from the four established after the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in 2014, to eight today.

At the Madrid Summit, NATO Leaders agreed to further strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and forward defenses. This entails having more forces at higher readiness.

The eight battlegroups on the eastern flank will be scaled up to brigade level. There will also be more pre-positioned equipment and weapons stockpiles, to allow NATO to be even more responsive in times of crisis or conflict. Allies also agreed a new force model, which will strengthen and modernize the NATO Force Structure. It will also resource the Alliance's new generation of military plans, in line with its 360-degree approach, across the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains and against all threats and challenges. Specifically, the new force model plans for over 100,000 troops at ten day readiness, around 200,000 at 10 to 30 day readiness and at least 500,000 up to 30 to 180 day readiness. Forces will be earmarked to defend specific, pre-assigned NATO countries, thereby ensuring security for the long term.

The People's Republic of China: Challenges and Opportunities

If we read the 2010 Strategic Concept through today's geopolitical lens, we will notice, perhaps with surprise, that it does not mention the PRC, as if the PRC has no impact on the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. There is no denying that the rise of the PRC impacts our security: the PRC has the world's second largest defense budget and is investing heavily in modern military capabilities. It is substantially building up its military forces, including expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems. At the same time, it is not party to any

¹ NATO. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept," nato.int, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

existing arms control treaties – crucial tools to increase transparency and reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation around these capabilities.

The PRC is also increasingly assertive in the global arena and together with the Russian Federation, is using multilateral fora to push its autocratic agenda and undermine Western values and the rules-based international order. At the same time, the PRC continues to amplify the Russian Federation's hostile information activities against NATO. The PRC's investment in critical infrastructure in third countries and indeed in NATO Allied nations, is a risk we must also be aware of. The use of technology and artificial intelligence to monitor and control its own citizens is also worrying. All of this has consequences for NATO's security, interests and values.

It is important to stress that the PRC is not NATO's adversary and that is why we will continue to look at both the challenges and the opportunities that it brings. In this context, while we take into account the consequences it presents to security, it is also important to have a dialogue with the PRC to discuss issues such as arms control or climate change.

“At the NATO Summit, Allies reviewed the progress made in the fight against terrorism and reconfirmed their commitment to continue this fight with determination and solidarity.”

Our partners in the Asia-Pacific play a very important role here. NATO will continue to stand with its partners to preserve the rules-based international order, an order based on norms and values rather than on force. We are working together with them on cyber defense, emerging and disruptive technologies, maritime security, climate change, and countering disinformation in order to help resist the PRC's coercive policies.

New – and Not So New – Challenges

While the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine has brought military confrontation back to Europe at a scale that we have not seen in many decades, this is not the only threat that NATO faces. Cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent and sophisticated, terrorist threats persist, nuclear weapons are proliferating and climate change is driving instability and fueling crises.

Taking into consideration these new security challenges, strengthening NATO's national and collective resilience is a priority in the Madrid Strategic Concept. Even though the use of the term "resilience" in public discourse may be relatively new, NATO's work on resilience is not. The concept is grounded in Article 3 of 1949's North Atlantic Treaty. Our societies and our institutions must be able to better resist and bounce back from attacks. This includes many different elements to make our societies stronger: our infrastructure must be more resilient, we should diversify our supply chains and make them more secure and of course, properly address hostile information activities seeking to divide us and weaken our democratic institutions. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said on many occasions, civilian resilience is our first line of defense.

Ensuring resilience also requires a robust technological base. For over 70 years, NATO has stayed at the forefront of technology development to ensure the defense of its Allies and the success of its operations. Emerging and disruptive technologies are also having a profound impact on security. These technologies are providing new opportunities for NATO militaries, helping them become more effective, resilient, cost-efficient and sustainable. However, they also represent new threats from state and non-state actors, both militarily and to society at large. To embrace these opportunities and at the same time counter these threats, NATO has recently established a Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), to help develop cutting-edge solutions to security challenges by working closely with start-ups, industry, and academia.

Climate change is a defining challenge of our time, it acts as a crisis multiplier and more extreme weather devastates communities and fuels tensions and conflicts. Climate change matters for our security and we are working to incorporate it into everything we do – from defense planning to capability development and exercises. This calls for a fundamental transformation of NATO's approach to defense and security and sets NATO as the leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the security implications of climate change. In Madrid, Allies agreed to cut emissions by NATO bodies and commands by at least 45 percent by 2030 and to move towards net zero by 2050. NATO will maintain its operational effectiveness and readiness as we continue to adapt.

NATO Allies and Türkiye in particular, have been targets for terrorist groups. These groups have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies. The new Strategic Concept recognizes that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international stability and prosperity. In support of national authorities,

NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence sharing, including with partners, and continuous strategic analysis and assessment. One example is the work conducted by the Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, Türkiye, which serves both as a location for meetings and as a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The Centre reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organizations. NATO's training mission in Iraq is also actively helping to prevent the return of the Islamic State.

At the NATO Summit, Allies reviewed the progress made in the fight against terrorism and reconfirmed their commitment to continue this fight with determination and solidarity. Terrorism remains by nature a global threat. It knows no border, nationality or religion and thus it is a challenge the international community must tackle together. NATO has been contributing to a more holistic approach by strengthening outreach to, and cooperation with, partner countries and international actors.

Protecting Our Future, Together

In today's complex and unpredictable security environment, NATO's relations with partners across the globe are key. Our practical cooperation includes crosscutting global challenges such as cyber defense, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, non-proliferation, defense science and technology, and Women, Peace and Security. Some partners participate in NATO's military operations, while many have also benefited from NATO's expertise in areas such as building defense capacity and defense training and education.

The new Strategic Concept takes NATO's partnerships to a new level, adopting a more global outlook to face these threats together. In an era of strategic competition, it is vital that NATO works even more closely with nations and organizations that share its values. A good example of partnership is the work NATO does with the European Union, with whom we share 23 out of 30 members. Indeed, NATO protects 93 percent of the EU population. With the memberships of Finland and Sweden, this would rise to 96 percent. Both, already enjoy a very fruitful partnership, and will continue to deepen their cooperation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also made it clear that NATO needs to step up tailored political and practical support to partners vulnerable to Russian threats and interference, including the Republic of Moldova as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia. Supportive measures include strengthening resilience and reinforcing

public diplomacy and strategic communications. Hostile information activities represent a particularly worrying and pervasive threat, and NATO is ready to support partners to combat it.

NATO is also strengthening relations with its Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand and they joined NATO Allies at the Madrid Summit to discuss the global implications of the PRC's rise and the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine. NATO will continue working together in areas such as cyber defense, emerging and disruptive technologies, maritime security, climate change, and countering hostile information activities.

Jordan and Mauritania also participated in the Madrid Summit, demonstrating NATO's determination to continue to respond to challenges from the South, including the Sahel. Allies agreed a capacity-building package for Mauritania, additional capacity building support for Tunisia and they continue to support Jordan. Support will be focused in a number of key areas, including special operations, maritime security and intelligence, and the Alliance will help these partners deal with security concerns, including border security, irregular migration, and terrorism.

Today's challenges are too great for any one nation or organization to face alone. By standing together with its partners, NATO is stronger and safer and it can better protect its people, its values, and its way of life. NATO's new Strategic Concept provides us with an updated road map that will guide us in an increasingly challenging security environment and will ensure NATO remains ready to address different threats and challenges as they emerge. This roadmap and the historic decisions taken in Madrid will ensure that the Alliance is ready for the future, no matter how uncertain and unpredictable.



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A REVITALIZED NATO AND ITS “NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT” AMID GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES

At the beginning of 2022, just as the globalizing world was entering the post-Covid period and the United Nations Climate Change Conference declared a “code red” emergency for the climate crisis at COP 27, a strategically calculated move came from Russian President Vladimir Putin to unlawfully invade Ukraine. From the beginning, the invasion of Ukraine has generated impacts much larger and more transformative than any previous crisis, triggering serious crisis-ridden developments in the international system and globalization and forcing national governments and global actors to recalibrate and reposition. It is in this global and broader context NATO’s Madrid Summit and its “new Strategic Concept” should be analyzed and assessed. This paper argues that the summit is historic, necessary, but not sufficient. To substantiate this argument, it analyzes is NATO’s new strategic concept in detail, exploring its critical importance, its transformative effect and the six challenges that it faces.

E. Fuat Keyman*



* Fuat Keyman is the Director of Istanbul Policy Center and Vice President of Sabancı University.

Contrary to the fast and immature declarations of the “end of history” at the end of the Cold War in 1990, the 21st century has so far given rise to recurring global crises in security, economy, democracy, and climate and shifted power configurations between the West and the rest. The 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the 2008 global economic crisis, the 2010 Arab uprisings, climate change, democratic backsliding, the Covid-19 Pandemic, and finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine can all be categorized as “multiple crises of globalization”, paving the way to a “systemic change and power transition” in global politics. In his book *Strategic Vision*, Zbigniew Brzezinski calls this double movement “global turmoil”, a time characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, risk, and ontological insecurity whose consequences and impact could create everlasting conflicts and wars unless they are coped with effectively.¹ A hundred years ago, at the beginning of the 20th century, Antonio Gramsci penned his famous statement describing a similar situation: “the old is dying, the new cannot be born yet: in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”²

At the beginning of 2022, just as the globalizing world was entering the post-Covid period and the United Nations Climate Change Conference declared a “code red” emergency for the climate crisis at COP 27, a strategically calculated move came from Russian President Vladimir Putin. On 22 February, Putin famously gave a speech to justify his decision to invade Ukraine with reference both to previous world wars’ rhetoric on irredentism and fascism, and to the NATO decision in 2014 to further expand its geopolitical boundaries after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. On 24 February, Russia began its illegal invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s war aimed not only at the destruction of Ukraine but also, and more importantly, to leverage Russia against the West and strengthen its strategic place and capacity amid the new era of great power competition. From the beginning, the invasion of Ukraine has generated impacts much larger, more effective, and more transformative than any previous crisis, triggering serious developments in the international system and globalization and forcing national governments and global actors to recalibrate and reposition.

I argue that it is in this context of the simultaneous existence of war and system transitions that NATO’s Madrid Summit, and its “new Strategic Concept” should be analyzed and assessed. It has been seven months since the beginning of the ongoing invasion. As the conflict and combat have escalated, its impact has been crisis-ridden and multilayered. The war has sparked anew period of geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainties. The world as we know has profoundly changed. Moreover, we might be in a situation today where we are not able to fully capture the effects of the invasion, which might ripple out for years. As we can already see from the

¹ Z. B Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision* (Basic Books, New York, 2013).

² A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2000).

ensuing food and energy crises, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought to the fore the multiple crises of globalization that have been occurring simultaneously in the areas of security, energy, and food, coupled with climate, recession, unemployment, and inflation. At the same time, this has accelerated the ongoing systemic change and transition.

“The new Concept is reflective of a completely different threat environment, as now NATO is facing an era of strategic competition. For the first time, it recognizes that the Euro-Atlantic area is “not at peace”.”

While “the post-Cold War era” has come to an end with the beginning of the war, the political economy of globalization has been altered, combating global warming has been neglected, and a more fluid and disruptive era has begun. Furthermore, there is a laundry list of signs that the Pax-Americana and its embedded liberal post-1945 world order are quickly coming to an end: calls for the “Second Cold War” or “Cold War 2.0”; concerns about a nuclear war leading to the “Third World War”; trade wars and the rise of “de-globalization”; widening and deepening of severe polarization, exclusionary nationalism and “culture wars”; democratic backsliding and illiberal authoritarian populism; the global power shift and the fortification of the power of the non-Western international relations and strategic capitalism. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while fastening the end of the era, has been bringing about a variety of morbid symptoms and crisis-ridden developments, requiring each and every actor to reposition its role and place. During this interregnum, this transition, no actor is immune from the necessity to recalibrate its capacity and strategy. Strategic vision and choice are absolutely imperative for success. This is nowhere more evident and necessary than in Europe and the West.

NATO’s Madrid Summit: Historic, Necessary but not Sufficient

The initial reaction of Europe and the West to the invasion has been truly remarkable. The unity of the West, of Europe, of the transatlantic Alliance, of NATO, and the EU has been to a large extent achieved. What remains to be seen is the degree to which this initial and truly remarkable unity can be sustained amid the global and regional turmoil, the complexity of which has deepened through the multiple crises of globalization and changing power configurations in the international system.

In this historical context, NATO leaders gathered in Madrid on 29-30 June 2022 not only to discuss how to effectively tackle the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its immediate and long-term impacts, including the acceptance of Finland and Sweden's historic applications for membership, but also to set NATO's strategic direction for the future and to strengthen its role and place in European and global collective security, both of which will ensure that the Alliance will continue to adapt to the changing transatlantic and global world.

Together with the New Strategic Concept, key points discussed throughout the gathering covered the strengthening of investments in deterrence and defense. Among other measures, NATO decided that by 2024, Allies must meet the requirement of spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Furthermore, support to Ukraine and other partners at risk was ensured by a strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, which includes support in areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems, and fuel. Additionally, the Alliance's adaptation to emerging challenges such as issues related to climate change, challenges from NATO's South, and the reaffirmation of NATO's common values were among the topics discussed.

Just as remarkable as the memorandum of the summit was the trilateral agreement reached by Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden by which Ankara, as an existing member of the Western military alliance, lifted its veto on Finland's and Sweden's bid to join the Alliance in return for comprehensive assurances regarding the aspiring member states' links to Kurdish militants considered as a threat to Türkiye's national security. Indeed, before the gathering, the Turkish government had already clarified its uncompromising stance on the Nordic countries' membership as long as they pursued their ongoing investigations into the financing and recruitment activities against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and affiliated groups. Common ground was championed mostly thanks to Secretary-General Stoltenberg's constructive approach and his understanding of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's arguments, including that "No Ally has suffered more brutal terrorist attacks than Türkiye, including from the terrorist group PKK."³ On the eve of the summit, the tripartite meeting between the leaders of Sweden, Finland, and Türkiye as well as Secretary-General Stoltenberg resulted in the candidate states confirming that the PKK is a terrorist organization and promising to interrupt all bilateral activities with it and affiliated groups. This sent a strong message of unity and support for Kyiv in response to the immensely radicalized Russian threat.

By and far the most important outcome of the summit was the New Strategic Concept. The Concept is the guiding document that has outlined NATO's values

³ Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the trilateral meeting between Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden, NATO, last updated 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197253.htm

and vision every ten years since the end of the Cold War. It is a blueprint for future strategic plans and outlines NATO’s transformation in line with the NATO 2030 agenda adopted at the 2021 Summit. The new Strategic Concept consists of a total of 49 articles to “define the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them.”⁴ The Concept outlines NATO’s three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.⁵

*“Europe must explore alternatives in preparing for the coming
“Winter Peril” caused by Russia’s oncoming gas disruptions.”*

As outlined in the Strategic Concept, Russia is considered the “most significant and direct threat” to alliance security.⁶ This is an important point of departure from NATO’s last Strategic Concept in 2010, which defines Russia as a “strategic partner” of NATO, and to that end, the 2010 Concept focused on improving dialogue and cooperation with Moscow. True to its time, this reflects the pre-2014 security environment before NATO suspended all practical cooperation with Russia.

The new Concept is reflective of a completely different threat environment, as now NATO is facing an era of strategic competition. For the first time, it recognizes that the Euro-Atlantic area is “not at peace.”⁷ Its security is undermined by strategic competition as well as pervasive instability. Therefore, the Concept calls for further reinforcement of the “deterrence and defense” function of the Alliance under Article 5.8 As has been enshrined in the Washington Treaty for over 70 years, the Alliance’s key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure Allies’ collective defense as etched in Article 5.

Furthermore, within the new Strategic Concept, there is a focus on climate-related issues. Climate change is recognized as a “defining challenge, with a profound impact” on NATO’s collective security. The Alliance aims to become the leader of climate change security. With efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and

⁴ “FACT SHEET: The 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid”, *The Office of the White House*, 29 June 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/29/fact-sheet-the-2022-nato-summit-in-madrid/>

⁵ “Strategic Concepts”, *NATO*, last updated 18 July 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

⁶ “NATO declares Russia its ‘most direct threat,’ offers Finland, Sweden membership”, *DW*, 29 June 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-declares-russia-its-most-direct-threat-offers-finland-sweden-membership/a-62297662> 29 June 2022.

⁷ “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, *NATO*, accessed 18 July 2022, <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

⁸ “FACT SHEET: The 2022 NATO Summit”, *The White House*.

improve energy efficiency, NATO aims to combat the impacts of climate change while still ensuring military effectiveness and deterrence and defense. Thus, the new strategic concept aims to consider climate change, human security, and the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda across all NATO tasks.⁹

The new strategic concept embodies a new focus on hybrid threats. Terrorism, for example, is defined as a threat to the security of citizens and international peace as well as prosperity and is seen as the “most direct asymmetric threat”. Also, as defined earlier by NATO, cyber threats such as cyber-attacks could directly invoke Article 5. Upgraded defense plans, with more forces at high readiness and specific forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies, more troops, and more prepositioned equipment and weapons stockpiles in the east of the Alliance, have dramatically enhanced NATO’s eight multinational battlegroups.

Therefore, one can say that NATO will continue to adapt and develop, politically and militarily, to meet the challenges of a more unpredictable and competitive world. The Alliance is based on the enduring transatlantic bond between Europe and North America. Within the new Strategic Concept, it is stated that NATO remains the unique, essential, and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate, and act on all matters related to Allies’ security.

Let us turn our attention briefly to the European Union (EU). The war in Ukraine has been unprecedented in bringing together EU member states rapidly in the field of foreign policy. The EU’s primary actions have taken the form of six consecutive sanctions packages, including individual and economic sanctions, media restrictions, transport-related restrictions, a gradual oil ban, and diplomatic measures; granting of candidacy status to Ukraine and Moldova; a commitment to completely end the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas by 2030; and increased defense spending by individual member states, most notably Germany.

Yet, these measures also attest to the fact that in matters concerning security and defense, Europe still relies primarily on NATO and the United States. The EU has not yet taken any concrete measures toward developing a more substantial and unified security and defense policy. This means that the post-Second World War model of ensuring European security through the U.S. military presence and the political and economic integration embodied in the EU continues and will prevail for the time being.

In this context, the necessary and historic Madrid summit and the approved new

⁹ NATO 2022 *Strategic Concept*, NATO.

strategic concept would recalibrate, remodel, and revitalize NATO’s *modus operandi* and importance in European and global security architecture. As Galip Dalay has correctly observed, NATO is becoming “more European in its membership composition but more global in its ambition by establishing more links between the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific.”¹⁰ It did so by bringing to the fore the need for (a) a more agile and robust collective security; (b) a more determined stand and fight against terrorism; (c) a multi-dimensional and multi-layered understanding of security by going beyond state security and paying scant attention to democracy, human rights, human security, and climate change; and (d) a rules-based global and regional governance.

Moreover, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a revitalized NATO has meant, first, that Europe rather than the United States will be “pivotal terrain” for European, transatlantic, and global collective defense. Second, NATO will be the “key anchor” linking transatlantic security and collective defense with the Pacific and Asia. Third, NATO’s new Strategic Concept will mark an “institutional pivot” in European collective security defense. While the EU is focusing on making itself a “geopolitical actor” and achieving its strategic compass for security and defense, to put it in the words of President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, NATO’s new Strategic Concept and EU’s strategic compass and energy policy are expected to take decisive steps together in stride toward the regulation and reduction of Europe’s gas demand. Europe must explore alternatives in preparing for the coming “Winter Peril” caused by Russia’s oncoming gas disruptions. Finally, the revitalization of NATO is a necessary step in the revitalization and strengthening of the West not only as an “idea” but also as a “unified actor” in the battle between global rules-based governance versus populist authoritarianism and strategic capitalism.

Six Challenges

Indeed, as an initial response to the invasion, all of these decisions and ideas are truly remarkable. They constitute decisive and historic steps against invasion/aggression and power change/transition in the international system. Yet, they are not sufficient to achieve the desired end. There are at least six serious challenges hampering success, namely those of achieving sustainability, promoting democracy, internalizing inclusive governance, and advocating for rules-based inter- and intra-institutional alliances rather than transactionalism. In conclusion, let us clarify these challenges:

First, even though these efforts to achieve unity are remarkable, the unity of the

¹⁰ G. Dalay, “Turkey gains much from NATO, but a rocky road lies ahead”, *Chatham House*, 12 July 2022.

West at the nation-state and institutional levels is not easy to maintain. As the global and regional turmoil and globalization's multiple crises endure, cooperation and collaboration between actors becomes more difficult to continue. The “**sustainability and resilience**” of this unity is thus the main challenge to deal with. How to render this remarkable unity into a resilient and enduring one, as well as how to maintain NATO's effectiveness, are questions whose answers remain uncertain.

Second, the historic decisions taken at the NATO and EU summits should be coupled with a “**democratic reboot**”. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an attack by authoritarian populism on democracy and the rules-based international system. Moreover, democratic resilience, coupled with an effective system of checks and balances, is a recipe against fragility and fragile states and, at the same time, augments crisis responses. Defending democracy against backsliding and institutional fragility should be seen as a benchmark against which new strategic concepts can be assessed. However, the widening and deepening of the extreme right, authoritarian populism, and exclusionary nationalism in the West is damaging democracy at a time when it needs to be consolidated and secured.

Third, the question of global and European collective security and defense requires inclusive “**governance**”, which entails taking seriously and developing effective steps for alleviating food and energy security, solving the problem of supply chains, and providing citizen-friendly policies to help with the provision of fundamental needs. This requires inclusive governance that not only incorporates questions of democracy, human rights, and climate change but promoting participatory and deliberative collaborations between institutions, states, and civil society organizations.

Fourth, there should be “**coherence**” in the way in which NATO's new Strategic Concept operates in terms of strategies and tactics, ideas, and reality, and in coping simultaneously with unprecedented challenges coming from democratic, economic, and climate security. Coherence is also needed in sequencing a new strategic concept and a strategic compass.

Fifth, “**rules-based multilateralism and institutional alliances**” rather than flexible and transactional alliances should be promoted. As the post-war liberal order has declined and weakened over the last seventy-five years, what has been promoted by countries like Russia, Iran, Türkiye, and China can be called issue-based, flexible, transactional alliances with an emphasis on consequentialism over appropriateness, interests over rules, delivery over checks and balances. Thus, security and economy are prioritized over democracy, growth over climate change, and flexible alliances

over democracy. NATO’s historic Madrid Summit, while seeing Russia as an immediate security threat and China as a strategic security challenge, also promotes rules-based-multilateralism and institutional arrangements. Yet, the recent Russia, Iran, and Türkiye summit in Syria, as well as China’s operations in Asia and Africa, are examples of flexible alliances without democracy. Furthermore, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has warned in his famous book, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, the most dangerous development against the West would be “a grand and anti-hegemonic coalition of China, Russia, perhaps Iran”, and we may add Türkiye here, “united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.”¹¹ Brzezinski’s warning also has to do with the difficulty of sustaining unity without a democratic reboot, inclusive governance, and coherent strategies.

Finally, **sixth**, “**the double-face of Türkiye**” creates problems for Western and NATO unity. As Ivo Daalder puts it, “Türkiye: difficulty to live with, nearly impossible to live without... Turkey’s strategic importance to NATO is clear. And, yet, over the years, Ankara has hardly been a reliable ally.”¹² While being an important member of NATO, Türkiye’s continued willingness to increase its relations with Russia from security to the economy creates increasing concerns in the West. As a member of NATO and declaring itself as a “Ukraine-friendly country”, Türkiye’s pivotal role not only as a “geo-strategic balancer” between the West and the Rest, but also as a “geo-economic supply chain hub” in energy and food security has enhanced and become critical in this new crisis. In its diplomatic efforts, Türkiye has been a “mediator” between Russia and Ukraine for conflict resolution. Moreover, in its role as a strategic hub, Türkiye has been a crucial actor in tackling the food security crisis, allowing Ukrainian grain exports to transit the Black Sea. Türkiye has the potential to be a pivotal country acting as a “balancing agent” in the international system and globalization. All of these qualities make Türkiye an important actor both globally and regionally for effective global governance. Yet, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s close relations with President Putin; Ankara’s continuing close ties with Moscow in energy, economy, tourism; and its willingness to promote a flexible alliance with Russia and Iran in its regional affairs have been deepening the existing crisis between Türkiye and the West. The more the double-face of Türkiye continues in reality and perception, the longer the existing trust problems will remain between Türkiye and NATO, from which Putin and Russia will continue to benefit.

For sure, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at a time when globalization and the international system are in transition and turmoil has brought uncertainty, risk, and ontological insecurity to the fore. The revitalization of NATO is thus of utmost

¹¹ Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, (Basic Books, New York, 1998).

¹² Ivo Daalder, “Turkey: difficulty to live with, nearly impossible to live without”, *New Europe*, 21 August, 2022.

importance in making the unity of the West and the transatlantic alliance sustainable. A revitalized NATO through a New Strategic Concept is the West's answer to the changing power configuration among great powers at the systemic level. True, the Old is dying; but the New has not been borne yet. Uncertainty is what frames the present. What is certain in it is that Europe and NATO are the new pivots for global collective security and defense.**

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
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NATO'S CHANGING PRIORITIES

Russia's invasion of Ukraine seems to have led, with very few exceptions, to greater cooperation among members of the Western alliance and brought the transatlantic partners closer to one another. As a result, NATO, which has undergone several changes since the end of the Cold War, has regained its key role as the cornerstone of the West's collective security interests. In its enhanced position, NATO also appears to be emerging as the champion of the liberal order as well as the universal values embraced by transatlantic partners. Yet, it may also be facing new challenges both from within, particularly in the case of a prolonged conflict in Europe, and from China, which is demonstrating increasing rivalry to the West.

Ahmet O. Evin*



* Ahmet O. Evin is an Emeritus Professor at Sabanci University and Senior Scholar at Istanbul Policy Center.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine appeared to have an immediate effect of increasing solidarity among the EU and NATO member states and thus of strengthening transatlantic security bonds in a way not seen since the significant crises of the Cold War. With very few exceptions, the transatlantic community rallied around Ukraine and quickly organized a pipeline of military hardware deliveries via Poland. The Western alliance was soon joined by Australia, Japan, and even the eternally neutral Switzerland to impose sanctions on Russia. As of 31 July 2022, 6,934 sanctions have been imposed on Russian persons and entities since the invasion of Ukraine—by the United States (1,475), Switzerland (1,130), UK (1,038), EU (891), Australia (846), and Japan (618).¹ This figure represents the highest number of sanctions imposed on any single country; it includes 5,385 individuals and 1,085 companies in addition to institutions. The number of sanctions is nearly doubled to 11,554 if earlier ones against Russia imposed in the wake of its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 are taken into account. How effective this plethora of sanctions may be taken up later.

Meanwhile, Washington put as much emphasis on closing the transatlantic divide as enhancing the Alliance's military capabilities in the face of Russian aggression. By the time the G7 Summit took place on 26–28 June 2022, three months into the war, the leaders would once again reaffirm their unity by saying that “As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights.”² At its annual meeting on 29–30 June 2022, a “rejuvenated” NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept that, among others, called for significantly strengthening the Alliance's “deterrence and defense posture.”³

In these consecutive meetings, there was no trace of the friction, skepticism, national priorities, and their *sine qua non*, or the transactionalism that used to set the tone of Euro-American discussions, particularly of NATO summits, during the Trump administration. President Macron, who had declared NATO to be “braindead” in the autumn of 2019,⁴ now celebrated the summit as “unprecedented for Europe since the Second World War.”⁵ Said President Biden at the conclusion of the summit, “We

¹ “Live Monitoring of all Sanctions against Russia,” *Correctiv*,

<https://correctiv.org/en/latest-stories/2022/03/01/sanctions-tracker-live-monitoring-of-all-sanctions-against-russia/>

² “G7 Leaders’ Communiqué,” G7 Germany 2022, Elmau, 28 June 2022,

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57555/2022-06-28-leaders-communique-data.pdf>

³ “Madrid Summit Declaration: Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid 29 June 2022,” *NATO*, 29 June 2022,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm

⁴ “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead,” *The Economist*, 7 November 2019, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead>

⁵ “NATO’s brittle show of unity,” *Financial Times*, 2–3 July 2022,

<https://www.ft.com/content/07fa9884-b539-4c9b-ac41-7f084774e586>

set down a marker of unity, determination, and deep capabilities of the democratic nations of the world to do what needs to be done,” echoing the European Council President Charles Michel’s reaffirmation at the G7 meeting of the “unwavering unity” of the West.⁶ In his concluding remarks Biden also said, “Putin thought he would break the Transatlantic alliance. He tried to weaken us. He expected our resolve to fracture. But he is getting exactly what he did not want.”⁷

“After the Cold War was over, NATO’s Strategic Concept underwent three changes in tandem with Europe’s changing strategic environment. The first one, adopted on 7 November 1991, took into account the waning of the Soviet threat, with the Soviet troops beginning to withdraw from Eastern Europe and the former USSR satellite states gaining their sovereignty.”

The jubilant tone of the leaders could hardly obscure the hyperbole their statements entailed: Did such a strong unity actually exist across the Western world even while such speeches were being made at the NATO summit? A more serious cause for concern was the possible effect on global geopolitics of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine. One significant change in NATO’s new Strategic Concept harkens back to the Cold War in some ways. Second is a major geopolitical change brought on by Russia’s energy export restrictions to Europe. Third is the degree to which a prolonged conflict may affect centrifugal forces within the Western alliance, given differing economic vulnerabilities and economic priorities among them. Fourth is what recent evidence may be considered as a guide to assess the effects of sanctions imposed on Russia. The following discussion will consider these four questions and their implications for transatlantic security.

NATO’s Changing Geopolitical Environment

Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, above all, a security issue for the transatlantic community, it triggered an immediate response from NATO, which was able to formulate and adopt a new Strategic Concept within a short time span

⁶ Remarks by President Charles Michel before the G7 summit in Schloss Elmau, Germany, 26 June 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/26/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-before-the-g7-summit-in-schloss-elmau-germany/>

⁷ “NATO’s brittle show of unity,” *Financial Times*.

of four months. Conceived as a defensive alliance to provide collective security to its members, NATO was established in the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949, which derived its authority from Article 51 of the UN Charter, which refers to the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defense” of the UN member states.⁸ With Greece and Türkiye joining three years later, NATO was extended into the Eastern Mediterranean (1952). With the establishment of the Baghdad Pact (1955: later renamed CENTO)⁹ and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO: 1954), NATO became the key link for the implementation of the U.S. containment policy to prevent the spread of communism. Championed by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the containment policy can be said in retrospect to have served as a means for delimiting the arena for the projection of communist influence with a view to preventing conflict between the two rival powers of the bipolar world. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) was one case when the two powers came to the brink of war that was averted by the agreement between Moscow and Washington that the former would dismantle their weapons facilities and Cuba and the latter would refrain from invading that island. The example of the Cuban Missile Crisis would often be given in the context of Russia’s objections to NATO’s expansion in the context of Russia’s “near abroad.”

After the Cold War was over, NATO’s Strategic Concept underwent three changes in tandem with Europe’s changing strategic environment. The first one, adopted on 7 November 1991, took into account the waning of the Soviet threat, with the Soviet troops beginning to withdraw from Eastern Europe and the former USSR satellite states gaining their sovereignty. The document also mentioned, among other developments, the progress made in arms control and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) process. “The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy,” can be taken as the key sentence of this document, which identifies future threats as those possibly arising from “adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from social and political difficulties.”¹⁰ As a result, the “Allies seek ... to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defense.”¹¹

⁸ “United Nations Charter (full text),” United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

⁹ Also initially called the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization (METO), the Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization after Iraq’s withdrawal in 1959.

¹⁰ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991) agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991,” *NATO*, paragraph 9, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm#:~:text=The%20Alliance’s%20active%20pursuit%20of,European%20states%3B%20to%20help%20manage

¹¹ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991) agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991,” paragraph 26. (Ibid),

“Türkiye, a NATO member since 1952 with the second largest standing army in NATO, a founding member of the Council of Europe, and a candidate for EU membership, is a regional power that has demonstrated significant divergence from the Alliance’s values, principles, and even security priorities over the past decade or more.”

The Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept builds essentially on the main observations and inferences of the preceding one, stating that the “dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks.”¹² The civil wars that took place during the intervening years provide a telling example of the kinds of potential conflicts that the 1991 Concept warned about in general terms as a potential threat facing Europe. The new key strategic perspective offered in the 1999 Concept was NATO expansion, but an inclusive one as described in the following passage:

NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organizations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.¹³ President Clinton actively supported NATO enlargement not only because Visegrad countries had expressed the desire as early as 1992 to join NATO but he did so also to prevent the Republicans from making NATO enlargement an issue on the eve of Clinton’s first midterm elections in 1994.

¹² “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999), approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 24, 1999,” *NATO*, paragraph 3, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm#:~:text=At%20their%20Summit%20meeting%20in,-years%20of%20the%20Cold%20War

¹³ “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999), approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 24, 1999,” paragraph 12. *NATO*.

Despite opposition to NATO enlargement from hardliners in Russia, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin devised a *modus vivendi* regarding the accession process of the three Visegrad countries, which eventually joined the Alliance in 1997. Yeltsin did not threaten the three former Warsaw Pact countries for seeking membership in the Alliance; Clinton on his part had already formulated the Partnership for Peace to forestall the rapid accession of Eastern European countries while they agreed to promote cooperation between NATO and Russia by means of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Despite the balancing act of the Clinton Administration to support NATO enlargement, on the one hand, and to initiate security cooperation with Russia, on the other, public opinion in Russia remained skeptical about the West's intentions and opposed NATO enlargement.

With George W. Bush as president, seven other Eastern European countries were invited to join NATO at the Alliance's 2002 Prague Summit; two years later, when those seven countries were admitted into the Alliance at the Istanbul Summit, Russia's then President Putin articulated his strong objection. The die was cast.

“The End of History” Repudiated

Unlike the preceding two, the third Strategic Concept, adopted on 19 November 2010 in Lisbon, is a much shorter business-like document that does not include any assessment of changes in the Alliance's geopolitical environment. However, it does include a section on the security environment and several paragraphs on cooperation and partnership, including specially with Russia, a “relationship... based on the goals, principles, and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration specially regarding the respect of *democratic principles, and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity* of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area.”¹⁴

Two significant events that raised tensions between Russia and the West and reinforced the former's distrust of the latter were the so-called Rose and Orange Revolutions of 2004 in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. In the case of Ukraine, invalidated rigged elections, serious cases of corruption, and continued challenges mounted against a pro-democracy president elected by a slim majority continued to cripple the political arena and prevent reform. To the contrary, the Rose Revolution in Georgia marked the end of the old communist leadership and ushered in a “pro-Western reformer” as president. The democratization support provided by Western NGOs and the U.S. government in both these countries confirmed Putin's suspicions

¹⁴ “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19-29, 2010,” *NATO*, <https://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (Emphasis added.)

of U.S. ulterior motives regarding the Russian Federation. The result was the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 during which Russian troops came within the firing distance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the lifeline of the Southern Corridor.¹⁵ The import of this warning shot does not seem to have made an adequately strong impression on the West, possibly because of the successive economic crises taking place then.

Another very serious warning shot was Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, an act of aggression that could have been easily foreseen as a rehearsal for its later invasion of Ukraine. By occupying Crimea, moreover, Russia contravened with impunity one of the cardinal rules of the post-Second World War European order that there would no longer be any changes to the existing borders in that continent. Although, as noted, a large number of sanctions were imposed on Russia then, they did not seem to have enough of a punitive bite.

NATO Transforming

The recent Strategic Concept, adopted in Madrid on 29 June 2022, directly addresses the security threats posed primarily by the "Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine."¹⁶ Russia's "brutal and unlawful invasion, repeated violations of international humanitarian law, and heinous attacks and atrocities" are blamed for having caused "unspeakable suffering and destruction." While the summit, as noted, agreed to increase substantially the number of High Readiness Forces, allocate greater amount of funds for defense, and modernize military equipment, it also projected global concerns by emphasizing shared values as well as promoting "good governance" and integrating "climate change, human security, and the Women Peace and Security Agenda across all our tasks."¹⁷ It also differs from NATO's approach to security during the Cold War in declaring an openness to constructive engagement with rivals such as the People's Republic of China and even in keeping lines of communication with Russia open. NATO, it could be argued, is emerging as an institution to sustain the West's liberal order and its values in addition to its original mission of providing collective security for the transatlantic community.

While the war rages in unprecedented ferocity in Ukraine (both Russia and the allies have been careful not to spill the conflict into neighboring territory for fear of precipitating a confrontation involving nuclear powers), hostilities have been

¹⁵ For the war itself, see Ronald D. Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010); for the background and neighborhood, Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds., *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia* (New York and London: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁶ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022," *NATO*, Preface, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

¹⁷ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022," *NATO*, Preface.

escalating in the economic sphere. In response to the sanctions imposed on it, Russia was quick to take advantage of Europe's dependence on its energy resources, particularly natural gas. In 2021, total EU gas imports from Russia amounted to 155 bcm, representing 45 percent of its total imports and 40 percent of total consumption. Although plans were made to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas as soon as the war in Ukraine erupted, finding alternative sources at short notice proved to be difficult if not impossible given the large volumes involved. On March 8, 2022, the European Commission published an optimistic scenario according to which the EU could fully replace the Russian gas it currently consumes by means of a combination of measures, including importing gas from other sources, accelerating the energy transition, and improving efficiency and savings.¹⁸ The same week the International Energy Agency (IEA) published *A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the EU's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas*,¹⁹ which could lead to a reduction of nearly one-third of Russian gas imports.

Both these documents point to the fact that European dependence on Russian gas would continue, albeit in a decreasing proportion, until the end of the decade, given the demand for existing resources, accounting for a tight market, and limits to how fast energy efficiency and transition could be implemented. As a result, European gas prices increased to record levels (450 percent higher than they were at the end of July 2021), fueling inflation and diminishing prospects for economic growth in the euro area, for example, from 5.4 percent in 2021 to 2.6 percent in the current year.²⁰ Uncertainty with respect to Russian supplies, moreover, is more than likely to have further adverse effects on European markets, in particular on the German economy. Russia has reduced deliveries of pipeline gas to Europe several times, most recently by shutting off the Nord Stream 1 pipeline for scheduled maintenance, which ended on 21 July 2022; however, the gas flow was restored only at a fraction of its capacity after maintenance. Four days later, the flow was further reduced to 20 percent of the pipeline's capacity on the pretext of technical problems arising from sanctions that allegedly prevented the proper maintenance of compressors. It is true that Canada had placed sanctions on Russian pipelines and would not release a turbine sent there for maintenance until the German government secured its release. Standing in front of the repaired machine at a Siemens factory in Mulheim on 3 August 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz complained that Russians were not taking the delivery of

¹⁸ "EU unveils plan to reduce Russia energy dependency," *DW*, 8 March 2022,

<https://www.dw.com/en/eu-unveils-plan-to-reduce-russia-energy-dependency/a-61047997>

¹⁹ "A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas", *International Energy Agency*, 3 March 2022,

<https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/1af70a5f-9059-47b4-a2dd-1b479918f3cb/A10-PointPlanToReducetheEuropeanUnionsRelianceonRussianNaturalGas.pdf>

²⁰ "Gloomy and More Uncertain," *World Economic Outlook*, Update July 2022, *International Monetary Fund*,

<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/07/26/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2022>

the turbine while continuing to blame sanctions for not being able to pump higher volumes of gas.²¹ This latest example of prevarication on Moscow's part raises the fear of a complete gas cutoff by Moscow, as a result of which mandatory energy rationing may have to be implemented not only in Germany but across the EU. By putting an end to the era of the reliable supply of affordable gas, Moscow has already dealt a serious blow to Germany's economic model based on high-tech, quality exports produced at competitive prices. Moreover, by keeping Europe on its toes about future gas supplies in a period of economic uncertainty, it may well be hoping to help increase public dissatisfaction with Europe's costly support of the war in Ukraine. A few critical comments can already be heard in this respect as well as questions from those with an anti-American position who question why Germany should follow the U.S. lead to invite enmity of their powerful neighbor.

On the other hand, interdependence remains to be an important factor in intra-EU dynamics even in the face of crises. A case in point is its neighbors' reaction to Germany's current energy crisis. Germany's current crisis stemming from enormously high dependence on Russian supplies is entirely of its own making. Against better judgment, Germany did not diversify its supply sources; it did not even build LNG import facilities, which it is now trying to quickly construct in a race against time. Despite the situation, this author has not witnessed any indication of *schadenfreude* among its neighbors about the plight of Europe's biggest economy. To the contrary, economic actors from the industrial economies of Europe have been mainly concerned that an economic slowdown in Germany would adversely affect the rest of the continent.

Centrifugal Forces within the Alliance

There are, on the other hand, states that do not fully share either the values of the Alliance or the policies that NATO and the EU follow in tandem. Each of such states may be able to detract from the coherence or effectiveness of the organization they belong. Hungary, for example, an EU and NATO member, has a special relationship with Russia and benefits from regularly delivered Russian gas and oil supplies. Furthermore, it has never criticized Russia but habitually expresses disagreement with the EU's policies.²² Hungary also significantly diverges from the Alliance's common values, as evidenced by Prime Minister Orban's 23 July 2022 speech in which he denounced the mixing of European and non-European races, claiming that those societies that allowed the mixing of races could no longer [be called]

²¹ "Olaf Scholz says Russia blocking gas turbine delivery," *DW*, 3 August 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/olaf-scholz-says-russia-blocking-gas-turbine-delivery/a-62693090>

²² Amanda Coakley, "Putin's Trojan Horse Inside the European Union," *Foreign Policy* no. 245, 3 August 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/03/hungary-orban-russia-conservative-politics/>

nations.²³ As much as his nationalistic-populist stand was welcomed by the former U.S. President Trump, who hosted Orban at his New Jersey golf club, and as much as his racist approach to nationhood was received with enthusiastic cheers at the 2022 Conservative Political Action Conference in Texas, his “obsessive deference to the Kremlin” as “Putin’s Trojan horse in the EU” continues to baffle European leaders.²⁴

Türkiye, a NATO member since 1952 with the second largest standing army in NATO, a founding member of the Council of Europe, and a candidate for EU membership, is a regional power that has demonstrated significant divergence from the Alliance’s values, principles, and even security priorities over the past decade or more. Its preference to pursue at times an independent foreign policy has put Ankara at odds with its transatlantic allies, such as its purchase from Russia of the S-400 missile system, which resulted in Türkiye’s suspension from the F-35 program. One year after the delivery of the Russian missile system, on 14 December 2020, U.S.-imposed CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye led to a strange situation within the Alliance in which the leading member of sanctioned another important member. Although Türkiye has helped in allied efforts in the most recent conflict by providing effective armed drones to Ukraine and although it has recently played an important mediating role to assist, in cooperation with the UN, in the export of Ukrainian grains to world markets through the Turkish Straits, it has not imposed any sanctions on Russia. Other factors, such as Türkiye’s repeated threats to veto the NATO accession of Sweden and Finland, the recent agreement to pay for Russian energy imports in rubles, continuous disagreements with its NATO neighbor Greece to the extent of bringing them to the brink of war, among others, have caused strains between Ankara and Washington as well as the EU.

Questions have been raised about President Erdogan’s recent meetings with President Putin: first, on 19 July 2022, in Tehran, also with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi; and second, a bilateral meeting with Putin in Sochi only 17 days later as well as his statement upon his return from Sochi that he would participate, upon Putin’s invitation, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting next September in Uzbekistan.

As the *Financial Times* reported, Western capitals are increasingly alarmed at the deepening ties between Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, raising the prospect of punitive retaliation against the NATO member if it

²³ Shaun Walker and Flora Garamvolgyi, “Viktor Orbán sparks outrage with attack on ‘race mixing’ in Europe,” *The Guardian*, 24 July 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/viktor-orban-against-race-mixing-europe-hungary>

²⁴ Coakley, “Putin’s Trojan Horse.”

helps Russia avoid sanctions. Six western officials told the Financial Times they were concerned about the pledge made by Turkish and Russian leaders to expand co-operation on trade and energy after the two had a four-hour meeting in Sochi on Friday.²⁵

Dissatisfaction brought on by the stalling economy, rising cost of living, and possibly, energy shortages, can be expected to swell the ranks of those opposed to the war and its consequences on the quality of life in Europe. Those individuals and groups might constitute a centrifugal force within NATO as well as the EU, as might member states such as Hungary and Türkiye following independent paths that are widely divergent from the key collective security concerns of NATO. How serious a threat would those centrifugal forces constitute to the coherence of the West, especially in the context of the current conflict in Europe and the danger of another one arising between China and the Western alliance?

In this respect, the course of the Russia-Ukraine war is of concern. NATO military experts, especially from the U.S. and UK, have presented and continue to present their assessments of Russian forces' weaknesses in strategy and command effectiveness. On the other hand, a significant number of highly respected, impartial experts have argued to the contrary, maintaining that the sanctions imposed on Russia had not made much difference and were not likely to detract from Russia's ability to continue its war against Ukraine.

A recently published comprehensive study by Yale University's Chief Executive Leadership Institute presents credible evidence that Western sanctions have had a "devastating impact on Russia." Prepared by a group of prominent Yale scholars supported by a large team of specialists, the study concludes that (i) "Russian imports have largely collapsed," leading to critical supply shortages; (ii) as a result, "Russia's domestic production has come to a complete standstill"; (iii) because foreign businesses are leaving, "Russia has lost companies representing 40 percent of its GDP"; (iv) Russia's position as a key "commodities exporter has irrevocably deteriorated; moreover, it faces "steep challenges" to shift the direction of "its non-fungible exports such as piped gas" to Asian destinations; (v) Russia is currently suffering from the worst performing domestic financial markets in the world while it is "cut off from international financial markets"; (vi) because of Putin's unsustainable fiscal and monetary interventions to counter the foregoing structural weaknesses, "the Kremlin's finances are in much, much more dire straits than conventionally understood." As a conclusion, the study bluntly states that "Looking ahead, there is

²⁵ Laura Pitel, Amy Kazmin, Alice Hancock, and James Politi, "Alarm mounts in western capitals over Turkey's deepening ties with Russia," *Financial Times*, 7 August 2022.

no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia.”²⁶

Shortly after the release of the Yale study, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder held a media interview during which he claimed that the Kremlin wanted a negotiated solution to the war in Ukraine. He said that he had been “in Moscow for talks with President Putin” in the last week of July (his visit was confirmed by the Kremlin) and stated that he thought the deal reached in Istanbul to allow the export of Ukrainian grains to the world markets could be “the first step towards talks on a cease-fire.”²⁷ Was this a message given to the world with the blessings of the Kremlin?

The rapidly unfolding events related to the relentless war in Ukraine rule out bringing the foregoing discussion to a customary conclusion. In lieu of such a conclusion, let us end by posing a related issue that merits further consideration. In the preceding discussion it was suggested that NATO’s response to the current challenges in Europe have on the one hand, strengthened the Alliance but, on the other, carried the danger of detracting from the support of the Alliance in case of a prolonged conflict. At present China is posing increasingly serious challenges to the Euro-Atlantic area. How might challenges from Asia affect the West’s security architecture in future? How might NATO relate to that expanded security structure, possibly of an extended Alliance?

²⁶ Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, et. al., “Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy: Measures of Current Economic Activity and Economic Outlook Point to Devastating Impact on Russia,” *SSRN*, August 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4167193#

²⁷ “Germany’s Schröder touts possible Ukraine ceasefire, says he met Putin again,” *DW*, 3 August 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-schr%C3%B6der-touts-possible-ukraine-ceasefire-says-he-met-putin-again/a-62691249>



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GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

The Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new world order that has developed from the bipolar world of 1945 to 1991 and the brief unipolar interlude from 1991 to 2008. This new world order is dominated by a relatively declining U.S. and an emerging Sino-Russo anti American alliance, a renewed sense of the West as a counter to authoritarian regimes and reversal of the globalization trends of the past thirty years. We are moving into a deglobalizing, multipolar world.

John Rennie Short*



* John Rennie Short is a Professor at University of Maryland Baltimore County, School of Public Policy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of those pivotal geopolitical moments similar in magnitude to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Each of these marked a global geopolitical reordering. When Russian troops crossed the border of neighboring Ukraine in 2022 in an unprovoked attack, it marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new world order. Let's place it in a broader geopolitical context.

The Bipolar World, 1945-1991

We can characterize four world orders since the ending of World War II. First, there was the bipolar world. From 1945 to 1989 the main geopolitical fracture line was between a capitalist west and a communist east headed respectively by the USA and the USSR. The Cold War waxed and waned in intensity. The long-term trend was a carefully managed rivalry. The U.S. did not, for example, directly respond to the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Spheres of influence were respected, although covert operations and the use of proxies were rampant. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was only resisted by the U.S. through local proxies that helped to create the Taliban. This bipolar order was undergirded by a nuclear standoff which at its worst threatened the very basis of human life on the planet but whose fearsome possibilities created the frightening stability of a mutually assured destruction. To be sure, there were alternative geopolitical groupings outside the big two with various non-aligned groups. Still, the bipolarity of the East-West division was the central organizing principle of the post-1945 world order for 45 years.

The Unipolar Interlude: 1991-2008

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union a new world order began. It was initially marked by the overwhelming global dominance of the USA. It was briefly a unipolar world. With Russia on the verge of economic collapse and China still only an emerging power, it left the U.S. as the world's largest economy and a massive military with global reach. There was even talk of a peace dividend as the U.S. perhaps no longer needed the aggressive military posture to counter the Soviet bloc.¹ When, in 1995/96, China conducted provocative missile tests to rattle Taiwan, President Clinton ordered two aircraft carrier groups into the seas off the coast of China in a not-so-subtle reminder of who was the global superpower and who was not.

¹ Writers even described the 'end of history' as if there was no counter possibility to a liberal, capitalist, U.S.-led order. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. (New York: Free Press, 2008).

This unipolar world was short-lived. After 9/11, the U.S. embarked on a War of Terror that involved the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. As U.S. geopolitical strategy shifted from confronting the Soviet Union to a worldwide commitment to combatting Islamic terrorism, blundered tactics led to an impasse of constant military intervention that failed to provide strategic advancement. The early intervention into Afghanistan did overthrow the Taliban but led to a series of regimes with limited legitimacy and little control over the national space outside of Kabul.²

“The failures weakened the U.S. in the eyes of the world. They also led to mounting domestic criticisms of wars and debilitating engagements that lacked strategic significance.”

The invasion of Iraq was a fiasco. The U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s murderous regime unleashed anarchy. The collapse of the Baathist state led to the emergence of lethal conflicts between Sunnis and Shia forces. Kurds effectively broke away to form an autonomous region in the north of the country creating some anxiety for neighboring countries, such as Türkiye, with substantial Kurdish minorities. A series of blunders worsened the situation. The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi Army was a colossal error that marginalized 400,000-armed soldiers just as the former army leadership was bringing them back into possible service. The decision left almost a half million people unemployed, alienating those who could have provided basic security, and casting people with military expertise and guns into the streets. It essentially marginalized the Sunnis, undercut the basis for immediate and effective postwar reconstruction, and provided a rich recruiting base for anti-American forces. Former military operatives and Islamic fundamentalists formed the basis for a surging ISIS that, at its height, gained considerable territorial control over part of Syria and Iraq, threatening neighbors such as Türkiye and Lebanon.

The invasion of Iraq was a disaster.³ The United States promised Iraqis freedom but gave them anarchy, guaranteed democracy but generated sectarian violence, and pledged peace but caused mass deaths. The U.S. military was severely stretched, while the emphasis on Iraq allowed the Taliban to recover in Afghanistan, and the invasion never did lead to the death or capture of senior Al Qaeda figures. Osama

² The country’s Prime Minister was accurately referred to as the Mayor of Kabul.

³ From March 2003 to December 2009 around 110,000 civilians were killed, millions displaced, and mass violence was visited upon an entire country of over 31 million people. See *Iraq: The Human Cost*. <https://web.mit.edu/humancost-iraq/>

bin Laden was killed not because of the invasion of Iraq but despite it. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a strategic catastrophe. The final humiliation was the messy and hurried withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021. It was a poignant moment that recalled the withdrawal of Soviet forces decades earlier. It marked the end of two decades of failed interventions and costly mistakes.

The failures weakened the U.S. in the eyes of the world. They also led to mounting domestic criticisms of wars and debilitating engagements that lacked strategic significance. A more radical *grand strategy of restraint* gained strength. The broad contours of the argument are that the U.S. faces limited threats because of its geographical position, so international alliances are not needed, and the military should be drastically downsized. The proponents of restraint argue that extensive alliances come with actual costs of entanglement and the possibility of entrapment. Pursuing primacy is too costly and ineffective in reducing arms proliferation or encouraging democracy. After almost two decades of futile wars, the idea of pursuing a strategy of restraint appealed to more people in the U.S.

The end of the unipolar world is difficult to locate precisely. I will suggest September 2008. The global financial crisis (GFC) was caused by unregulated and speculative investment in the U.S. housing market. Mortgages originated in the U.S. were packaged and sold as commodities worldwide. As the market collapsed and people could not pay their mortgages, financial institutions faced huge losses. The intervention of the U.S. Federal Reserve, at terms very favorable to the banks and financial institutions, eventually righted the economy, but it was another sign of America's weakening. Not only a decade of strategic military blunders, the GFC revealed the vulnerability of a U.S. economy becoming more reliant on financial speculation. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 highlighted the growing distrust of the elites and the rising populist sentiment. While there are many differences between Obama and Trump both were insurgent candidates who spoke to a discontent with traditional U.S. foreign policy. There was growing domestic backlash to foreign interventions. In a speech to the graduating class of the military academy at West Point on the 13 June 2020, President Trump spoke about ending the "era of endless wars."

A Tripolar World Coming into Coherence: 2008-2022

We can suggest the rise of a tripolar world from 2008/2009 to 2022. It is a period marked by a relative weakening of the U.S., a resurgence of Russia, and China's rise.

The 1990s were a lost decade for Russia. Much reduced in size after the fall of

the Soviet Union, it faced economic ruin. However, as the 20th-century turned into the 21st-century Russia emerged from the wreckage of the immediate post-Soviet collapse. Its vast natural resource base, and especially its rich oil and gas reserves, provided increased government revenue and laid the basis for a rising standard of living. President Putin emerged as an authoritarian leader who squashed any opposition and established a measure of popular support with social spending primarily funded by oil and gas exports. The carbon and mineral resources were sold on the global markets and Russia gained influence and massive revenues that bought domestic support and paid for a military buildup that allowed for force projection. An emboldened Putin embarked on a strategy of annexing territory in Crimea, threatening Georgia and claiming a more global role for Russia with interventions in Syria. Ever mindful of the humiliation of the loss of empire and the decline of national power, he used his increasingly centralized authority to reimagine a more muscular Russia reclaiming former imperial territorial holdings.

“The invasion and its aftermaths have brought China and Russia closer together as trading partners. They share an anti U.S. stance and have also become more closely allied with shared military maneuvers along their shared boundaries in Central Asia and the Far East.”

Putin saw both threat and opportunity on his western borders. The perceived threat was the extension of Western influence especially in the enlargement of NATO and the European Union into Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Ukraine inhabited a liminal space between the East and Russia but was pulling away for the Russian orbit. In the Orange Revolution of 2004, the Russian-backed candidate was defeated and again in 2014 the same Russian-backed President was set packing by intense widespread protests.⁴ Putin imagined Ukraine’s reorientation towards the West as a direct threat.

Putin also saw an opportunity of a weakened and uncertain U.S., a fracturing European unity and dwindling support for NATO. Russia flexed its military muscles in Georgia, Syria and in its 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russian backed forces effectively took control over a swathe of eastern Ukraine. Facing little resistance

⁴ In the Maidan (Independence Square), an important symbolic public space in Kyiv, protesters chanted, “Ukraine is part of Europe. See two excellent documentaries *Maidan (2014)*, directed by Sergei Loznitsa, and *Winter on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom (2015)*, directed by Evgeny Afineevsky.

or severe backlash, Putin saw Russia as a Great Power able to exercise its will and exert its power.

There was also the rise of China as an economic and military force. The last three decades has witnessed the impressive economic growth of China. After the economic reforms of the late 1980s China engaged directly with the global economy. It imported raw materials and exported manufactured goods all over the world. China lifted between 300-500 million out of poverty and created an expanding middle class.

The increase in foreign trade also involved a greater involvement in the global economy and governance. China's engagement was promoted by a U.S. that saw the more significant economic integration of China as leading to greater global stability and new investment opportunities. There was a naive belief that increased globalization of China's economy would lead to greater democratization of Chinese society. China became an essential hub of the global economy; it is now the leading trading partner of at least 80 countries. China has also embarked on a global investment program. The Belt and Road initiative involves vast infrastructure investment at selected hubs along land and sea routes linking China with the rest of the world.

China's rise was initially in the economic sphere. There is a famous Chinese saying: China stood up under Mao, got rich under Deng and is getting strong under President Xi Jinping. Since Xi came to power as President of the PRC in 2013 he has embarked on a more assertive geopolitical stance. He has centralized control and has committed China to a more aggressive posture in the South and East China Seas and a more confrontational attitude with Japan and the USA. China makes claims to most of the South China Sea and is building up its military capabilities to push U.S. power projection from the Chinese coast and create a Sino-dominated, maritime space further east to the island chains of the Pacific Ocean.

The rise of China and its more aggressive posture under Jinping has caused a significant shift in U.S. and to some extent European attitudes. In the U.S., the pro-Chinese interest—known as 'panda huggers'—has been eclipsed by the 'dragon-slayers' who see the need for a more forceful response to China's rise. The Greek historian Thucydides, writing around 2,500 years ago, observed that still have relevance for the contemporary U.S.⁵ If it does nothing, it risks the competitor becoming stronger, hastening a confrontation. If it confronts, it creates the conditions for war.

⁵ The *Thucydides Trap*, now often employed to describe U.S.-China relations, states that when an existing power is threatened by rising power it has two options. See G. Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Thucydides is now widely quoted when analysts assess the possible trajectory of U.S.-China relations.

U.S. geopolitical strategy has shifted over the years from the confrontation of the bipolar world to the incoherence of the unipolar world to the recognition that China is now a peer competitor that poses a severe threat to U.S. power and the existing global order.

A Multipolar World?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a crystallization of a new world order. Four elements can be noted.

First, the invasion and the image of war and destruction have prompted a revival of the idea of the West as a liberal democratic ideal and geopolitical force as a counter against an unpredictable and expansive Russia. In the past three decades NATO as an idea and practice was weakened. Many Western European commentators and even some in the U.S. saw little use for military organization shaped by the Cold War. It seemed to be losing its relevance and most member contributions did not increase. Defense spending was widely unpopular in many NATO member countries. This was not a view shared by those countries formerly part of the Soviet Union, such as Estonia, and former Soviet bloc members such as Poland, but key members such as Germany saw less relevance. As Germany and other European states signed more energy deals with Russia, they were not only becoming more dependent on Russia but also allowing themselves to imagine a postwar-Europe where war was a very distant possibility. The Russian invasion of a vulnerable Ukraine reminded many countries of the need for military alliances. Finland and Sweden joined NATO, domestic opinion in the West shifted toward more military spending and acceptance of the greater need for tighter security arrangements. The Russian invasion led to a renewed demand for NATO. It resurrected the idea of the West as a bastion against an authoritarian and brutal dictator eager to reclaim lost empire even at the cost of existing and settled international borders. Russia morphed from a trading partner and member of international community to a threat to the West and the rule governed behavior of the international order. Russia's actions strengthened the idea of the West as military alliance and as a geopolitical and geo-economic force. The combined economic power of the West was mobilized in punishing sanctions.

In effect, Russia's actions reminded the West of the need for mutual defense treaties and military alliances. Countries on the border or near border with Russia such as Finland and Sweden, that had long eschewed NATO, joined the alliance as a security

umbrella to protect themselves from an unsettling neighbor. European economies realized the dangers of their reliance on Russian gas and oil. It will take some time to make the transition but Russian energy dominance in western markets has been seriously undermined. Russian integration into the global economy has been dealt a severe blow. Russia is now seen in the West as a rogue state.

In summary, Russia has strengthened the idea of NATO and created a greater sense of Western coherence as a set of shared values about the rule of international law. Russia's action has enlarged the size and reach of NATO, brought Western powers together, shown the economic power of a coherent anti-Russian response, and deepened the ideological sense of a West pitted against an expansionist Russia. It is Putin's worst nightmare. It has renewed security and diplomatic ties between the U.S. and its NATO allies and has sensitized the rest of Europe to the idea of a Russian threat that was unimaginable before the Ukrainian invasion.

Second, the invasion of Ukraine has weakened Russia in both the short and longer term. In the short term, the abysmal performance of the Russian forces revealed the hollowness to Russian military power. With poorly trained troops, inadequate strategy and poor tactics, the Russian military was exposed as a lumbering, inefficient, fighting machine. Russia's superior numbers may well win the day against a much smaller opponent, but reputational damage to the Russian war-machine is immense. Russia is also facing major economic consequences as it faces sanctions, loses traditional energy markets in Europe for its oil and gas, struggles to obtain credit on international capital markets, its oligarchs face humiliating sanction, and its middle class find it difficult to travel to the West. Due to Putin's actions, the Russian people may face a fall in the quality of life and standard of living. Russia is shrinking as a global economic force.

Third, the reaction to the invasion seems at least in the immediate aftermath to have strengthened a Sino-Russian alliance. There were already significant trading ties between the two countries and a series of joint military exercises in the Far East. They both share distrust of the U.S. and seek to undermine U.S. led world order. China's tacit support for Russia raised issues of hypocrisy for a Chinese regime that has long placed respecting national sovereignty as a cornerstone of the global order.⁶ China's embrace of Russia has strengthened Western and U.S. fears of China's global ambitions. Its effective support of a rogue state has heightened anti-Chinese sentiment.

China can profit from the event. As Russia loses European markets China is ready to

⁶ Chinese attempts to justify the Russian invasion with arguments about the NATO expansion seem weak and unconvincing.

take up much of the demand. However, this places China into a stronger bargaining position. So, while Russia can sell its carbon and mineral products to China it is from a weaker bargaining position. So, it is not quite accurate to describe a tripolar world as the U.S. and China far outweighs Russia in both military capabilities and economic heft. Russia is emerging as a secondary prop to China's expanded global role. Russia will function as a cheap energy source for China, and as a source of ideological and possible military support in the conflict with the U.S.

The invasion and its aftermaths have brought China and Russia closer together as trading partners. They share an anti U.S. stance and have also become more closely allied with shared military maneuvers along their shared boundaries in Central Asia and the Far East. Both China and Russia have ongoing territorial disputes with Japan, and we can expect them to integrate their security arrangements in this part of the world. As Russia recedes from the global economy, ties with China will increase but China's overwhelming economic advantage will ensure an unequal partnership. The reinvigorated sense of the West as both a commitment to a liberal democracy order, a geo-economic force and a security alliance may also block China's aggressive global expansion. The West is finding its voice as China has blundered. Issues over rampant intellectual property theft, crude use of trade deals to enforce a pro Chinese stance, the treatment of Uighurs, the crackdown of protests in Hong Kong, and the secrecy over the outbreak of COVID have all tarnished China in the eyes of not only the West but also some of its near neighbors in Asia. With its tacit support for the brutal invasions of Ukraine, China can no longer position itself as force for good against a corrupt, war mongering U.S. To some extent the renewed geopolitical bluster of Chinese diplomats and academics may be a reaction to a China that faces problems of an ageing population, a weakening economy and property market collapse. Foreign enemies are always easier to portray as sources of disorder rather than the need for domestic structural reforms.

China is committed to taking back Taiwan. However, its actions in recent years especially the crackdown in Hong Kong does not make Chinese incorporation a popular project in Taiwan. A Western alliance mobilized to cut off Russia from the global banking system. China now must factor in this coherent and powerful Western reaction as a likely response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.


Finally, we may be witnessing a period of deglobalization. After almost fifty years of accelerating globalization, we may see marked deceleration and even a more pronounced deglobalization. It is taking several forms. Russia is being decoupled from the global economy. China is preparing for possible decoupling if it invades Taiwan. Across the world states are more concerned with the risk of pandemics,

financial contagion, and the need to secure supply chains of vital goods. The pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of global supply chains and the importance of domestic supply and manufacture. A flattening world is being replaced by a world of various archipelagoes of trading blocs, security groupings and hardening supply chains. The major economies will try to reinforce domestic production and secure supply chains with stable partners. After Ukraine, strategic and security preferences will factor much more into economic considerations of nation states than connecting to the global economy.

We are moving from the flattening world of rapid globalization to a world of separate networks; perhaps towards a more complex pattern with a Europe bloc, a North American bloc, and a Chinese dominated Sino-Russian bloc. Strategically we are also witnessing the increasing role of regional powers beyond this U.S.-China/Russia- Europe axis. Regional powers such as Türkiye and India will no doubt play a more prominent role in their regional realms exercising power and influence. If their power expands, we may be moving into a world of separate blocs and the more explicit power projections of regional powers.

We are moving into a more distinctly multipolar world.

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FUTURE UNCERTAIN: NATO IN A POST-QUANTUM, POST-AI WORLD

The emerging and disruptive technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence and quantum technologies—confront NATO with a paradox: the integration of those technologies into national armed forces will significantly narrow and possibly invert the systemic technology dominance NATO has enjoyed since 1945 and widen the technology gap within the Alliance with potentially debilitating consequences for operational effectiveness and allied cohesion. The precise impact of these disruptive technologies must remain largely speculative, but it is certain that they will change the nature of war-fighting, exacerbate the security dilemma, and precipitate in a recalibration of the global balance of power.

James Sperling*



* James Sperling is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Akron.

The role of technological change in the conduct of warfare or consequential shifts in the balance of power is beyond dispute. Technological changes fall along spectrum bounded at one end by evolutionary changes with incremental modifications of doctrine and at the other by revolutionary changes that can initiate systemic change. The deployment of ICBMs with multiple independently maneuverable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or nuclear capable cruise missiles initiated a shift in the offensive-defensive balance in ways that aggravated the security dilemma: both created a foundation for transitioning from a strategy of counter-value retaliation to a counter-force strategic first strike. Revolutionary technologies, by contrast, initiate a fundamental shift in the balance of power or render obsolete major military capabilities underpinning military doctrine: the introduction of gunpowder as a propellant and explosive in the 13th century and nuclear weapons in 1945 had such systemic consequences. The 21st century technologies are likely to include both categories of technological change; many, like artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies, will not only alter the global and theatre correlation of forces between NATO and its adversaries, but may reshape the global balance of power.

These technologies may also create an unbridgeable technology gap within NATO. There has been a persistent technology gap within NATO since its founding which limited NATO's operational effectiveness and weakened Alliance cohesion.¹ Today, NATO is preoccupied with the internal and external consequences of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT): many fear that these technologies will minimize or erase NATO's decades-long technological edge vis-à-vis any peer competitor or potential adversary.² NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg summed up this shared concern in his 2020 *Annual Report*: "Technological dominance has always been key to NATO's success. But that dominance is now being challenged..." with potentially dire consequences for NATO's ability to protect its core and peripheral interests regionally and globally. These EDTs may also have the unintended consequence of exacerbating the decades-long technology gap between the U.S. and its allies—an outcome that would compound the loss of technological dominance.³

The *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* reiterated that strategic concern: "[EDTs]... are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance, and

¹ Representative studies include Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *The Atlantic Community: A complex imbalance* (New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold, 1969): p. 72-88; David Yost "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2000): p. 97-128; and William Greenwalt, *Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).

² Leona Alleslev, *Defence Innovation: Special Report*, 041 STC 20 E rev. 1 (Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2020): para 8-16.

³ NATO, *The Secretary General's Annual Report 2020* (Brussels: NATO, 2021): p. 54.

becoming key arenas of global competition. Technological primacy increasingly influences success on the battlefield.”⁴ The goal of technological primacy, in turn, yielded an intra-alliance agreement to “promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge.”⁵ The new strategic concept identified the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China as NATO’s contemporaneous and putative threats, respectively, to the alliance and its member states. Emerging technologies play a key role in shaping the NATO perception of the nature of the threats posed. In the Russian case, the document identified the deployment of “novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems” (i.e., hypersonic missiles and cruise missiles) that could lead to fundamental changes in nuclear doctrine and fatally compromise allied nuclear (and conventional) deterrence.⁶ The immediate concerns with China are ongoing “malicious hybrid and cyber operations” against NATO member states, but the long-term threat was identified as China’s long-term ambition to control “key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains.” If that goal were to be realized, China would offset or end NATO’s existing margin of technological dominance.⁷

“Five of those technologies—artificial intelligence (AI), lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), hypersonics, space, and quantum—are the most likely to disrupt strategic stability and reduced allied interoperability and cohesion.”

These concerns surrounding EDTs raise three interconnected questions: What EDTs are the most critical for NATO? How might the integration of technologies across the major warfighting (land, air, sea, and space) domains affect the offensive-defensive balance? What dangers do these EDTs pose for NATO’s future interoperability and cohesion? The answers to those questions establish the range of technologically induced challenges NATO will face in the future.

⁴ NATO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid*, 29 June (Brussels: NATO, 2022), para 17, available at: <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

⁵ NATO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid*, 29 June (Brussels: NATO, 2022): para 24.

⁶ NATO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid*, 29 June (Brussels: NATO, 2022): para 8.

⁷ NATO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid*, 29 June (Brussels: NATO, 2022): para 13.

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

The United States and NATO followed successive technology-driven strategies designed to substitute capital (advanced weapons systems) for labor (armed forces) to offset Warsaw Pact's quantitative superiority across weapons systems and personnel. These strategies, for example, included the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950s and stealth technologies in the 1980s. The current offset strategy seeks to integrate quantum and artificial intelligence technologies into all military capabilities.⁸ This offset strategy differs from those that came before it in at least two respects. First, a putative adversary—China—is acknowledged to be doing the same *and* is assumed capable of doing so to the detriment of NATO.⁹ Second, quantum and artificial intelligence technologies will render virtually meaningless the distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities: the offensive or defensive purpose of an AI or quantum augmented weapons system can only be determined *ex post*. Moreover, these technologies currently favor the offense: swarm technologies and hypersonic (cruise) missiles make carrier task groups highly vulnerable to A2/AD strategies, while advances in quantum sensor technologies would irrevocably compromise a second-strike capability and, by extension, further erode the extended American deterrent underpinning NATO.¹⁰

What EDTs are the NATO Member States Seeking to Develop?

In 2021, NATO issued an EDT strategy identifying the critical technology clusters in the 21st century.¹¹ Five of those technologies—artificial intelligence (AI), lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), hypersonics, space, and quantum—are the most likely to disrupt strategic stability and reduced allied interoperability and cohesion.

Quantum

Quantum technologies with military applications fall into three categories: communications, quantum, and computing. Quantum computers will enable comprehensive situational awareness across war-fighting domains and big

⁸ On the evolution of these offset strategies, see Gabriele Rizzo, "Disruptive Technologies in Military Affairs" in Fabio Rugge (ed.), *The Global Race for Technological Superiority* (Milan: ISPI, 2019): p. 55-92. On the potential of quantum and AI technologies, see NATO ACT, "Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Robotics (MUAAR)," *Fact Sheet* (2020), at: https://www.act.nato.int/application/files/5515/8257/4725/2020_mcdc-muaar.pdf

⁹ See GAO, *DOD Critical Technologies*, GAO-21-158 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2021), pp. 2-3; UK Ministry of Defence, *National Security Through Technology*, CM 8278 (London: The Stationary Office, 2021), 2.4.

¹⁰ See Christopher A. Bidwell and Bruce W. Macdonald, *Emerging Disruptive Technologies and Their Potential Threat to Strategic Stability and National Security* (Federation of American Scientists, 2018): p. 17-18 and 28.

¹¹ See NATO, *Foster and Protect: NATO's Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies*, 15 July 2022, at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm

data analytics far beyond the capabilities of today's supercomputers. Quantum communications and encryption technologies promise an impenetrable computer network protected by quantum encryption guaranteeing the safe transmission of data in real time and preventing the spoofing, corruption, or interception of communications.¹² Quantum encryption will also permit access to all non-quantum encrypted networks and data. In the post-quantum world, military communications will have a binary character: secured or unsecured. Lastly, quantum sensors embedded in satellite mesh networks will enable comprehensive maritime situational awareness, the detection of the currently invulnerable submarine component of national nuclear deterrents, and a terrestrial substitute for vulnerable space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems (PNT).¹³

“Developments in AI, quantum, hypersonic, and directed energy weapons technologies will inevitably shift the offensive-defensive balance in ways that will aggravate the security dilemma. The inevitable shift to an offensive strategy is problematic for a self-declared defensive alliance, especially since NATO derived and sustained its political legitimacy from that mission.”

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

LAWS are capable of selecting and engaging targets independent of human agency. The deadly dynamic of LAWS—the maximum advantage of deploying LAWS will accrue to those who place humans from the “kill chain” at the furthest remove—offers a first-mover advantage compounded by the absence of an operational distinction between offensive and defensive capability or intent. These characteristics promise to exacerbate the security dilemma in all war-fighting domains, conventional or nuclear.¹⁴ The trans-domain proliferation of LAWS has produced a range of weapons systems collectively known as UxVs. The most consequential include unmanned air vehicles (UAV for ISR or UCAV if armed) and unmanned surface or submarine maritime vessels (USV and UUV, respectively).¹⁵ Maritime LAWS will enhance

¹² Michiel van Amerongen, *Quantum Technologies in defense & security* (NATO Review, 2021): p. 5-6.

¹³ See Jacopo Bellasio and Erik Silfersten, *The Impact of New and Emerging Technologies on the Cyber Threat Landscape and Their Implications for NATO*, (Tallinn: CCDCOE, 2020): p. 96.

¹⁴ Jürgen Altman and Frank Sauer, *Autonomous Weapons Systems and Strategic Stability* (Survival, Vol. 59, No. 5, 2017): p. 119-21.

¹⁵ NATO STO, *2020 Highlights: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge, 2020-2040* (Brussels: NATO STO, 2020a): p. 60, www.sto.nato.int

the effectiveness of mine-countermeasure and anti-submarine warfare.¹⁶ Aerospace LAWS will enable swarm technologies for the purposes of theatre ISR missions and potentially for neutralizing enemy A2/AD forces or enhancing one's own.¹⁷ Space-based UxV applications currently lack kinetic capabilities, but directed energy weapons technologies could disable maritime and aerospace UxVs that depend upon secure access to the space commons. Aerospace and maritime LAWS also possess two terrestrial advantages: they minimize casualties and reduce personnel requirements, important force multipliers for NATO owing to the public aversion to casualties and unfavorable long-term demographic trends.¹⁸

Hypersonic Technologies

Hypersonic boost-glide and cruise missiles, which exceed Mach 5 and have low trajectories, can evade existing anti-missile ballistic defense systems. Both Russia and China have deployed hypersonic missiles to NATO's dismay: it constitutes "proof" that NATO has lost its technological edge and now places NATO forces at a tactical and strategic disadvantage.¹⁹ Maneuverable hypersonic degrade strategic stability by introducing endemic ambiguity with respect to warhead and target, but the kinetic energy released by a hypersonic missile without a warhead makes possible a counter-force nuclear war-fighting strategy with violating the nuclear threshold.²⁰ Finally, hypersonic weapons-augmented A2/AD strategies will expand the defensive maritime periphery of continental powers and reduce the maritime advantage NATO currently enjoys. A hypersonic missile interceptor system would alleviate these threats to NATO operational dominance but detecting and tracking hypersonic missiles depends upon secure space-based infrared sensors—something that cannot be guaranteed.²¹

Space Technologies

Space is the "high ground" of any future great power conflict and the NATO states are, compared to Russia and China, asymmetrically dependent upon space-based

¹⁶ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Wehrwissenschaftliche Forschung Jahresbericht 2020* (Berlin: BMVg, 2020): p. 92-93.

¹⁷ NATO STO (2020a): p. 60.

¹⁸ O'Rourke, Ronald, *Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles*, R45757 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2022), p. 1.

¹⁹ NATO STO, *Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040: Exploring the S&T Edge* (Brussels: NATO STO, 2020b), pp. 89-91; UK, Secretary of State for Defence, *Defence in a competitive age*, CP 411 (London: The Stationary Office, 2021), §2.2.

²⁰ Fabio Rugge, "The Global Race for Technological Superiority" in *idem*. (ed.), *The Global Race for Technological Superiority* (Milan: ISPI, 2019), pp. 32ff.

²¹ Raytheon, "Missile Defense Agency selects Raytheon Missiles & Defense to develop first-ever counter-hypersonic interceptor," *Raytheon Technologies*, 19 November 2021, <https://www.rtx.com/News/News-Center/2021/11/19/missile-defense-agency-selects-raytheon-missiles-defense-to-develop-first-ever>

assets. NATO space dominance is double-edged: the exploitation of space has lent NATO a battlefield advantage on land and sea and in the air, but dependence upon space-based assets for ISR, PNT, command and control, UxV operations, and communications represents a source of vulnerability as space transitions from an enabling, militarized domain to a weaponized battle space.²² The range of offensive technologies capable of blinding or disabling space-dependent weapons platforms range from direct-assent weapons to directed energy weapons to electromagnetic pulse weapons, among others.²³ They collectively pose a direct threat to the effectiveness of NATO military operations in the event of great power war. A deterrence strategy is unlikely to alter that vulnerability: Russian and Chinese forces are much less dependent on space-based assets for operational effectiveness. Nonetheless, there are mitigating technologies on offer: interference with ISR will be limited once quantum encryption is fully developed just as free space optical communication technologies will limit the interception of satellite-to-satellite communications. FSO augmented satellites will be less expensive than current communications satellites, enabling greater redundancy in an integrated satellite mesh network, and they present a much smaller target than current satellites, reducing the risks of either a ballistic missile and high-energy assault.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Most observers view AI as the critical defense technology of the future. The NATO Science & Technology Organization endorsed Christopher Bidwell and Bruce Macdonald's claim that AI "is going to be the biggest geopolitical revolution in history."²⁴ These claims depend upon the successful transition from artificial narrow intelligence (the current state of AI technologies) to artificial general intelligence—a remote eventuality at best. But AI carries some liabilities: it may well be vulnerable to data poisoning, flawed algorithms, or AI-generated disinformation.²⁵ The fusion of AI and quantum computing technologies will enhance ISR capabilities, foster trust and enhance the effectiveness of LAWS, and provide a data analytics advantage for the country or alliance that does so first. Yet the postulated first-mover advantage accruing to NATO (or China) with respect to AI will likely be short-lived—the private sector constitutes the leading-edge in AI research and the profit motive all but guarantees that AI and big data will be commodified at the expense of national security.

²² See Beyza Unal, *Cybersecurity of NATO's Space-based Strategic Assets* (London: Chatham House, 2019), pp. 9-16; and NATO, *NATO's overarching Space Policy*, 17 January 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=nato&utm_campaign=20220117_space

²³ See Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, *Global Counterspace Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, 2019): p. 7.1-7.9.

²⁴ See NATO STO (2020b): p. 53.

²⁵ See Mark Fitzpatrick, *Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Command and Control* (Survival, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2019): p. 91.

Potential Strategic Consequences of EDTs

EDTs will have first, second and third order consequences for NATO. The first order effects occur when technological innovations alter the offensive-defensive balance or the nature of war-fighting within a single domain; second order effects occur when the technological change induces a shift in the offensive-defensive balance across war-fighting domains; and third order effects occur when a suite of EDTs narrow or invert existing power differentials among polar powers or give rise to new ones. The EDTs identified in NATO documents as well as those of the major NATO states are generally cross-cutting in terms of application and effect, a phenomenon reinforced with the advent of multi-domain warfare—itsself a product of these EDTs and the U.S. Department of Defense aspiration to achieve total battlefield situational awareness and the concept of joint domain warfare initiated with the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act.²⁶

Anti-satellite and hypersonic EDTs will have specific war-fighting-domain consequences. Anti-satellite technologies pose a kinetic threat (as distinct from cyber- or electronic warfare) to a range of capabilities, not the least among them being the NATO member-state PNT satellite systems (the American GPS, the European Galileo, and the French DORIS).²⁷ As noted above, these counter-force technologies have weaponized space and increased the ease with which adversaries can disrupt or destroy vital space assets. Hypersonic weapons are also candidates for altering the nature of maritime warfare. In the absence of a dependable anti-ballistic missile defense capability, hypersonic missiles have the potential to alter warfare akin to the replacement of Dreadnaughts by aircraft carriers in the mid-20th century. The postulated inability to protect carriers from this new weapons category—especially as the technology becomes diffused throughout the international system—will multiply the number of adversaries that can effectively thwart NATO's current strategic advantage derived from carrier-based force projection.²⁸

Developments in AI, quantum, hypersonic, and directed energy weapons technologies will inevitably shift the offensive-defensive balance in ways that will aggravate the security dilemma. The inevitable shift to an offensive strategy is problematic for a self-declared defensive alliance, especially since NATO derived and sustained its political legitimacy from that mission. The integration of these technologies into

²⁶ See David A. Deptula, *A New Battle Command Architecture for Joint All-Domain Warfare* (*ÆTHER: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower*, Vol. 1, No. 1 2022): p. 52.

²⁷ Defense Intelligence Agency, *Challenges to Security in Space: space reliance in an era of competition and expansion* (Washington, DC: DIA, 2022): p. 9-10.

²⁸ See O'Rourke (2022): p. 39-41; and Colin Meyer, *The Navy's Big Carrier Groups are Sitting Ducks* (Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2022).

future weapons platforms will call into question that mission despite best efforts to maintain fidelity in rhetoric and doctrine to collective defense; NATO doctrine will inevitably acquire an offensive character despite an embedded aversion to it. NATO will become a more lethal and threatening adversary, but their inherent offensive character may disrupt the strategic status quo in such a way that it erodes the alliance's legitimacy with a substantial share of the left-leaning, reflexively pacifist European. Although quantum encryption and free space optical communications are inherently defensive in nature, that very characteristic will force decision-makers to adopt worse case assumptions about their adversaries: the future inability to penetrate an adversary's information networks will defeat efforts to acquire signals intelligence that provide antagonists to formulate a more realistic assessment of an adversary's capabilities and intentions. AI is the most destabilizing technology if its promise is realized and integrated into LAWS. Those states relying upon (dependable) AI will be able to engage in warfare at a lower political cost (in terms of human casualties) and do so with lower manpower requirements that currently consume up to 50 percent of NATO member-state defense budgets, thereby freeing funds to purchase those AI-dependent weapons systems and reinforce a reliance upon them.²⁹ AI encodes a deadly logic: on an AI-dominated battlefield, the state willing to remove humans fully from the "kill-chain" will enjoy a lethal advantage vis-à-vis states that insist on ensuring that humans remain in it. The logic of AI forces every state to place humans at the same link in the "kill chain". The state placing humans at the furthest remove—the absence of human agency—will achieve a strategic and tactical advantage to any adversary not doing so. This dynamic poses internal and external challenges for NATO. There is not only no common global approach to AI-augmented weapons, but NATO itself presently "lacks a common approach to governance and the use of AI, autonomy and automation..."³⁰ It is also highly unlikely that an intra-alliance consensus can be reached on the outer limits of autonomy from human interference, an absence that could easily generate technologically caveated armed forces and create willy-nilly an operationally bifurcated alliance limiting the effective aggregation of NATO capabilities.

If these technologies are as critical as alleged to maintaining NATO's technological edge vis-à-vis potential adversaries, then it is also a near certainty that NATO's adversaries will seek the same. This dynamic virtually ensures that the NATO edge will be narrowed sooner than later. There are already certain sub-fields of AI and quantum technologies where the Chinese are assumed to have a lead over the U.S. and other NATO states in terms of development, although the translation of that technological advantage into a military advantage remains ambiguous presently. It

²⁹ See European Parliamentary Research Service, *Innovative technologies shaping the 2040 battlefield* (Brussels: EPRS, 2021): p. 22.

³⁰ See NATO ACT (2020).

is incontrovertible, however, that Russia and China have a deployed capability—hypersonic missiles—that may make obsolete critical pillars of NATO force projection capabilities and, perhaps more important, reduce the credibility of the American security guarantee. It is a near certainty that quantum technologies and AI will be quickly diffused throughout the international system—the profit motive of the leading-edge corporations developing these technologies will override any concern with national security. As a consequence, these EDTs will inevitably produce a narrowing of the power differential between the NATO states and China, particularly. But it is less likely that the current technological edge enjoyed by NATO will be erased or that there will be a tectonic rather than evolutionary reordering of the global balance of power, the end point of which remains indeterminate.

Conclusion: NATO Cohesion and EDTs

There are any number of disruptive impacts that EDTs may have on intra-alliance cohesion. The most significant internal challenges to NATO cohesion and operational effectiveness can be traced to the necessity of balancing the costs and benefits of technology sharing and technology hoarding among allies, particularly where it touches upon ISR; the barrier to interoperability caused by the integration of those technologies into weapons systems that will put them out of the financial reach for all but the largest NATO member states; and the prospect of nuclear deterrence based on counter-value retaliation displaced by counterforce war-fighting once quantum gravity sensors are developed—a technological innovation that will make the 24/7 tracking of heretofore invulnerable ballistic missile submarines possible. These challenges are aggravated by the European concern that they are overly dependent upon U.S. technology and should implement policies targeting the reclamation of technological sovereignty, particularly as it pertains to cryptology and cyberspace,³¹ by the inevitable American complaints about burden-sharing if resources are devoted to European autonomy rather than measures supporting American dominance and dependence, and by disagreements on how to respond to the continued depredations of revisionist powers that have closed the technology gap with the West. Each of these potential technology-driven developments could significantly strain allied cohesion and effectiveness.

Despite the anticipated disruptions caused by these technologies, it is tempting to remain sanguine about their external and internal consequences for NATO. In the post-war past, analysts viewed contemporaneous technological changes as revolutionary and as harbingers of tectonic shifts in battlefield advantage, power

³¹ See NATO STO (2020b): p. 47-48; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2020): p. 154-55. See also, Paula Forteza, Jean-Paul Herteman, Iordanis Kerenidis, *Quantique: le virage technologique que la France ne ratera pas* (Paris: 2019), at: https://forteza.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/A5_Rapport-quantique-public-BD.pdf

differentials, or global hegemony. In retrospect, those past shifts appear to have been closer to the evolutionary rather than revolutionary end of the spectrum. Yet, it seems likely that this cycle of technological innovation will be as disruptive as were the introductions of gunpowder and nuclear weapons. These technologies will yield untoward shifts in the offensive-defensive balance and the squeezing of power differentials to NATO's disadvantage; it will yield a geopolitical and geostrategic constellation of power that will jeopardize the West's ability to protect the existing rules-based international order. Unlike the past, these new technologies will have the perverse effect of narrowing the technological gap between NATO and the rest, while exacerbating the existing technological and interoperability gaps within the alliance.

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RUSSIA'S ASSAULT ON UKRAINE: FALLOUT FROM THE WAR

The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating "the rest of our territory." The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a "grinding struggle" may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence.

Dina R. Spechler* & Martin C. Spechler**



* Dina R. Spechler is Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept. of Political Science, Indiana University.

** Martin C. Spechler is Professor Emeritus of Economics, Indiana University and Purdue University.

In addition to active-duty military personnel, perhaps as many as 100,000 Ukrainian civilians have been fighting as volunteers against the invading forces of the Russian Federation. Thousands of combatants and tens of thousands of non-combatants have died, according to Mr. Zelensky. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reports that 100-200 of its soldiers have been killed and hundreds wounded daily in recent weeks. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu has said 6459 Ukrainian enemy soldiers had been captured by early June. Casualties among civilians caught in destroyed structures will also amount to many thousands more. In the Donetsk Basin, the Ukrainian military has now expended most of its ammunition against the much better-armed Russians and needs replacements from Western sources.

Besides those permanently lost, more than 8 million Ukrainians have fled to neighboring countries, especially Poland, or been moved (often forcibly) to Russia, while another seven million have been internally displaced. Although some of those who left have returned, many may never do so. Most EU member states have welcomed the refugees despite the substantial cost of housing and feeding them, as well as providing other desperately needed services. Some are beginning to find jobs, benefiting from tight labor markets or assistance from pre-existing diasporas.

Partly because of all its missing workers, nearly half of the expected output of Ukraine's economy will not be produced this year, according to the World Bank.¹ After 100 days of the war, 182 educational institutions were destroyed and nearly 1900 damaged, as well as more than 500 hospitals and other health care centers, and a comparable number of factories. Thirty-eight thousand residential buildings were destroyed, leaving 220,000 people homeless. The vast majority of the residents have fled since the fighting escalated in Eastern Ukraine. By the war's end, the number of people without long-term housing may well be in the millions. Transportation infrastructure will need to be completely rebuilt: roads, airports, and railway stations have been frequent targets of the Russian military. Destruction was estimated at more than \$100 billion after 100 days. Eventual reconstruction might cost \$750 billion, according to a recent estimate by Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine's Prime Minister.² Besides the material losses, the Ukrainian economy is already suffering from shortages of consumer goods and severe inflation, especially in food and gas prices.

On the other side, perhaps as many as 50,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded in battles, according to British estimates. They come from an invasion force of 300,000. Many contract soldiers, often drawn from poor regions in the

¹ Simon Torkington, "Ukraine's Economy Will Shrink by Almost Half This Year, Says World Bank," *World Economic Forum*, 22 April 2022.

² Dan Bilefsky and Nick Cumming-Bruce, "Ukraine's Prime Minister Says Rebuilding Will Cost \$750 Billion," *The New York Times*, 5 July 2022.

North Caucasus and Siberia, have been affected by low morale. To recruit them, the pay³ has to be some three times the median wage, and generous settlements must be provided to those injured or the families of those killed. Besides ordinary soldiers lost, many junior officers in the Russian Army have been killed during the offensive, including several generals. Ukrainian weapons have wiped out at least one thousand tanks, as well as many other pieces of military equipment.⁴ Most of these may be replaced in time, but some of the most sophisticated weapon systems require Western electronic components that are not available to Russia now.

“The most immediate impact has been on the cost of food. In some countries like Lebanon, Egypt, and Pakistan, which are heavily dependent on imports, food prices have risen more than 30 percent since the beginning of the year.”

Despite the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western powers, the country has profited handsomely from high oil and natural gas prices on the world market. A Finnish Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air report estimated Russia's daily profits at about one billion dollars from oil and gas exports during the first hundred days of the invasion.⁵ That could cover the estimated daily war expenditures of \$876 million. Oddly, the ruble has appreciated against the U.S. dollar and the Euro despite the double-digit inflation, partly because of forced conversion of foreign earnings and reduced imports.

However, the Russian economy, too, has suffered significantly from the effects of the war. Despite the strengthened ruble, the government had to declare a dollar-debt default. The country's domestic product is down some ten percent, following the stagnation of the entire period since 2014. Russia cannot access the special parts needed for many kinds of equipment it formerly obtained from Europe or the USA. Among important items disabled are many pieces of agricultural machinery and airplanes owned by Russian companies, 70 percent of which are now grounded. Imported articles are disappearing from shelves in Moscow and other cities, including some critical medicines, or are being sold at higher prices. Prices in general have risen some 17 percent.

³ Neil McFarquhar, “Desperate for Recruits, Russia Launches a ‘Stealth Mobilization,’” *The New York Times*, 12 July 2022.

⁴ Terrence Guay, “Global Arms Industry Getting Shakeup by War In Ukraine,” *The Conversation*, 7 June 2022.

⁵ Financing Putin's War: Fossil Fuel Imports from Russia in the First 100 Days of the Invasion,” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, 12 June 2022.

Longer run harm to the Russian economy will result from the departure of substantial number of intellectuals and technical personnel —300,000 by one estimate—who have left the Russian Federation out of disgust for the actions and the propaganda of the Putin regime. The *Moscow Times* estimated that 170,000 information specialists, who now have much better prospects in the West, may have left by the end of April.⁶ Many are now temporarily living in Armenia, the Baltic states, or other countries where Russian is widely spoken. Since these individuals can often manage in English or other Western languages, they may be able to consider careers abroad, in the USA, Canada, or Western Europe. This means a long-term weakening of Russian technical efforts. More than 1000 Western companies have picked up and left the country. They will not return until peace seems assured.

The economy of the Russian Federation is linked to that of several Central Asian states which normally trade with or through Russia. 75-80 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports to the West go through the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the shore of the Black Sea. These have been hurt by reductions in Western purchases of Russian oil and increased shipping costs owing to more significant risks to tankers. Sanctions on Russia have likewise prevented European goods from reaching Central Asia. At the same time, Russia has imposed a ban on the sale of crucial commodities Central Asian countries had imported from there. It has ended the export of grain and white sugar to its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union, creating substantial food insecurity in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan received 77 percent of its grain from Russia in 2021. As a response, Nur-Sultan has blocked wheat exports to Kyrgyzstan, which has obtained 90 percent of its supply from Kazakhstan and Russia in recent years.

As Western sanctions have led to the closing of many Russian businesses and reduction in new construction, the demand for Central Asian laborers has diminished. Thus, many Central Asians have returned to their homes in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, depriving these individuals of the rubles they had been earning and sending to their families. 60,000 workers returned home from Tajikistan and 133,000 from Uzbekistan in the first quarter of 2022, for example⁷ Typically, these workers come from highly impoverished communities, whose situation has now become desperate. The overall economies of these states are likewise negatively affected. Remittances from workers abroad amounted to 31 percent of Tajikistan's GDP and a comparable percentage of Kyrgyzstan's.⁸ Revival of Islamist fundamentalism may be one consequence, while political unrest and tensions among

⁶ "170,000 Russian IT Specialists Could Emigrate by April," *Moscow Times*, 19 April 2022.

⁷ "Sanctions on Russia Already Hitting Remittance-Dependent Countries in Central Asia," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs," 16 June 2022.

⁸ "Central Asian Governments Fret Over Shrinking Remittances from Russia," *The Economist*, 23 June 2022.

various ethnic groups in these countries are also expected to rise.

In some Central Asian states, the economic impact of the war is combined with fears that they may be the next targets of Putin's imperial ambitions. Strains in their governments' relations with Moscow have been especially noticeable in the case of Kazakhstan, where there have been multiple rallies against the war. All the Central Asian states have been careful to avoid antagonizing Russia, refraining from explicitly condemning its actions. Representatives from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stayed away from the emergency session of the UN General Assembly in February which criticized those actions; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan abstained.⁹ However, Kazakhstan has announced that it will not recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk or acknowledge that Crimea is part of Russia.¹⁰ The governments of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly have been questioning the value of their membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization, Moscow's answers to the EU and NATO. Putin has visited Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe and Turkmenistan's Ashgabat to reassure friendly rulers of his benign intentions, as widespread bitterness at Russia has been reported there.

“Even if Mr. Putin was to achieve all his territorial objectives in Ukraine, that would do little to enhance his country's security. NATO's new-found unity, increased strength and more extended border pose a greater threat to Russia than Ukraine's foreign policy ever did. Russia will emerge from the war more vulnerable than when it initiated the conflict.”

The impact of the war is also beginning to be felt far beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps the most significant effect has been the substantial drop in the global supply of food, especially cereals and oil seeds. Before the war Ukraine shipped 6 million tons of agricultural products per month to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Owing to Russia's blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports and damage to its roads and railroads, only 15-20 percent of this amount can now be exported.¹¹ The

⁹ Shannon Tiezzi, “How Did Asian Countries Vote on the UN's Ukraine Resolution?” *The Diplomat*, 3 March 2022.

¹⁰ “Kazakhstan Says It Does Not Recognize Separatist-Controlled Territories in Ukraine as Independent,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, April 5, 2022; Vladimir Rozanskij, “Tokoev and Putin Clash Over Ukrainian Crisis,” *AsiaNews*, 22 June 2022.

¹¹ Heinz Strubenhoff, “The War in Ukraine Triggered a Global Food Shortage,” *Brookings*, 14 June 2022.

fighting has also sharply restricted cultivation and harvesting of grain in the country. Russia likewise was a major supplier of food to the world. Sanctions imposed by governments and banks have prevented a significant proportion of its food exports from reaching global markets as well. Experts predict that if the war continues, by the end of 2022 world food exports will have declined by 40-50 percent.¹²

The most immediate impact has been on the cost of food. In some countries like Lebanon, Egypt, and Pakistan, which are heavily dependent on imports, food prices have risen more than 30 percent since the beginning of the year. Exacerbating the problem, as many as twenty countries have responded to this situation by restricting profitable food exports to stabilize domestic prices and ensure adequate supply at home. Some have imposed a complete ban on grain exports. Consequently, 94 percent of low-income countries are experiencing significant increases in the price of food, according to the World Bank.¹³ As a result, hundreds of millions of people are already experiencing hunger and malnutrition; the UN World Food Program has forecast multiple famines in the coming year. What is currently a food *affordability* crisis is likely to become an even more dangerous food *availability* crisis in as many as 45 countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Intense political unrest may follow, just as it did prior to the Arab Spring.

The consequences of the war have not been entirely negative for some countries, most notably energy exporters. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have benefited from higher prices for their oil, resulting from the Western refusal to purchase it from Russia. U.S. eagerness to bring down that price has led Washington to attempt to repair its relationship with the Saudis, resulting in a presidential visit in July. Qatar and the U.S. have greatly benefited from a 700 percent increase in the price of natural gas in the last year.¹⁴ Israel has concluded a deal with Egypt and the EU enabling Israeli natural gas to be sent by pipeline to Egypt, which will liquefy it and transport it to ports in Europe. That will assist EU members eager to reduce their dependence on Russian gas. Shipyards in South Korea, the world's largest supplier of LNG tankers, have experienced a considerable surge in orders.

Even some energy importers have benefited from the situation created by the war. Deprived of its market in Europe, Russia has been selling crude oil at steeply discounted prices to India and China. That has helped both nations combat inflation. At the same time, India has profited by marketing refined petroleum products such as gasoline and diesel. China has moved closer to achieving its long-term national

¹² Heinz Strubenhoff, (2022).

¹³ "Food Security Update," The World Bank, 15 July 2022.

¹⁴ Gerson Freitas Jr., Stephen Stapeczynski, and Anna Shiryayevskaya, "Natural Gas Soars 700%, Becoming Driving Force in the New Cold War," *Bloomberg*, 5 July 2022.

security objective of diversifying its oil supplies. Its security has also been enhanced by the fact that the U.S. navy can no longer obstruct the transportation routes for this vital commodity, as was the case with imports from the Middle East.

The war has had not merely a vast economic impact, but comparably profound geopolitical implications as well. Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has generated a sense of alarm among NATO members not felt since the early 1980's. Many member-governments, including those in Germany, France and the United States had come to view Russia as a status-quo power. Moscow was perceived to be unhappy with, but not prepared to disrupt, the post-Cold War territorial settlement that had involved the dismemberment of the USSR into 15 independent sovereign states, each free to determine its security arrangements and political allegiances. Evidence to the contrary, such as Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and its seizure of Crimea in 2014 had not been sufficient to alter this perception. That view was abandoned in February 2022. The leaders of many NATO countries now see Russia as a real threat, not only to the eastern members of the organization, but to the fundamental principles of sovereignty and democratic governance. Moreover, the danger seems immediate, rather than merely a remote possibility.

To the surprise of many observers, an organization that only recently had been riven by disputes about burden-sharing and the amount it was incumbent on each to spend on collective defense quickly became united in the days leading up to the invasion. When Russia recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and sent in troops to support their claims, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced, "We stand in solidarity with Ukraine's people and its government."¹⁵ NATO countries were united, he declared, in their full support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders. They would provide military equipment to Ukraine and do whatever was necessary to protect any and all members from aggression.

For three decades, since the USSR collapsed, NATO had struggled to find a sense of purpose. Experts, politicians, and national leaders in many member countries had begun to question whether it was truly needed. Their sense of purpose was restored overnight when Russian troops crossed into Ukraine. All NATO members now concluded that they must protect one another against an aggressive Russia that might launch an unprovoked attack on any of them. Deterring such an attack was clearly necessary; defending member states in the event of such an attack might well be. Moreover, it was incumbent on NATO to defend the rules-based international order Western countries had erected after World War II.

¹⁵ "NATO Secretary General: This is the most dangerous moment in European Security for a generation." [www.nato.int](https://www.nato.int/press/2022/0222-stoltenberg-ukraine), 22 February 2022.

Four months later, NATO would issue a radically new mission statement identifying not only Russia, but also China as a threat to that order.¹⁶ The previous statement, published in 2010, had identified Russia as a potential ally in creating a common space of peace and security. It had not mentioned China. Now China has been depicted as Russia's partner in mounting a challenge to the values and interests of NATO members. Like Russia, it is described as committed to realizing its ambitions through its "coercive policies."

It is not merely NATO members whose perception of Russia and its intentions changed dramatically in the aftermath of the Russian assault on Ukraine. Finland and Sweden now saw the need to take a step which leaders in both countries had considered since the 1950's but had never resolved to take: applying to join the alliance. For Sweden this was a particularly wrenching decision. It had a tradition of neutrality going back two centuries. Although it had secretly cooperated with NATO members throughout the Cold War, officially it remained neutral. Finland had likewise chosen neutrality after being invaded twice by the USSR during World War II. However, like Sweden, Finland effectively abandoned that policy in 1994, when it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and began openly participating in operations conducted by the alliance. Still, both countries pointedly refrained from seeking full-scale membership until May of 2022. For both the decision to join, taken with new support from domestic public opinion, was a historic policy change, directly resulting from the war.¹⁷ NATO has now formally extended an invitation to both.

The accession of these two countries is expected to strengthen NATO significantly. Both have proved themselves to be highly effective security partners in operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Iraq. Both have been steadily increasing the interoperability of their forces with those of the alliance. Both have been modernizing those forces and investing in new military equipment. Their membership will substantially enhance NATO's presence in the Baltic and the Arctic. Finland's 800-mile border with the Russian Federation will make it easier to stop an offensive should Moscow choose to mount one.

NATO's new threat perception has significantly increased members' planned spending to bolster their collective defense. Most notably, Germany has committed

¹⁶ NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Adopted 29 June 2022.

¹⁷ The first beneficiary of this decision was Türkiye. As a condition for supporting the Finnish and Swedish membership bid, which required the endorsement of all thirty NATO members, Türkiye obtained a formal commitment from both countries not to support Kurdish or other organizations that threatened its security. Both also agreed to end informal arms embargo they had imposed on Türkiye in 2019 after its intervention in northern Syria. At the same time, the United States indicated it was willing to sell Türkiye upgraded F-16 fighter jets which it had long sought.

to doubling its defense spending, while U.S. President Joe Biden endorsed an increase in the American defense budget of \$29 billion more than he had initially requested.¹⁸ Together the members have pledged an extra \$210 billion to improve the military posture of the alliance.

In addition to promising higher spending, NATO has made plans to strengthen its forces' readiness level and deterrent capabilities. More troops will be rotated into frontline positions in the Baltic States. Four new multinational battalions will be stationed in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. Hundreds of thousands of troops (a seven-fold increase) will be placed on high alert and kept on stand-by in their home countries for rapid deployment to the front. The number of U.S. troops in Europe will rise from 70,000 to 100,000, with many of these permanently stationed on NATO's eastern flank. The headquarters of the U.S. 5th Army and a field support battalion will be placed in Poland. The U.S. military presence in Western Europe will be enhanced as well. Altogether, these measures have been described as the most significant improvement in NATO's defense posture since the end of the Cold War. Like the invasion that triggered them, these changes have also entrenched more deeply the post-Cold War geopolitical rivalry between East and West.

These developments have been and are likely to be costly for both sides. Russia's military and economy have been damaged, and its security has also been diminished. Even if Mr. Putin was to achieve all his territorial objectives in Ukraine, that would do little to enhance his country's security. NATO's new-found unity, increased strength and more extended border pose a greater threat to Russia than Ukraine's foreign policy ever did. Russia will emerge from the war more vulnerable than when it initiated the conflict.

Less clear is whether President Putin will have a price to pay in terms of domestic political support. Polling by Russia's independent Levada Center indicates strong support for the war thus far. In fact, the percentage of individuals saying they back Putin's actions had risen steadily to 81 percent by mid-May.¹⁹ Of course, the threat of steep fines or even jail sentences for criticizing Russia's invasion, even for calling it a war, may have deterred many respondents from giving an honest answer. Putin has used Russia's huge revenues from higher oil and gas prices to raise pensions and the minimum wage. That may be enough to enable him to avoid criticism for a while. In the long run, though, much higher prices for consumer goods or their disappearance from the market may be blamed on him.

¹⁸ Shannon Bugos, "Biden Approves \$29 Billion Increase in Defense Budget," *Arms Control Today*, April 2022.

¹⁹ Levada-Center, 18 May 2022. See also Anton Troianovski, "Putin's Mission to Indoctrinate School Children," *The New York Times*, 17 July 2022.

Family members of soldiers who have died or returned severely wounded are already beginning to voice their anger. Resentment is reportedly growing among returnees from the front who complain of inadequate training, poor medical care, inedible rations, the failure of the government to pay promised compensation or refusal by commanders to allow them to leave after they have completed their term of service. While popular support may not be needed to keep Putin in power, the Russian leader has always been concerned about maintaining it owing to the legitimacy it confers.

The war has also been costly for the U.S. and its allies in strategic terms. President Biden has made it his mission to mobilize NATO to support Ukraine.²⁰ He has been successful in this endeavor but has been unable to devote sustained attention to a comparable mobilization of America's Asian allies to counter Chinese aggression in the Pacific. The sharp deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations has effectively halted arms control negotiations. Both sides have a lot at stake: the U.S. is eager to limit Russian deployment of non-strategic nuclear missiles; Moscow badly wants an agreement on missile defense; both would benefit from a treaty that addressed cyber-defense and conventional precision-strike weapons.

The war has not been painless for the West in economic terms either. Assisting Ukraine has not been cheap for the U.S. or its European partners. Washington has provided \$54 billion in military and other aid to Ukraine since the war began; the EU has delivered \$15 billion, and individual EU members have contributed \$18-20 billion in financial, military and humanitarian assistance, according to *Statista*. These amounts, along with increased defense spending have made it more challenging to address domestic needs. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on Russia and Russia's countersanctions have sent energy prices soaring. U.S. and European consumers have paid at the pump. The 700 percent jump in the price of natural gas has dramatically increased the cost of electricity in homes and businesses throughout Europe. Germany is facing the prospect of energy rationing. These developments are likely to have political repercussions in Western democracies, where voters will penalize current officeholders.

While the dramatic rise in the prices of fuels, along with those of grain and seed oils, has imposed steep costs on millions throughout the world, perhaps the most widely shared consequence of the war will be its adverse impact on the global effort to limit climate change. To reduce their dependence on Russia for fuels and compensate for its reduction in supplies of gas, European countries are restarting coal-fired power plants and reversing decisions to shutter old ones that are still operating. Germany,

²⁰ This began immediately after the invasion was launched. See "Statement of the President on the NATO Summit and Call With President Zelensky," The White House, 25 February 2022.

Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands are effectively abandoning their plans to phase out the use of coal. Others in Europe, including the Czech Republic and Romania are considering similar moves. Yet coal is much more polluting than other energy sources and generates much more significant greenhouse gas when burned.

At the same time, Europe is scrambling to find alternative sources of natural gas, whose extraction, transportation and liquefaction has an even greater impact on climate warming. Exploiting these sources will involve substantial new investment in infrastructure, both by European importers and by suppliers of this commodity. The G7 has committed the world's largest economies to undertake public investments in gas projects as "a necessary response to the current crisis."²¹ Government-backed international lenders, such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, had been seeking to finance renewable energy projects. Now they are prepared to support projects that will expand the use of much less climate-friendly energy. Last November in Glasgow European and North American governments pledged their determination to phase out the use of fossil fuels. The war in Ukraine has made that a much more remote possibility—too remote to prevent irreversible climate warming.

If Ukraine succeeds in regaining the territory it has lost to Russia since the war began, and even if its only accomplishment is to prevent its adversary from expanding beyond the Donbas and the other territory it has captured in the east and the south, the war will arguably have accomplished some highly worthwhile objectives. It will have preserved the independence of an aspiring democracy subjected to unprovoked aggression, and it may have helped to deter similar aggressive actions by Russia or China in the future. But the cost to most of the world's actors—not merely the participants and their supporters—is certain to be very high.

²¹ G7 Leaders' Communiqué, 28 June 2022, p. 5. See also Leslie Hook, "G7 Accused of 'Backsliding' on Climate Goals Over Energy Security Fears," *Financial Times*, 28 June 2022.

GEOPOLITICS, GEOGRAPHY AND THE UKRAINIAN - RUSSIAN WAR

The trigger of the Ukraine-Russia war is the enlargement of NATO, essentially a Western exploitation of Russian weakness emanating from Soviet Union's dissolution. Russia has communicated her reactions to the enlargement peacefully until the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The second wave of enlargement coming from the direction of neutral states such Finland and Sweden originates from Finnish and Swedish fears of being the next targets of Russian military campaigns. NATO enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality and become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion efforts has led to a further expansion through war. However, the exclusion of and warring with Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large alliance to balance China. The West should understand that it is not wise to create incentives for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance.

Serdar Ş. Güner*



TPQ

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*Serdar Ş. Güner is an associate professor at the International Relations Department at Bilkent University.

Geopolitical positioning of the states in the international system shape international politics. The permanence of states' placements is a structural feature bending the distribution of power across states. Geographic positions of Russia, China, and the United States are constituting major power centers therefore turning the distribution of power across the three states.

"Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent." Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, (New York: Crane Russak, 1977, p. 1.)

"States are always engaged in curbing the force of some other state. The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor." Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, p. 20.)

It is impossible to replace, interchange states' geographic positions. One cannot work in a laboratory by placing Russia in the place of the United States and placing the United States in the place of Russia or injecting new superpowers in an international system to examine changes in global conflict and cooperation. The impossibility of conducting such experiments marks the demarcation between the discipline of international relations (IR) and science.¹ Yet, without thinking about verification of scientific hypotheses, like in physics, it is possible to generate conjectures, like in this paper, about how the current war between Ukraine and Russia would evolve and end.

Consequences of Russia-Ukraine War

The war will change Russia-Ukraine territorial border. Donbass and Luhansk regions will almost certainly become parts of Russia. Ukrainian forces can recapture those strips of land only under unexpected series of military victories by the Ukrainians. Other regions might suffer the same fate as well. Besides the changes of territorial contiguity conditions, the war will have several other consequences. First there will be a long-term impact on Russia-Ukraine relations, war will leave a deep scar in psychological, sociological, and political terms. Second, it will alter beliefs of Russia's military superiority, provided that Russia fails in obtaining an easy victory. The new belief will be that Russia is not as effective militarily in Eastern Europe reckoning the old days of, say, Soviet invasion of Hungary. A Russian failure will also strengthen Chinese hand, as a weakened Russia might desire to align itself with China.

¹ About the demarcation problem, see David B. Resnik, "A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem," *Studies in History and the Philosophy of Science Part A*, Vol.31, No.2 (June 2000): p. 249-267.

The Trigger: NATO Enlargement

There are two central questions in need of answers. Why did the war occur and how would it end? The trigger of the war is the enlargement of NATO. The Soviet disunion is followed by a successive instances of NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. The enlargement resembles a domino effect that transformed the NATO-Russia border.

“It is possible to argue that Americans have double crossed or cheated Russia amounting to a U.S. exploitation of a weakened Russian power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”

Did Russia not react to the enlargement? Indeed, she did. She has tried to communicate her dissatisfaction with the enlargement during diplomatic meetings and encounters. The invasion of Ukraine can be interpreted as the most recent Russian reaction. Russian perspective regarding the enlargement is that the German reunification was realized on Western terms in 1990, but Western promises of no NATO expansion were not kept.² The dispute is whether or not Western promises of no further NATO expansion after the German reunification were binding. American diplomats and analysts mostly claim that those promises were informal. The result is Russian feelings of being betrayed by the West.³

It is possible to argue that Americans have double crossed or cheated Russia amounting to a U.S. exploitation of a weakened Russian power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. “While for the West, NATO’s expansion is perceived as “the enlargement of security community,” Russians see it as an assertive move of the Western, but primarily the American military infrastructure getting closer to Russian borders.”⁴ The current prospects of Finland and Sweden to become NATO members originate from Swedish and Finnish perceptions of a Russian threat given the current Ukraine War, reminiscent of the Turkish perceptions of a Soviet threat following Stalin’s demands on Turkish straits and Eastern Anatolia after the Second World War which subsequently effected Türkiye to become a NATO member. NATO

² Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?” *International Security*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2021): p.162-203.

³ Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. offer to Limit NATO Expansion.” *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2016): p.7-44.

⁴ Maxim A. Suchkov, “Russia’s “Post-West World Order”: Why Turkey Matters,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No.1 (2017): p. 69-78.

enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality willing to become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion to Ukraine has led to a further expansion through war.

Russian Warnings

NATO's primary role is to oppose any state that controls a large portion of Eurasia, either the Soviet Union or Russia. Cold War was characterized by the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. But now "NATO threatens Russia".⁵ Thus, the opposition between two alliances evolved from a balance to a Western threat of Russia. Suppose one claims that NATO is nothing but an instrument to project U.S. power into Eastern Europe and observes the number of former Soviet allies in Eastern Europe that's changing sides and turning into NATO allies. In that case, one could imagine the level of Western betrayal Russians feel. Vladimir Putin, facing the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia as future NATO members, expressed his anger in NATO Bucharest Meeting in April 2008 by declaring that Moscow would view any attempt of expansion of NATO near its borders as a "direct threat".⁶ Indeed, a NATO-member Ukraine would be the last straw that Russia could bear. Hence, the war is nothing but the result of Western and Ukrainian rhetoric of freedom and democracy bolstering prospects of Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

Geographic Realities and Structural Modifiers

Geographic realities are hard to change. Russian territory corresponds, *grosso modo*, to that of the Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire corresponding to what the British geographer Halford Mackinder calls the "pivot area".⁷ Mackinder remarks that "The most remarkable contrast in the political map of Europe is that presented by the vast area of Russia occupying half the Continent and the group of smaller territories tenanted by the Western Powers."⁸ Adjusted to today's world, the Mackinder's "Inner Crescent" that borders the pivot area westwards contains whole Europe. Ukraine and Belarus are located in the Eastern European region of the Inner Crescent and are contiguous to Russia. The strategic importance of both states is already noted by Mackinder who claims that: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island

⁵ Celeste Wallander A., "Why Russia Belongs to NATO", *Christian Science Monitor*, Vol. 89, No. 25 (1996): p.19.

⁶ The *Guardian*, "Putin warns NATO over expansion", 4 April 2008.

⁷ Halford Mackinder J., "The Geographical Pivot of History." *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1904): p.421-437. Looking at the Mackinder's map at page 435 and the current political map of Asia, one can quickly recognize that the pivot area contains not only Russian territory but also those of former Soviet republics in Asia such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan in addition to Mongolia, northern parts of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and northern Chinese provinces including Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.

⁸ Halford Mackinder J., "The Geographical Pivot of History." *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1904): p. 423.

controls the World.”⁹

One should object against Mackinder’s views as they pertain to a bygone era and that now we live in the twenty-first century. As Colin Gray’s claim noted, it is impossible to change geographic realities of the planet earth: states’ locations are “the most permanent.” However, one can think that while the United States shares borders with only Canada and Mexico, it is contiguous to all states in the rest of the world. Why would this be true? The U.S. global contiguity to all states in the world is due to American power projection capabilities through oceans, continents, and nuclear bombs carried by intercontinental missiles.

“Russian decisions of balancing and bandwagoning depend on Russian perceptions of NATO, China’s aggressive intentions, and the distribution of power in the strategic triangle. There is no doubt that as Sweden and Finland will become NATO allies, NATO will be stronger. Hence, Russians will be more inclined to search for Chinese support to balance NATO.”

Weapons technology together with geographic proximity constitutes a potent structural modifier.¹⁰ The more distance there is between states, the less able they become in projecting their power to fight each other.¹¹ Ukraine (or Georgia for the same reasons) as a NATO member will definitely increase NATO’s ability of conducting successful military incursions into Russia. In contrast, nuclear weapons technology does not suffer from the diminishing power over distance. One cannot imagine that a nuclear missile’s power depletes through its trajectory. Thus, a nuclear state can be considered as if it is contiguous to another state while sharing no borders amounting to nuclear contiguity. All states endowed with nuclear weapons including intercontinental missiles benefit from nuclear contiguity. Hence, one can distinguish between nuclear contiguity and what international borders display which is conventional contiguity. The former implies the proximity of destruction of any

⁹ Halford Mackinder J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (London, 1916): p.106.

¹⁰ S. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Retrieved 15 May 2022, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304>

¹¹ Kenneth Boulding calls the diminishing amounts of projected military capabilities over distance as the “loss-of-strength gradient”: Kenneth Boulding. *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper, 1962): p. 262.

states' territories which would create a hostile environment to any biological form of life after a nuclear exchange unlike the latter which is at the core of territorial conflicts; territories permitting life. NATO's enlargement can be categorized by both. NATO engulfing Ukraine becomes stronger vis-a-vis Russia and there is no security in being just as strong as a potential enemy, there is security only in being "a little stronger" as Nicholas J. Spykman claims.¹² Therefore, Russia becomes a state that has almost no security especially after a possible inclusion of Sweden and Finland to NATO.

The Strategic Triangle: Russia, China, and the United States

Russia's increased level of insecurity has immediate repercussions on Russia-China-United State relations, qualified as the "strategic triangle".¹³ NATO enlargement can bring Russia and China together amounting to a balancing alliance. For this to happen, Russia and China should agree to face NATO together. Such an alliance need not be based on a formal treaty like the Sino-Soviet Pact of 1950. It is sufficient that the two powers help each other and align their ideas and objectives in diverse military issues without signing an accord.

China prefers a multipolar world where European Union stands as a new center of power, independent of the global political agenda of U.S., that is, as an autonomous player in world politics. During the Group of Twenty meeting in Brisbane in 2014, China's top leader Xi Jinping opted for a deeper cooperation between the European Union and his country and wished that China and the European Union would become supporters of a multipolar world.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Chinese preference for a European pole is difficult to materialize. European Union is not entirely independent of the United States. For example, the United States warns China about its stance towards Russia, especially concerning Russian invasion of Ukraine, and, similar to the attitude of the United States, European leaders put pressure on Xi Jinping to keep a distance between Russia and China. China does not desire to be pressed in that direction.¹⁵ China prefers to be the most powerful and independent state free from any alliances so that she's free to decide on issues of conflict and cooperation

¹² Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942): p. 21.

¹³ Serdar Ş. Güner, "A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Alliance Formation and Dissolution: The Case Study of the relationship Among the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China," 1949-1972, PhD Dissertation, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1990; Lowell Dittmer, "An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis", *World Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (July 1981): p. 485-515. Dittmer does not offer a game-theoretical analysis. He discusses the strategic triangle according to the Structural Balance Theory. For a thorough application of the Structural Balance Theory in, for example, the Syria conflict, see Serdar Ş. Güner and Dilan E. Koç, "Shifting Balances of Power in the Syrian Conflict," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.16, No. 1 (Spring, 2017): p.123-131.

¹⁴ Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, "Faced With a Changed Europe, China Sticks to an Old Script," *New York Times*, 15 April 2022.

¹⁵ Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, 15 April 2022.

for herself in world politics.

Balancing, Bandwagoning, and Two-Front Wars

If NATO enlargement brings Russia and China closer indicating a move of balancing against the West, the inverse alignment pattern, namely, bandwagoning, would occur if states flock to the stronger side. Balancing implies that Russia aligns with the mighty West after her failure in Ukraine targeting a rising China. Taken between a rising China and an enlarged NATO, Russia would share the same geographic position as Germany that was sandwiched between France and Russia prior to the First World War. Russia would then face a two-front war problem: she would face a war prospect with NATO in the west and with China in the east.¹⁶ Russia would then act not in the spirit of a costly fighting with both enemies but would select one of them as an ally to oppose the other.

Russian decisions of balancing and bandwagoning depend on Russian perceptions of NATO, China's aggressive intentions, and the distribution of power in the strategic triangle. There is no doubt that as Sweden and Finland will become NATO allies, NATO will be stronger. Hence, Russians will be more inclined to search for Chinese support to balance NATO. Nevertheless, China would not reciprocate Russian quest for Chinese help against NATO as long as her drive to reach a power supremacy toward the U.S. is jeopardized. A reduced Chinese power due to its alliance with Russia and attracting Western animosity would preclude her to counter and circumvent the United States. Such a prospect would ultimately prevent China from realizing her objectives about the South China Sea, especially Taiwan. Therefore, Chinese reciprocation for any alignment desire from Russia is conditional upon her assessments of her foreign-policy issues, not necessarily upon NATO getting stronger. If China rises to a level where it can dramatically oppose the U.S. , then China would help the Russian quest and a Sino-Russian alliance might form which can change the global power distribution. A Sino-Russian alliance pitted against NATO would generate a bipolar world stable in terms of Kenneth Waltz's theory of Structural Realism and unstable in terms of Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer's arguments¹⁷ Under the shadow of nuclear weapons, such a bipolar world of West pitted against a Sino-Russian alliance would exemplify a nuclear contiguity driven by the fear of a doomsday with no one daring to risk a nuclear exchange.

In a sense, a bipolar world of the West against the Sino-Russian alliance might be

¹⁶ German strategists von Moltke and von Schlieffen solved German two-front problem by planning to attack France first and then turning to Russia which would mobilize its forces in a period of almost two months.

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (1964): p. 881-909; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964): p. 390-406.

more stable compared to George Orwell's forecast in his book *Nineteen Eighty-Four* depicting a war-driven tripolar world consisting of Oceania containing the U.S., Latin America, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia, Eurasia containing Russia and Europe, Eastasia containing China, Japan, Korea while the rest of world like India, a large part of Africa, Arabia, Southeast Asia including Indonesia remain to be zones of perpetual wars.

Tripolar worlds are the smallest systems where two poles of states can improve their power position by aligning with each other against the third. Without any certainty about which alliance of two will form against whom, a tripolar world represents a form of instability. In contrast, in a bipolar system there is no uncertainty about who the enemy is unlike in multipolar systems.¹⁸ Hence, a weakening of Russia and Russia leaning to China leading to a Sino-Russian alliance targeting the West or a decline of Russia and Russia leaning to NATO are more stable in structural terms than a three-power configuration of Russia, China, and NATO.¹⁹ Thus, a NATO engulfing Sweden and Finland is not necessarily a factor of instability at systemic level. Yet global political stability in terms of polarity remains in limbo until the outcome of the Ukraine war becomes crystal clear.

The End of Ukraine-Russia War

How will the war in Ukraine end? The equivalent of this question is asking when human deaths including military personnel on both sides, wartime rapes, assassinations of Ukrainian civilians, war crimes, the exodus of millions of Ukrainians to contiguous countries will end. From a Russian perspective, it is not hard to notice that popular local support for war (even the support of Russian soldiers) is not at its fullest. The sinking of the Russian navy star is only one example of Moscow's difficulties in fighting and its losses. There is no easy victory in Ukraine.

The first take of the Ukraine War is the likelihood of Russian forces to be engaged in combat without a clear military strategy. What was Russian objective exactly? A takeover of the whole Ukrainian territory and a placement of a puppet government à la Belarus or a capture of the entire Ukrainian territory? Would not be a capture of Luhansk and Donbass enough? Answers to these questions can only be found in Russian war strategies. In more specific terms, Moscow should not be after a strategy that focuses on power demonstration against NATO but primarily should be after a strategy that aims to bend or end Ukraine's willingness to resist. Would captures of some regions of Ukraine lead to the abandonment of Ukrainians' resistance or of

¹⁸ Waltz, 1964.

¹⁹ Structural balance theory is based on the principle of "a friend of my friend as well as an enemy of my enemy is my friend and a friend of my enemy as well as an enemy of friend is my enemy." See Güner and Koç, 2017.

their aspirations of becoming a NATO member? Similarly, would captures of some regions of Ukraine lead to a strengthening of Russia against NATO in geographic and therefore geopolitical terms? Conditions of the end of the war can be speculated upon by the answers to these questions which even Russian military authorities cannot quickly provide.

Secondly, from Moscow's perspective, the military help from the West to Ukraine is a problem. One can recall how the outside aid provided to the Afghan guerrillas created high costs on Russian forces during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One outcome of this problem is military escalation. Thus, sending more troops, using more equipment, and threats of using nuclear weapons can constitute a remedy. Nevertheless, a prolonged war implies a Russian military failure that might lead states in the Western camp and China to update their prior beliefs about Russian fighting capabilities.

A third remark about an end to the war can be made considering Putin's expectations of a quick victory. Eventually, Putin had wished a quick decline in popular support to Zelenskyy and Ukrainian leadership as a whole. He had also predicted a low Ukrainian resistance to the Russian forces. However, once the war has begun, he might have adjusted his views according to the actualization of the conflict. One should never eliminate prospects of military failure during the war, which goes for both sides -Ukraine and Russia. Plans are to be revised day to day. Putin's reception of war forecasts and eventualities from his own military might not be hundred percent correct. Thus, the end of the war is not near at all, and victory is uncertain.

If one assumes that Ukraine is the weaker belligerent in this war, then it is a possibility that Ukraine may choose to continue to fight till the end; because if her defeat against Russia is imminent, then any attainable peace is worse, in Ukraine's eyes, than fighting till the end. Why accept a total or partial sovereignty loss which is considered worse compared to a continuous fighting? It is possible to reach the same result of no near cessation of military hostilities in terms of overall gains and costs. Russia would prefer to fight rather than to negotiate a peace settlement with Ukraine given successive Russian military setbacks, because Russia would estimate that the power asymmetry in her favor would persuade Ukraine to surrender sooner or later. Putin would expect that higher levels of destruction and human costs would probably lead to the end of the conflict, and, therefore, he would prefer escalation for future rounds. Zelenskyy, likewise, can increase its level of resistance as he receives Western military aid. The result would, then, be a stalemate with no possibility of an end to the war in the near horizon.

Concluding Remarks

The expansion of NATO after the German unification constitutes a big strategic mistake. It only serves to provoke Russia to undertake military actions, which are the only options left for Moscow. The ultimate Russian means seems to be the use of its nuclear arsenal leading to the destruction of Europe and perhaps the world. Instead of benefiting from the break-up of the Soviet Union through the enlargement of NATO, the West should welcome Russia forming a colossal conglomerate of states almost encompassing the whole World except China. If there is need for a security system covering Europe, then why exclude Russia? If Russia becomes a member of a European security system, China would be deterred from issuing threats and claims like in issues of Taiwan and South China Sea, which are targeted by a widespread counter alliance. The exclusion of Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large coalition to balance China and creates incentives for forming a Sino-Russian alliance. Consequently, the West should take notice of Russia as a valuable and potential ally against China regardless of Ukraine's fate.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF NATO ENGAGEMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The new strategic concept of the alliance looks at the Mediterranean situation as a shift in the engagement with a history that is as old as the origins of the Western bloc. In this history, the Italian role has been an example for the other Mediterranean countries that later joined NATO. The steps in the construction of the Atlantic coalition started also in Mediterranean with U.S. military engagement grounded in Truman's doctrine. Twenty years later, the North Atlantic Council's report on the alliance's future tasks examined crucial "exposed areas" for NATO, and first among them was the Mediterranean. After the collapse of the Soviet system, NATO worked on a relationship of coexistence and cooperation with Russia. The ongoing invasion in Ukraine has thwarted years of discussion and work, but the partnerships promoted by NATO with the countries of the so-called enlarged Mediterranean stand as a success story.

Matteo Gerlini*



* Matteo Gerlini (PhD) is Assistant Professor at University of Siena and NATO defense college foundation Scientific Council's Chair.

The structures of the political-military alliance sealed with the North Atlantic Treaty were decided upon within the framework of the so-called Cold War. The conflict between the two superpowers, the United States, and the Soviet Union, arose in Europe. The continent was the epicenter of a conflict which never escalated into open warfare and revolved around the “Iron Curtain” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced had descended on the continent in his famous speech. So, the prospects of a dreaded conflict had a distinctly land-based character, with a possible battlefield moving from Germany to the Pyrenees. In the case of an invasion by the Warsaw Pact forces, the strategic debate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) revolved around European fears of U.S. engagement.

The Beginning

By 1950, in the midst of the Korean War, the first line of defense was established in West Germany, disrupting assumptions that had placed the boundary much further West. This enabled Federal Germany’s participation in the Atlantic alliance in 1955, which in turn allowed it to guarantee to other European allies that the reconstitution of the German armed forces was not dangerous. The city of Berlin became the *topos* of the Cold War and the division of Europe. Along with this incontrovertible element, which called the U.S. commitment of the defense of Western Europe into question, there were other matters, such as the question of nuclear armaments or control of the Mediterranean, which has endured well after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system.

Focusing on the Mediterranean, it is appropriate to retrace here the steps in the construction of the Atlantic coalition. U.S. military engagement is grounded in President Harry S. Truman’s doctrine, which wove U.S. national security with international aid to free peoples struggling against totalitarianism. Formulated in 1947, the doctrine was applied in 1948 in support of the governments of Greece and Türkiye. Two Mediterranean countries linked to U.S. national security, a founding element of the era that fixed the role of the U.S. in preparation for the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization that would derive from it, the NATO. The geographical focus for the application the Truman Doctrine was the Mediterranean as well, that is, Mediterranean countries that did not orbit the Soviet Union. The necessary background for the success of the Truman doctrine was the placement of the Italian republic in the Atlantic field. The defeat of the Popular Front in the first elections of Republican Italy and the country’s subsequent accession to the North Atlantic Treaty were preconditions obtained by overcoming various kinds of obstacles.

The French government pledged that the Italian Republic would be among the signatory states of the treaty on 4 April 1949. Ennio Di Nolfo recalls that, with Italy's entry in the treaty, the French strengthened the representation of Catholic countries within the alliance and off shouldered some of the responsibility of dealing with large swathes of coastline on the Mediterranean alone.¹ These reasons are certainly analytically valid with respect to the Western European balance of power – but from the American perspective, the strategic-political relevance of the Mediterranean and other crucial basins on the planet was already given. There was certainly a strong co-management of these areas with the United Kingdom, as the United States was moving from a comprimario to superseding it as global hegemon. A trend in the special relationship that united the British and Americans developed in the following years: it started in the Mediterranean, where the takeover occurred earlier than in other eastern basins and coincided with the beginning of U.S. support for the Greek government.

“In 1960, NATO deployed PGM-19 Jupiter strategic missiles to Apulia and, later, to the province of Smyrna, directly threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads. The choice had many implications, but one that geographically seemed to express the value of Italian and Turkish territory as NATO's southern flank to the interior of the continent, not to the sea.”

Historically in the British area of influence, the U.K. government was no longer able to maintain effective patronage over monarchist forces loyal to it in the Hellenic Civil War of 1946-49, which pitted them against communist formations, already the backbone of the resistance against Nazi occupation. The victory of the Christian Democrats in Italy, followed by the victory of the Greek anti-communist forces, precluded Soviet entry on Mediterranean shores. However, this cardinal issue for the Anglo-Americans was not to be part of NATO's priorities at the time of the organization's founding, it was to remain a side issue. It was too far outside of the Atlantic line of defense, and it was too important to the respective British and

¹ The historical bibliography on NATO has in its essentials: David Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe*, (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970); Ennio Di Nolfo, *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Appraisal*, (Berlin-New York (edited by). 1991); Walter De Gruyter; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years*, Lexington, (The University Press of Kentucky 1984); Lawrence S Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson; Raimondo Luraghi, Victor Alba, *NATO, and the Mediterranean*, (Wilmington, Delaware, 1985); Scholarly resources; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*, (Westport 1999); Praeger; Schmidt, Gustav. (Edited by). 2001. *A History of NATO. The First Fifty Years*. (New York: Palgrave).

U.S. imperial policies. This position was easily justified, since the line of possible aggression was coming from the heart of the European continent, as the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had shown, and not from the sea. The French, on the other hand, were fully engulfed in a situation that encompassed an arm of the Mediterranean in the national sphere, since Algeria was not simply a colony but part of France's metropolitan territory. This aspect marked a key difference between French and British participation in the integrated command of NATO's Mediterranean maritime forces because France had to take care of its Algerian shore as a priority.

The Enlargement

In 1951, the representatives of Greece and Türkiye signed treaty access and began their integration process in the structures of the alliance. This first enlargement intersected with the process of decolonization in the Mediterranean, not only of Algeria but especially of Malta. Consolidation was marked by the developments in military technology, namely new ballistic carriers armed with nuclear warheads. The entry into the so-called "missile age" reduced the deterrent value of the air force: it was no longer the sole carrier of nuclear weapons, as it had been in the early years of nuclear weapons. The bombers in the sky were in constant rotation, guaranteeing retaliation even if command centers were destroyed. In 1960, NATO deployed PGM-19 Jupiter strategic missiles to Apulia and, later, to the province of Smyrna, directly threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads. The choice had many implications, but one that geographically seemed to express the value of Italian and Turkish territory as NATO's southern flank to the interior of the continent, not to the sea. However, it must be considered that the missile deployment came at the end of a period of fluid definition of NATO command structures, which would be followed by a phase – the one we are currently in – where the Mediterranean character of Italy, Greece and Türkiye became central to their integration into the Atlantic system.

The constellation of command centers was initially plotted according to a pattern with Naples as its main star. Here, the Allied Southern Command had been established in 1951, and it also included the command of the Mediterranean naval forces. As early as 1952, accompanying the entry of Greece and Türkiye into the treaty, the Mediterranean Naval Forces Command were reorganized in Malta and placed under British command. The entry of the two countries with a long history of conflict, in addition to marking a political success for the alliance, it also highlighted the need to find a new center of gravity for the maritime command. The island of Malta, still a British possession, was a strategic asset in this redefinition. The Naples command was converted into Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), one of the two operational strategic commands of Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe (SHAPE), established in 1953 at Rocquencourt in the Ile-de-France. So, the British had the Mediterranean Gibraltar Command (COMGIBMED) and the Southeast Mediterranean Command (COMMEDSOUTHEAST); the French the Western Mediterranean Command (COMMEDWEST); the Italians the Central Mediterranean Command (COMEDCENT); the Greeks the Eastern Mediterranean Command (COMEDEAST); and the Turks the Northeast Mediterranean Command (COMEDNOREAST), which extended its responsibilities over the entire Black Sea.

“As early as the late 1970s, the strategic debate was marked by the deployment of BMG-109 Tomahawk and MGM-31 Pershing missiles, the so-called Euro-missiles, to bases in European countries that agreed to their deployment.”

Over the course of 1952, with NATO expanding in the Mediterranean, important changes were taking place on the other sides of the sea. In Egypt, the monarchy was being overthrown in a military coup, and from the republican ranks of the military emerged the character of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. In the anticolonialism that informed the insurgents, led by Nasser, there was a hostility toward the old European imperial powers, along with an emerging tendency to disengage from the confrontation between the blocs. There was no preclusion, however, toward the United States and the Soviet Union, with whom Nasser engaged in various negotiations, leading to a striking supply of arms from Czechoslovakia. Coupled with the support the Nasserites provided the Algerian rebels within the struggle against France, in the name of the pan-Arab ideology that aimed at the establishment of a unitary state of all Arabs, the Egyptian armament increased, and the hostility of French and the British governments made U.S. engagement with the new regime a tougher enterprise.

The following year, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal by expropriating the Anglo-French company that held rights to it. This led to a secret Anglo-French understanding with the Israelis in order to militarily undermine the Arab republic. Although in the heart of Europe the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had shaken consciences and exposed the harsh order of the Iron Curtain, in that same year, in those same days, the Suez crisis and the war that followed touched the chords of the Atlantic alliance. In the frustration of Anglo-French designs to maintain some form of control over the seething Arab scene, which occurred in the wake of the Soviet threat to intervene even with nuclear weapons in defense of Egypt, and the harsh U.S. political censure

of the Europeans, new elements matured. Yugoslavia, led by Josif Broz, known as Tito, had joined Egypt and other southern countries in the nonaligned movement that year, making the political landscape of the Mediterranean states even more dynamic. The French resolutely embarked on the quest for an autonomous nuclear option in order to redeem the republic's international status from the Suez fiasco – and to avoid that form of American “nuclear-sharing” welcomed by the Italians with the Jupiter missiles, which remained under U.S. control with the dual-key system required for warhead activation. The French nuke was successfully tested in 1960, as the Algerian War flared up, which ended two years later with the Evian Accords that made the North African country independent of France. NATO's Western Mediterranean Command (COMMEDWEST) was moved from Algiers to Toulon, in an obvious strategic setback.

Crisis and Transformation

In the fall of that year, the Cuban missile crisis brought the focus of the Cold War back to the issue of nuclear armaments. After the deployment of missiles in Italy and Türkiye, to which were added the missiles deployed in Britain, the pro-Soviet choice of the Cuban revolutionary government seemed to scramble the cards of the strategic game. The Cubans intended primarily to defend themselves against a U.S.-sponsored armed intervention and only secondarily to politically weld their revolution to the Eastern bloc. The prospective deployment of Soviet missiles armed with nuclear warheads on the Caribbean Island made the risk of nuclear war concrete, as U.S. territory would cease to be sanctuary, that is, excluded from the range of nuclear missiles. The U.S. emerged with an image victory, politically important, because the Russians gave up installing missiles in Cuba, but had to strategically pay the duty of divesting missiles in Italy and Türkiye. It was an ambivalent decision, undertaken by John Fitzgerald Kennedy's presidency, that invested the two Mediterranean countries. In fact, the Jupiter missiles were deemed by the Americans to be technologically outdated, compared to the new UGM-27 Polaris missiles, which could be launched from ships and, especially, submarines. As always, technological choices are inseparable from political decisions. Granted that the Polaris missiles were only slightly newer than the Jupiter missiles, this could not mean that the latter, which had been deployed for only two years, were already obsolescent. Consequently, it was precisely the U.S. political commitment to the defense of distant Europe that was again perceived as uncertain. With the response to the Soviet threat consigned to missiles placed in submarines rather than in bases located on the territory of Allied states and subject to possible aggression, U.S. intervention became even more discretionary. The U.S. being the heart of the alliance, a – perceived or factual – weakening of it could shake the foundations of

NATO. Further, the treaty did not provide a go-to response in the face of aggression by a member country, so the quality of assurances to the Europeans was contingent, with the search for constant political confirmation. There is no doubt that the U.S. decision was part of the Kennedy Doctrine of flexible response: the U.S. would react proportionately to Soviet threats, without immediately moving to nuclear attack. Within this approach, however, sharing nuclear weapons was happening less, and the Italian affair was exemplary of this reduction. Indeed, the Italian navy had prepared the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi to be equipped with Polaris since 1961, and designed the Vittorio Veneto with the same feature, when in the end the United States did not donate the missiles. In this ever-changing climate, French President Charles de Gaulle in 1966 decided on the exit of French forces from the integrated NATO structures, which was accomplished the following year. The weight of the French decision was obviously disruptive, and it brought unprecedented transformations to the structures of the alliance. In the Mediterranean scenario, the Toulon command was closed, and its responsibilities transferred to Naples. In the same year, the British-led Mediterranean naval command was also dissolved following Malta's independence and the growth of a neutralist orientation on the island.

The NAVSOUTH in Naples, inheriting the role of the Allied Mediterranean Forces, was put in place with the organizational restructuring of 1967 and became the pivot of maritime command for the entire Mediterranean, not just the central-western part of it under direct responsibility. Along with this change, NATO had to start defining a new role for the Mediterranean in its defense policy. In short, the basin was no longer just the maritime link of NATO's southern flank, but a major strategic area.

The North Atlantic Council's report on the alliance's future tasks, presented in the same year 1967 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, opened an unprecedented process of NATO's transformation. In its military aspects, the report examined crucial "exposed areas" for NATO, and first among them was the Mediterranean. Indeed, a renewed Soviet assertiveness was shifting substantial Black Sea forces beyond the Straits: from 1964 to 1970 Soviet naval transit tripled, and from 1965 the Black Sea Fleet deployed its Fifth "Eskadra" in the Mediterranean, called SOVMEDRON (Soviet Mediterranean Squadron) by NATO. It was meant to balance the power of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, attempting to orient according to Cold War patterns and the existing conflicts among the riparian countries as part of the strategy that had been underway for years of building an "anti-imperialist" camp of non-European countries. In the face of SOVMEDRON, the Turkish position was on the firing line, but bound by treaties of free transit from the straits; Greece was weakened by the colonels' regime established in 1967; France and Britain were in retreat for the reasons mentioned above. Against this backdrop, attention to the Arab Israeli conflict

was heightened and superpowers intervened. The Soviet Union expanded support for the Arab sphere, particularly increasing military cooperation with Egypt through maritime cooperation. There is no question that Soviet shipping at the roadstead in Alexandria and Port Said deterred the Israelis from bombing these ports during the 1967 war. Between wars, Soviet presence in Egypt ran its course, and on the eve of the 1973 war Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers from the country. In the course of peace talks, Egypt has moved closer to the West and NATO, while the Soviets firmly held Syrian ports.

The Roots of the Present

In 1969 in Libya, a revolutionary coup d'état established the republic and opened the long season dominated by the figure of Muhammad Gaddafi, who proclaimed himself heir to Nasserite pan-Arabism. Qaddafi shifted the strategic balance in the Mediterranean, not only because Libya was no longer tied to the Western bloc, but also because he began to exert strong pressure on Malta to become a Libyan semi-protectorate. Eventually the Italians negotiated a favorable position for Malta with the Atlantic allies, while in the eastern Mediterranean the Greeks and Turks were wrapped in the coils of the Cypriot question that bogged down the British themselves, holders of the island with its strategically located Akrotiri base.

While maintaining the Maltese policy of neutrality, the country entered a guardianship agreement with Italy that effectively blocked both Soviet aspirations and the aggressive Libyan interests in the island's maritime space. Thus, throughout the 1980s, NATO structures in the Mediterranean were increasingly called into question by crises and interventions only tenuously related to defense against Soviet expansionism, whether real or perceived, but increasingly related to the issue of Middle East based terrorism as a threat to world security or more generally to those areas of instability outside the bipolar confrontation, such as the Persian Gulf after the Iranian revolution of 1979. It is worth recalling the case of the multinational force in Lebanon which, although under UN auspices, employed NATO structures to carry out the two missions in the early 1980s.

The fruits of this policy were not long in coming, as during the same 1980s Egypt began a partnership with NATO itself, hosting and participating in joint exercises going by the codename "Operation Bright Star," repeated usually on a bi-yearly basis to this day. A remarkable rapprochement, which dragged NATO in the middle of political game of the MENA countries, inevitably exposing facilities and personnel. As early as the late 1970s, the strategic debate was marked by the deployment of BMG-109 Tomahawk and MGM-31 Pershing missiles, the so-called Euro-missiles,

to bases in European countries that agreed to their deployment. Italy also allocated the NATO base of Comiso in Sicily as a site for the Euromissiles.

In 1989, the onset of the collapse of the Soviet system posed the need for the redefinition of the alliance in the face of a relationship of coexistence and cooperation with Russia. The ongoing invasion in Ukraine has thwarted years of discussion and work, but on the Mediterranean side, it is useful to recall the significance of the partnerships promoted by NATO with the countries of the so-called enlarged Mediterranean. The first was the Mediterranean Dialogue, promoted in January 1994 by the Italian government.² The Mediterranean Dialogue created a bilateral partnership of NATO countries with countries on the southern shore of the sea, promoting cooperation, exchange of information and in general security concepts. This approach has undoubtedly increased the quality of NATO's public diplomacy, and has made possible cooperation aimed, for example, at countering terrorism. In 2004 a restructuring of the commands created the Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) - Naples from the former AFSOUTH, first in the Bagnoli neighborhood and then since 2012 in Lago Patria. Within the JFC, the NATO Strategic Direction South - Hub was established in 2017 - where the spirit of the Mediterranean Dialogue is translated into operational lines to countries on the southern shore of the sea. In the same year, the Istanbul NATO summit established a second relevant partnership, the Istanbul cooperation initiative, targeting Gulf countries.³ It signified the completion of NATO's bilateral approach toward the broader Mediterranean, in a cooperative approach that has so far ensured the success of the North Atlantic political and military alliance.

² Massimo Ambrosetti, *NATO's Mediterranean dialogue*, (The International Spectator 2001), n.1: p. 83ss.

³ Cüneyt Yenigün, *Gulf Security, NATO and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, (Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015), Vol. 3, No. 2: 13-27.

THE FUTURE OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AT NATO

In a ground-breaking move, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) features prominently in NATO's Strategic Concept for the first time, a powerful signal that it will form a central part of NATO's changing priorities going forward. At the same time, there have been significant gendered silences in NATO and its allies' response to the Russia-Ukraine War, undermining these policy aspirations. This is despite over a decade of significant investment in the WPS architecture across NATO's political and military structures, including the creation of a high-level Special Representative on Women, Peace, and Security, reporting directly to the Secretary General and supporting a comprehensive WPS policy adopted in conjunction with NATO partners. Focus therefore needs to be given to what NATO can do to operationalize the WPS aspirations of the new Strategic Concept in practice.

Diana Morais*, Samantha Turner** &
Katharine A. M. Wright***



* Diana Morais is Chair of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and a PhD Candidate at the University of Lisbon.

** Samantha Turner is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Stimson Center.

*** Dr Katharine A. M. Wright is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University (UK).



ATO's approach to Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) has developed significantly since it first adopted a policy on the topic in 2007. From a much problematized 'add women and stir' approach to improve operational effectiveness in Afghanistan, it has become a prominent feature of the alliance's new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit. Here NATO reiterated its commitment to integrate the WPS agenda across all tasks and 'to continue to advance gender equality as a reflection of our values'.¹ WPS should therefore form a core part of NATO's changing priorities, primarily in response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Yet where we might have expected to see NATO leadership commit to include WPS as part of their response, in particular the defense of 'Western values', we have instead seen WPS marginalized by the Alliance despite stated policy commitments.²

The WPS agenda is encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the nine follow-up resolutions. It calls for the better representation of women in peace and security, while also acknowledging the gendered impact of armed conflict (on men and women) through the integration of gender perspectives, along with addressing the use of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). The adoption of UNSCR 1325 was groundbreaking, it marked the first time the Security Council had discussed women's experiences of conflict and also because of the significant involvement of (feminist) civil society in supporting the Resolution's adoption.³ Civil society is therefore integral to keeping the agenda alive at the Security Council but also through holding governments, and international organizations, to account for their WPS commitments.⁴ Such external scrutiny is integral to realizing the transformative potential of the WPS agenda, for example, highlighting where implementation is racialized and 'others' those on the receiving end of WPS initiatives,⁵ rather than seeking to transform gendered and racialized structures underpinning existing foreign, security and defense policy apparatus.

Central to the future success of NATO's WPS work is the Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR) on WPS. The establishment of this high-level role in 2012 was recognized as an example of best practice by the UN.⁶ The SGSR provides

¹ NATO, 'Strategic Concept', 2022, <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

² K.A.M. Wright, 'Where Is Women, Peace, and Security? NATO's Response to the Russia-Ukraine War', *European Journal of Politics and Gender*, 5 May 2022, 1–3.

³ Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella, and Sheri Gibbings, 'Women, Peace and Security Resolution 1325', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6, no. 1 (2004): 130–40.

⁴ Soumita Basu, 'Gender as National Interest at the UN Security Council', *International Affairs* 2 (2016): 255–73; K.A.M. Wright, 'Challenging Civil Society Perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security Agenda', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 18 April 2022.

⁵ Toni Hastrup and Jamie J Hagen, 'Critical Studies on Security Racial Hierarchies of Knowledge Production in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda', *Critical Studies on Security* 00, no. 00 (2021): 1–4.

⁶ Radhika Coomaraswamy, 'Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Security the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Resolution 1325', *UN Women*, 2015, [http://wps.unwomen.org/\\$sim\\$/media/files/un_women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf](http://wps.unwomen.org/sim/media/files/un_women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf)

“A more recent and serious challenge concerning NATO’s changing priorities and the place of WPS is the gendered silences surrounding NATO’s response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is surprising given this is a war fought not just in terms of territory but also represents a fundamental attack on democracy and NATO values including individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law.”

leadership on WPS at NATO, acting as the external face of NATO’s WPS work, for example, through addressing the UN Security Council.⁷ However, most crucial is their internal role where they must bring together allies to operationalize NATO’s WPS commitments. Each of the previous three incumbents of the role and the current SGSR, Irene Fellin, have brought different qualities to the role. However, what has proved critical to the success of the SGSR position to-date is their ability to leverage external scrutiny to push for NATO to do more on WPS and to hold the alliance accountable for its stated priorities.⁸

NATO’s first engagement with WPS came in 2007 when it adopted a policy in conjunction with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This has since been revised three times; all such policies have been accompanied by action plans, the most recent of which was approved at the October 2021 Defense Ministerial. In 2009, Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 translated the WPS agenda to apply to the Strategic Commands (and has since been revised three times). There have been some challenges to putting WPS into actionable policy at NATO, for instance, the initial 2011 WPS action plan was classified which meant civil society could not hold NATO to account for its WPS work as is common more broadly on WPS, yet the subsequent declassification served to limit the applicability of WPS to sensitive areas of NATO’s work.⁹ Despite such challenges, NATO’s WPS policies have developed substantially and are applicable across all of NATO’s tasks. There is therefore a significant policy commitment to WPS by NATO, its allies, and partners; what remains is to operationalize these commitments across the Alliance’s tasks.

⁷ K.A.M. Wright and Annika Bergman Rosamond, ‘NATO, Angelina Jolie and the Alliance’s Celebrity and Visual Turn’ 47, no. 4 (2021): 443–66.

⁸ Katharine A.M. Wright, Matthew Hurley, and Jesus Ignacio Gil Ruiz, *NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organizing from Within* (London: Routledge, 2019); Wright, ‘Challenging Civil Society Perceptions of NATO’, 202.

⁹ Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, *NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organizing from Within*.

There are several challenges to operationalizing NATO's WPS policy in practice. First, NATO's commitment to WPS has been primarily external facing, rather than concerned with reforming its own gendered structures. For example, WPS has served as a 'safe issue' through which NATO can build relationships with 'awkward' partners,¹⁰ including partner states such as Georgia, Jordan, Japan, and Ukraine.¹¹ NATO's work on WPS has also been projected as a 'good news story' for the Alliance during the challenges of its involvement in Afghanistan¹² and more recently as a public diplomacy tool to reach 'new audiences' through engaging celebrity.¹³ Second, NATO's initial engagement with WPS through its intervention in Afghanistan led to an understanding of WPS as a tool to increase operational effectiveness, through the use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs)¹⁴ and Gender Advisors. Finally, while a growing number of individuals at NATO are committed to WPS, inadequate resourcing¹⁵ and the gendered policing of WPS work¹⁶ are reflective of significant institutional resistance which serves as a hindrance to operationalizing WPS policy commitments in practice.

A more recent and serious challenge concerning NATO's changing priorities and the place of WPS is the gendered silences surrounding NATO's response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is surprising given this is a war fought not just in terms of territory but also represents a fundamental attack on democracy and NATO values including individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. Russia's conduct of the invasion, with allegations of the widespread use of CRSV,¹⁷ runs directly counter to the law of armed conflict and is directly applicable to the WPS agenda. Further, Ukraine is a signatory to NATO's WPS policy, and the alliance has supported the development of Ukraine's WPS policy since 2014¹⁸ and

¹⁰ Charlotte Wagnsson, 'A Security Community in the Making? Sweden and NATO Post-Libya', *European Security* 20, no. 4 (2011): 585–603; K.A.M. Wright, 'NATO'S Adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the Agenda a Reality', *International Political Science Review* 37, no. 3 (2016): 350–61.

¹¹ Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, *NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organizing from Within*.

¹² K.A.M. Wright, 'Telling NATO's Story of Afghanistan: Gender and the Alliance's Digital Diplomacy', *Media, War & Conflict* 12, no. 1 (2019): 87–101.

¹³ Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 'NATO, Angelina Jolie and the Alliance's Celebrity and Visual Turn'; Elsa Hedling, Emil Edenborg, and Sanna Strand, 'Embodying Military Muscles and a Remasculinized West: Influencer Marketing, Fantasy, and "the Face of NATO"', *Global Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (10 March 2022): 1–12. *{\i Global Studies Quarterly}* 2, no. 1 (10 March 2022

¹⁴ Keally McBride and Annick T.R. Wibben, 'The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan', *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 3, no. 2 (2012).

¹⁵ Megan Bastick and Claire Duncanson, 'Agents of Change? Gender Advisors in NATO Militaries', *International Peacekeeping* 3312 (2018): 1–24.

¹⁶ Matthew Hurley, 'Watermelons and Weddings: Making Women, Peace and Security "Relevant" at NATO Through (Re)Telling Stories of Success', *Global Society* 32, no. 4 (2018): 436–56; Matthew Hurley, 'The "Gendeman": (Re) Negotiating Militarized Masculinities When "Doing Gender" at NATO', *Critical Military Studies*, 2018.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, 'Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas: Summary Executions, Other Grave Abuses by Russian Forces', 4 April 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas>

¹⁸ Mila O'Sullivan, "'Being Strong Enough to Defend Yourself": Untangling the Women, Peace and Security Agenda amidst the Ukrainian Conflict', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 21, no. 5 (20 October 2019): 746–67. *{\i International Feminist Journal of Politics}* 21, no. 5 (20 October 2019).

the absence of WPS from NATO's response and support for Ukraine undermines the efficacy of the agenda. If NATO were 'to continue to advance gender equality as a reflection of our values'¹⁹ as the new Strategic Concept commits it to, then we would expect WPS to be activated here. This would entail the inclusion of Gender Advisors as part of the NATO forces deployed on the eastern flank and for WPS to be mainstreamed into NATO's public diplomacy in order to uphold and defend NATO values more broadly. There is still time for NATO to act here; it is therefore important to consider what concrete actions are needed to operationalize WPS in all of NATO's tasks going forward.

“Bringing NCGM further ‘into the fold’ of NATO offers an important opportunity for other NATO nations to contribute staff to NCGM beyond the Nordics (and Canada and the Netherlands who have also seconded personnel), to demonstrate unity and that WPS is a topic all allies are actively seized of.”

Future-proofing NATO through WPS

As NATO re-orientates back towards its collective defense purpose to protect allies in the face of a recalcitrant Russia, the implementation of the WPS agenda is more relevant than ever. Over the last decades, conflict has become profoundly marked by transnational terrorism and violent radicalization, as well as the return of territorial annexation and contested sovereignty in disputed territories, as the case of Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine have showed. NATO has also recognized space and cyberspace as new operational domains, and the Alliance is currently developing an initial concept for Multi-Domain Operations. There are also new challenges posed from growing geopolitical competition, advances in warfare technology and hybrid threats, and from climate change.

The strategic environment has evolved into a highly complex, hybrid and dynamic system with many new, state, and non-state actors (both local and international). Understanding their roles, relationships and their interdependencies is key to assess their potential impact to NATO's security. Considering the highly gendered nature of war and the increasing complexity of the strategic environment and its interrelation with the human dimension, requires an in-depth understanding of how new and more

¹⁹ NATO, 'Strategic Concept'.

advanced patterns of warfare affect whole populations, how women, men, girls and boys can differently have influence on and be impacted by threats to our security due to their gender.²⁰ This demonstrates how through operationalizing WPS, NATO will build resilience to ensure allies can better respond to threats and withstand attacks below the threshold of conflict more effectively. The resulting ability to analyse a situation through a gender perspective enables NATO to conduct a comprehensive analysis of conflict to better predict, prevent and mitigate risk on the battlefields of the present and future.

Leadership

Internally, WPS should be reframed within NATO as a core leadership topic, not a women's issue, or something extra but as something essential. This means ensuring that all leaders across the Alliance are required to have a working knowledge of NATO's commitments on WPS and how to operationalize it. Given the reality of the highly gendered composition of the alliance, with men significantly overrepresented in leadership roles in the military but also (to a lesser extent) political structures, it is essential that this topic be a key part of any learning curriculum for senior NATO leadership and forms part of their professionalization. There are already a number of men who support WPS within their roles at NATO²¹ but we need more of these men, including key alliance military leaders with a grasp of the basic tenets of WPS and understanding of its relevance to the Alliance's tasks, who can take the reins and push the agenda forward.

Representation

WPS brings to the fore the issue of representation, and women's representation is important to address at NATO, particularly in senior leadership positions where men dominate.²² However, the WPS agenda is about far more than that, and caution should be sought before placing women into WPS roles solely by merit of their gender, rather than their prior expertise. Likewise, we should be cautious about calls seeking to increase the number of women in NATO (and NATO forces) on an essentialized stereotypical assumption that women can, and will, bring about the change expected of them on the basis of their gender, even though they have signed up to the same institutional values as their male colleagues.²³ It is therefore essential to resist this narrow understanding of WPS which frames the agenda as

²⁰ Andrew Atkinson, Marco Grandi, and Gergana Vaklinova, 'Resilience, Human Security, and the Protection of Civilians: A Critical Approach for Future Urban Conflict', The Stimson Center, 2022, <https://www.stimson.org/2022/resilience-human-security-and-the-protection-of-civilians-a-critical-approach-for-future-urban-conflict/>

²¹ Hurley, 'The 'Genderman': (Re)Negotiating Militarised Masculinities When 'Doing Gender' at NATO'; Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, *NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within*.

²² Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, *NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within*.

²³ Annica Kronsell, *Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense: Militarism and Peacekeeping* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

a ‘women’s issue’, WPS is not just applicable to women, as NATO’s own policy attests, it calls for the integration of gender perspectives to ensure actions do not disproportionately impact one gender over another. In placing the onus on women, who are in a disadvantaged position structurally within the alliance, we not only put them in an impossible position, but we let men off the hook and overlook wider calls for institutional reform.

Accountability

As a result of NATO’s engagement with WPS, the alliance has begun to consult civil society formally in the policy making process for the first time through the Civil Society Advisory Panel on WPS (CSAP).²⁴ CSAP provides an important forum for NATO to engage with WPS experts from a range of civil society based in member and partner states, along with those on the receiving end of NATO operations, to gain external evaluation of NATO’s WPS work. There have been some challenges with CSAP, in particular perceptions of the value NATO places on civil society feedback, which have contributed to a reluctance among some civil society to engage. However, these teething problems are to be expected given the alliance’s lack of previous experience here and are far outweighed by the benefits CSAP has the potential to bring to NATO’s WPS work.²⁵ This is because engaging civil society through such a forum is crucial not only to holding NATO to account for its WPS commitments, but to ensure its WPS policies and priorities align with changing operational priorities. This will ensure NATO maintains a strategic edge going forward, including preventing and minimizing harm in future engagements. It is essential therefore that CSAP’s mandate continues to be renewed.

Professionalization

The practice of WPS requires the acquisition of specialist knowledge on the topic of gender perspectives and its relevance to peace and security, or its professionalization. Such a process needs, however, to be cognizant of the wider global power structures in which NATO operates to ensure it reflects the brevity of the WPS agenda and is not exclusionary.²⁶ NATO Gender Advisors and those responsible for WPS are in a number of cases well positioned structurally within the alliance with direct access to leadership, though more needs to be done to make this consistent across the political and military structures and ensure these roles are adequately resourced. Another significant challenge to realizing the efficacy of Gender Advisors is the professionalization of the practice of WPS. Gender Advisors continue to be appointed

²⁴ Wright, ‘Challenging Civil Society Perceptions of NATO’.

²⁵ Wright, ‘Challenging Civil Society Perceptions of NATO’.

²⁶ Haastrup and Hagen, ‘Critical Studies on Security Racial Hierarchies of Knowledge Production in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda’.

in some instances with no education or training and no prior experience working on WPS.²⁷ This puts that individual at a significant disadvantage, with them having to play ‘catch up’ to learn about an agenda which is far from common sense. In some cases, women are appointed to these positions on an assumption that women ‘know gender’ by merit of being women, this further undermines the WPS agenda, and the expertise required to implement it. Such work at NATO should be cognizant of the wider critiques of WPS professionalization, notably that it removes ‘experts’ from the lived experiences of those on the ground through creating hierarchies of knowledge²⁸ and should seek to address the hegemony of whiteness which pervades such spaces.²⁹ NATO must therefore continue to engage, and listen to, civil society in its WPS practice to provide accountability and should seek to diversify and strengthen its training programme.

Training

NATO’s department head for gender in military operations training is the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) based in Sweden. Until this point the NCGM has not been on an equal footing with other specialists at NATO with its expertise unable to be recognized as a Center of Excellence because it is a partner state which hosts it (despite other NATO members contributing). Sweden’s imminent membership of NATO provides an opportune moment to address this imbalance and to place gender expertise on a par with other specialisms including cyber security, military medicine, and strategic communication. Designating NCGM a NATO Centre of Excellence (COE) is an essential part of this. COEs offer recognized expertise and experience of value to NATO, through assisting in the development of doctrine, identifying lessons learned, and contributing to improving interoperability among allies, while avoiding duplication.³⁰ Bringing NCGM further ‘into the fold’ of NATO offers an important opportunity for other NATO nations to contribute staff to NCGM beyond the Nordics (and Canada and the Netherlands who have also seconded personnel), to demonstrate unity and that WPS is a topic *all* allies are actively seized of. It is also an opportunity to engage with NATO partners further afield, and utilize civil society expertise, to ensure knowledge is reflective of the full depth and breadth of the global WPS agenda.

²⁷ Wright, ‘NATO’S Adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the Agenda a Reality’.

²⁸ Maria Martin de Almagro, ‘Lost Boomerangs, the Rebound Effect and Transnational Advocacy Networks: A Discursive Approach to Norm Diffusion’, *Review of International Studies* 44, no. April (2018): 672–93.

²⁹ Hastrup and Hagen, ‘Critical Studies on Security Racial Hierarchies of Knowledge Production in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda’.

³⁰ NATO, ‘Centers of Excellence’, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm

Doctrine

Gender doctrine is integral to operationalizing NATO's WPS commitments in practice. Military Doctrine refers to the 'fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives'³¹, it helps to standardize the way things are done and ensures that everyone is doing things in the same way and producing the necessary reports and outcomes needed for mission support. NATO must approve gender doctrine and simplify 'how to do' WPS in a way that is accessible, replicable, mission focused, and standardized. This should be through the provision of a simple, general tool on how to integrate gender perspectives into missions and operations; including examples of particular situations that are field tested and proven to work. There also needs to be overall guidance for how to integrate gender perspectives into strategic, operational, and tactical level situations beyond WPS. This is in addition to guidance on how to mainstream gender perspectives into all other doctrine documents; specifically what aspects are the most important, and how do they relate to other doctrinal practices. To put this into practice, NATO will need to call on its most skilled practitioners to work with experts from other areas of military focus in order to make sure that the requirements are the correct fit for each area that gender perspectives as a cross-cutting topic touches.

Concluding remarks

NATO has the highest-level commitment of allies to WPS through the new Strategic Concept, it also has the policies to put these aspirations into place, yet as we have detailed here significant barriers remain to operationalize this to future-proof the alliance in the face of changing priorities. To address this, our six key takeaways for NATO are to:

- Drive WPS forward as a **leadership** issue
- Understand the importance of meaningful **representation**
- Provide **accountability** through engaging on WPS externally
- **Professionalize** the practice of WPS through valuing gender expertise including resourcing it
- Invest in WPS **training** through designating NCGM as a COE
- Develop gender **doctrine**

³¹ Mark Attrill, 'NATO Doctrine: Joint Warfare Centre's Role in Its Development', *The Three Swords Magazine*, 2015, http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/NATO_Doctrine_JWC_role.pdf

A COMPASS AND A CONCEPT: A GUIDE TO THE EU AND NATO STRATEGIC OUTLOOKS

Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe's security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer "braindead," issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities' goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.

Ricardo Borges de Castro* & Rita Barbosa Lobo**



* Ricardo Borges de Castro is Associate Director and Head of the Europe in the World Programme, European Policy Centre.

** Rita Barbosa Lobo is Programme Assistant in the Europe in the World Programme, European Policy Centre.

Russia's unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022¹ is a watershed moment for Europe. The conflict puts an end to the security architecture that defined Europe in the last 30 years, and it further accelerates the transition into a new global order in which principles such as multilateralism and territorial integrity are questioned by competition and great power rivalry, already sharpened by the COVID-19 pandemic.

As the war approaches its half-year, there is no end in sight to it as well as its manifold consequences: Apart from the brutal destruction inflicted on Ukraine and the geopolitical earthquake it unleashed, a humanitarian crisis, an energy crisis, a food crisis, and a 'cost-of-living' crisis have followed, not to speak of the potential economic and financial turmoil that could follow if the conflict drags on.

The European Union responded swiftly and decisively by imposing six sanction packages on Russia² so far and adopting several support measures for Ukraine³ – from financial assistance to granting EU candidate status to the country. For the first time, the bloc is also funding the delivery of weapons and military support to the tune of €2,5 billion under the recently created⁴ European Peace Facility.⁵

Wake-Up Call

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is indeed a wake-up call for Europe. EU countries were quick to tear down old taboos: Germany decided to spend more on defense⁶ and provided military assistance to a country at war;⁷ Denmark reversed its 30-year opt-out of EU's CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy);⁸ and Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership.⁹ But the war also lays in sharp focus the demand for the EU to become a more autonomous actor in security and defense, better able to deal with a more challenging international environment.

¹ "Missiles rain down around Ukraine", *Reuters*, 25 February 2022.

² "Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine," *European Council*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>

³ "EU solidarity with Ukraine," *European Commission*, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine_en#timeline

⁴ "Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528", *EUR-Lex*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D0509>

⁵ "EU solidarity with Ukraine," *op. cit.*

⁶ "German government and opposition agree on €100B defense spending bill", *Politico*, 30 May 2022.

⁷ "Germany to send Ukraine weapons in historic shift on military aid," *Politico*, 26 February 2022.

⁸ "Denmark votes overwhelmingly to join EU's common defense policy", *The Guardian*, 1 June 2022.

⁹ "Pushing Finland and Sweden into NATO was Putin's key geopolitical miscalculation", *Euractiv*, 12 May 2022

This ambition is not new, however. Already in 2016, the EU Global Strategy¹⁰ set out clearly the need for more European defense cooperation, harking on tumultuous years that saw, among other developments, a refugee and migration crises, terrorist attacks in major European capitals, and Brexit.

“NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit reflects that vision, but it is naturally shaped by current events as is the Compass: Provides a sharp assessment of the current security challenges facing Allies considering Russia’s renewed aggression and threat to Euro-Atlantic security and gives a general orientation with regard to NATO’s political and military domains.”

The following year, in 2017, the EU adopted the Permanent Structured Cooperation¹¹ which allows EU countries to cooperate in shared projects to develop their defense capabilities further. Similarly, the EU set up a European Defense Fund on that same year to support collaborative defense research and development. The fund carries an €8 billion budget for 2021-2027.¹²

It is in this context of growing ambition in security and defense that the EU launches the ‘Strategic Compass’ process during the German presidency of the Council of the EU in 2020 and, on 24 March 2022, one month after Russia’s war on Ukraine started, the EU leaders adopt the plan.¹³

A New ‘Compass’ for EU Security and Defense¹⁴

For the first time, the EU and its member states approve a strategy for EU security

¹⁰ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, *European External Action Service*, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

¹¹ “Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States”, *EUR-Lex*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32017D2315>

¹² “Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defense Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 (Text with EEA relevance)”, *EUR-Lex*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj>

¹³ “Will the Strategic Compass be a game-changer for EU security and defense?” *EPC Round-Up*, 5 April 2022, <https://epc.eu/en/publications/Will-the-Strategic-Compass-be-a-game-changer-for-EU-security-and-defen-479820>

¹⁴ For a detailed overview see table – 2 below.

and defense anchored on a shared threat assessment.¹⁵ The Compass¹⁶ provides an in-depth characterization of the EU's current strategic environment and attempts to foster greater coherence and coordination of the bloc's security and defense policies. What is more, the document serves as a guide for action, with concrete goals (see table 1 below) and timelines.

Work in progress at the start of the war, the Compass was revised and updated to illustrate the impact of Russia's aggression for Europe's security landscape. By setting clear goals and timelines, the Compass also reveals the EU's awareness of its defense and security shortfalls as well as capability gaps.

What Is in The Compass

The Strategic Compass addresses four key domains: 'Act,' focuses on the EU's capabilities in crisis management; 'Secure', refers to the EU's ability to anticipate threats, deal with manifold dangers, and protect its citizens; 'Invest,' seeks to identify and address technology and capabilities' investment needs; and lastly 'Partner' refers to the EU's strategic partners and how they can contribute to achieving common goals.

Under 'Act,' the Compass proposes to adapt the way in which the EU conducts CSDP missions and operations to the current environment. By creating more robust, flexible, and comprehensive CSDP missions, the EU will be able to adapt to changing regional and international circumstances and increase operational effectiveness.

To complement the EU's crisis management objectives, the newly proposed EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, when ready, will allow the EU to quickly deploy troops into different crisis areas. This also includes the possibility of increased cooperation with partners' security and defense forces, facilitated by the European Peace Facility which will allow the EU to provide training and military assistance to partners.

In the 'Secure' objective, the EU Cyber Defense Policy will allow the EU to protect its citizens and institutions from cyberattacks and a new EU Hybrid Toolbox should fortify the EU's capabilities to counter foreign manipulation and interference. The Compass also proposes measures to increase resilience against climate change and promote a carbon climate-neutral EU presence on the ground.

With respect to 'Invest', member states agree on a substantial increase in defense

¹⁵ "A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security", Council of the European Union", *European Council*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defense-in-the-next-decade/>

¹⁶ The expressions 'Strategic Compass' or 'Compass' will be used interchangeably.

spending. To alleviate this commitment, the Compass refers to some of the Commission's initiatives which include incentives for EU countries to expand their collaborative investments. This could include a value-added tax (VAT) waiver and a reinforced European Defense Fund (EDF) bonus system.

The last key component of the Compass is to strengthen 'Partnerships'. Indeed, the EU places great emphasis on the importance of partners for the EU as a global strategic player. Amongst this commitment, improving engagement with organizations such as NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the African Union and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is crucial. A stronger EU will also complement NATO which remains the foundation of collective defense for its members.

Table 1 – Strategic Compass Select Deliverables

Select Deliverables
• EU Rapid Deployment Capacity consisting of 5,000 troops that can be dispatched to different types of crises with regular live exercises to promote interoperability and readiness • EU Hybrid Toolbox to counter foreign manipulation and interference • EU Cyber Defense Policy to tackle cyber-attacks • EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense to strengthen our resilience and detection capabilities • Investment in next generation capabilities as well as technological innovation for defense

A New 'Concept' For an Expanding NATO

In June 2020, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary-General, laid out the priorities for the future of the Alliance with an eye to 2030.¹⁷ These include ensuring that the Euro-Atlantic alliance remains militarily strong, becomes politically more robust, and takes a more global approach focusing on issues from climate change to China's rise and its impact on the rules-based international order.

NATO's new Strategic Concept¹⁸ adopted at the Madrid Summit reflects that vision, but it is naturally shaped by current events as is the Compass: Provides a sharp assessment of the current security challenges facing Allies considering Russia's

¹⁷ "NATO 2030", NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf

¹⁸ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept", NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

renewed aggression and threat to Euro-Atlantic security and gives a general orientation with regard to NATO's political and military domains.

Unlike the 2010 strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon NATO summit,¹⁹ this year's document comes at a time of great geopolitical instability. As clearly stated almost at the start of the document, "The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace" and an attack on Allies should not be ruled-out.²⁰ As a direct response to this new security environment, NATO's concept reaffirms and reinforces its commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,²¹ the most important guarantee of collective defense among its members.

In its strategic outlook, the new Concept²² defines Russia as the "most significant and direct threat"²³ to Allies' security and vows to strengthen deterrence and defense to protect Euro-Atlantic security. In line with NATO 2030 reflections, China is mentioned for the first time in a NATO Strategic Concept and characterized as a 'challenge.' The closer relationship between Russia and China, sealed by Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping a few weeks before Russia started its invasion of Ukraine,²⁴ and perceived as a potential threat to NATO, also finds a place in the new document.

Regarding NATO's deterrence and defense objectives, during the NATO Madrid Summit, leaders agreed on a major increase of high readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000,²⁵ as well as raising defense spending. In addition, a new NATO innovation Fund has been proposed to promote technological advancements, particularly, dual-use emerging technologies.²⁶

The Concept mentions the importance of partners to preserve a rules-based international order, stresses the importance of climate change cooperation and the need to address climate security. Finally, NATO's commitment to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament remains strong.

¹⁹ "NATO summit in Lisbon: the key issues", *The Guardian*, 18 November 2010.

²⁰ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept", *NATO*, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

²¹ "The North Atlantic Treaty", *NATO*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

²² The expressions 'Strategic Concept' or 'Concept' will be used interchangeably

²³ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept", *NATO*, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

²⁴ "Xi and Putin show united front amid spiraling tensions with West," *Aljazeera*, 4 February 2022.

²⁵ "NATO increases high alert force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops", *UK Defense Journal*, <https://ukdefensejournal.org.uk/nato-increases-high-alert-force-from-40000-to-300000-troops/>

²⁶ "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept", *NATO*, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

An Expanding NATO

As important as adopting a new Concept, the decision to enlarge NATO was also sealed at the Madrid Summit. Indeed, the potential accession of Finland and Sweden will increase NATO territory adding a new 1,345km border with Russia.²⁷ Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO brings two EU members into the alliance reinforcing its European pillar and is likely to also change the security architecture of the Arctic Council as seven of its eight members will now be NATO members.²⁸

*Comparing And Contrasting the EU'S Strategic Compass and NATO'S Strategic Concept*²⁹

The Compass and the Concept are not twin strategies, but there is considerable convergence on the outlooks presented by the EU and NATO, despite the specificities of each organization. Table 2 below is a guide to compare and contrast how both organizations understand their security environment, look at particular actors and regions, perceive threats and challenges, outline their stability, defense and deterrence plans, and seek to cooperate with each other.

Table 2 – Guide to EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

	<i>STRATEGIC COMPASS</i>	<i>STRATEGIC CONCEPT</i>
<i>ACTORS & REGIONS</i>		
<i>Russia</i>	• <i>Russia</i> is depicted as undermining European and global security and stability. • Russia's aggressive and revisionist actions <i>severely and directly threaten</i> the European security order and the security of European citizens. (p.17)	• <i>Russia</i> is the <i>most significant and direct threat</i> to Allies. • NATO does not seek confrontation but cannot see Russia as a partner. • NATO remains willing to keep open channels of communication to manage and mitigate risks and prevent escalation. • Considering heightened Russia's threat, NATO reinforces need to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities. (p.4)

²⁷ "With NATO move, is normally neutral Finland boosting security?", *Aljazeera*, 12 July 2022

²⁸ "New Concepts but Old Problems: NATO's New Strategic Concept", *Royal United Services Institute*, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/new-concepts-old-problems-natos-new-strategic-concept>

²⁹ With few exceptions that are clearly indicated, the text and information included in the table is taken from the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept.

China	• China is described as a <i>partner for cooperation</i> (e.g., climate change), <i>an economic competitor and a systemic rival</i>. • China's <i>military might</i> is also referred, more concretely, its ambition to completely modernize its military by 2035 (including the development of lethal autonomous weapons) (p.18) • While emphasizing European strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific, the EU points out that China is <i>increasingly more assertive</i> in the region. (p.20)	• For the first, China is mentioned in a NATO strategic concept. Specifically, the People's Republic of China's ambitions and coercive policies <i>challenge</i> the Euro-Atlantic interests, security, and values. • China's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation also seen as harmful to the alliance. • Despite this, NATO remains open to constructive engagement with China, including building reciprocal transparency. (p.5)
Western Balkans & Black Sea	• Western Balkans' stability and security is not a given due to increasing foreign interference, including information manipulation campaigns, as well as through potential spill over from broader security situation in the region (p.18, 19)	• Western Balkans and the Black Sea Region are of strategic importance. Furthermore, NATO will enhance efforts to <i>bolster the capabilities</i> of the Western Balkans and Black Sea region to address threats and challenges including third party interference and coercion. (p.11)

<i>Africa & the Middle East</i>	• Emphasis on the <i>strategic importance</i> of <i>Africa</i>, including the potential of its economic and demographic growth. • <i>Stability and security</i> in regions such as the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique Channel, remain key for the EU. • The EU intends to <i>strengthen strategic cooperation</i> with the <i>African Union (AU)</i>, based on political dialogue and operational engagement from Somalia to the Sahel Region. (p.55) • In the wider <i>Middle East and Gulf Region</i>, active conflicts and persistent instability place the EU's security and economic interests at risk. (p. 19) • With respect to the <i>Middle East</i>, the EU's priority remains to address <i>nuclear non-proliferation challenges</i>. (p.20)	• <i>Conflict, fragility and instability</i> in <i>Africa</i> and the <i>Middle East</i> directly affect Euro-Atlantic security and the security of NATO partners. More specifically, the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity can aggravate the political, economic and security challenges facing these regions. This situation can also fuel the rise of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations. (p. 4) • <i>NATO</i> to reinforce cooperation and coordination with the AU (p.9)
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<i>Indo-Pacific</i>	• The <i>Indo-Pacific region</i> is defined as a new center for global competition and power politics. <i>Geopolitical tensions</i> endanger the rules-based order in the region and put pressure on global supply chains. The EU has significant <i>geopolitical</i> and <i>economic interest</i> in stability and security in the region. (p.20) • The EU will work together with the <i>Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN)</i> to enhance shared awareness and information exchange on violent extremism, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats, cybersecurity, maritime security, transnational crime, humanitarian and disaster relief and crisis management. (p.55)	• The <i>Indo-Pacific</i> is <i>crucial for NATO</i>, given that developments in the region can affect <i>Euro-Atlantic security</i>. The alliance intends to <i>strengthen dialogue</i> and <i>cooperation</i> to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests. (p.11)
<i>CHALLENGES & THREATS</i>		
<i>“Dragonbear” relationship³⁰</i>	• No mention of <i>Russia and China</i>’s close relationship.	• The <i>deepening strategic partnership</i> between <i>China and Russia</i> and their mutually reinforced attempts to undermine the rules based international order counters alliance interests. (p.5)

³⁰ Velina Tchakarova, “The Dragonbear: An Axis of Convenience or a New Mode of Shaping the Global System?”, *Austria Institut Für Europa-Und Sicherheitspolitik*, <https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2020/the-dragon-bear.php>

<i>Climate Change & Security</i>	• <i>Climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters</i> will affect the EU's security landscape. Indeed, they are proven to be <i>drivers for instability</i> and conflict around the globe. (p.22) • The EU will adapt its CSDP engagements, <i>increase energy efficiency</i> and resource efficiency as well as, keep the environmental footprint of CSDP missions in line with the Union's goal of climate neutrality by 2050 under the European Green Deal. (p.38) • By the end of 2023 the EU and member states will take steps to fully implement its <i>Climate Change and Defense Roadmap</i>. (p.41)	• <i>Climate change is as a challenge</i> of our time with a profound impact on Allied Security. • <i>NATO</i> intends to become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. • <i>NATO</i> commits to contribute to <i>reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency and investing in the transition to clean energy sources</i>. (p.6)
<i>Proliferation & Weapons of Mass Destruction</i>	• <i>The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</i> continues to be a <i>persistent threat</i> for the EU. • The <i>erosion of the arms control</i> architecture has created a normative void that is directly impacting the stability and security of the EU. In this way, support will continue to be provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (p.22)	• The <i>erosion of arms control architecture</i> negatively impacts strategic stability. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials, or weapons against NATO by a hostile state and non-state actors remains a <i>threat</i> to security. • Mention of <i>Iran and North Korea's</i> nuclear and missile programs. (p.5) • <i>NATO</i> remains committed to the <i>Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty</i>, including Article VI for a world without nuclear weapons. (p.8)

<i>Technology</i>	• Importance of <i>disruptive technologies</i> for military affairs. • The EU is already collectively <i>investing in defense innovation</i> and creating new standards. The <i>Defense Innovation Hub</i> has been proposed within the European Defense Agency to increase and coordinate cooperation on defense innovation among Member states. (p.47)	• Highlights the risks of <i>emerging and disruptive technologies</i>. Technological primacy leads and influences battlefield success. • Development of the <i>Innovative Technologies Fund</i>. (p. 5)
<i>Space & Cyberspace</i>	• The EU seeks to strengthen its <i>EU cyber defense policy</i>. (p.12) • A new <i>European Cyber Resilience Act</i> will increase the EU's common approach to cyber infrastructure and standards. (p.35) • The development of an <i>EU Space Strategy for Security and defense</i> is also proposed to assist in building a common understanding of space related risks and threats and build appropriate responses and capabilities. (p.36)	• The <i>secure</i> and <i>unfettered access</i> to space and cyberspace is key to effective deterrence and defense. • A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities (...) to, from, or within space, could reach the level of armed attack and could lead to the North Atlantic Council invoking <i>Article 5</i>. (p.7)

Hybrid Threats	• The EU intends to create an EU Hybrid Toolbox that brings together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats. (p.12) • State and non-state actors are increasingly using hybrid strategies, disinformation campaigns, direct interference in the EU's elections and political processes, economic interference, and the instrumentalization of energy and migration. (p.22) • Strengthen the EU's ability to detect, identify and analyze hybrid threats and their sources, the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) and the Hybrid Fusion Cell have been created. • EU hybrid Rapid Response teams will be created to support member states in countering hybrid threats drawing on the necessary sectoral national and EU civilian and military expertise. (p.34)	• NATO will invest in its ability to prepare for, deter and defend against hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors. Hybrid operations could reach the level of armed attack and lead to the North Atlantic Council invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (p.7)
Terrorism	• Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a serious threat to peace and security, inside the EU and beyond (p.20) • The EU will increase its engagement with strategic partners including the network of countering terrorism experts in EU delegations. (p.41)	• Terrorism is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of allies' citizens. (p.4) • NATO emphasizes the urgency to counter terrorism and will base its approach on prevention, protection, and denial measures as well as, enhance cooperation with the international community. (p.8)

Maritime Security	• Maritime security in the <i>Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Mediterranean, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean</i> and the <i>Arctic</i> is of the utmost importance for the EU's security, economic development, free trade, transport, and energy security. (p.22) • The EU intends to expand its <i>Coordinated Maritime Presences</i> to other areas of maritime interest that impact on the security of the EU and seek relevant partners. • The EU will also seek to reinforce its naval operations deployed in the Mediterranean and off the Somali Coast. (p.27)	• Maritime security is recognized as a key factor to ensure peace and prosperity. NATO intends to <i>strengthen</i> its <i>posture</i> and <i>situational awareness</i> to deter and defend against all threats in the maritime domain. (p.7)
DETERRENCE & DEFENSE RESPONSES		
Commitments To Deterrence & Defense & Crisis Management	• <i>Strengthen civilian CSDP</i> (Common Security and Defense Policy), to allow faster deployments. • Develop an <i>EU Rapid Deployment Capacity</i> composed of <i>5,000 troops</i> that can be mobilized for several types of crises. It will be operated under the <i>EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability</i> command and control structure and will report to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as, inform the EU Military Committee (EUMC) (P.11, 25) • In addition to building infrastructure and strengthening military capabilities, the EU will seek to adapt its <i>decision-making processes</i>. (p.26)	• NATO's <i>deterrence and defense posture</i> is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. (p.6) • <i>NATO's nuclear capability</i> is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. The circumstances in which NATO could potentially use nuclear weapons is extremely remote. (p.7) • In the context of NATO's Madrid Summit, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, announced that Allies agreed to increase their <i>rapid reaction troops</i> from <i>40,000 to 300,000</i>.³¹

<i>Commitments To Mutual Defense</i>	• References to mutual assistance and preparedness in the context of Article 42(7) TEU (mutual assistance) and Article 222 TFEU (solidarity) (pp.28; 31)	• Reinforcement of NATO's commitment to collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (p.3)
<i>Partners</i>	• Cooperation with NATO and the UN (United Nations). • Regional partners such as the OSCE, African Union and ASEAN are also of importance for the EU, • Cooperation with like-minded bilateral partners such as Canada, U.S., Norway, UK, and Japan as well as, the development of tailored partnerships with the Western Balkans, the EU's eastern and southern neighborhoods, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. • Development of an EU Security and Defense Partnership Forum to work more closely with partners to address common challenges. (p.13)	• The EU is identified as a unique and essential partner for NATO. Furthermore, NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent, and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. (p.10)
<i>Membership</i>	NA	NATO reaffirms its open-door policy consistent with Article 10 North Atlantic Treaty. (p.9)

<i>Defense Spending</i>	• The EU will use the <i>European Defense Fund</i> and <i>Permanent Structured Cooperation</i> to invest in technological innovation in defense as well as, to create a new <i>Defense Innovation Hub</i>. (p.12) • Need to invest more to fill in critical capability gaps. (p.43)	• Initiatives to <i>increase defense spending</i> and reinforce capabilities, while <i>avoiding unnecessary duplication</i> with the <i>EU</i>, will be necessary to maintain Euro-Atlantic security. (p.10)
<i>EU & NATO COOPERATION</i>		
<i>European Union – NATO Relationship</i>	• A stronger EU in the field of security and defense will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and will be <i>complementary to NATO which remains the foundation of collective defense for its members</i>. (p.14) • Despite the EU's commitment to working with NATO, there is a need to enhance its <i>strategic autonomy</i> as the EU should to take more responsibility for its own security. (p.23)	• The EU is described as a <i>unique</i> and <i>essential partner</i> for NATO. NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent, and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. • NATO recognizes the value of a <i>stronger and more capable European defense</i> that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. (p.10)

The Way Forward

Not surprisingly, the EU's Compass and NATO's Concept are broadly convergent in their outlooks, not least because both organizations share geography, members, interests, and values. But some key questions remain on how EU-NATO cooperation and coordination will evolve in the future; how certain headline goals from spending to troop commitments will be jointly implemented; as well as how relationships with key third countries such as China will develop given the diverse approaches to Beijing on both sides of the Atlantic.

The substantial level of overlay among both documents suggests that the EU and NATO should coordinate and find a division of labor that avoids duplications and identify roles that each institution may perform better: e.g., the EU focusing more on civilian (and military) crisis management and NATO on deterrence and

territorial defense. Indeed, EU–NATO cooperation will be key to ensuring that both organizations reinforce and complement each other, especially when the alliance’s European pillar will be bolstered by Finland and Sweden’s accession.

“The substantial level of overlay among both documents suggests that the EU and NATO should coordinate and find a division of labor that avoids duplications and identify roles that each institution may perform better...”

Close coordination and permanent dialogue between the EU and NATO should also support efforts in defense spending and making sure that levels of troop commitment and readiness are not mutually detrimental. More investment in defense should seek to meet the targets set by both organizations, while avoiding waste and duplication, especially in a period when the consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine are hampering economic growth and fueling higher inflation and a ‘cost-of-living’ crisis. Military spending in times of social and economic hardship will become increasingly more difficult. Therefore, EU and NATO members should promote higher levels of defense cooperation, joint procurement, and collaboration considering also that the development and acquisition of military equipment is traditionally a very lengthy process.

Equally relevant in this context are troop commitments and levels of readiness sought by both organizations. While not much is yet known about NATO’s new goal of 300,000-strong rapid reaction troops and their level of readiness to be deployed, questions remain: what will be the impact of such a commitment to the EU’s crisis management tasks? What consequences will that have for the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000? It is important to realize that there are not two sets of armed forces: One for NATO and another for the EU. For countries that are members of both organizations this aspect should not be underestimated.

Finally, while Europeans have hardened their views on China in the last few years, the country is still perceived in many EU countries as an economic opportunity. China, despite the increasingly difficult political relationship between Brussels and Beijing, is now the biggest trading partner of the EU in terms of goods.³² Contrary,

³² “Significant increase in EU imports from China,” *Eurostat*, 1 April 2022, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20220401-1>

the U.S. considers China to be its most significant long-term strategic challenger and relations between both countries continue to deteriorate. While both the Compass and the Concept describe China as a challenge, if not a threat, there is substantial nuance in how both organizations engage with it and that could potentially lead to divisions within the EU and across the Atlantic.

It is high time for a new EU-NATO joint declaration that sets-up permanent joint dialogue mechanisms and addresses any issues that could potentially become contentions and undermine what is strategically vital: the security, prosperity, and peace of the Euro-Atlantic space.

NATO AFTER MADRID: PREPARING FOR AN AGE OF CONFRONTATION AND DISRUPTION

NATO's Madrid Summit in June 2022 was potentially transformative. Allied leaders agreed to a fundamental shift in NATO's deterrence and defense posture and to continue the fight against terrorism. They committed to long-term support for Ukraine, they invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, and they unveiled a new NATO Strategic Concept. Alliance members must now translate words into deeds. They must move from deterrence by reinforcement to deterrence by denial. They must bolster their resilience to disruptive forces. They need to offer Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other partners what they need to defend themselves. They must address the China challenge. And they must rebalance transatlantic defense burdens by boosting European capabilities.

Daniel S. Hamilton*



* Dr. Daniel S. Hamilton is Senior nonresident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network.

NATO's Madrid Summit in June 2022 was potentially transformative. Allied leaders were united in their view that Russia poses the most significant and direct threat to their security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. They agreed to a fundamental shift in NATO's deterrence and defense posture, with strengthened forward defenses, enhanced battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance, and an increase in the number of high readiness forces to well over 300,000. They recommitted to the fight against terrorism, and addressed NATO's response to threats and challenges from the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel. They underscored the importance of greater resilience as the first line of effective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and cooperative security. They agreed to invest more in defense, to increase common funding, and to advance a NATO Innovation Fund and Defense Innovation Accelerator to help the Alliance sharpen its technological edge. They endorsed a new action plan to strengthen cyber cooperation. They committed to long-term support for Ukraine through a strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package. And they invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance.

Leaders also unveiled a new NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance's long-term guideline document, which describes a "contested and unpredictable" world in which Alliance interests and values are challenged by "pervasive instability, rising strategic competition and advancing authoritarianism." In that context, and for the first time in a Strategic Concept, allies state that China's "ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values."¹ To underscore their concerns -- and in another first -- allies welcomed the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea to the Madrid summit. They agreed to initiate a roadmap for expanded cooperation, ensuring closer political consultation and joint work on such issues as cyber and hybrid threats, maritime security, counterterrorism, and the impact of climate change on security.

These are impressive steps. If the Summit is to be considered truly transformative, however, Alliance members must now translate words into deeds.²

Moving From Deterrence by Reinforcement to Deterrence by Denial

At Madrid, allies underscored NATO's primary task of collective defence. On the ground, currently, the Alliance depends on tripwire forces deployed in eastern allied

¹ NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf-f290622-strategic-concept.pdf

² The author would like to acknowledge insights offered by fellow members in a [NATO Task Force](#) of U.S. and European experts convened by the [Transatlantic Leadership Network](#); some of the recommendations offered here emanated from that initiative. See the Task Force Report: Daniel S. Hamilton and Hans Binnendijk, eds., *One Plus Four: Charting NATO's Future in an Age of Disruption*, <https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NATO-TF-SC-final-feb-16-2022.pdf>

states, plus places ultimate reliance on reinforcement by ready forces now deployed to the rear, including in the United States. Essentially, this means giving up ground upon attack and then reoccupying it after reinforcements are sent forward. The horrific devastation unleashed on Ukraine's citizens and the destruction of Ukrainian cities make it clear that deterrence by reinforcement is neither credible nor desirable. On the eve of the Madrid summit, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said that in the event of a Russian invasion, her country would be "wiped from the map" under existing NATO plans.³

“Sweden and Finland are already very close partners to NATO. They are militarily advanced and technologically savvy.”

Prompted by these concerns, allies at Madrid essentially agreed that NATO must move away from tripwire defense and provisions for reinforcement to forward defense and deterrence by denial – the operational implication when Allied leaders say they will ‘defend every inch’ of NATO territory.⁴ Allies resolved to strengthen NATO's force posture, including with ambitious plans to be able to mobilize as many as 300,000 troops within 30 days. This change will require more U.S. and European troops deployed to NATO's eastern flanks, new infrastructure by host nations to receive those troops, a new command structure, and a revised concept for military operations. Putting all of this together will take time, at minimum another year, even as Russia's war in Ukraine continues and confrontation with Russia persists.

Moreover, in line with what NATO calls its “360 degree” approach to defense, the Alliance must be able to dissuade and deter threats to its members, from whatever source and across all domains, while being prepared to defend all parts of NATO territory and to protect the critical functions of Allied societies. That means not only countering challenges from Russia, but also addressing pressures emanating from NATO's south and southeast, and to guard against malevolent disruption to the critical functions of allied societies. The Alliance needs to bridge gaps in its ability to better integrate its political, military and technological capacities across all five operational domains: land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space. NATO has been

³ Richard Milne, “Estonia's PM says country would be ‘wiped from map’ under existing Nato plans,” *Financial Times*, 23 June 2022.

⁴ See, for example, the NATO Strategic Concept; President Biden's remarks in his State of the Union address to the U.S. Congress, 1 March 2022; and remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: “NATO Chief Says Alliance Will Defend ‘Every Inch’ Of Its Territory, As It Sets New Summit,” RFE/RL, 24 February 2022; “Scholz wants to strengthen Nato's eastern flank,” *Deutschland.de*, 8 June 2022.

good at addressing each domain on its own. Being good at multi-domain operations is exponentially harder.

The Alliance must also fill critical capability gaps to deal with Russia's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This includes counter A2/AD capabilities such as suppression of adversarial air defenses, availability of long-range precision strike conventional missiles, improved Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), and additional electromagnetic warfare assets.

New Allies, New North

One of the many consequences of Vladimir Putin's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is the complete transformation of Northern Europe's security landscape. Denmark has pledged to boost its defense spending to reach NATO's 2 percent goal, and in early June 2022 Danish voters abandoned their country's long-standing opt-out from the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, now enabling Denmark to take part in joint EU military operations and to cooperate on development and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework. Even more stunning is the decision by Finland and Sweden to cast aside their long-time traditions of military non-alignment and join NATO, which will strengthen Allied deterrence and defense across the Arctic, Nordic and Baltic regions.

Sweden and Finland are already very close partners to NATO. They are militarily advanced and technologically savvy. Despite Finland's relatively small population, Helsinki can mobilize 280,000 troops in thirty days. Its air force is among Europe's best. Sweden has re-emphasized territorial defense and bolstered its air, land and sea capabilities. Each country's regional expertise on Russia and traditions of 'total defense' will also add to NATO's understanding of Northern European security challenges and ways in which Allied societies can build resilience against disruptive threats. The addition of Sweden and Finland will connect the entire High North outside of Russia in a NATO strategic space, raising the threshold of risk for Russia should it contemplate any further aggression. It will also facilitate NATO support to the Baltic states, which is currently constrained through the sliver of territory along the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Supply and support of the Baltic states by new NATO Baltic Sea allies will enhance those countries' ability to defend themselves.

While NATO allies at Madrid invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, NATO membership is not complete until all 30 NATO nations ratify their accession

to the North Atlantic Treaty. This could leave both countries vulnerable to Russian pressure. Allies need to expedite the ratification process.

The Resilience Imperative

During previous wars hot and cold, allies knew where the front line was. During the Cold War, it was the Fulda Gap astride the Iron Curtain. After the 9/11 attacks, allies safeguarded their security at the Hindu Kush. Now, as Russia continues its assaults on Ukraine, Europe's frontline rips across Ukrainian territory, and its foremost defender is Ukraine, a non-NATO country.

“Given the stakes, allies must now infuse the Strategic Concept’s generalities with specific meaning. They should make it a strategic objective to do everything possible, short of extending an Article 5 guarantee, to help Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova defend themselves and resist Russian destabilization.”

But Putin’s war is a multi-front war. Russia’s assaults on Ukraine and other neighboring countries are multi-dimensional. They include weaponizing food, energy, refugees, cyber, information and other flows. The dangers such efforts pose have been amplified in recent years by a spate of disruptions to allied societies generated by state actors, non-state networks, even nature itself. The upshot: today’s front line is not just in Ukraine. It can be anywhere – Black Sea ports, Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar, Frankfurt’s airport, Oregon’s Bowman Dam, Italy’s food supply, Britain’s hospitals, France’s social media platforms. Today, the front line could be your computer. It could be your mobile phone.

To ensure security in this age of persistent confrontation and ongoing disruption, allies need to improve their resilience: they need to sharpen their ability to anticipate, prevent, and, if necessary, protect against and bounce forward from disruptions to critical functions underpinning democratic societies. While allies have been attentive to this challenge, so far they have defined resilience rather narrowly and statically as pertaining particularly to critical infrastructures and continuity of government. Responses have not been integrated adequately into allied planning or operational activities beyond narrow country-by-country baseline metrics.

Before the Madrid Summit, allies stood up a new Resilience Committee to better coordinate their efforts. At Madrid, leaders stepped up their game. They pledged to “pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security, as a national responsibility and a collective commitment.”⁵ This is an auspicious beginning. The test will be in its implementation.

Of course, each NATO member state bears primary responsibility for ensuring the resilience of its own democratic society. Resilience begins at home. However, in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats and disruptive cyber-attacks, no nation is home alone. Few critical infrastructures that sustain the societal functions of an individual country are limited today to the national borders of that country. Strong efforts in one country may mean little if a neighboring ally is weak. Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must also be able to protect their connectedness — the vital arteries that are the lifeblood of open societies. Resilience will never be achieved on a country-by-country basis; allies dependent on mutual flows of people, power, goods and services must move from country-by-country baseline requirements to *shared* resilience, by establishing metrics together that can ensure their mutual security. This needs to include and go beyond critical infrastructures to encompass key industries, financial flows, strategic ports and transportation/reception nodes, supply chains, communications and information networks, and other elements of the connective tissue that binds allies’ critical societal functions.

They must also be prepared to project resilience forward to non-NATO partners.⁶ We see the importance of this today in Ukraine, which is being used by Russia as an experimental laboratory for hybrid threats and disruptive attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure, incapacitating electricity grids, subway systems and airports. Because Kyiv is largely unable to retaliate, Russia has also found Ukraine to be a useful testing ground for its cyberwarfare capabilities.

In the current crisis, NATO has acted to help Kyiv become more resilient to such attacks. That is good, but allies should not think of such help as a “one-off” in the middle of a passing crisis, they should think of it as an ongoing, integral part of NATO’s mission going forward.

Ukraine is not a lone example. All across Europe’s southern and eastern peripheries

⁵ NATO Strategic Concept.

⁶ For more on the concepts of ‘shared’ and ‘forward’ resilience, see Daniel S. Hamilton, [Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Alliance’s Resilience](#), presentation to Principals, NATO Warsaw Resilience Symposium, May 2022.

disruptive challenges to weak democracies can ripple back into NATO territory. These examples underscore NATO's interest in projecting resilience capacities forward to vulnerable democratic partners. Allies should share societal resilience approaches and operational procedures with partners to improve democratic resilience to corruption, psychological and information warfare, interference with elections or democratic institutions, and disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other critical infrastructures.

Resilience is a job for NATO, but it need not be a job for NATO alone. Enhanced NATO-EU cooperation offers a means to leverage the combined resources of both organizations in common cause. Most NATO member states are also EU member states. Much of the resilience challenge has to do with civilian institutions and privately-owned infrastructures, many of which are integrated into EU structures and processes. Fortunately, NATO and the EU already work closely on resilience issues related to critical infrastructure protection, and allied leaders at Madrid underscored the importance of this cooperation. They must now extend that cooperation to issues of shared and forward resilience.

Securing the Eastern Neighborhood

Eight years after illegally annexing Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and launching a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Russia unleashed a full-scale conventional invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia's renewed invasion was not just an attack on Ukraine; it was an assault on the entire European security order that has evolved since the end of the Cold War. If Putin succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, Russia's other neighbors – including the Baltic states – could be next.

NATO and EU countries have offered considerable support to Ukraine, while being careful not to slip inadvertently into direct military clashes with Russian forces that could unleash a much broader war. The question now is how to sustain and enhance support for Ukraine and other NATO partners facing Russian aggression.

There is no consensus within NATO to admit Ukraine as a member of the Alliance. Most NATO allies are not even prepared to take the preliminary, procedural step of granting Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP). In NATO's June 2022 Strategic Concept, the Alliance reiterated that a "strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area" and that the "security of countries aspiring to become members of the Alliance is intertwined with our own." Alliance leaders committed to helping NATO aspirants Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina build their capabilities and resilience, yet did not state more specifically what they are prepared to do in this regard.

Given the stakes, allies must now infuse the Strategic Concept's generalities with specific meaning. They should make it a strategic objective to do everything possible, short of extending an Article 5 guarantee, to help Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova defend themselves and resist Russian destabilization. This means devising and implementing a package of measures tailored to each country's particular situation. This "Secure Neighborhood Initiative" (SNI)⁷ would encompass not only military equipment and training, but measures to increase these countries' resilience against cyber-attacks, financial disruption, disinformation, economic warfare and political subversion. For Ukraine, the country currently under attack, the Ukraine-NATO Commission could provide for ad-hoc consultations whenever Ukraine or allies believe the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened. These countries should gain more access to the Alliance's Centers of Excellence (CoE). A new NATO Trust Fund should be created that is dedicated to capability development and focused on defensive weapons acquisitions.

Rather than adhering to the standard formula that NATO partnerships are demand-driven and funded largely by voluntary national contributions, under the SNI, NATO would proactively make it a formal NATO responsibility, backed by common funding, to help train Ukrainian and Georgian armed forces and to facilitate their acquisition of modern defensive weapons that would raise the cost to Russia for any new aggression – such as anti-armor capabilities, counter-artillery systems, air and missile defense, anti-ship missiles and combat drones. This would be of far greater benefit to Ukraine and Georgia than a MAP, which is largely symbolic, or the distant prospect of NATO membership.

Addressing the China Challenge

At Madrid, allied leaders essentially declared the Indo-Pacific and European theaters to be increasingly linked. They underscored that NATO's ability to address traditional and unconventional threats in Europe is becoming intertwined with related challenges to Alliance security interests posed by China. And while they said they were "open to constructive engagement" with Beijing, they pledged to work more closely together to address the "systemic challenges" posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security, including through enhanced shared awareness, resilience and preparedness, as well as standing against China's "coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance."

⁷ See the NATO Task Force Report, op. cit. I am grateful to Alexander Vershbow, who first proposed this approach, for his insights. See "A NATO Secure Neighborhood Initiative for Ukraine and Russia's Other Vulnerable Neighbors," the Alphen Group, 2 May 2022. <https://thealphengroup.com/2022/05/02/premium-blog-a-nato-secure-neighborhood-initiative-for-ukraine-and-russias-other-vulnerable-neighbors/>

In this regard, the Alliance should explore deeper coordination under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits allies to promote ‘conditions of stability and well-being’ and to ‘encourage economic collaboration’. Article 2 offers a frame through which allies could work to enhance investment screening of foreign investment in security-related infrastructures, companies and technologies, as well as other steps to protect individual Allied nations from security-related dependencies on China. Article 2 also offers a framework for enhanced cooperation with the European Union on these issues, including common or complementary principles of action with regard to economic-security contingencies.

Additional steps allies might consider include bolstering protection of defense-critical infrastructures and defense-related supply chains. This could include updating NATO’s secure telecommunications requirements for 5G, and incorporating secure 5G spending and other cyber and infrastructure protections into NATO’s spending goals.⁸ They should consider an Alliance-wide review of defense supply chain dependencies on China, and establish a NATO-EU Dialogue to address threats to critical infrastructure, investment screening, export controls (including of dual-use technology), telecommunications, and supply chains. Standards should be set for NATO members and partners regarding external investment in critical infrastructure, particularly if that infrastructure plays a role in NATO missions. And they should improve cooperation between NATO and international development finance corporations to highlight alternative investment options for critical infrastructure, especially among newer members and partners.

Participation at Madrid by the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea was an encouraging sign, as was their agreement to chart a roadmap for expanded cooperation. As they flesh out those details, consideration should be given to inviting Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand to join Australia as NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Varying levels of enhanced military cooperation could be considered, from information sharing and joint exercises to joint operational planning or joint command centers. NATO should consider setting up NATO liaison office in these countries’ capital, as well as establishing Centers of Excellence in the Indo-Pacific. Much like current CoEs in Helsinki and Bucharest, these centers would not be formal NATO entities but be open to participation by a host of actors, including NATO. Private sector actors could also participate. Priority issues are a) addressing security challenges arising from economic interdependencies and technological advances; and b) security challenges related to competition in the global commons. Finally, NATO and its

⁸ For more on these recommendations, see NATO Task Force Report, op. cit.; Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton, “Face it, NATO: The North Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are Linked,” *Defense News*, 21 June 2022; Lindsay Gorman, “NATO Should Count Spending on Secure 5G Towards Its 2% Goals,” *Defense One*, 3 December 2019.

partners should explore an ad-hoc, issue-by-issue dialogue with India, which has not indicated interest in a deeper partnership with NATO yet shares overlapping concerns regarding Chinese actions and intentions.

From Strategic Autonomy to Strategic Responsibility

While Russian President Vladimir Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine has reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance, it has also deepened Europe's strategic dependence on the United States. As NATO continues its most urgent task — helping Ukraine beat back Russia's assault — it must address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing Trans-Atlantic defense. Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe's capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

Europe's long-standing aspiration to develop more effective ways to act militarily is now intersecting with the long-standing U.S. aspiration that Europeans shoulder more of the common burden. Stated simply, in the past Europe has wanted autonomy without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing NATO and U.S. political influence. Now, it is time to unite these two debates and find a new balance for both.⁹

Over the next decade, the transatlantic partners must rebalance their relationship so that Europe assumes greater strategic responsibility, with two military goals in mind.

First, European allies should build their conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Should a conflict simultaneously break out with China in Asia and Russia in Europe, the United States may not be able to deploy adequate reinforcements to Europe. European allies need to be able to pick up the slack.

Second, Europe should become the first responder to most crises along its southern periphery. European allies should develop capabilities to conduct crisis management operations without today's heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and C4ISR.¹⁰

⁹ For more on these recommendations, see Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Alexander Vershbow, "[Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense](#)," Brookings Institution, 24 June 2022.

¹⁰ The EU's goal in its [Strategic Compass](#) released in March of this year of developing the capacity to generate an "intervention force" of 5,000 individuals who could deploy beyond EU boundaries is a small yet useful start.

To achieve these two strategic goals, NATO allies could agree within the NATO Defense Planning Process to a military level of ambition for European strategic responsibility. European allies and Canada could commit to investing sufficient resources to ensure that, by the end of the decade, they can meet 50 percent of NATO's Minimum Capability Requirements.¹¹ Meeting this standard will take time, given Europe's current lack of enablers, its relatively low readiness rates, and its fragmented military industrial complex. Building European strategic responsibility will be a process, not a one-time event.

Enhancing Security in an Age of Persistent Confrontation and Ongoing Disruption

Europe and North America stand today at a historic inflection point, between a fading era of relative stability and a volatile, dangerous age of disruption that is global in nature and broad in scope. Challenges include, but go beyond, persistent confrontation with a revanchist Russia and competition with a militarily powerful and technologically advanced China. They extend to emerging technologies that are changing the nature of competition and conflict and digital transformations that are upending the foundations of diplomacy and defense. The scale and complexity of critical economic, environmental, technological, and human flows, as well as the dependency of many societies on such flows, have increased dramatically. These risks require Europe and North America to reaffirm their mutual bonds, retool NATO and their other institutions, and rebalance their partnership.

¹¹ For more on NATO's Defense Planning Process, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm

NATO: THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTIVISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SCENARIO

The secure defense of NATO members does not depend on the Kyiv frontline; the southern flank is the most unguarded. This paper deals with the Mediterranean, a closed sea without borders which globalized before globalization, examining some strategic alternatives for Western allies. The Mediterranean is a point of contact, a diaphragm, and a battlefield. In addition, the central Mediterranean is a relevant area where Russia and China have their foot in the door because of the disengagement of France and Italy and the lack of attention of NATO. It is precisely on this weaker frontier that NATO must relaunch its commitment and presence. Defending marine spaces determines the continent's safety. So, losing the Mediterranean can be disastrous. And finally, it examines Italian policy in the Mediterranean to date and the reasons why Italy can and must correct the strabismus of the USA, which is completely looking at the Indo-Pacific, and of imagines a peripheral Europe without politics.

Lorenzo Somigli*



* Lorenzo Somigli is an Italian journalist, geopolitics and energy expert; author of reportage abroad, as in Lebanon. Communication consultant for companies. He is also parliamentary assistant in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is like a seaquake in contemporary history. The repercussions on food and energy systems and the global chessboard are epochal. Energy systems, as the heart of the economic model of development, stability, are under stress. Global relations are in a fluid phase. The heavy return of Russia on the center stage of history stands in the way of a Western world that is regaining momentum after years of exhaustion, in which its values have worn out. In this changing scenario, the Atlantic Alliance must play a role, especially in the “Wider Mediterranean”.

NATO Race to The East: Effects, Perspectives, Fragility

Contrary to those who had predicted its “brain death”, the Atlantic Alliance has shown its usefulness; by closing its ranks and is giving a new impetus to expansion to east by welcoming new members and strategic partners “outside the area”. Indeed, NATO is successful if it works as a dynamic, flexible, extended alliance because the Atlantic could be protected by protecting the peripheral seas, such as the Baltic, Black Sea, Persian Gulf, and so the Mediterranean.

In an interview, Stoltenberg¹ retraced the evolutionary stages of NATO: the containment of the USSR, the operations against ethnic conflict in the Balkans – this commitment must be relaunched, the fight against terrorism and then, from 2014 onwards, the containment of Russia. Stoltenberg envisioned a global projection of a multidimensional and “open-door” NATO, with a focus on the Arctic, Baltic, and Black seas. However, there is no specific reference to the Mediterranean region.

NATO has been shifting its centre of gravity further east, following precise geopolitical theories,² and now Poland is a stronghold with Baltic countries and heroic Ukraine as outposts. Meanwhile, Russia and China are increasing their influence in the “Wider Mediterranean”. Russia’s militaries and militias have exercised in Syria and Libya for years while China continues to enforce commercial cooperation – these should be warning signs.

The Mediterranean is still in turmoil after the Arab Springs and is seeing all these developments. The UE considers the Mediterranean only when migratory flows increase and must contract out the management. However, the new NATO Strategic Compass opens a phase of renewed activism, also in the “peripheral” seas: here the fate of the clash could be decided. The expansion eastward made it possible to

¹ S. Lumet and E. Perrot, “La solidarité stratégique après Madrid, une conversation avec le secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg”, *Le Grand Continent*, 15 July 2022.

² Z. Brzezinski, *Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1998).

be prepared for the worst as predicted by Past USA President Bill Clinton,³ and the same should be done on the southern side.

The Relevance of a “Global Sea” and Its “Peninsula-Island”

The “Great Game” between ascending global or regional powers is in its early stages and the Mediterranean will be a decisive factor as ever. Cap Bon, the Transmed gas pipeline that carries precious Algerian gas to Italy, ends up in Mazara del Vallo in Sicily, and the Pantelleria-Pelagie-Malta triangle in the Strait of Sicily, are a necessary passage, a point whose control determines global equilibria.

“Italy was the main supporter of an opening of credit towards Russia, placing faith in a transition towards a Western-style model. In the “End of History” climate of the late 1990s, Italy had tried to bring Russia closer to the Western world.”

It was in Sicily that Garibaldi had landed less than a century earlier, in 1860, supported by British gunboats to complete the dream of Italian Unity, defeating the Kingdom of Naples. The Southern Italy was also the first landing point of the USA, a fully-fledged global superpower, in Europe, with the Husky operation in 1943. The American presence in Sicily, confirmed by subsequent military installations (the bases of Sigonella and Niscemi and missiles), was decisive for the projection towards the Old Continent of the USA and control over the Mediterranean for Soviet containment.

In the British proposal for the partition of Italy at the Tehran conference (1943), the two Italian islands, Sardinia, and Sicily with the control of the Strait of Messina, would in fact have come under British protection – the folds of history are so illuminating.

Today, the American order seems to have changed. The progressive strategic retreat of the U.S. – the VI Fleet has reduced its range of action – and the simultaneous pulling back of France and Italy, especially after the Libyan crisis, has been compensated only in part by the renewed activism of Türkiye in the *Ak-deniz*. This is a critical point for the entire Alliance and should present a strategic concern.

³ B. Clinton, “I Tried to Put Russia on Another Path”, *The Atlantic*, 7 April 2022. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/bill-clinton-nato-expansion-ukraine/629499/>

However, geography is a constant and it is predictive. Italy, while retreating, still juts out in the Mediterranean, and because of this, is destined to be involved in the clash due to its barycentric position – primarily in Sicily – and if not in the Russia-USA clash via Ukraine, it might be involved in the latent clash with China, in asymmetrical forms. Italy may appear, at most perhaps, a co-star, if it can relaunch its autonomous presence: otherwise, it will remain a much sought-after prey.

The Clear NATO Choice

In the early stages of the Russian invasion, Italy was a “special note” for its historical and economical affinity with Russia. The cultural relations between the two peoples have solid foundations and so do the economic ones, although already undermined by the wave of post-2014 sanctions.

Italy was the main supporter of an opening of credit towards Russia, placing faith in a transition towards a Western-style model. In the “End of History” climate of the late 1990s, Italy had tried to bring Russia closer to the Western world. It was the season of the historic meeting in Pratica di Mare⁴ between Putin and Bush, the formal end of the cold war, which, indeed, was resolved with nothing. History took up another, less desirable, path.

That attempt was born of a political vision that saw Europe as a container within concentric circles with a political and geographic centre in Western Europe and extending to Russia, one of the homelands of European culture. However, the first cracks in this project emerge with the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans at the end of the 90’s.

Indeed, although it is strongly linked to Russia due to its dependency on gas, Italy immediately sided with conviction against Russia by actively participating in the various sanctions with heavy economic repercussions. It is also true, that due to the strong presence of economic interests that have resulted in lobbying actions, which in the political debate has often been influenced by pro-Russian positions; the Russian mission also contributed during the toughest weeks of the Coronavirus. Italy and Germany, respectively the second and first manufacturing powers, are strongly interconnected - the production districts of Northern Italy, the most developed region, are part of the German value chain - and both are in serious trouble due to the consequences of energy dependence to the point of being forced to soften their position from the threat of collapse on the social order.

⁴ Kremlin statement, At the Russia-NATO Summit President Vladimir Putin and leaders of 19 NATO countries signed the Rome Declaration “NATO- Russia Relations: A New Quality”, 28 May 2002.

Italy within the NATO: a Happy Intuition

Italy's entry into NATO was a "win-win" move. On the one hand, Italy regained international credibility and recognition after the horrors of totalitarianism, the armistice, and the flight of the king – the lowest moment in the history of the ruling classes in Italy – through the then-new Alliance with the USA, GB, France, Benelux, and Portugal etc. On the other, the Alliance overcame the typically Atlantic characterization and the self-limiting order it imposed, projecting itself fully into the Mediterranean as the main actor. It was a fortunate intuition.

After all, the Mediterranean, Braudel noted, is a "sea of seas" (Aegean Sea, Adriatic Sea) but also a "sea between seas" and therefore, in its extensive interpretation, is of considerable importance. The entrance to the peninsula was strategic, like that of Türkiye, which wedges the Alliance into Eurasia, another important area for the Wider Mediterranean. NATO, therefore, is not as a system with watertight compartments, it is as flexible and capable of grasping the complexity of geopolitical issues, which require more long-term policies and planning.

“While the U.S. has reduced its presence and attempted stabilization with the Abrahamic Agreements, France and Italy have lost the presence and credibility of their past.”

In parallel of the entrance in the Alliance, the U.S. commitment to the reconstruction of Italy has led to rapid industrialization centered around flourishing production districts that are still the backbone of the industrial system, currently in severe crisis due to energy scarcity. This strategy has made it possible to cement the model of democracy and prosperity.

The adhesion was supported both by the USA – with its continued presence in Sicily – and by the Italians (the activism of the then ambassador to Washington Alberto Tarchiani⁵ for this cause was remarkable – he leaved a detailed diary of his last year in the USA), it was a great intuition because it allowed NATO to open to the Mediterranean. Within the Alliance, Italy has been able to act as a guide and mediator in the transition of the Arab world in the phase of decolonization.

⁵ A. Tarchiani, *Tormenti di un ambasciatore. L'anno conclusivo di Washington 1954*, new Italian edition by Daniela Felsini (Rubbettino, 2006).

This political framework also includes the choice of gas as a source to produce electricity: material support for the stabilization of the ruling classes in North Africa that have come out of the yoke of colonialism. The Italian commitment to support the National Liberation Front in Algeria but also Tunisia during Bourguiba and his successor is to be viewed in this way.

Mediterranean, The Long Trail of Chaos. Russia at The Gateway

The more NATO expands and consolidates in the Northeast, the more Russia tries to penetrate from the South, the weaker the flank. The conquest of Crimea, Russia's outpost towards the much desired "warm seas", the armour plating of the Donbas, and the stabilization in the Black Sea make Russia a fully-fledged Mediterranean power. The Russian role is confirmed by the stable presence in Syria, Libya and in areas such as the Sahel which naturally extend to the Mediterranean; the Chinese presence in Algeria⁶ must also be considered, as demonstrated by the agreements for gas and phosphates, as well as the presence in Greek and Italian ports. Russia is upon us.

The Mediterranean is still affected by the long trail of the chaos of the Arab Spring season which did away with the elites made in post-colonialism, which had developed a framework of stability, albeit with some serious inconsistencies. Tunisia has been devastated by terrorism and only a return to presidential form seems to ensure any stability. Although spared by the Springs, fragile Lebanon – two years after the terrible explosion of the port of Beirut (4 August 2020) – is increasingly becoming a battleground between regional powers. Libya no longer exists – an unforgivable mistake on France and Italy's part.

While the U.S. has reduced its presence and attempted stabilization with the Abrahamic Agreements, France and Italy have lost their presence and credibility of the past. The difficulties of the two regional powers are also confirmed by the end of the mission in Mali coordinated by France which leaves the Sahel area dangerously uncovered, where, conversely, Russia's interest is confirmed. However, the mission had shown several limitations and the two coups in Mali had already compromised relations with Paris.

At the same time, some Arab countries have moved towards the western bloc: Morocco and Tunisia, as demonstrated by the participation in the Ramstein summit and the aid promised at the last summit in Spain. In the first case, an effect of the Abrahamic Pact which attracted the western bloc; in the second the need

⁶ "Un accord sino-algérien relance un mégaprojet de phosphates", *Arab News*, 23 March 2022.

for acceptance by the IMF. Net of these approaches, the situation in the enlarged Mediterranean remains potentially critical.

Looking for New Alliances?

As a center of gravity in the Mediterranean, the Italian peninsula can be a stable landing place towards the Mediterranean or a shore towards Europe. Someone suggests, it is “almost an island”. For this reason, bilateral relations are intensifying, with France, which is interested in returning to the Mediterranean Sea, and with Türkiye, which needs a stopover in Europe.

The Quirinal Treaty confirms closer collaboration with France and inaugurates a privileged axis with Paris, which anticipates a redefinition of the European framework. The great confusion and autonomous pressures are breaking up the EU front: the understanding between Italy and France is an attempt to respond to the chaos.

A relaunch of relations with Türkiye is also very positive. The third Italo-Turkish summit, the previous one was in 2012, solidifies the relations between the two peoples – at the time Italy was a strong promoter of Türkiye’s EU accession – primarily industrial and commercial but also energy relations, because Türkiye became a hub in gas infrastructures.

Conclusions

The resurgence of Italian proactiveness in the central Mediterranean would be a guarantee of security and stability for the whole Alliance as well as a harbinger of development for the North Africa and Mediterranean people, who suffer most from the consequences of war.

It is a process that requires a plurality of actions: a relaunch of the presence of the Army and, above all, of the Navy (in constant downsizing) and cultural diplomacy which, thanks to the legacy of the recent past, would find fertile ground – to be counted within this effort, the proposal of the former Prime Minister Romano Prodi⁷ to favor Mediterranean universities; the strengthening of the infrastructural system, such as the bridge between Messina and Reggio Calabria to keep Sicily linked, avoiding centrifugal forces, the ports or that of Taranto or that of Trieste as an outlet on the Mediterranean of Central Europe.

What is certain is that any ambition to go back to being a medium-sized regional

⁷ P. Bricco, Prodi: «Costruiamo nuove università mediterranee per cambiare visione», *Il Sole*, 24 Ore, 10 July 2022.

power will be crumbling if the problem of energy dependence is not resolved in time with a national and European strategy for self-sufficiency. The recent political fibrillations with the thunderous fall of the government led by the coach Mario Draghi make Italy even weaker.

A short-sighted view of history has condemned Mediterranean to be peripheral, but the latest episodes show its undisputed importance in the “Great Game”.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN NATO'S NUCLEAR PRIORITIES

NATO's new Strategic Concept highlights areas of change and continuity in nuclear priorities. These priorities will be driven by a combination of global and domestic political factors. In this article, I argue that the continued threat posed by Russia, the growth of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe, the rise of China, and the emergence of new nuclear technologies will drive NATO nuclear priorities for the foreseeable future. Russian aggression drives continuity in NATO nuclear priorities, as Russia has been, and will remain, the primary threat to NATO security. Meanwhile, the other factors will combine to force changes to NATO nuclear priorities and policies.

Spenser A. Warren*



* Spenser A. Warren is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington and a Graduate Affiliate of the Indiana University Russian Studies Workshop.

Nuclear weapons play an important role in NATO strategy. Multiple policy documents state that NATO is a nuclear alliance that relies on nuclear and conventional capabilities to ensure the security of its members.¹ There has been significant continuity in the role that nuclear weapons play in NATO doctrine, although the collapse of the Soviet Union did result in changes to NATO force structure in the 1990s and early 2000s.² Moving forward, NATO's nuclear priorities will continue to see much continuity. However, the changing strategic environment, in Europe and globally, will cause important changes in NATO nuclear priorities.

This article will discuss how NATO's nuclear priorities will change, and how they will remain the same, in the near to mid-future. The article will look at the impact of four trends on NATO's nuclear priorities and policies: the reemergence of Russian aggression in and around Europe, increasing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the rise of China, and the emergence of new nuclear technologies. I argue that Russian aggression will drive a degree of continuity in NATO nuclear priorities, while the other factors will force changes to NATO's nuclear priorities and policies.

The rest of this article will focus on these trends and their impact on the change or continuity of NATO priorities and policies. The next section will discuss the threat of Russia. The third section will discuss the impacts of the growing pro-TPNW and anti-nuclear movements on NATO nuclear policies. The fourth section will discuss how the rise of China will change NATO nuclear priorities. The fifth section will explore potential responses to the emergence of new nuclear technologies. Finally, the sixth section will conclude the article by discussing factors that could limit or increase the impacts of these trends.

Russian Aggression and Nuclear Continuity

Russia's war in Ukraine has already changed NATO. Sweden and Finland are joining the alliance in response to the growing Russian threat in Northern Europe.³ NATO members are deploying more troops to its eastern flank.⁴ And many analysts have argued that Putin's aggression in 2014 and 2022 has given NATO two gifts: a purpose

¹ For examples, see "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 June 2022, <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>; "Active Engagement, Modern Defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19 November 2010, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm?selectedLocale=en

² "Final Communiqué: Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 June 1996, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25064.htm?selectedLocale=en

³ Michael Claesson and Zebulon Carlander, *How Sweden and Finland Can Bolster NATO*, War on the Rocks, 19 July 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/how-sweden-and-finland-can-bolster-nato/>

⁴ *Allies Stand Together to Bolster NATO's Eastern Flank*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 May 2022, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/nato_eAV_air

for existence in the 21st century and greater solidarity among NATO members.⁵

While increasing Russian aggression over the past decade has changed NATO policies and priorities, it will not significantly change NATO's nuclear priorities. Rather, by forcing NATO to remain focused on the threat posed by Russia, Russian aggression will ensure a level of continuity in NATO nuclear priorities. The threat of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear modernization has been mentioned in multiple strategic documents.⁶ Most recently, the 2022 Strategic Concept depicted Russia as the principal threat to allied security.⁷ The Strategic Concept highlights Russia's modernization of its nuclear arsenal and its use of nuclear weapons for coercive signaling as threats to European and Transatlantic security. Earlier in 2022, NATO released its most recent Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Policy, which cites Russia as "the most pressing CBRN security challenge facing NATO."⁸

“Anti-nuclear movements may continue to gain strength among the general population and elected leaders of hosting states, posing a challenge for NATO nuclear sharing.”

Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the use of non-kinetic measures to increase discontent in NATO member states, and the modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal guarantee that Russia will remain NATO's primary nuclear priority for the foreseeable future. NATO has already developed strategies to deter Russian aggression against NATO members. NATO members rely on the security provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The independent nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and France contribute to NATO's ability to deter Russian aggression. And the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye is intended to deter a Russian attack against NATO members and to increase NATO capabilities should a regional war emerge.⁹

⁵ Steven Erlanger, *Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again*, New York Times, 14 January 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/nato-russia-ukraine-europe.html>; Thomas Graham, *NATO Countries Signal Resolve at Summit: What Does It Mean for Russia?*, Council on Foreign Relations, 30 June 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nato-countries-signal-resolve-summit-what-does-it-mean-russia>

⁶ For example, the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 19 November 2010.

⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 June 2022.

⁸ "NATO's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_197768.htm?selectedLocale=en

⁹ This article does not seek to examine the efficacy of nuclear sharing, although other scholars have. For example, see Todd S. Sechser, *Sharing the Bomb: How Foreign Nuclear Deployments Shape Nonproliferation and Deterrence*, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23, No. 3-4 (2016): p. 443-458.

Each of these above strategies will be continued by NATO into the near and mid-future. However, Russian aggression is not the only trend impacting NATO nuclear priorities. NATO will seek to maintain its nuclear capabilities while dealing with increasing political pressures in NATO member states, including those hosting nuclear weapons, to support disarmament and oppose the deployment of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. The next section will discuss the impact of pro-TPNW and anti-nuclear movements on the future of NATO nuclear policies.

Disarmament, Anti-Nuclear Movements, and Future NATO Nuclear Policy

TPNW has support from anti-nuclear NGOs and the governments of several non-nuclear states. The treaty required ratification from 50 United Nations members to enter into force. On 24 October 2020, Honduras became the 50th member to deposit its ratification documents with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, allowing the treaty to enter into force in January 2021, although no nuclear armed state has signed the treaty.¹⁰

The Netherlands participated in the TPNW negotiations, while both the Netherlands and Germany participated in the TPNW Meeting of State Parties as observers in June 2022.¹¹ Neither country has signed the treaty and the Dutch government has explicitly stated that they will not do so as long as NATO is a nuclear alliance.¹² However, the participation of both governments in the Meeting of State Parties is a reflection of growing anti-nuclear sentiment in each state. Multiple Dutch political parties have supported disarmament and opposed the hosting of nuclear weapons.¹³ Members of both the Social Democratic Party and Green Party in Germany have publicly supported TPNW and opposed the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons on German soil.¹⁴ And the public of both countries are increasingly anti-nuclear.¹⁵ Germany and the Netherlands are not alone. Belgium and Italy, which also host U.S.

¹⁰ Jan Eliasson and Dan Smith, *The 50th ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 26 October 2020, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-comment/2020/50th-ratification-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons>

¹¹ “Following parliament’s vote, Netherlands will attend TPNW MSP,” ICAN, 18 June 2022, https://www.icanw.org/netherlands_tpnw_msp

¹² Michal Onderco, et.al., *When do the Dutch Want to Join the Nuclear Ban Treaty? Findings of a Public Opinion Survey in the Netherlands*, The Nonproliferation Review, Forthcoming.

¹³ Wilbert van der Zeijden, *A Dutch Revolt? The Salience of the Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Issue in Dutch Politics*, European Security, Vol. 23, No. 1: p. 45-57.

¹⁴ Julia Berghofer, *With Its First Three-Party Coalition, Where’s Germany’s Defence and Security Policy Heading?* European Leadership Network, 25 November 2021, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/with-its-first-three-party-coalition-where-germanys-defence-and-security-policy-heading/>; Ronja Ganster, *Germany’s New Government Settles the Nuclear Debate – For Now*, German Marshall Fund, 12 November 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/germanys-new-government-settles-nuclear-debate-now>

¹⁵ Michal Onderc and Michal Smetana, *German Views on US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Public and Elite Perspectives*, European Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2021), 630-648.

nuclear weapons, have seen an increase in anti-nuclear sentiment.¹⁶

Increasing support for disarmament and opposition to hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has not translated into anti-hosting policies in these member states.¹⁷ But there is no guarantee that the inability of the anti-nuclear movement to generate anti-hosting policies will continue. Anti-nuclear movements may continue to gain strength among the general population and elected leaders of hosting states, posing a challenge for NATO nuclear sharing.

“One factor that is increasing the threat of both Russia and China is the modernization of their nuclear arsenals and the emergence of novel technologies. The potential proliferation of these technologies to rogue states such as North Korea and Iran also poses a threat to NATO.”

If U.S. nuclear weapons are evicted from the Netherlands, Germany, or another hosting country, American and NATO leaders will likely seek to find new hosts. Potential new hosts include countries in Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, and Sweden and Finland. Poland has expressed interest in hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, an interest that predates Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.¹⁸ The United States and NATO have refrained from deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in countries such as Poland or Romania to prevent provoking Russia and to adhere to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.¹⁹ Concerns regarding possible escalation of tensions with Russia caused by the forward deployment of nuclear weapons to NATO's Eastern Flank, could prevent such a deployment in the future, although that is not a certain outcome. The United Kingdom has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons before and has its own nuclear capability. Deploying weapons to the United Kingdom is less likely to

¹⁶ Ludovica Castelli, *Italy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Hesitant Opening?* Istituto Affari Internazionali, 16 June 2022, <https://www.iai.it/it/publicazioni/italy-and-nuclear-ban-treaty-hesitant-opening>; Gabriela Galindo, *Belgium Narrowly Rejects Removal of US Nuclear Weapons*, The Brussels Times, 17 January 2020, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/90143/removal-of-us-nuclear-weapons-from-belgium-narrowly-rejected-by-lawmakers-nato-kleine-broegel-deter-rant-tpnw-un-npt-nuclear-heads>

¹⁷ Stefanie von Hlatky, *Transatlantic Cooperation, Alliance Politics and Extended Deterrence: European Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons*, *European Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), 1-14.

¹⁸ Aaron Allen, *The Ongoing German-Polish NATO Nuclear Sharing Nexus*, *New Eastern Europe*, 1 July 2021, <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/07/01/the-ongoing-german-polish-nato-nuclear-sharing-nexus/>

¹⁹ Steven Pifer, *US Nukes in Poland Are a Truly Bad Idea*, Brookings Institution, 18 May 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/18/us-nukes-in-poland-are-a-truly-bad-idea/>

cause or escalate a crisis with Russia and would be met with limited opposition from the British public. Finally, Sweden and Finland have not ruled out the possibility of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, although it is unlikely that nuclear weapons will be deployed in either country in the near future.²⁰

The need to find new nuclear hosts may not materialize. However, growing support for the anti-nuclear movement is not the only force that may cause changes in NATO nuclear priorities and policy. The rise of China, coupled with its growing partnership with Russia, will force NATO to change its nuclear priorities. These changes are the subject of the next section.

NATO Nuclear Priorities and Deterring a Rising China

NATO leaders perceive China as a threat to Transatlantic, European, and Arctic security. While the United States and China have engaged in an increasingly tense rivalry for decades, the Chinese threat had not figured into the strategic thinking of NATO.²¹ This has changed. The 2022 Strategic Concept names China as a major threat, the first time that China has been mentioned by a NATO Strategic Concept.²² According to the Strategic Concept, China's threat is primarily related to increasing Chinese assertiveness in space, cyber domains, and China's growing partnership with Russia.²³ Both the Strategic Concept and the 2022 CBRN Policy also highlight the threat posed by the modernization and expansion of China's nuclear arsenal.²⁴

The perception of a Chinese threat will increase. China and Russia will continue to build closer ties in the wake of the Ukraine War, as Russia needs access to Chinese markets and technology to offset the impacts of Western sanctions.²⁵ China is also increasing its presence in the Arctic, a region crucial to the alliance.²⁶ China is also increasing its investment in parts of the Middle East and Africa, bringing it greater influence in regions of strategic importance for NATO's European members.²⁷

²⁰ *NATO Does Not Plan Nuclear Arms or Bases in Finland, PM Tells Paper*, Reuters, 19 May 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/no-nuclear-arms-or-nato-bases-finlands-soil-pm-tells-paper-2022-05-19/>; Jens Petersson, *As Sweden Gets Ready for NATO, Will Its Approach to Nuclear Weapons Change?* Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 27 July 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/07/as-sweden-gets-ready-for-nato-will-its-approach-to-nuclear-weapons-change/>

²¹ Bill Hayton, *NATO Knows Asia is Vital to Protecting Global Security*, Chatham House, 28 June 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/nato-knows-asia-vital-protecting-global-security>

²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 June 2022.

²³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 June 2022.

²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 June 2022; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 14 June 2022.

²⁵ David O. Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, *Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia's War on Ukraine*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 June 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine>

²⁶ Sanna Kopra, *China and its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute's China Series 2022*, The Arctic Institute, 17 March 2020, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-trajectories-the-arctic-institute-china-series-2020/>

²⁷ Dawn C. Murphy, *China's Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022).

NATO will need to consider the increasing threat of China for the foreseeable future. NATO's primary tool for addressing this threat will continue to be the U.S. nuclear arsenal. France and Britain will also play an increasing role in NATO's competition with China; and French and British conventional capabilities would enhance NATO's capabilities in the Pacific, a region beyond NATO's traditional region of interest. Both the British and French have already shown an interest in increasing their capabilities in the South Pacific.²⁸

The American, British, and French navies will likely deploy attack submarines in larger numbers in the Pacific. These submarines could counter Chinese ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). All three could also increase the number of their own SSBNs deployed to the region, a step the United States is already expected to take. Other NATO members could contribute to missions in either the Pacific or Arctic. While these other states do not possess nuclear weapons, their conventional submarine, surface ship, and naval aviation forces could be used to track Chinese SSBNs or even engage with them in the event of a conflict between NATO members and China.

Finally, NATO will increasingly engage with non-NATO partners in the region. The Madrid Summit saw the participation of potential Pacific partners for the first time.²⁹ The partners already engaging with NATO include Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.³⁰ In addition to the participation of these Pacific partners during the Madrid Summit, the United States, United Kingdom, and France have increased their individual engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. The United States and United Kingdom formed a new security agreement—AUKUS—with Australia in 2021. The United States has increasingly engaged with Japan, India, and Australia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. And the United States, United Kingdom, and France have increased their arms trade with India over the past decade.³¹ Recent sanctions on Russia may also lead to increasing arms engagement between India and Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland, and Romania, as each could sell replacement parts

²⁸ David Camroux, *AUKUS: Why Britain Was the Big Winner*, *The Diplomat*, 2 December 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/aukus-why-britain-was-the-big-winner/>; Frederic Grare, *France, the Other Indo-Pacific Power*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 October 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/21/france-other-in-do-pacific-power-pub-83000>

²⁹ Hayton (2021).

³⁰ Mirna Galic, *Despite Ukraine Focus, Asia-Pacific to Play Prominent Role at NATO Summit*, United States Institute of Peace, 27 June 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/despite-ukraine-focus-asia-pacific-play-prominent-role-nato-summit>

³¹ Manu Pubby, *France Gains as Indian Arms Imports From Russia Drop*, *The Economic Times*, 15 March 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/france-gains-as-indian-arms-imports-from-russia-drop/article-show/90209989.cms?from=mdr>; Ashok Sharma, *India to Boost Arms Output, Fearing Shortfall from Russia*, ABC News, 7 April 2022, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-boost-arms-output-fearing-shortfall-russia-83927635#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%20%2D%2D%20India%20on,from%20its%20main%20supplier%20Russia>

for Soviet-era equipment operated by the Indian military.³²

One factor that is increasing the threat of both Russia and China is the modernization of their nuclear arsenals and the emergence of novel technologies. The potential proliferation of these technologies to rogue states such as North Korea and Iran also poses a threat to NATO. The next section will address how these technologies will change NATO nuclear priorities and policies.

NATO's Response to Novel Nuclear Technologies

On 1 March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced the development of several novel nuclear weapons systems.³³ Several of these systems were not only new to Russia, but would be the first of their kind developed anywhere. Two of these systems, *Kinzhalt* hypersonic air-launched cruise missile and the *Avangard* HGV, have already been deployed.³⁴ Another, *Tsirkon* hypersonic cruise missile, will enter mass production by the end of 2022.³⁵ Two additional Russian weapons, the *Burevestnik* nuclear-powered cruise missile and the *Poseidon* unmanned underwater vehicle, are still in the testing stage.³⁶

Russia is not the only NATO adversary developing new nuclear technologies. China is currently developing and testing its own nuclear-capable HGV.³⁷ North Korea and Iran, both of which are mentioned as potential threats to the security of NATO members in the 2022 Strategic Concept and CBRN Defense Policy, may also develop hypersonic weapons.³⁸ North Korea is currently testing what it claims is a hypersonic missile, while Iran has conducted research on hypersonic weapons.³⁹

These weapons are better able to penetrate missile defenses. NATO members have a few options for responding to the development of these new technologies. First,

³² Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach, 2022, *Helping India Replace Russia in the Value Arms Market*, War on the Rocks, 20 May 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/helping-india-replace-russia-in-the-value-arms-market/>

³³ Vladimir Putin, *Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly*, Office of the President of Russia, 1 March 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>

³⁴ Akshai Vikram, *Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Understanding Avangard, Kinzhalt, and Tsirkon*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 August 2021, <https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/russias-new-nuclear-weapons-understanding-avangard-kinzhalt-and-tsirkon/>

³⁵ *Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile Enters the Final Stage of State Trials*, Naval News, 21 January 2022, <https://www.naval-news.com/naval-news/2022/01/tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-enters-the-final-stage-of-state-trials/>

³⁶ Amy F. Woolf, *Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization*, Congressional Research Service, 21 April 2022, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf>

³⁷ Sidarth Kaushal and Sam Cranny-Evans, *China's New Hypersonic Capability*, RUSI, 26 October 2021, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/chinas-new-hypersonic-capability>

³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization 29 June 2022; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 14 June 2022.

³⁹ Kelley M. Saylor, *Hypersonic weapons: Background and issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2022, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf>

they may develop new defense systems that are better able to counter hypersonic weapons. Second, NATO members may seek to maintain nuclear deterrence by modernizing and expanding their own nuclear arsenals, guaranteeing the ability to do unacceptable damage in response to a nuclear attack. Third, NATO members may attempt to engage Russia, China, and others in arms control negotiations intended to limit the deployment of hypersonic or other new weapons. Finally, NATO members may choose to ignore the development and deployment of these weapons altogether.

The most likely responses will be developing new missile defense capabilities and modernizing nuclear arsenals. The United States is pursuing both strategies, developing new technologies of their own and attempting to develop systems capable of countering hypersonic weapons.⁴⁰ If developed, these advanced missile defense would likely be deployed to Europe, similar to the current deployment of Aegis ashore systems in Poland and Romania.

Conclusion

These four trends are driving, and likely will continue to drive, change and keep the continuity in NATO's nuclear policies. Russia's aggression, combined with its nuclear modernization, ensure that it will be the top priority for NATO nuclear doctrine in the foreseeable future, while the increasing threat from China, emerging nuclear technologies in the hands of potential adversaries, and growing power of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe will force some change in NATO's nuclear priorities. This section will conclude by discussing what additional factors may limit the influence of these trends.

The Russian threat is likely to remain. However, certain factors could make it more or less dangerous. Russia could withdraw from the remaining arms control agreements that limit the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. This would pose a serious threat to NATO and would force NATO members, including the United States, to consider how to manage an impending arms race between the Washington and Moscow. Alternatively, Russian leaders could decide to reduce the threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal and engage in good-faith negotiations to limit emerging nuclear technologies or revive the INF Treaty, although it is unlikely that this will happen.

Similarly, the threat of China could increase or decrease. Increasing Chinese

⁴⁰ Shannon Bugos, *U.S. Rushes Hypersonic Development*, Arms Control Today, 1 June 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-06/news/us-rushes-hypersonic-development#:~:text=The%20Hypersonic%20Air%2DBreathing%20Weapon,Martin%20as%20the%20prime%20contractors; David Vergon, DOD Focused on Hypersonic Missile Defense Development, Admiral Says, U.S. Department of Defense, 11 May 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3028518/dod-focused-on-hypersonic-missile-defense-development-admiral-says/>

belligerence in the South China Sea or the Straits of Taiwan could risk a China-United States crisis, a crisis that could result in a China-NATO confrontation. The threat posed by China could be reduced by future arms control agreements that include limits on the Chinese arsenal. These agreements may also include France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, China and Russia could compete over interests in the Arctic, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia, creating a rift in their relationship and limiting the threat of a China-Russia axis.

Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran may be unable to fully develop the novel systems they are currently pursuing. Technological issues, testing problems, and increasing costs could make these programs unappealing. Additionally, Iran may not cross the nuclear threshold, although Iranian proliferation appears increasingly likely given the inability of negotiators to revive the Iran Nuclear Deal, limiting the threat posed by new systems to a conventional threat.

Finally, economic issues, social issues, or climate issues may distract from the hosting of nuclear weapons. This may result in anti-nuclear parties ignoring the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Alternatively, anti-nuclear voters may vote for pro-nuclear parties due to agreements on other policies.

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


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